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Abstract
This thesis argues that the image as circulated within society has changed from what 
is broadly conceived of as a mass media society to that of an information society or a 
rhizomatic condition. This discontinuity is linked to changes that have taken place 
both within technology and the ‘communications systems’ that make up the media. 
This is theorized as a move from the ‘mobilization of images’ to the ‘weaponization 
of images’ and it takes the following form: the mobilization of images is connected 
to a twentieth century notion of propaganda and the rise of a mass society; whereas 
the weaponizing of images is understood as emerging through a 
networked/rhizomatic society connected with new media. It has also resulted in a 
paradigm shift from techno-war to image warfare. More specifically, this thesis is 
about exploring how American and British governments and militaries are failing to 
manage image warfare because they are operating with an outdated understanding 
that it is possible to ‘control’ images; whereas A1 Qaeda appears to be understanding 
image warfare better. What I seek to show in this thesis is the disjuncture between 
this outdated idea of ‘controlling’ images (which Western governments and media 
continue to use) and a more dispersed or deterritorialized idea about how images 
operate in a rhizomatic condition. I explore this via my three conceptual terms: 
‘image munitions’, ‘counter-image munitions’, ‘remediation battles’, with specific 
reference to the war on terror and specifically through four thematic case studies -  
political communications, suicides, executions and abuses -  which allow exploration 
of different parts of this new theatre of war. In the conclusion I reflect on the 
implications of this analysis for understandings of contemporary and future warfare.
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Preface and Acknowledgements
As this thesis will explore the journeys of some of the most powerful images in the 
war on terror, it makes sense to first give a general outline of the journey taken in the 
production of this thesis.
The images of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks -  images of planes flying into 
the twin towers of the World Trade Center, images of people falling to their deaths 
from the WTC, images of the towers collapsing and more -  were shocking. I was on 
a break from a summer maintenance job at my old school (earning some money 
before starting university) when someone came into the maintenance office and 
turned the television on. Almost two weeks later I enrolled as an Undergraduate in 
the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. 
Professor Ken Booth’s welcome address was confirmation that 9/11 was going to be 
a dominant theme in the Interpol Department (and International Relations 
internationally) for the foreseeable future.
I watched the start of the war in Afghanistan, the airing of bin Laden videos, Western 
responses to these videos and the start of the 2003 Iraq War all unfold on my 
television in my student accommodation. I particularly remember the ‘Saving of 
Jessica Lynch’; the fall of Saddam Hussein’s statue in central Baghdad; President 
Bush’s ‘Mission Accomplished’ speech; and the mediated images of the corpses of 
Uday and Qusay Hussein. During the Easter break of my first year I travelled to 
Zanzibar to teach English and Civics at a village school, whilst there I took a few of 
our students to Stone Town (the capital of Zanzibar) where we visited The House o f 
Wonders (Beit el Ajaib) Museum o f History and Culture o f Zanzibar and the Swahili 
Coast.
The House of Wonders has had a varied history. In the nineteenth century it was the 
ceremonial palace of the Sultan Barghash. Today it is a museum. When I visited it 
was hosting a travelling exhibition of the American photographer Joel Meyerowitz’s 
images from ‘Ground Zero’, one stop on a global tour of over sixty countries. After
1
September 11: Images From Ground Zero1 was supported by the US State 
Department, local American consulates and embassies. This exhibition was part of 
Charlotte Beers’, then Under-Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public 
Affairs, drive to change public perceptions of America within the Muslim world. 
Liam Kennedy has noted that:
this exhibition is clearly intended to shape and maintain a public memory of 
the attacks on the World Trade Center and their aftermath. As such, it is a 
fascinating initiative in cultural diplomacy that both echoes structures of Cold 
War propagandizing and raises fresh questions about the role of visual culture 
in American foreign policy -  and more particularly about the role of 
photography in the shadow war of representation that still ensues over the 
meaning o f ‘9/11’.2
In the summer of my second year I was selected to partake in the House of Commons 
Placement Scheme from the Interpol Department in Aberystwyth. I worked as a 
Research Assistant to Annette Brooke, Liberal Democrat MP for Mid-Dorset and 
North Poole, in both her Westminster and Constituency offices. It was certainly a 
very interesting time to be at the Palace of Westminster. I was lucky to be able to 
attend the session of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee’s investigation into the 
decision to go to war in Iraq when Alastair Campbell, the former Director of 
Communication and Strategy to Prime Minister Tony Blair, gave (or performed) his 
evidence.
During my third year, Saddam Hussein was captured. Images of his “spider hole” 
and his humiliating medical examination circulated widely throughout the 
international media. Simultaneously, the true extent of the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at 
the Abu Ghraib prison facility was becoming recognised, The Daily Mirror 
published abuse images that were later proven to be fake and a series of gruesome 
hostage videos were being circulated and remediated and discussed within the 
international media along with a number of suicide bombing videos and suicide 
video wills. Whilst doing my Masters in the Interpol Department in Aberystwyth -  
and busy writing my dissertation -  two more significant events unfolded on my
1 See www.ioelmeverowitz.com/photography/after911 .html. Accessed on 03 February 2009
2 Liam Kennedy, 'Remembering September 11: Photography as Cultural Diplomacy1. International
Affairs 79, no. 2 (2003), p. 315
2
television in my student accommodation: the suicide bombing of London on July 7, 
2005 and the failure of a second attempt two weeks later.
Throughout my Undergraduate and Masters Degrees I was always struck by the lack 
of emphasis on the role of the ‘media’ and ‘images’ within International Relations. 
Cynthia Weber has crystallized this concern, writing in 2008:
[F]or the most part, mainstream IR fails to understand... the links between the 
linguistic and the visual. It fails to link the linguistic to the visual because 
while the linguistic is understood as the medium through which ‘real’ politics 
is communicated, the visual is often dismissed as merely popular.3
Critical International Relations and Critical Security Studies theorists are currently 
working to link the linguistic and the visual and my thesis further contributes to this 
area of academic inquiry.
In 2005, I moved to the Department of Political and Cultural Studies at Swansea 
University (then the Department of Politics and International Relations) to research 
the role of A1 Jazeera in the war on terror. Central to my initial research application 
was the complex way in which Western governments were using A1 Jazeera as a 
device to speak directly to Muslims worldwide, assuming that they could use it as a 
device for communicating directly with the perpetrators of terrorist attacks, and yet 
also complaining that A1 Jazeera was an outlet for propaganda from fundamentalist 
terrorists. Initially I had supervision from the Department of Politics and 
International Relations and the Department of Media and Communication Studies. I 
was soon also invited to become a Research Associate on an Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) New Security Challenges (NSC) Programme4 project 
Shifting Securities: News Cultures Before and Beyond the Iraq War 2003.5 At the 
end of my first year and after discussions with my supervisors I decided to broaden 
the scope of my research, shifting away from examining the role of A1 Jazeera in the 
war on terror to researching image warfare itself.
3 Cynthia Weber, 'Popular Visual Language as Global Communication: The Remediation o f United
Airlines Flight 93'. Review o f  International Studies 34, no. 1 (2008), p. 138
4 See www.newsecuritv.bham.ac.uk. Accessed on 07 June 2009
5 See www.mediatingsecurity.com. Accessed on 07 June 2009
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In the journey taken to the completion of this thesis I have, as is apparent, found 
support in many places and from many people. I wish therefore to record my thanks 
to the staff at the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, 
Aberystwyth (2001-2005) for giving me a solid grounding in IR scholarship and to 
my fellow Undergraduate and Masters Students. Similarly, I thank my supervisors at 
Swansea University, Dr. Alan Finlayson, Dr. Lee Jarvis, Dr. Samuel A. Chambers 
and Dr. Andrew Hoskins, for their help, advice and patience in bringing this thesis to 
fruition, and also my PhD Examiners Dr. Debbie Lisle (Queen’s University Belfast) 
and Dr. David M. Berry. Thanks to Professor Roland Axtmann, my Head of 
Department, for his help and support and for awarding me a travel bursary which 
enabled me to present part of my research at a conference on violence in Budapest, 
Hungary; to Dr. Mark Evans, the Director of the Graduate Centre in the School of 
Arts and Humanities, for guiding me through the different stages of my PhD; 
Professor Nikki Cooper, the Director of The Callaghan Centre for the Study of 
Conflict, Power and Empire, for allowing me time to do my PhD corrections before 
starting work as Research Assistant in The Callaghan Centre for the Study of 
Conflict, Power and Empire and Professor Helen Fulton, the Director of the Research 
Institute for Arts and Humanities, for making me an Honorary Research Associate of 
the Research Institute for Arts and Humanities. The academic staff past and present 
of the Department of Political and Cultural Studies -  formerly the Departments of 
Politics and International Relations, Media and Communication Studies and 
American Studies -  specifically Dr. Rebecca M. Brown (for introducing me to 
Visual Culture and Art History scholarship), Dr. Jonathan Bradbury, Dr. Helen 
Brocklehurst, Dr. Alan Collins, Dr. Columba Peoples, Professor Mike Sheehan and 
the administrative staff of the School of Arts and Humanities and the Department of 
Political and Cultural Studies -  specifically Susan Lambert, Gabriella Wasiniak, 
Anne Edwards, Kat Jennings, S. Miraj Ansari and Kirstie Andrews. Thanks to my 
fellow PhD students past and present -  specifically Eram Ashraf, Kevin Bannon, Dr. 
James Beard, Ramli Dollah, Jong Eop Kim, Regina Fritzsche, Dr. Liam McCarthy, 
Dr. Richard Murphy and Richard van der Watt -  for all the lighthearted, sometimes 
heated, and always entertaining conversations. Thanks are also due to: Jed Chandler 
for organizing the programme of generic research training courses and to the 
Postgraduate Research Faculty; the librarians and staff of the Library and
4
Information Services at Swansea University for helping me to track down items for 
my research; the librarians at the Hugh Owen Library at Aberystwyth University and 
the National Library of Wales in Aberystwyth for similarly helping me to track down 
items for my research.
Thanks are also due to those who worked on the ESRC project Shifting Securities: 
News Cultures Before and Beyond the Iraq War 2003 and specifically to Dr. Andrew 
Hoskins, Professor Marie Gillespie and Dr. Ben O’Loughlin for inviting me to 
become a Research Associate and to present a paper at the project conference. 
Thanks to Dr. Noureddine Miladi for organizing his Centre for Arab and Muslim 
Media (CAMMRO) conference series as this introduced me to a number of people 
either working in or pursuing research about Arab and Muslim media. The Callaghan 
Centre for the Study of Conflict, Power and Empire and The Centre for the Study of 
Culture and Politics (C-SCAP) at Swansea University both also gave me 
opportunities to present my research at seminars. I wish to thank all of the 
organizers, panel chairs, discussants, panel members and audiences who have 
attended such presentations and asked me questions or made suggestions. I also 
want to acknowledge the support of the British International Studies Association 
(BISA) and the Political Studies Association (PSA) for their bursary awards which 
allowed me to attend and present papers at their annual conferences at the University 
of Cambridge and the University of Bath.
Finally, thanks to my family and friends for all their support through the good and 
not so good times.
This thesis is the result of my own research and therefore any 
mistakes/misunderstandings are attributable solely to me.
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Abbreviations
9/11 September 11, 2001
7/7 July 7, 2005
21/7 July 21, 2005
ABC American Broadcasting Company
ACLU American Civil Liberties Union
AK-47 Kalashnikov Assault Rifle
AWOL Absent Without Leave
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BCCF Baghdad Central Confinement Facility
BDSM Bondage Domination Sadism Masochism
BG Brigadier General
BISA British International Studies Association
C4I/BM Command, Control, Communications, Computer
Applications, Intelligence and Battle Management 
CAMMRO Centre for Arab and Muslim Media Research
CBS Columbia Broadcasting System
CCTV Closed-Circuit Television
CD Compact Disc
CD-ROM Compact Disc Read-Only Memory
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CNN Cable News Network
CONUS Contiguous United States
Cpl. Corporal
C-SCAP The Centre for the Study of Culture and Politics
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
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DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid
DPP Danish Peoples Party
DU Depleted Uranium
DVD Digital Versatile Disc
ELS Experience Learning System
ESRC Economic and Social Research Council
FOJM Friends of John McCarthy Campaign
G2 The Guardian Newspaper Magazine
GCSE General Certificate of Secondary Education
GTE General Telephone & Electronics Corporation
I/ITSEC Interservice/Industrial Training System and Education
Conference
ITC Institute for Creative Technology
ID Identification
IDF Israeli Defense Force
IR International Relations
ITN Independent Television News
JIDC Joint Intelligence and Debriefing Center
LA Los Angeles
Lt. Col. Lieutenant Colonel
Lt. Cpl. Lieutenant Corporal
Lt. Gen. Lieutenant General
LTC Lieutenant Colonel
MG Major General
MI Military Intelligence
MI5 Security Service
MIME-NET Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network
MoD Ministry of Defence
MP Military Police
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MSNBC Microsoft National Broadcasting Corporation
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Government Organization
NBC National Broadcasting Corporation
NSC New Security Challenges Programme
OPLAN 1003 VICTOR Operation Iraqi Freedom
PGM Precision Guided Munition
PLF Palestinian Liberation Front
PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PSA Political Studies Association
Psyops Psychological Operations
PTSD Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
QLR Queen’s Lancashire Regiment
R&D Research and Development
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs
RMeA Revolution in Media Affairs
SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
Sgt. Sergeant
SMS Short Message Service
SPC Specialist
STOW Synthetic Theater of War
STRICOM Simulation, Training and Implementation Command
TV Television
TWA Trans World Airlines
UAF93 United Airlines Flight 93
UK United Kingdom
UGC User Generated Content
UN United Nations
UNAMI United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq
UNRWA United National Relief and Work Agency
US United States
USA United States of America
use University of Southern California
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTC World Trade Center
WTO World Trade Organization
WWII World War Two
Y2K Year 2000
9
Introduction
This thesis explores the nature of images in contemporary warfare, addressing the 
changing ways in which they circulate within society and the impact this has on the 
conduct of conflict. I argue that a significant shift has occurred in the relationship 
between images and the media system which makes possible their circulation and 
identify this as a shift from a mass communication system to a rhizomatic 
communication system. This shift is driven by changes in technology and in the 
‘communications system’. Technological developments such as the internet, blogs, 
camera/video-phones and more -  have fundamentally altered the ways in which 
governments, militaries, terrorists, Non-Government Organizations (NGO’s) and 
citizens engage with images. To employ Manuel Castells term: ‘a space of flows’6 
has opened up and so replaced the unidirectional flow of information and images 
with, in Daya Kishan Thussu’s language, ‘multi-directional flows’7 of information 
and images. In the context of military action I theorize this as a move away from the 
‘mobilization of images’ (attached to the twentieth century notion of propaganda and 
the mass media society) to the ‘weaponization of images’ (which is attached to the 
networked/information society connected with new media). The thesis then sets out 
to explore this via a number of case studies of events from the war on terror. Across 
these case studies I show how war has moved from techno-war to image warfare 
(thus opening up a new theatre of war) and also how the American and British 
governments and the militaries are failing to manage image warfare because they still 
believe that they can ‘control’ images in the rhizomatic condition, whereas A1 Qaeda 
understands that images are uncontrollable and subject to unpredictable circulation 
and remediation in the war on terror.
6 See Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume I: The Rise o f
the Network Society. 2nd eds. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), Manuel Castells, The 
Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume 2: The Power o f  Identity (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1997) and Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society 
and Culture, Volume 3: End o f Millennium. 2nd eds. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000)
7 Daya Kishan Thussu, Mapping Global Media Flow and Contra-Flow', in Media on the Move:Global
Flow and Contra-Flow, ed. Daya K. Thussu (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 12
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This idea of controlling the flow of images is, however, not just confined to the 
twentieth century notion of propaganda; it is also deeply embedded within 
theorisations of techno-war. Techno-war describes a theory of warfare which was 
developed, by the Pentagon, from the lessons learnt by the war in Vietnam. In the 
Vietnam War America had failed to deal effectively with the challenges of 
conducting war in the television age. The Pentagon allowed journalists to operate 
unilaterally within the theatre of war and so produce and disseminate news reports 
without information and images first being passed by military censors. Images, such 
as those documenting the My Lai Massacre or the photograph Accidental Napalm, 
proved very unpopular with the American public and so contributed towards a 
groundswell of support for the anti-war movement. Vietnam has since gone down in 
history as a deeply unpopular war. Techno-war was premiered during the 1991 Gulf 
War and showcased the supplementing -  where possible -  of military personnel with 
technologies, such as airpower and Precision Guided Munitions (PGM’s). Also, 
during the 1991 Gulf War, the Pentagon instituted a press pool system to control the 
flow of information, images and the spectacle of war. Journalists would gather daily 
to be briefed by senior military personnel and their information and images would 
then be shared between journalists in the press pool and disseminated throughout the 
international media. The dominant features of techno-war are: a greater reliance on 
technology, soldiers no longer viewed as mere cannon fodder and a shift in the 
balance of the control of the dissemination of images away from the media and back 
to the military. This way of warfighting has since given rise to the development of a
m o
techno-war war machine in America, as examined by James Der Derian. This war 
machine dominated the 1990s; it was also adapted for internet war in Kosovo and 
was finally formalized -  in 1999 -  with the creation of the Institute for Creative 
Technologies (ICT) at the University of Southern California (USC).
In conventional wars and against conventional enemies, such as Iraqi and Serbian 
militaries, American techno-war has proven itself to be a dominant force. However, 
on September 11, 2001 a new kind of war -  image warfare -  crashed onto the scene 
with A1 Qaeda’s coordinated attacks against the World Trade Center, the Pentagon 
and its failed attack on The White House (the United Airlines Flight 93 incident).
8 See James Der Derian, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment 
Network. 2nd eds. (London: Routledge, 2009)
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Techno-war had immediately been replaced, however, the Bush administration’s 
response was to quickly launch a spectacular techno-war attack against Afghanistan; 
thinking that they could regain control of the spectacle of war back from A1 Qaeda. 
This was immediately overshadowed by A1 Qaeda’s release of a video or image 
munition to A1 Jazeera on October 7, 2001, featuring Osama bin Laden. Proof 
indeed, in the words of Paul Virilio, that America ‘are always one war behind. . .there 
are not yet any experts in global terrorist warfare;’9 whereas A1 Qaeda appears to 
have a more sophisticated understanding of image warfare.
In this thesis, having taken on board Virilio’s judgment that there are currently no 
experts in global terrorist warfare, or in what I term image warfare (given A1 Qaeda’s 
successful embracing of it), I offer an important reassessment of the war on terror. I 
explore the disjuncture between ‘controlling’ images and understanding the 
contemporary deterritorialized circulation of images in the rhizomatic condition. I 
also recognize that as war has now moved on from techno-war to image warfare so 
IR needs to do the same and respond to these new security challenges by embracing 
image warfare rather than merely unsuccessfully adapting techno-war for the 
challenges of global terrorist warfare. Mainstream IR continues to miss the 
significance of the shift from techno-war to image warfare. However, Critical 
International Relations, Critical Security Studies and post-positivist IR theorists have 
begun to recognize the important role played by images and popular culture in the 
war on terror. But even these fail sufficiently to challenge the dominance of techno­
war or indeed engage with image warfare. I, however, in this thesis, identify how 
society has shifted from a mass media system to a rhizomatic media system and 
explore the implications for this shift on war (a paradigm shift from techno-war to 
image warfare). I also engage with literature in the cognate disciplines of Media 
Studies and Visual Culture and present IR with compelling evidence of the 
contemporary circulation of images and the implications for contemporary and future 
war. The rhizomatic media system is distinct from the mass media system which so 
dominated the twentieth century and as such the relationships between the 
institutional actors involved in media production, the complex objects they produce
9 Paul Virilio, Ground Zero. Translated by Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2002), p. 35
12
and the varied subjects who consume has changed. It is to a discussion of these 
important differences that I now turn.
Media actors are the institutions that are dedicated to the refining of the raw 
materials of events; objects are produced by media actors and disseminated to 
audiences, the subjects that consume objects produced by media actors. Early 
communication theory saw communication as a somewhat simplistic and linear 
process and also subjects (audiences) were not accounted for. The development of 
this conception into one of a mass media system enabled a description of a situation 
in which a few dominant media actors produce a limited range of objects to be 
consumed by a largely homogeneous and passive audience. Transferred to the field 
of military conflict this top-down media model essentially encouraged the 
development of strategies for the mobilization of images as propaganda and 
privileged the activity of those, such as governments and militaries, who seek to 
control and censor information and images. However, within Media Studies theorists 
such as Stuart Hall challenged the simplicity of the mass communication model. 
Hall proposed his model of the encoding/decoding process which was significant for, 
firstly, stressing the agency of audiences in interpreting and responding to media 
products and, secondly, for giving a determinate role for the ‘texts’ of media, the 
genre and codes through which they became communicable, their history of 
production and development as significant in the history of both media production 
and consumption.10 The importance of this re-theorisation for the conceptualising of 
images and information in warfare has become apparent only recently.
The 1990s saw the news media becoming dominated by the Cable News Network 
(CNN) which pioneered twenty-four hour satellite news broadcasting and the real­
time reporting of war, during the 1991 Gulf War. CNN was also observed to be 
having an impact on foreign policy (‘The CNN Effect’11). A key example of this 
was Somalia. In 1992, President George H. W. Bush partly as a reaction to the news 
coverage of humanitarian crisis ordered American military forces into Somalia. In 
1993 The Battle of Mogadishu was covered by the media who also reported on how
10 Stuart Hall, 'Encoding, Decoding', in The Cultural Studies Reader, ed. Simon During (London:
Routledge, 2000), pp. 507-18
11 Piers Robinson, The CNN Effect: The Myth o f News, Foreign Policy and Intervention (London:
Routledge, 2002)
13
an American Black Hawk helicopter had been shot down over Mogadishu and 
footage was shown of a dead US Army Ranger being dragged through the streets. In 
response to the airing of this footage President Bill Clinton took the decision to 
withdraw American troops from Somalia. Despite this important shift in the 
military-media matrix CNN was still a part of the mass media system, a centralized 
media actor producing content for a mass audience.
James Der Derian in his travels through the contemporary American techno-war war 
machine has simultaneously also described the Pentagon’s contemporary 
reimagining of the mass communication model: the military-industrial-media- 
entertainment network (MIME-NET).12 The MIME-NET is the home of a number of 
collaborative projects -  such as the development of new military technologies 
(weapons and communication systems), military simulations, the production of a war 
script for invading Afghanistan, the designing of a media centre in Doha, Qatar and 
the manufacture of a number of media spectacles. However, the MIME-NET 
assumes that information and images can still be centrally controlled and 
consequently it does not meet with the challenges of the new media age.
Another media actor -  A1 Jazeera -  also emerged during the 1990s and in the twenty- 
first century it has spearheaded a media revolution, a Revolution in Media Affairs 
(RMeA), which has resulted in the shift from a mass media system to a rhizomatic 
media system and also a shift from techno-war to image warfare. Like CNN before 
it A1 Jazeera has also had an important impact on the foreign policy process, 
however, what distinguishes A1 Jazeera from CNN and what allows A1 Jazeera to be 
considered a part of the rhizomatic media system rather than a part of the mass media 
system is the fact that as a new media actor it produces diverse content that other 
news networks would not air first, thus appealing to a diverse audience and also 
impacting on foreign policy. For example, A1 Jazeera gained a formidable 
international reputation when it aired a bin Laden video on October 7, 2001. Since 
then A1 Jazeera has aired more bin Laden tapes, suicide video wills, hostage 
execution videos and unofficial camera-phone footage showing Saddam Hussein’s 
execution. If the 1990s was the decade of The CNN Effect then the first decade of
12 Der Derian, Virtuous War. 2nd eds.
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the twenty-first century was most certainly the decade of The A1 Jazeera Effect. 
According to Philip Seib, ‘[sjatellite television channels continue to proliferate and 
their impact on politics and society generally continues to grow. As the satellites 
these channels use whirl through space, the A1 Jazeera effect is also receiving a boost 
from the tools of cyberspace.’13 A1 Jazeera therefore represents all the different 
forms of new media which together have resulted in a shift from mass media to 
rhizomatic media, impacting on the circulation of images and also encouraging the 
paradigm shift from techno-war to image warfare.
The somewhat unpredictable nature of the rhizomatic media system has also 
impacted on civil society because content production can now take place anywhere. 
Images now float freely. This revolution in media production and dissemination now 
opens up new possibilities for new kinds of media, political and military actions. 
Instead of content being controlled by a few dominant media actors the balance has 
now shifted as new media actors can now produce and disseminate their own 
content. Anti-war movements and pro-war movements have similarly used the 
rhizomatic media to their advantage as they have interfered with the official media 
and so have become credible alternatives rivalling the official media. The 
uncontrollability of information and images in the internet age is also apparent given 
the fact that a number of new media actors -  such as artists, advertisers and even a 
disenfranchised teenager in his bedroom -  can also now pick up and deploy image 
munitions with subversive intentions that are totally distinct from those of the 
original producers intentions and so it is that remediated images keep popping up in 
surprising places in the new media environment. If Stuart Hall showed the circular 
nature of the ‘encoding/decoding’ process, and the potential for relative autonomy on 
the part of media audiences, then new technology pushes this model yet further 
making it possible for consumers to be simultaneously producers of media content 
which is in turn consumed by media producers. Similarly, media texts are no longer 
static or inviolable objects but resources open for access and reformulation as new 
kinds of media content on new platforms.
13 Philip Seib, The Al-Jazeera Effect: How the New Global Media Are Reshaping World Politics 
(Washington D. C. : Pontomac Books, Inc., 2008)
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My engagement with literature found in cognate disciplines such as Media Studies 
and Visual Culture offers IR compelling insights about this changing media system 
and the contemporary circulation of images. However, to help bridge the gaps 
between the International Relations, Media Studies and Visual Culture literatures I 
introduce three conceptual terms to the lexicon of IR: ‘image munitions’, ‘counter­
image munitions’ and ‘remediation battles’. These are intended to help synthesise 
International Relations, Media Studies and Visual Culture and to break new ground 
in terms of the theorising of image warfare, rather than merely relying on updating a 
version of techno-war. Before outlining just what I mean by each of my conceptual 
terms it is important to note that image munitions are never launched 
indiscriminately into a news-cycle, an analogy exists here between them and 
Precision Guided Munitions (PGM’s), but rather they are launched by actors with 
very specific intentions. This does not mean that image munitions never get 
misfired. As I will show in Chapter Five with the death images of Uday and Qusay 
Hussein and the capture/trial/execution images of Saddam Hussein, examples of 
image munitions being misfired. My conceptual terms also represent distinct 
moments in image warfare akin to the distinct moments in techno-war and other 
kinds of warfare. Once an image munition is deployed this is then followed by the 
release of a counter-image munition and so there unfolds a mimetic war of 
representation. This is then followed by intense remediation battles as image 
munitions and counter-image munitions get picked up and deployed in surprising 
contexts by new media actors with different political purposes.
Traditional war is fought with the aid of a diverse arsenal of munitions: bullets, 
bombs, missiles and mines. Image warfare is no different. It is fought with a diverse 
arsenal of image munitions: from real-time images to post-hoc images and images of 
diverse mediums of capture. However, it is important to note that image munitions 
do have distinct properties that distinguish them from bullets, bombs, missiles and 
mines. When traditional munitions are deployed successfully they detonate and get 
destroyed (obliterating all that is located in the blast site and the surrounding area) 
whereas when image munitions are launched successfully they do not get destroyed 
and they do not kill and injure people in the blast site and the surrounding area; 
rather they remain, as it were, perfect and ready for anyone to pick up and re-use.
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Counter-image munitions are deployed with the specific intention of replacing image 
munitions in the news-cycle. They contain all of the same elements which go into 
producing image munitions only counter-image munitions are launched in response 
to the deployment of image munitions. This does not always have to be an 
immediate response; they can be deployed strategically at a time of some delay from 
when image munitions were launched. For example, as I will show in Chapter Four, 
suicide video wills are often released a long time after a suicide bombing has taken 
place. They are timed to either coincide with the anniversaries of a suicide bombing 
or to interrupt current political debates. Whenever counter-image munitions are 
released they get inserted into current news cycles and immediately draw attention 
away from the government or military and back to the terrorists cause. Counter­
image munitions have similarly been produced by Britain and America in the war on 
terror. These include, for example and as I will show in Chapter Three, the 
appearance of Prime Minister Tony Blair, President George W. Bush and other 
politicians on A1 Jazeera in response to the airing of bin Laden tapes. However, the 
Blair government and the Bush administration have failed to recognize that their 
appearances on A1 Jazeera are in fact counter-productive as they engage A1 Qaeda in 
a dangerous game of mimetic one-upmanship.
The concept of remediation battles describes how it is that image munitions and 
counter-image munitions get reproduced. It is necessary to highlight an important 
distinction here though between what is circulation and what constitutes remediation. 
Where reproduced images are merely direct copies of original image munitions (for 
example, bin Laden on CNN) this is representative of circulation. Where reproduced 
images are altered by new media actors and then inserted into new image contexts 
with a distinct political purpose (for example, bin Laden and the “Bert is Evil” 
poster) this is instead representative of remediation. Remediation battles ultimately 
play an important role in image warfare as the rhizomatic media system now allows 
more new media actors than ever before to pick up and deploy image munitions in 
new image contexts. I recognize that graffiti artists and anti-war protesters, with 
their placards, have already been remediating images for decades. However, today 
as new media technologies have been developed so too the number of ways for new 
media actors to disseminate their image remediations has proliferated and become 
increasingly sophisticated. This sets in motion a complex and unpredictable series of
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chain reactions as image munitions continue to get relocated, redirected and 
remediated.
The Aesthetic Turn in International Relations
This thesis is not only concerned with the contemporary rhizomatic and 
unpredictable flow of information and images and with theorising the shift from 
techno-war to image warfare; it also takes place against the backdrop of the 
‘aesthetic turn’ -  a new field of study in IR, as identified by Roland Bleiker in 2001. 
The ‘aesthetic turn’ is something which Strategic Studies and War Studies theorists 
need to embrace more forcefully if they are to properly engage with the new security 
challenges posed by image warfare. Bleiker called for a broadening of IR’s 
concerns, noting that:
legitimising images, narratives and sounds as important sources for insight 
into world politics, aesthetic approaches have moved scholarship away from 
an exclusive and often very narrow reliance on diplomatic documents, 
statistical data, political speeches, academic treatises and other traditional 
sources of knowledge about the international.14
Diplomatic documents and other traditional information sources are not now 
irrelevant and have not somehow been made redundant by the aesthetic turn. But the 
information revolution -  the development of twenty-four hour news and the internet 
-  has led to an increasing visualisation of and in society, and the emergence of 
different information sources: digital images, video-blogs, camera-phones, none of 
which existed just a few years ago. This demands scholarly attention of new kinds 
and in new ways.
The political theorist William E. Connolly has called for ‘every political theorist 
under the age of 35 to become as well-trained in the reading and analysis of visual 
culture -  particularly television, film, and TV news -  as they are in the interpretation 
of texts within the history of political thought.’15 He asserts that ‘the reading of
14 Roland Bleiker, 'The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory'. Millennium: Journal o f
International Studies 30, no. 3 (2001), p. 526
15 Samuel A. Chambers, The Queer Politics o f Television (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009), p. 1. See also
William E. Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis, MN: University 
o f Minnesota Press, 2002)
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television shows [and images] will prove to be as important to politics in this century 
as the study of philosophical texts has been in the past.’16 Cynthia Weber has also 
made a compelling argument for moving beyond the ‘linguistic turn’ to account for
1 7‘popular visual language.’ Her point is both conceptual (she argues that the 
linguistic turn excluded alternative realms of inquiry), but also empirical (she draws 
attention to the centrality of new forms of knowledge in global political life). Weber 
calls upon the discipline of ER to react to these recent changes within society, and 
embrace this visual language. To ignore these information sources, she shows, is no 
longer a credible option. Weber writes:
More than a generation ago, the discipline of International Relations took the 
linguistic turn marked by the introduction of ‘discourse analysis’ to bear on 
core questions of international relations. Celebrated by some, resisted by 
others, and mainstreamed by still others, the linguistic turn reinvigorated IR 
scholarship. But it had its limitations. Practiced in IR as a primarily 
textually-based set of research techniques, discourse analysis took speech and 
particularly writing as its focus, often to the exclusion of other
communicative practices, like hearing, feeling, and seeing -  all of which are...
18vital for understanding global politics.
But, Weber argues, today ‘popular visual language’
is increasingly circulated through wireless networks onto the digital screens 
of our daily lives (computers, telephones, and televisions). And it is 
experienced as much if not more by amateurs than it is by experts. All of this 
makes visual language the language of contemporary popular culture -  the 
language that amateurs and experts increasingly rely upon in order to claim 
contemporary literacy.... But for the most part, mainstream IR fails to 
understand... the links between the linguistic and the visual. It fails to link 
the linguistic to the visual because while the linguistic is understood as the 
medium through which ‘real’ politics is communicated, the visual is often 
dismissed as merely popular.19
Rachel Hughes supports this line of argument, noting that although traditionally 
‘geopolitics’ and ‘visual culture’ have been seen as distinct areas of academic 
enquiry, contemporary debates collapse the invisible divisions between ‘geopolitics’ 
and ‘visual culture’:
16 Ibid, p. 1
17 Cynthia Weber, ‘Popular Visual Language’, p. 137
18 Ibid, pp. 137-138
19 Ibid, p. 138
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The two terms -  ‘geopolitics’ and ‘visual culture’ -  invoke quite different 
associations. ‘Geopolitics’ conjures up the sombre arena of international 
politics, populated by diplomats and world leaders and taken up with the 
conduct of international agreements, sanctions and conflicts. ‘Visual culture’ 
suggests all manner of images -  as well as popular media forms like film and 
television that we utilise by virtue of a sense of sight. But think for a moment 
about how we come to know world events, or of the global and political 
nature of the major image producers of our time, and the necessity of thinking 
about geopolitics and visual cultures as related fields becomes more 
evident.20
Interest in visual culture is spreading within IR as is indicated by the spread of
91special issues and sections in journals. Similarly the number of monographs, edited 
books and textbooks considering the important role of aesthetics and visuals within
99International Relations is also increasing markedly. This demonstrates the 
importance of the ‘aesthetic turn’ in IR. It is hoped that this thesis can be a 
contribution to that turn and, in particular, to the recognition of its importance for 
researchers in War Studies and Strategic Studies. For, if they fail to take it, scholars 
of contemporary conflict will not only fail to grasp the significant role of images in 
contemporary warfare but, as a consequence, may endorse strategies that are not only 
ineffective but positively harmful.
20 Rachel Hughes, 'Through the Looking Blast: Geopolitics and Visual Culture'. Geography Compass
2 (2007), p. 976
21 Review o f  International Studies special section on ‘Art, Politics, Purpose’ (edited by Alex Danchev
and Debbie Lisle, 35(4) (October 2009)); Review o f International Studies special section on 
‘Culture and Politics of Global Communication’ (edited by Costas M. Constantinou, Oliver 
P. Richmond and Alison M. S. Watson, 34(S) (January 2008)); Security Dialogue special 
issue on ‘Securitization, Militarization and Visual Culture in the Worlds o f Post-9/11 ’ (edited 
by David Campbell and Michael J. Shapiro, 38(2) (June 2007)) and International Relations 
special issue on ‘Images and Imaginings of Security’ (edited by Stuart Croft, 20(4) 
(December 2006))
22 Stuart Croft, Culture, Crisis and America's War on Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006), Francois Debrix and Cynthia Weber, eds. Rituals o f  Mediation: International 
Politics and Social Meaning (Minneapolis, MN: University o f Minnesota Press, 2003), 
Michael J. Shapiro, Cinematic Political Thought: Narrating Race, Nation and Gender 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), Michael J. Shapiro, Cinematic Geopolitics 
(London: Routledge, 2009), Michael C. Williams, Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and 
the Politics o f  International Security (London: Routledge, 2007), Cynthia Weber, Imagining 
America at War: Morality, Politics and Film (London: Routledge, 2006), Robert W. Gregg, 
International Relations Film (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications, Inc., 1998), 
Christine Sylvester, Art/Museums: International Relations Where We Least Expect It 
(Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2008), Debbie Lisle, The Global Politics o f  
Contemporary Travel Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Jutta 
Weldes, ed. To Seek out New Worlds: Exploring Links between Science Fiction and World 
Politics (New York, NJ: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Marianne I. Franklin, Resounding 
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Macmillan, 2005)
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C hapter Summary
Chapter One, ‘War/Images and International Relations Theory’, explores the long­
standing relationship between war and images, but stresses how in contemporary 
times this relationship has been fundamentally changed. I show how although 
International Relations recognizes the important role played by information and 
images in war it has ultimately failed to account for the recent significant changes in 
this relationship. America and Britain still believe that they can control the 
circulation of images in war when the reality is that the circulation of images is today 
increasingly unpredictable. I define this as a shift from a centralised mass media 
model to a deterritorialized rhizomatic media model and examine the recent history 
of media and war and highlight the structural changes in war coverage: the Vietnam 
War (the first television war), then moving on to discuss the 1991 Gulf War (the first 
real-time war), the Kosovo Conflict (the first internet war) and finally September 11, 
2001/the war on terror (image warfare). I then place image warfare into an academic 
context by discussing the work of key IR theorists: F rancis Debrix and his 
discussion of IR theorists and popular culture and the construction of a ‘risk’ or 
‘terror’ discourse, Richard Jackson on official language and the construction of a war 
on terror discourse and Stuart Croft on the construction and maintenance of a war on 
terror discourse/meta-narrative via the study of images and popular culture. I also 
explore Milena Michalski and James Gow thesis that moving images are the key 
weapons of contemporary war; Michael J. Shapiro and his discussion of the new 
violent cartography and its counter-spaces, specifically international film festivals 
and finally James Der Derian’s travelogue account of his journey through the 
American techno-war war machine (the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment 
Network or MIME-NET) which is currently outdated in the age of image warfare.
Chapter Two, ‘Theorising Image Warfare’, starts by further exploring the IR 
literature (specifically the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) literature) and 
reveals how media and images have been sidelined in discussions about 
contemporary war in favour of theorisations of technology. I argue that this 
reinforces the outdated idea that the circulation of information and images can still be 
controlled in the internet age. To get a better understanding of the contemporary role
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of media and images in war I engage with literature in Media Studies. Exploring 
how society has moved away from a mass media system (of centralised propaganda, 
dominant in the twentieth century) to a networked/rhizomatic system (of 
deterritorialized flows of information, dominant today) and how new media 
technologies -  such as the internet, blogs and mobile phones -  play an important 
role. I also examine theories of ‘postmodern war’ as discussed by Jean Baudrillard 
and Paul Virilio. Baudrillard was initially critical of real-time communication, in his 
response to the 1991 Gulf War, but was forced to change his mind after the 9/11 
attacks; Virilio offers a prophetic glimpse of the deterritorialised information age 
where new forms of activity and agency are now possible.
I turn from Media Studies to research from within Visual Culture, and specifically 
the work of Susan Sontag, W. J. T. Mitchell, Nicholas Mirzoeff, Robert Hariman and 
John Louis Lucaites. This field also reveals the complex circulation and remediation 
of images. To help bridge the gaps between IR, Media Studies and Visual Culture I 
also develop three conceptual terms: ‘image munitions’, ‘counter-image munitions’ 
and ‘remediation battles’ and test them against iconic historic images and their 
contemporary appropriations: The Flag Raising at Iwo Jima and The Unknown Rebel 
(or Tank Man). Finally, I discuss the methodology I employ in this thesis.
Chapter Three, ‘Political Communications’, explores a part of the new image warfare 
theatre of war. I examine political communications -  understood as a form of image 
munition -  discussing how the ‘official’ political communications made by leaders 
are an important instrument in disseminating information from the seat of power to 
the public in times of war and peace and I recognize the important role of new media 
technologies in their development. I specifically examine ‘official’ political 
communications made by American Presidents and British Prime Ministers -  
President Bush and Prime Minister Blair in the war on terror -  and show how this 
style of address has now also been adopted by A1 Qaeda with Osama bin Laden’s 
‘unofficial’ political communications. I then discuss the role of ‘place’, ‘symbolism’ 
and ‘mimesis’ in these addresses, Andrew Hill’s Lacanian analysis of the bin Laden 
tapes, Binoy Kampmark’s commentary about the spectre of bin Laden and the 
circulation of bin Laden’s image munitions in the war on terror. Before drawing 
attention to a number of interventions which show how bin Laden’s image
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munitions, since being originally deployed by A1 Qaeda, have now been picked up 
and remediated by new media actors with intentions that are distinct from A1 Qaeda. 
Thus proving just how unpredictable the flow of images actually are in the 
rhizomatic condition and how A1 Qaeda indeed has a more sophisticated 
understanding of image warfare compared with either America or Britain.
Chapter Four, ‘Suicides’, discusses another important part of the image warfare 
theatre of war. I start by exploring how suicide terrorism is an effective tactic used 
by A1 Qaeda to gain a military advantage against superior conventional militaries in 
the war on terror, but also how there is an important symbolic dimension to suicide 
terrorism. I examine this symbolic dimension, employed by terrorists specifically to 
produce image munitions about their suicide bombings and also suicide video wills 
that are important because they allow terrorists to keep control of their attacks for as 
long as possible. I discuss specifically the bombing of The Canal Hotel in Baghdad, 
on August 19, 2003; the September 11, 2001 terror attacks and the release of 
counter-image munitions over United Airlines Flight 93 and the 9/11 suicide video 
wills; the triple suicide bombing of Firdos Square in Baghdad on October 24, 2005; 
the July 7, 2005 London Bombings and the July 21, 2005 Failed London Bombings. I 
also further discuss the circulation of image munitions and counter-image munitions 
about 7/7 with reference to stories of heroism (such as that of Paul Dadge, a London 
commuter) and the release of suicide video wills by Mohammed Sidique Khan and 
Shehzad Tanweer, two of the 7/7 bombers. Finally, I examine a number of 
interventions produced by new media actors with divergent intentions from those of 
A1 Qaeda, further evidence that the remediation of image munitions is now 
unpredictable and beyond the control of specific social groups.
Chapter Five, ‘Executions’, examines another important part of the image warfare 
theatre of war. To begin, I discuss three related and symbolically powerful terrorist 
tactics: hijackings, hostage-takings and hostage executions. I explore how hijackings 
and hostage-takings are conducted to produce a strong media presence, reinforce us 
versus them distinctions and maintain media interest for the duration of the crisis. I 
similarly explore how hostage executions are carried out for the same reasons as 
hijackings and hostage-takings but how they are also conducted with the intention of 
manufacturing and deploying powerful image munitions. I discuss these terrorist
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tactics with specific reference to airplane hijackings pre-9/11, the hijacking of the 
cruise ship Achille Lauro, the Aldo Moro hostage-taking and execution and the 
Beirut hostage crisis from the 1980s. I then conceptualise and distinguish between 
two categories of hostage: ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ and also engage Jean 
Baudrillard on hostages and ‘symbolic exchange’, before turning to examine 
contemporary hostage-takings and executions in the war on terror, specifically: 
Daniel Pearl, Nick Berg, Kenneth Bigley and Alan Johnston. These hostage-takings 
and executions are all symbolically powerful; this is partly proven by the Johnston 
hostage-taking but also by the fact that a plot to kidnap and behead a British Muslim 
soldier in Birmingham has been foiled and the fact that writers and directors have 
also begun to appropriate this symbolism in their fictional depictions of the war on 
terror. Hostage execution image munitions have since also been picked up and 
deployed by new media actors with intentions that are entirely distinct from A1 
Qaeda, evidence of the uncontrollability of images in the current rhizomatic media 
system. I also explore how executions have been misjudged in the war on terror, 
especially by America but also by the new Iraqi government. I discuss how although 
death images of Uday and Qusay Hussein were released to the media in an attempt to 
win over the hearts and minds of Iraqis, they have instead been picked up and 
deployed by A1 Qaeda against the Bush administration and also picked up and 
remediated by new media actors with intentions that are entirely distinct from both 
the Bush administration and A1 Qaeda. The same mistakes were again made by the 
Bush administration, but also by the new Iraqi government, with the transformation 
of the capture/trial/execution of Saddam Hussein into a media spectacle. Again this 
was done to try and win the hearts and minds of Iraqis but instead it resulted in A1 
Qaeda picking up and deploying these damaging image munitions against the Bush 
administration and the new Iraqi government. Since, new media actors have also 
picked up and deployed these Saddam Hussein image munitions with intentions that 
are distinct from the Bush administration, the new Iraqi government or indeed A1 
Qaeda -  proof, once again, that the spectacle of execution can no longer be 
controlled in the internet age.
Chapter Six, ‘Abuses’, discusses another part of the image warfare theatre of war. 
However, this case study is distinct from my previous case studies because rather 
than examining image munitions that were produced with the specific intention of
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being weaponized and deployed in the war of images. Instead, I examine abuses in 
the war on terror that were not meant to be made public but which have since been 
picked up and weaponized in the war on terror against the Bush administration and 
the Blair government. I also discuss how war abuses have largely remained out of 
sight but how when they have been made public they have quickly been mobilized 
by anti-war protesters and popular culture and I also discuss Nicholas Mirzoeff s 
account of ‘The Empire of Camps’ -  the so-called invisible war on terror -  and its 
role in image warfare. This leads onto a discussion of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse 
scandal and when the Abu Ghraib images were in fact transformed into damaging 
image munitions. I also illustrate this discussion with an examination of a selection 
of the Abu Ghraib image munitions and also image remediations -  produced by new 
media actors who have picked up and deployed the Abu Ghraib image munitions 
with intentions that are distinct from either the American soldiers who originally shot 
them or anti-war protesters, NGO’s and A1 Qaeda who have deployed them; all 
evidence of the uncontrollable circulation of images in the information age. 
Attention then turns to both Guantanamo Bay and the Extraordinary Rendition 
programme -  two other features of the invisible war on terror -  and here I survey 
their circulation through witness testimony, reports and images and their remediation 
by new media actors; further evidence of the deterritorialised and unpredictable 
circulation of images in the internet age. I then discuss General Sir Michael 
Jackson’s announcement of an investigation into the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by some 
British soldiers and how this was immediately followed by the publication of 
damaging faked prisoner abuse images in The Daily Mirror. This episode, I argue, 
has had major implications for discussions about the invisibility/visibility of abuse in 
the war on terror and about the relationship between real and faked abuse images. I 
also discuss how Britain eventually released image munitions featuring the real abuse 
of Iraqi prisoners by some British soldiers at Camp Breadbasket. This is further 
evidence that Britain misunderstands image warfare and still believes that it can 
control the spectacle of abuse in the war on terror. In conclusion, I consider the so- 
called ‘own goal effect’ of abuse image munitions in the war on terror and the early 
attempts by President Barack Obama to promote transparency, bring to an end the 
invisible war on terror and exorcise Bush’s legacy.
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Overall this thesis argues that the image circulates differently through contemporary 
society, identifying a transition from a mass communication system to a rhizomatic 
communication system, also that contemporary war has changed: shifting from 
techno-war to image warfare. I also show how in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century the American and British governments and militaries have failed to adapt to 
image warfare, instead fighting the war on terror with an outdated techno-war way of 
warfighting; whereas A1 Qaeda has instead embraced image warfare. I argue that 
America and Britain needs to respond to these new security challenges by embracing 
image warfare if they wish to regain a strategic advantage back from A1 Qaeda in the 
war on terror. Also, I show how an embracing of ideas found in Media Studies and 
Visual Culture can give International Relations theory a more sophisticated 
understanding of new media and images. This, I hope, will encourage more IR 
theorists to engage with literature in Media Studies, Visual Culture and beyond and 
properly theorise this new theatre of war rather than simply recycling techno-war.
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Chapter One 
War/Images and International Relations Theory
Introduction
This chapter surveys the study of the relationship between war and images within 
International Relations theory. That relationship, like propaganda, is perhaps as old 
as war itself. However, in the contemporary period, it has changed radically and in 
ways that IR theory does not always fully appreciate. As I will show, theories of 
conflict and strategy have come to recognise the importance in war of information, 
news and images and are preoccupied with trying to dominate this field as one might 
in the conventional battle theatre. But the challenge that theorists must rise to today 
is posed by the fact that information, news and images cannot now be dominated by 
anyone.
To make possible further consideration of these issues, this chapter begins by 
examining contemporary transformations of the production, distribution and 
reception of mediated information. I argue that this is best conceptualised as a shift 
from a “mass-media” model of communication to what I describe as a 
networked/rhizomatic model of communication. I then also consider the recent 
history of the relationship between media and war, drawing attention to the major 
changes in the structure and circulation of media coverage of conflict: exploring in 
turn the Vietnam War (the first television war), the 1991 Gulf War (the first real-time 
war), the Kosovo Conflict (the first internet war) and finally September 11, 2001 and 
the war on terror (which, as I will show, heralds the emergence of a full-blown image 
warfare). Once I have mapped these step-changes in media form and structure, and 
in the intersection of war and media, I turn to an examination of the work of key IR 
theorists with an interest in conceptualising and analysing ‘image warfare’. I first 
explore F rancis Debrix’s theorisation of the construction of a ‘risk’ or ‘terror’ 
discourse. An important aspect of Debrix’s work is that he extends the reach of IR 
theory into a consideration of the impact and significance of representations from 
within popular culture. I then examine Richard Jackson’s work on the role of
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language in the construction of the discourse of the war on terror showing how his 
approach opens up new and important terrain but, however, it is also limited by a 
conception of language that underplays the specific force and mobility of images. 
Stuart Croft has, perhaps more than anyone, contributed greatly to our capacity to 
theorise and analyse the construction of a war on terror meta-narrative and does so 
with reference to both visual and popular culture. In particular his conception of the 
‘crisis cycle’ provides a useful framework for analysis. After examining Croft I go 
on to consider Milena Michalski and James Gow’s argument that moving images are 
the key weapons in contemporary war. Theirs is, as I show, an important argument 
but -  again -  limited by attention to a single mode of media, the cinematic/televisual 
narrative, and thus unable to recognise important aspects of the power and mobility 
of the still image.
In exploring Michael J. Shapiro’s work on what he refers to as a ‘new violent 
cartography’ and also his exploration of its counter-spaces -  specifically 
international film festivals. I show how it is necessary to acknowledge the variety of 
spaces in and through which not only narratives but also images may flow. Finally, I 
explore the crucial work of James Der Derian who, in his journey through the 
American RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) war machine, the Military- 
Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network or MIME-NET, shows clearly how the 
Pentagon’s RMA inspired way of warfighting has become outdated in an age of 
image warfare.
As I will show, IR theory has begun to make great advances towards appreciating 
and understanding the importance of images, their production, circulation, content 
and form, to contemporary ideologies and cultures of conflict. This has also made it 
possible to comprehend that the image is also a tool of war, a weapon deployed into 
distinct fields of battle. However, to fully understand that field it is also important to 
understand more about images themselves and, crucially, appreciate how the 
contemporary media landscape has changed to such an extent that traditional 
concepts of how to seize, control and retain a terrain can no longer be applied there. 
I now turn to a discussion of the changing form of media actors, their objects and 
subjects.
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M edia Actors, Objects and Subjects
Concerning myself with media does not mean that my concern is restricted to a 
single phenomenon or activity but, rather, with relationships between parties to forms 
of communicative transfer. To understand the place of media in, for instance, the 
‘war on terror’ I need, then, to attend to the relationship between a diverse range of 
institutions, persons, groups, things and so on. Perhaps the most straightforward way 
to begin grasping something of the (changing) quality and tone of these relationships 
is to think in terms of media actors, media objects and media subjects. Here, media 
‘actors’ refers to both the persons and the institutions dedicated to the refining of the 
raw material of events and its conversion into ‘news’. What they produce are 
‘objects’ the texts (written, audio, visual and so on) that then circulate, are made 
available in some way, to the ‘subjects’ who consume them (also in various ways).
The actions of media actors are governed by a variety of forces. This includes of 
course the perceived interests of media institutions, which may also shape the 
information media actors produce. Media institutions are generally if not exclusively 
commercial and reliant on advertising revenue. They are therefore shaped to some 
extent by the need to meet market objectives, perhaps also by public relations 
advisors and advertisers. But media actors’ behaviours are also shaped by their own 
internal routines and traditions: tacit as well as explicit rules which shape what 
information can and cannot be produced and shown by a media institution. In 
addition they are influenced by official, social as well as governmental regulations a 
breach of which may occasion censure.23 Finally, media actors are also influenced 
by the kind of technology that is available. Without the aid of technology raw 
information about events taking place in the world cannot be reported. Marshall 
McLuhan captures this perfectly with his statement: the medium is the message.24 
Technology is therefore a vehicle of communication but not one that is entirely 
neutral in its effects. At its simplest the processes of media communication may be 
conceived as simply involving the formation of a message sent to a receiver. 
However, the history of media theory is the history of the increasing complexity of 
such a model of communication and as I will show the contemporary developments
23 Hall, 'Encoding, Decoding', pp. 507-18
24 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 19
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in media and communication technologies have had a profound effect on who and 
what can be a ‘media actor’.
Objects are the products produced by media actors and disseminated to audiences. 
The nature of these objects may be greatly shaped by some of the same forces that 
affect media actors including commercial interests, routines, traditions, regulations 
and technologies. For instance, famously, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky 
have identified five primary news filters which, they argue, shape the selection and 
presentation of news material: ownership, advertising, sourcing, flak and anti­
communism.25 But in addition to these ideological forces, what is important to note 
is the extent to which media outputs are packaged objects created in line with rules 
not only of institutions but also of genre and form that are then inserted into the 
news-cycle via a news broadcast and then circulated to audiences. Indeed, the news 
broadcast itself is a genre invented by media actors for the dissemination of objects 
to audiences but which now defines the ways in which actors make and produce 
news. But these are changing under the pressure of new technologies. News 
broadcasts appear on all media platforms and although the format of the news 
broadcast and the kind of objects used will vary depending on the platform and the 
technology at the disposal of the media actor what is consistent across all news 
broadcasts is the use of inserted objects to help convey messages to audiences. 
Objects can also be described as texts (and images) as they are all forms of 
communication. A news broadcast therefore is the product of a complex 
intertextuality of objects, becoming ever more complex with each new media 
technology, as audiences can now consume the news in varied ways and as the 
context of texts and objects continues to change.
Given the complex intertextuality and the range of forces that might shape the 
objects of media production, it is clear that communication models need to be more 
complex than those developed by early communication theorists such as Claude E. 
Shannon and Warren Weaver. Their ‘information model’ simply described the 
conversion of information into a message, passed through a transmitter which 
converts the message into a signal which, when received, can be turned back into a
25 Edward S. Herman, and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy o f  the 
Mass Media (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 2
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consumable message.26 As Stuart Hall demonstrated in his ‘encoding/decoding’ 
model of communication27 codes and signs are contained within all media messages 
which are to be understood, and analysed, as distinct moments within the 
communicative process, their coding and the subtleties of their decoding are vital and 
complex parts of the overall process. According to Debbie Lisle, Hall’s model 
challenges this position on two points:
First, [Hall] suggests that all media texts are polysemic; that is, each 
document -  a television show, a photograph, a novel -  contains a number of 
possible interpretations. What happens in the process of communication is 
that all these different interpretations are gathered up and squashed into a 
preferred meaning that serves dominant political agendas. Second, [Hall] 
suggests that there is no guarantee that the preferred meaning encoded into a 
media text by its producers will be read in the intended way by its consumers. 
Certainly many people will ‘get the message’, but many people will not -  and 
some will deliberately refuse it.
One effect of Hall’s model then is to foreground the complexities of audience 
consumption of ‘reading’. Hall’s model shows that the audience is indeed diverse 
and unpredictable rather than simply being uniform and predictable. This brings us 
to the ‘subjects’ of media processes: the audiences that consume media objects and 
that are diverse and highly unpredictable to such an extent that media actors can 
never fully predict how such subjects will respond to objects. Furthermore, in the 
contemporary period the complexity of the relationship between media actors and 
subjects has increased dramatically, in ways that constitute a fundamental change 
and in ways that impact on media and war. Where the mass communication model 
describes a system characterised by a few dominant media actors, who produce a 
limited range of products for dissemination to a largely undifferentiated audience it is 
now clear that communication is not such a straightforward affair and there is not 
always a centralised, top-down flow of information. In the traditional model 
communication is a producer-led business with a privileged position also occupied 
by governments and militaries concerned to censor and control information. It is just 
this kind of domination that is made more complex as communication technologies
26 See Claude E. Shannon, and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory o f  Communication
(Chicago, IL: University o f Illinois, 1998)
27 Hall, 'Encoding, Decoding', pp. 507-18
28 Debbie Lisle, 'How Do We Find out What's Going on in the World?' in Global Politics: A New
Introduction, eds. Jenny Edkins and Maja Zehfuss (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 161
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have become more affordable, and this has changed not only the media landscape but 
also the actors, objects and subjects that move within it. Today there are many kinds 
of media outlet that compete with each other for the attention of audiences who have 
access to an ever more diverse range of media content from an expanding number of 
devices.
The overall effect of this has been somewhat paradoxical. As media platforms, 
products and audiences have diversified so media conglomerates have become ever 
larger in an attempt to maintain their dominant position. Media conglomerates -  
such as Time Warner, Disney and News Corporation — have used their significant 
resources to proliferate and expand their ownership of a diverse range of different 
media. For example Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation has acquired companies 
concerned with: books, newspapers, magazines, music, radio, film studios and 
television broadcasting. In owning multiple companies across different media News 
Corporation is able to produce a more diverse range of media content. Yet, at the 
same time as this concentration of ownership there has also been a decentralising of 
media use and control, as a consequence of radical technological change that has had 
significant effects on audiences, or subjects, of media communication.
The development of satellite and cable broadcasting and twenty-four hour real-time 
news has revolutionized communication. It has significantly increased airspace, and 
made communication technologies increasingly accessible to new media actors, able 
to set up new channels, to produce and disseminate their own content ready to be 
consumed by new audiences. Cable News Network (CNN) pioneered twenty-four 
hour news broadcasting and by the time of the 1991 Gulf War had also pioneered 
real-time news coverage, presenting landmark coverage of the war as it was 
unfolding. This, as Lisle argues, began to alter the balance of power between state 
and media actors:
Such intense media saturation during the Gulf War increased the power of the
media to determine how governments responded to international crises.
Indeed, throughout the 1990s people identified the ‘CNN effect’, in which the
military no longer works in a pre-emptive mode (that is, controlling and
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censoring reporters during war), but now works in a reactive mode where it is 
forced to respond -  sometimes militarily -  to issues raised by the media.29
CNN, however, reinforces the dominant mass communication model. It is a 
centralised media actor that produces news content for dissemination to a mass 
audience. Although satellite and cable broadcasting offers increased choice for 
audiences, they are still largely owned and controlled by traditional media actors, 
such as News Corporation which owns BSkyB. However, the development of non- 
Westem news channels has been important in changing the balance of media power. 
A twenty-four hour news network, A1 Jazeera was set up by the Emir of Qatar, in 
1996, as a direct challenge to CNN. Although A1 Jazeera is a centralized media actor 
-  like CNN -  it challenges Western domination of the news media. It was not until 
after the September 11th attacks when A1 Jazeera became true competition for CNN 
and other Western news channels. Following 9/11 A1 Jazeera began airing bin Laden 
videos and from here these video messages were quickly picked up by Western news 
networks which circulated them internationally. A1 Jazeera has since built a 
formidable international reputation for airing challenging content, such as suicide 
video wills and hostage videos, which other networks would not premier. However, 
the BBC and CNN have since routinely aired this challenging content second-hand 
via A1 Jazeera.
A1 Jazeera is therefore a significant new media actor. It produces diverse news 
content that previously would not have received airtime and allows it to circulate 
internationally. As Philip Seib observes, ‘[s]atellite television channels continue to 
proliferate and their impact on politics and society generally continues to grow’, but 
also, as he continues, ‘[a]s the satellites these channels use whirl through space, the 
A1 Jazeera effect is also receiving a boost from the tools of cyberspace.’ A1 
Jazeera, then, has been very important in challenging Western domination of the 
news media. But, equally important in forcing governments and militaries into a 
‘reactive mode’ where they have to respond to content being produced by new media 
actors, who have access to a range of other new media technologies that yet further
29 Ibid, p. 154
30 Seib, The Al-Jazeera Effect, p. 45
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complicate the relationship between media, objects and subjects and that do so in 
ways which make control of media much more challenging.
Although the internet and mobile phones have been around for some time it was not 
until the turn of the twenty-first century when these communication technologies 
became accessible to the masses. Content is now no longer solely controlled from 
the top-down by a few powerful media actors forming a centralised network. Rather, 
content can often bypass traditional media actors’ altogether as new actors and 
subjects communicate directly with each other via the internet and through mobile 
phones. Today’s new media environment is dominated by User Generated Content 
(UGC) and citizen journalism where audiences are now able to start creating, 
uploading and disseminating their own new media content for audiences to consume 
and where traditional media actors can also be found sourcing content.
Blogging, for example, has become an increasingly popular way to distribute content 
over the internet. It is immediate and direct. Once a message has been typed out by 
a new media actor and they have pressed the publish button then the content is 
immediately available for an international audience to read, comment on or indeed 
appropriate. In the war on terror the warblog has become popular with those 
journalists dissatisfied with the restrictions of mainstream publishing, with soldiers 
who want to put their thoughts and opinions about the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
into the public domain and with citizens in the Afghanistan and Iraq theatres of 
conflict (something I will return to in Chapter Two).
YouTube is another popular way to distribute new media content. It too is immediate 
and direct. Once a user has finished uploading their video content they can then 
immediately publish it for others to view, comment on and appropriate. In the war 
on terror a number of soldiers have uploaded content to YouTube. Some of this 
content is innocent, showing soldiers during their down time playing football in the 
desert or re-enacting Peter Kay’s charity video of Tony Christie’s song: Is This the 
Way to Amarillo. But some of this content is of a more challenging nature, 
presenting soldiers discussing their number of ‘kills’ or showing somewhat gruesome 
scenes from battles (examples of what some have come to call war pom). This kind 
of footage has come under critical scrutiny not only for its bad taste but also as
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potentially posing a significant challenge to operational security in the Afghanistan 
and Iraq theatres of operation. However, the British and American militaries have 
been unable to ban this kind of content from appearing on YouTube completely (see 
Chapters Three to Six).
Social Networking Sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, also facilitates the 
publication of new media content and its distribution via the internet. New media 
actors can use such sites to write messages, upload audio, image and video content 
and then to mobilize campaigns. Mobile phones also enable users to now take 
photos and videos, connect to the internet and publish directly and immediately 
without the intervention of news networks (see Chapters Two, Four and Five).
All of this amounts to an important, even a profound, shift in the balance between 
media actors, objects and subjects. Hall’s model introduces the singular significance 
of media objects, requiring that they be attended to as a determinate moment in the 
communications process. In so doing, and in emphasising the complexity with 
which audiences may consume media objects, Hall greatly disturbed traditional 
media models, introducing into the circuit elements from the routines, traditions and 
contexts of media actors and institutions, audiences and media forms themselves. In 
showing the extent to which these were embedded in wider social and economic 
circuits he also showed how the expectations of media actors and the responses of 
media subjects could be connected, completing a closed circuit. However, new 
media technologies disturb such a model even more. As I have shown, such 
technologies do not merely enable a few new media actors but make it possible for 
audiences to become producers, responding to, commenting on and creating their 
own media objects. At the same time media actors are making use of citizen 
journalism or carrying the homemade productions of activists become audiences. 
Consequently, the environment in which media objects are produced, transmitted and 
received has become increasingly complex and unpredictable and the positions of 
audiences and actors unstable, even reversible. This has also changed, dramatically, 
the circulation of media objects between parties and, importantly as I will show 
shortly, made it possible for objects to be circulated, and recirculated between varied 
audiences and producers, making them simultaneously freer than ever before (images
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for instance may pop up in all sorts of unexpected and incongruous contexts) yet they 
are also more dependent on context for intelligibility and meaning.
This is not to suggest that there has been any sort of destruction of mass broadcasting 
or media conglomerates or that state control and regulation of media has become 
impossible. James Der Derian has examined attempts to do so as part of 
investigating the Pentagon’s contemporary reimagining of the mass communication 
model: the military-industrial-media-entertainment network (MIME-NET). He 
explores how the Pentagon has teamed up with the University of Southern California, 
with industry in the Silicon Valley, the media and Hollywood entertainment 
executives and established the Institute for Creative Technologies (ICT).31 The 
MIME-NET is positioned at the heart of the contemporary American war machine 
and is the home of a number of collaborative projects -  such as the development of 
new military technologies (weapons and communication systems), military 
simulations, the production of a war script for invading Afghanistan, the designing of 
a media centre in Doha, Qatar and the manufacture of a number of media spectacles. 
However, the extent to which the MIME-NET assumes that information can still be 
controlled is yet to be established (see my discussion of the MIME-NET later in this 
Chapter) and as a result it fails to fully grasp the complexity and the challenges of the 
new media age. For the scope and scale of the transformation of the media 
environment is such as to require a development in the way I conceive of 
communication away from variants of mass communication to what I will call a 
‘rhizomatic’ model of communication.
I take this term in part from Aijun Appardurai who writes of how, ‘[t]he world we 
live in now seems rhizomatic, even schizophrenic, calling for theories of 
rootlessness, alienation, and psychological distance between individuals and groups 
on the one hand, and fantasies (or nightmares) of electronic propinquity on the
32other.’ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari identify two specific examples of 
rhizomes within the plant kingdom: tubers and bulbs33 and, from within the animal
31 Der Derian, Virtuous War. 2nd eds.
32 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions o f  Globalization (Minnesota, MN:
University o f Minnesota, 1996), p. 29
33 Gilles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Translated
by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, MN: University o f Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 6
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kingdom, ants.34 What they draw attention to is the way in which both spread out not 
through the building of a vertical hierarchy but horizontally, spreading out and 
establishing new kinds of connection. In contemporary society, they argue, the 
rhizome
ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of 
power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences and social struggles. A 
semiotic chain is like a tuber agglomerating very diverse acts, not just 
linguistic, but also perceptive, mimetic, gestural, and cognitive: there is no 
language in itself, nor are there any linguistic universals, only a throng of 
dialectics, patois, slangs, and specialized languages. There is no ideal 
speaker-listener, any more than there is a homogeneous linguistic 
community.35
This description of a rhizomatic society perfectly encapsulates the shape and 
experience of the internet which facilitates the ceaseless opening up of connections 
with different semiotic chains, furthermore, like a tuber, if one node is cut off from 
the network then the connection is not fully broken -  the node simply opens a new 
connection with another semiotic chain and so the network continues. That network 
includes, of course, not only the sites and modes of communication but the producers 
and consumers as well -  with the precise location of each shifting depending on 
where -  and when -  they form part of the chain. As I have shown one mistake of 
traditional models of media communication was to assume that the audience is 
uniform and predictable. As Hall argues, this is not the case. Rather the audience 
is diverse. Deleuze and Guattari take this further arguing that ‘there is no ideal 
speaker-listener, any more than there is a homogenous linguistic community’. Theirs 
is a description of a complex, heterogeneous audience that may be active as well as 
passive: just the kind of audience that today populates and uses the internet and that 
creates and consumes new media content. In the rhizomatic communication model 
messages are subject to unpredictable circulation and as such the traditional 
relationship between media actors, objects and subjects is now also increasingly 
unpredictable. This is thanks in part to a greater diversity of media actors and 
subjects. Subjects now also have the ability to produce their own objects without
34 Ibid, p. 9
35 Ibid, p. 7
36 Hall, 'Encoding, Decoding1, pp. 507-18
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having to first engage with traditional media actors and subjects can now also dictate 
what kinds of objects traditional media actors’ source and disseminate.
The utility of this kind of conception of media is well demonstrated by Patrick Fuery 
and Kelli Fuery who have adapted Deleuze’s and Guattari’s theory to help theorise 
images.37 They have explored how defining images of key events become distributed 
and copied throughout society, like socially based rhizomes opening up new 
connections with ‘semiotic chains.’ They reveal that ‘[w]hat is perhaps of even 
greater significance, however, is that these connections are not just to other images. 
Instead the rhizomatic feature of connections extends across a vast array of subjects, 
and is in a constant state of production.’38 The rhizomatic nature of images helps to 
explain the complex journeys of images in the war on terror and the ability of these 
powerful images to circulate throughout society. Images have the ability to 
transcend different media platforms and social contexts. Once an image crosses over 
from one medium to another or from one social group to another a new state of 
production immediately begins. Images, like rhizomes, are also resilient, according 
to Deleuze and Guattari: ‘A rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it 
will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines.’39 This is a good 
description which also translates well to a conceptualisation of the weaponizing of 
images: once an original image has been released any attempts then made to censor 
or delete it will be futile. The image can immediately be copied appearing across 
multiple media platforms and different image contexts. A good example of this is 
the photomontage work by the polemic artists Peter Kennard and Martha Rosier. 
Both artists have made powerful political statements through their photomontage 
work and the remediation of iconic images. Peter Kennard has concisely described 
the motivation behind his art and it serves as a good description of the image as a 
rhizome in a constant new state of production:
The photojoumalist goes out and takes the pictures; I sit in a room with the 
tools of my trade and try to pummel these pictures into revealing invisible 
connections, disconnecting them from direct representation into statement 
and argument. Although, compared to a photojoumalist, I’m grounded and
37 Fuery and Fuery, Visual Cultures, p. 110
38 Ibid, p. 113
39 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 9
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stuck at my safe desk or in my darkroom under safelight, I still feel that my 
subject has to be made up from events from around the world.40
My point here is that no longer can a few powerful media actors control the flow of 
information or images; instead content production now takes place anywhere. 
Images now float freely. As a result, Appadurai believes ‘that the United States is no 
longer the puppeteer of a world system of images but is only one node of a complex 
transnational construction of imaginary landscapes.’41
The importance of this for IR theory and Strategic Studies is that it makes possible 
new kinds of political, civil and potentially military actions. For example anti-war 
protest movements and pro-war movements both exploit the rhizomatic nature of the 
media to interfere with official media. A range of actions of varied motivations and 
forms are taking place which undermine and corrupt the format of images by 
reinserting them into unexpected parts of the media universe. Examples of this that I 
will explore in more detail later on include YouTube video parodies of hostage 
execution videos (see Chapter Five) or parodies of bin Laden in movie posters (see 
Chapter Three).
If International Relations theorists want to understand media/images in contemporary 
war then no longer can they think of the media in terms of media actors who produce 
information and disseminate it to passive audiences. IR theorists must instead realize 
that the relationship is now more complex: audiences are more diverse and the 
relationship between media actors and audiences is now a site and form of 
contestation. Communications of all kinds can be made directly over the internet 
rather than passing through central networks controlled by a few powerful media 
actors. This shift from a mass communication model to a rhizomatic communication 
model is singularly important to understanding why it is that governments and 
militaries can no longer control the spectacle of war.42 In the age of mass
40 Peter Kennard, Dispatches from an Unofficial War Artist -  Extract, Available at:
http://www.peterkennard.com/main/home set.htm. Accessed on 19 January 2008
41 Appadurai, Modernity at Large, p. 31
42 My understanding o f the spectacle o f war is adapted from Guy Debord’s description o f  a spectacle: 
‘The spectacle is not a collection o f images; rather, it is a social relationship between people that is 
mediated by images.’ See Guy Debord, The Society o f  the Spectacle. Translated by Donald 
Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books, 1999), p. 12. Paraphrasing Debord -  the spectacle o f war
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communication governments and militaries were able to either censor the 
information leaving war zones -  with information first having to pass through 
centrally controlled military censors -  or control the information that journalists had 
access to -  via press pools. However, in the rhizomatic age, information is 
increasingly sourced and disseminated via decentralised new media -  such as the 
internet, mobile phones, blogs, YouTube and Social Networking Sites (like Facebook 
and Twitter). It therefore, lies beyond the immediate control of governments, 
militaries and media conglomerates and becomes instead not only a tool of political 
and military conflict but, as I will now see, one of its theatres.
W ar and Images
The process of visualising war is almost as old as warfare itself: from ancient cave 
paintings and hieroglyphs in Egypt, to ancient Greek pottery, through Renaissance 
art, to early twentieth century propaganda, the television age and beyond.43 What are 
consistently present in the background of historical wars are propaganda and the 
mass communication model. During the twentieth century (often characterized as 
the age of mass media) images and propaganda -  a tool of persuasion used to gain 
public support -  became more sophisticated. Nicholas Reeves describes the way in 
which, at the start of the century, the mass media were conceived of as ‘either a 
‘magic bullet’, capable of inflicting propaganda wounds on the mass audience that 
was powerless to resist, or as an ‘hypodermic needle’ in which, once again, the 
masses could not resist the messages which were being injected into its body 
politic.’44 However, as the century progressed, the conception of propaganda, and its 
use, became ever more sophisticated.
The Second World War saw the mass media enlisted in the war effort and was an 
important turning point in terms of war propaganda and public diplomacy. Prior to 
the declaration of war ‘the arts’ (including images) were already being mobilized, 
simultaneously with ‘the armies’ of both Britain and Germany and others. As an
is not a collection o f war images; rather, it is a social relationship between people that is mediated by 
war images.
43 See David D. Perlmutter, Visions o f  War: Picturing Warfare from the Stone Age to the Cyber Age
(New York, NJ: St. Martin's Griffin, 2001)
44 Nicholas Reeves, The Power o f Film Propaganda: Myth or Reality? (London: Cassell, 1999), p. 5
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arms-race ensued, so a similar arts-race was also being conducted by the 
Propaganda Ministries of these countries. Artists, writers, directors, conductors and 
so forth were employed to produce, firstly, morale-boosting material and secondly 
material with the intention of striking fear into the hearts of their enemy. In Britain 
the arts-race, according to Reeves, ‘saw unprecedented co-operation, both between 
the Ministry [of Information] and the [British film] industry and within the various 
constituent elements of the industry itself.’45 Z. A. B. Zeman, in Nazi Propaganda, 
shows how Josef Goebbels, the Propaganda Minister of the Nazi Party during the 
Second World War, understood images and knew how to manufacture and release 
‘the right image at the right time.’46
Propaganda at this time was viewed in a very different way to today. Philip 
Hammond argues that whereas ‘in the past propaganda generally played a secondary 
role, aimed at securing public support for a military venture,’47 more recently ‘the 
point of the missions undertaken by the Western military has often seemed to be 
primarily their propaganda value rather than, say, the acquisition of territory or the 
achievement of some strategic goal.’48 What Hammond describes is a definite shift 
in the positioning of propaganda within contemporary warfare. Whereas in the past 
propaganda was essentially seen as playing a secondary role within war, today 
propaganda has assumed a primary position within it. That primacy of propaganda 
within war was confirmed when the media spectacle of September 11, 2001 was 
communicated globally as a declaration of war, by A1 Qaeda, against the West. This 
has also resulted in the opening up of a new theatre of war: techno-war has given 
way to image warfare. According to Colin Mclnnes: ‘In the previous decade, war 
had become something conducted at a safe distance. But on 11 September the 
attacks were at the heart of the West, against the capital of the United States and 
against one of its most famous and most visited cities.’49 ‘Distant suffering’50
45 Ibid, p. 160
46 Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda (New York, NJ: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 36
47 Philip Hammond, Media, War and Postmodernity (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 41
48 Ibid, p. 41
49 Colin Mclnnes, 'A Different Kind o f War? September 11 and the United States' Afghan War'.
Review o f  International Studies 29, no. 2 (2003), p. 171
50 See Luc Boltanski, Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999) and Lilie Chouliaraki, The Spectatorship o f  Suffering (London Sage 
Publications, 2006)
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collapsed and New York instead ‘became the sufferer.’51 In response President 
George W. Bush, with much international support, declared a war against terror.
The following four sections of this chapter discuss in more detail this changing 
relationship between images and war from the Vietnam War, through the First Gulf 
War, the Kosovo Conflict to September 11th and the war on terror. I will explore: the 
effect of the televising of war and the ways in which journalists were able to operate 
unilaterally from the war theatre; the effect of real-time communication on war and 
the ways in which the Pentagon sought to develop a new way of warfighting and also 
to control the flow of information to the news media. The impact of the internet on 
war and how this allowed the American military to have greater interoperability, but 
how it also allowed journalists to have greater access to information in the war 
theatre, and finally, how image warfare was realised with the September 11 attacks 
and the war on terror. As I will show the American government and military have 
struggled to maintain control of the spectacle of war as society has moved away from 
a mass media system to a more rhizomatic and diverse media system which has in 
turn made information and images about war into more than a merely secondary 
element but a full-blown theatre of conflict. Furthermore, what has since become 
clear about this new age of warfare is the inability of Western militaries to respond 
effectively to these new image related challenges. Instead of having to deal once 
more with unilateral journalists (as in Vietnam) the challenge is how to deal 
effectively with unilateral terrorists who can deliver dangerous and damaging 
weaponized images directly to editors for immediate circulation. P. J. Crowley 
argues that America is currently losing the battle for hearts and minds in the Islamic
C1}
world while the A1 Qaeda brand has instead become increasingly popular. So far 
Western techno-war strategists have failed to deal effectively with the new image 
warfare theatre of war.
M edia and the Vietnam  War
51 Lilie Chouliaraki, 'Watching 11 September: The Politics o f Pity'. Discourse & Society 15, no. 2-3
(2004), p. 186
52 P. J. Crowley, 'The Battle o f Narratives: The Real Central Front against A1 Qaeda', in The Impact o f
9/11 on the Media, Arts and Entertainment, ed. Matthew J. Morgan (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2009), p. 37
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The Vietnam War is a clear example of the Pentagon attempting to dominate the 
media and finding it more of a challenge to do so than it had expected. When 
America went to war against Vietnam, in March 1965,53 few could have guessed the 
significant long-term impact this war would eventually have. This was when 
postmodern war began.54 Television enabled war, for the first time, to be beamed 
into people’s living rooms. Since World War Two, the war in the Pacific and Korea, 
right up until Vietnam, war had largely been put to the back of the American public’s 
mind. This distancing from the events of war was a coping mechanism but it was 
also due to the fact that war was no longer directly affecting society at home. There 
was no shortage of food, the draft had ended and minimal numbers of American 
soldiers were being killed. All of these factors meant that the hell of war was slowly 
being forgotten. War films about World War Two in both the Western and Pacific 
theatres, like The Great Escape and Sands o f Iwo Jima, were helping to fictionalize 
the events of the Second World War. However, as the war in Vietnam went on, more 
and more American soldiers were being killed and yet more were returning home 
with horrific war wounds: bums, amputated limbs and post traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD). This reconnected families of military personnel and others with the horrors 
of war. As the war continued the draft was eventually reintroduced and unlike in 
World War II it proved very unpopular with some.
Another way in which the American public were reconnecting with war was through 
their televisions. Many homes in America had a television set sitting in the comer of 
the living room and every evening families right across America would sit down and 
tune in to watch the evening news, waiting to see and hear the latest about the war 
over in Vietnam. The nightly news showed the war in ‘Technicolor’ and reporters 
did not shy away from showing scenes of war which sometimes disturbed sections of 
the audience. The main concern of reporters was to communicate the realities of war
53 Much debate still takes place among historians over when the Vietnam War actually began. This is 
because no official declaration o f war was ever actually made; it was more of a process towards all out 
war. Vietnam had been at war with itself since the 1950s, however, when the US Aircraft Carrier 
“Core” entered the region in December 1961 this moved the conflict away from merely being a 
regional dispute to an issue firmly on the American political agenda. The next major event, in terms 
o f the escalation o f war, came in March 1965 when the first US troops were posted into Vietnam. 
This signalled the start o f the war proper as it was then that American soldiers began dying and this 
was when the war shifted from being merely a concept in the publics mind to actually being a reality 
in the minds o f the public.
54 See Chris Hables Gray, Postmodern War: The New Politics o f Conflict (London Routledge, 1997)
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back home rather than getting too caught up with the sometimes delicate sensibilities 
of their audience. Many of the journalists reporting from the theatre of operations 
were operating unilaterally, reporting on events without fear of censorship from the 
Pentagon. Robin Andersen has recorded how:
[pjhotographers captured images of battles fought in the streets of Saigon, 
including wounded U.S. soldiers, and television brought those pictures into 
American living rooms during dinnertime. New satellite technology allowed 
immediate uplinks that made airtime with very little editing...One of the most 
disturbing sequences of the war was caught on film during Tet: the summary 
execution of a Vietcong officer by a South Vietnamese general. Though the 
final sequence of the soldier’s death was edited for television, NBC producer 
Robert J. Northfield described the footage as “the strongest stuff American 
viewers had ever seen.” Photojoumalist Eddie Adams also took stills of the 
street execution, and the images became known as “the shot seen around the 
world.”55
American military censors were ill-prepared to handle television in the warzone 
because they were still adhering to a mass communication model mindset. They 
responded by adapting press conferences for wartime and came up with daily 
military press briefings. These press briefings were an attempt by the military to try 
and regain control of the information and images leaving the war zone by providing 
journalists with ready packaged digests of information. However, these press 
briefings were not taken seriously by the media (and were nicknamed by them ‘the 
five o’clock follies’). As a result many reports were sent back to editors without the 
approval of military censors.
Another method employed by the US military to try and regain control over the 
information leaving the conflict theatre, the deployment of American army 
photographers with military units. This was also not without its problems. Even 
though army photographers were loyal to the military they also had strong loyalties 
with the American public. A case in point would be the My Lai Massacre, from 
March 1968, where US army photographer Ronald L. Haeberle eventually released 
photographs of the massacre and its aftermath to the media. These images along 
with Nick Ut’s Accidental Napalm image -  of a naked girl with burning flesh 
running down a road towards the camera -  and Eddie Adams’s image showing the
55 Robin Andersen, A Century o f  Media, a Century o f  War (New York, NJ: Peter Lang, 2007), p. 49
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execution of a Vietcong officer by a South Vietnamese general have become the 
icons of the Vietnam War.
From start to finish the entire military reaction to cameras and journalists in the 
theatre of operations was strategically wrong. According to Harry G. Summers Jr., 
the Pentagon had mistakenly tried to conceal the realities of war from the viewing
56public when they were all watching in ‘living color’ on a nightly basis. As a result 
support for the war soon began to fall away and large numbers of American civilians 
took to the streets in protest against the war. These protests were also reported by the 
media and thus helped to further spread anti-war sentiment. With hindsight the 
Vietnam War should be considered a war between the media and the military where 
the media were more effective in exploiting the power of television to disseminate 
war information and where the military failed to respond to the new challenges of 
television and so let uncensored images leave the Vietnam theatre of operations.
During the Vietnam War the speed and context of war was such that reports were 
released at delayed intervals. However, the media proved they were better prepared 
for reporting the war than the military were in controlling its reporting. 
Consequently, after the war’s conclusion the American military were forced into a 
period of self imposed international isolation and a major rethink regarding their way 
of warfighting. So began the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)57 and a 
communications revolution, a Revolution in Media Affairs (RMeA), which would 
result in the development of real-time communications/war.
M edia and the First G ulf W ar
The contrast between Vietnam and the 1991 Gulf War was stark. Where the former 
was mediated through television and newspaper images and reports relayed at varied 
times, with official sources contrasting their version of events, the First Gulf War 
took place in real-time, ‘live’ and relayed by military command. The war in the Gulf 
represented a radical change in the military-media relationship. Officially the war
56 Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis o f  the Vietnam War (New York: Presidio
Press, 1995), p. 36
57 See The RMA Debate online resource http://www.comw.org/rma/index.htm]
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began on August 2, 1990 and concluded on February 28, 1991. This war was also 
the first to be reported in real-time and it signified a massive watershed moment in 
terms of postmodern warfare. As Michael P. Clark has argued:
Along with the usual footage of troops marching, planes taking off and 
landing, and tanks rolling out on manoeuvres, the Gulf War also came home 
in exactly the same form that it appeared to many of the people fighting it, as 
an image on the video screen. Watching a blurry shape being framed by the 
electronic sight on a tank, the Iraqi landscape slide past the sighting screen on 
a fighter-bomber, or a bridge grow larger and larger as a smart bomb plunged 
toward its target, the viewer quite literally saw the same image of the war as 
the soldier and in fact did what the soldier did: looked.59
This left audiences feeling that they had actually witnessed the war. But it was 
mediated war, a simulacrum, a Baudrillardian hyperreality. The Pentagon selected 
and released a number of images to the world’s press specifically with the intention 
of their being circulated and becoming the defining images of the conflict, the most 
iconic of which was the footage of PGM’s hitting their targets with supreme 
accuracy. The war was concluded with a spectacular 100-hour ground offensive 
between February 24th and February 28th and all that was missing from it was a 
trumpeted fanfare as coalition forces entered Baghdad. This was indeed the pinnacle 
of ‘spectator-sport war.’60 While coalition forces were busy celebrating as they 
rolled into Baghdad, President George H. W. Bush was also busy celebrating and 
somewhat presumptively declaring that the Vietnam Syndrome had finally been 
“kicked”.
Important lessons had indeed been learnt, by America, since the Vietnam War. The 
value of US soldiers’ lives had changed; no longer were they seen as mere cannon 
fodder. The Pentagon realized that as news audiences watched wars unfolding on 
their television screens, and as the media were highlighting certain stories involving 
certain groups of military personnel it was only natural that audiences would feel an 
increased connection and be deeply affected when soldiers were killed in action. In
58 See Alastair Finlan, The Gulf War 1991 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003)
59 Michael P. Clark, 'The Work o f War after the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', in The Vietnam
War and Postmodernity, ed. Michael Bibby (Boston, MA: The University o f Massachusetts 
Press, 1999), p. 28
60 See Colin Mclnnes, Spectator-Sport War: The West and Contemporary Conflict (London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2002)
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order to try and prevent this ‘negative affect’ from manifesting itself, the Pentagon 
developed a new way of warfighting which relied less on front-line soldiers and more 
on airpower. This new way of warfighting, as noted above, was premiered during 
the 1991 Gulf War. Also, instead of seeing the media as an enemy, the Pentagon 
unveiled plans to integrate the media within the American war process itself. This 
plan was sold to the media as a way to safeguard the lives of journalists as they 
would no longer have to operate unilaterally from dangerous front-line positions. 
This concern for journalist safety was also reflected, by the Pentagon, prior to the 
start of the war when it ordered all journalists out of Baghdad. The military then set 
up press pools at a purpose built facility where information would be distributed 
centrally by the American military through press briefings and this information 
would then be shared throughout the press pools by journalists. These press 
briefings provided journalists with packaged digests of information which could then 
easily be repackaged by journalists and sent back to their editors to be circulated to 
news audiences.
Philip M. Taylor has argued that audiences of the Iraq War were mesmerized by the 
real-time footage of the war.61 But such mesmerizing goes even deeper. The 
journalists themselves were mesmerized by this military manufactured, heavily spun 
footage. They were not critical of the footage but simply circulated it, without 
developing effective ways to cope with the new challenges of reporting war in the 
age of real-time communications. As Cynthia Weber puts it:
What makes CNN so interesting is not only its fusion of news and 
entertainment but also the declaration its acronym makes. CNN does not 
only stand for the Cable News Network. Employing phonetic license, the 
acronym CNN announces that this network stands for the Circulation of Non- 
kNowledge.62
61 Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 14
62 Cynthia Weber, 'The Media, the 'War on Terrorism', and the Circulation o f Non-Knowledge', in
War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7, eds. Daya Kishan Thussu and Des Freedman 
(London: Sage Publications, 2003), p. 190
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According to Robin Andersen: ‘With the exception of Arnett in Baghdad and the 
controversy surrounding his reporting, American officials and military sources
/TO
provided the overwhelming bulk of CNN’s round-the-clock-coverage.’
The First Gulf War was when media events64 and war first came together in real-time 
for specific audiences. As a result, according to Leon Kreitzman, ‘the world is [now] 
seen through a different lens.’65 In some ways aspects of Raymond Williams’ 
argument ‘that cable television will be the final opening of Pandora’s Box, or that 
satellite broadcasting will top out the Tower of Babel’66 became a reality during the 
1991 Gulf War. This development in news, meant that audiences felt that they could 
be real spectators and in a sense participants to the war and also react immediately to 
events as they were unfolding over in the distant Iraqi theatre of operations. Viewers 
were tricked into thinking that they were more than mere spectators. In reality, 
according to Kevin Robins, ‘image technologies...may. ..be mobilised as 
intoxicating and narcotic distractions or defences against the vicissitudes of reality. 
And, at their most extreme, they may be used to construct alternative and
rn
compensatory realities.’
This became a reality during Operation Desert Storm, when much of the footage 
released by the military to the press was clinical PGM footage taken from a safe 
distance. The 1991 Gulf War was effective in terms of war propaganda precisely 
because the American military were able to trick the media into doing their will 
(unlike during the Vietnam War) and thus present to news audiences clinical visuals 
which would not adversely effect morale and fuel anti-war sentiments. This reversal 
of fortunes put the military back in a dominant position over the media.
The 1991 Gulf War saw the start of real-time war. The military also proved that they 
were better prepared to control the centralized flow of war information leaving the 
theatre of operations, while the media instead merely reported -  rather than
63 Andersen, A Century o f  Media, p. 187
64 See Daniel Dayan, and Elihu Katz, Media Events: The Live Broadcasting o f  History (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1994)
65 Leon Kreitzman, The 24 Hour Society (London: Profile Books, 1999), p. 63
66 Raymond Williams, Towards 2000 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 128
67 Kevin Robins, Into the Image: Culture and Politics in the Field o f  Vision (London: Routledge,
1996), p. 123
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questioned -  the official version of events. However, this contemporary domination 
of the military over the media would not last for long.
M edia and the Kosovo Conflict
The difference between the First Gulf War and the Kosovo Conflict was obvious. 
Where the former saw the premiering of real-time communications/war and the 
dominance of official sources, the Kosovo Conflict saw the weaponizing of the 
internet and this new development further complicated the military-media 
relationship.
NATO forces intervened in Kosovo, in 1999, so that the Serbian military, led by 
Slobodan Milosevic, could be ejected thus allowing displaced Kosovar Albanian 
refugees to return to their homeland. First a bombing campaign was undertaken, 
similar to the air campaign during the 1991 Gulf War. This was followed by the 
deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces. The bombing campaign was conducted 
to knock-out certain pre-selected nodes, specifically communication systems and 
transport systems like roads and bridges, before military ground forces were 
deployed. It was hoped that this air campaign would either paralyse the Serbian 
military to such an extent that it would force them to surrender, or, the Serbian
/TO
military’s ability to fight would be severely weakened.
From an audience perspective the NATO bombing campaign was a spectacular, 
made-for-TV event. It shared all the hallmarks of the 1991 Gulf War air campaign: 
missiles were shown being launched by military personnel on aircraft carriers, a safe 
distance from the theatre of operations. Also, footage showing PGMs destroying 
bridges and other carefully selected targets were shown through the media. One 
particular PGM video perfectly reflected Western military concerns about collateral 
damage. The video showed a bridge with a vehicle travelling along it and the bridge 
being destroyed just after the vehicle has cleared it. Footage of missiles was also 
circulated throughout the international media, showing missiles travelling through
68 See Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (London: Vintage, 2001)
49
the night skies, looking as one online observer put it, ‘like flames and falling like 
stars.’69
The second phase of the military operation, the deployment of ground forces, again 
reflected Western concerns about collateral damage. It is significant that NATO 
decided to deploy peacekeeping forces rather than traditional military forces. This 
decision gives the impression that NATO believed that the conventional military 
operations had been concluded with the end of the air campaign. Peacekeeping 
forces are also distinct from traditional military forces as they are mandated to 
maintain the peace and not engage militarily unless their own lives are being directly 
threatened by enemy violence. Therefore they could not engage in skirmishes on the 
ground but only help maintain the peace.
The internet, then a relatively new technology, was mobilized with great effect 
during the war in Kosovo (and it is now referred to as the first internet war). This 
NATO led campaign also saw the auditioning of what James Der Derian has termed 
the RMA’s ‘hybridization of warring and gaming.’70 Thanks to the internet, the 
Western military were able to conduct network-centric warfare where all arms of the 
military were able to communicate with each other in real-time. This meant that for 
the first time instant communications could be made and maintained between the 
military command base, soldiers on the ground, air force personnel and naval forces 
on aircraft carriers thus enabling military planners to respond to real-time situations 
and therefore adapt their plans to take account of these previously unaccountable 
events.
The Serbian military were also reliant on the internet for communications although 
they did not have the same network-centric capabilities as the NATO forces. Prior to 
important Serbian communication nodes being bombed, NATO forces had launched 
an electronic campaign against the Serbian military. They spread disinformation 
through email, they also urged military personnel to defect, tampered with Serbian 
intelligence, planted fake intelligence in Serbian information systems and uploaded
69 Thomas Keenan, 'Looking Like Flames and Falling Like Stars: Kosovo, 'the First Internet War".
Social Identities: Journal for the Study o f  Race, Nation and Culture 7, no. 4 (2001), p. 540
70 James Der Derian, 'War as Game'. The Brown Journal o f  World Affairs 10, no. 1 (2003), p. 39
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computer viruses. This was psychological operations (psyops) for the information 
age.
The internet also had a significant effect on the media and this in turn affected the 
way journalists reported the war. In the 1991 Gulf War the media were caught off 
guard. But journalists had learned valuable lessons from this. Journalists were 
mindful not to rely again solely on military disseminated information. Instead the 
internet was exploited as a new source of information by the mainstream media, 
during the Kosovo Campaign, helping journalists to add depth to their news reports. 
Thomas Keenan has argued that:
At the digital level, and at the speed of light, new fields of action emerged 
and were robustly populated. The channels were open. It was this alternative 
public sphere [the internet] that was put to the most extreme test...in the 
spring of 1999, when the war that had circled around Serbia and Kosovo for71so many years finally landed.
Indeed, the Kosovo Conflict proved, according to Manuel Castells, the clear 
emergence of unofficial media actors and individuals and that:
states are losing the battle over media in the Information Age. The ability of 
information, and images, to diffuse via satellite, video-cassette, [DVD] or the 
Internet has dramatically expanded, so that news black-outs are increasingly 
ineffective in the main urban centers... precisely those places where the
7 ?educated, alternative elites live.
This is because these educated alternative elites mobilized themselves through the 
internet, writing blogs and publishing their accounts of the war for the rest of the 
world to read. From here these words were then circulated through the mainstream 
media. The internet therefore enabled alternative elites in the Kosovo theatre of 
operations to have a voice and communicate this voice clearly, directly and without 
too much censorship to audiences in the West. The internet dominated the course of 
the Kosovo Campaign. While NATO forces were busy exploiting this technology, 
conducting military operations whilst staying in constant communication with their 
commanders and carrying out unprecedented psychological operations (psyops) -  the
71 Keenan, 'Looking Like Flames’, pp. 542-543
72 Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume 2, p. 257
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media were also exploiting this technology and adapting to warfare in the internet 
age.
The Kosovo Conflict marked the start of internet warfare. A distinct new war 
platform had opened up; the military further advanced their psychological operations 
(psyops) and network-centric war while the media mobilized the internet. Once 
again the media routinely questioned the official version of events, thanks in part to 
the emergence of bloggers (eyewitnesses operating online within the theatre of 
operations). Therefore, any military advantage gained in Iraq was soon eroded by 
the media and civilian bloggers in Kosovo. Again the media edged ahead of the 
military in terms of information warfare dominance as military attempts to establish 
one central point of information control were again thwarted.
M edia and Septem ber 11, 2001 and the W ar on Terror
The contrast between the Kosovo Conflict and September 11 /the war on terror were 
marked. Where the former saw the start of internet war, the 9/11 attacks signalled a 
shift towards image warfare. Images did play an important role in the other conflicts. 
However, the other conflicts are defined by real-time communication and the 
internet. On September 11th traditional ways of warfighting became outdated almost 
over night. Even propaganda was promoted from a secondary role in war to one of 
centrality73 as A1 Qaeda weaponized images and deployed them against the West. 
All of the technology at the disposal of the Pentagon and the American Intelligence 
Services had not stopped A1 Qaeda’s 9/11 terrorist attacks. According to John 
Downey and Graham Murdock:
the events of 11 September 2001 heralded a counter-revolution in military 
affairs in which the established weapons of modem guerrilla warfare 
(hijacking, car bombs, suicide bombers, small arms and portable rocket 
launchers), coupled with the global dispersal of combatants effectively 
counteract many of the supposed gains from advanced weapons systems and 
communication networks.74
73 See Philip Hammond, Media, War and Postmodernity (London: Routledge, 2007)
74 John Downey, and Graham Murdock, 'The Counter-Revolution in Military Affairs: The
Globalization o f Guerrilla Warfare', in War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7, eds. 
Daya Kishan Thussu and Des Freedman (London: Sage Publication, 2003), p. 71
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The rules of the game had changed. Anna M. Agathangelou and L. H. M. Ling 
believe that:
On September 11, 2001, terrorists struck at the heart of the capitalist world- 
order. The attack and its targets demonstrated with horrendous efficiency 
that neither global wealth (World Trade Center (WTC)) nor military might 
(the Pentagon) could defend against low-tech, human sacrifices when
7 Smobilized.
W. J. T. Mitchell has also argued that:
The destruction of the towers had no strategic military (as distinct from 
symbolic) importance and the murder of innocent people was, from the point 
of view of the terrorists, merely a regrettable side effect (“collateral damage” 
is the military euphemism) or merely instrumental to the aim of “sending a
K\message” to America.
The media was therefore central to A1 Qaeda’s 9/11 plans especially its plans for the 
World Trade Center. Osama bin Laden was acutely aware that his terrorist 
organization could not hope to compete on traditional military terms with the West 
and needed to find a way to exploit existing systems. The media was an existing 
system that had already been successfully hijacked by terrorists and A1 Qaeda knew 
that the media could again be exploited to disseminate their powerful images of 
terror. In selecting the WTC as a target A1 Qaeda had intentionally selected a 
powerful media spectacle. According to Patrick Fuery and Kelli Fuery:
The Twin Towers were already established images, existing in so many of the 
visual representations of New York (and synecdochically, the USA), and the 
terrorists would have known that their acts would be captured by a variety of 
media. And it is the images of the towers that remain most vivid in people’s 
minds.77
According to Slavoj Zizek:
Is not the endlessly repeated shot of the plane approaching and hitting the 
second WTC tower the real-life version of the famous scene from 
Hitchcock’s Birds, superbly analysed by Raymond Bellour, in which Melanie
75 Anna M. Agathangelou, and L. H. M. Ling, 'Power, Borders, Security, Wealth: Lessons o f Violence
and Desire from September 11'. International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 3 (2004), p. 517
76 W. J. T. Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves o f  Images (Chicago, IL: The
University o f Chicago Press, 2005), p. 13
77 Patrick Fuery, and Kelli Fuery, Visual Cultures and Critical Theory (London: Arnold, 2003), p. 69
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approaches the Bodega Bay pier crossing the bay in a little boat? When, as 
she approaches the warf, she waves to her (future) lover, a single bird (first 
perceived as an indistinguishable dark blot) unexpectedly enters the frame 
from above right, and hits her on the head. Was not the plane which hit the 
WTC tower literally the ultimate Hitchcockian blot, the anamorphic stain 
which denaturalized the idyllic well-known New York landscape?78
The media therefore unwittingly played an important force multiplier role on 
September 11th. They shot and circulated powerful images which have since formed 
the opening chapter of the iconography of the war on terror -  these images were also 
the first of many that have since been manufactured and deployed by both A1 Qaeda 
and Western governments in the war on terror.
In response to the terrorist attacks, America declared a war against the criminal acts 
of 9/11 -  thus showing just how much the rules of the game have indeed changed. In 
order to help strategize this unique war situation the Pentagon enlisted members of 
the media and influential members of the Hollywood entertainment industry, 
gathering them together at the University of Southern California’s Institute for 
Creative Technology, which James Der Derian has termed the MIME-NET. This is 
further evidence of America misunderstanding the changing information 
environment, still trying to control the spectacle of war and the kinds of information 
that journalists can circulate. Part of what was developed from this meeting was a 
war script. The media’s job was then to cover the war in Afghanistan -  America’s 
response to 9/11 -  as acted out by the military.79
The war in Afghanistan began as planned with a big budget remake of a combination 
of the First Gulf War and the Kosovo Conflict opening scenes: only this time A1 
Jazeera was playing the role of CNN. The TV friendly air campaign, or pilot 
episode, contained all of the now familiar elements like tracer fire racing across the 
night skies of Afghanistan. The second part of this war script was planned to be a 
short, sharp ground attack, leading to the defeat of the Taliban and bin Laden’s quick 
capture. This second part of the war script however was cancelled and ended up not 
being filmed. Instead A1 Qaeda responded to the launching of the war in
78 Slavoj Zizek, Welcome to the Desert o f  the Real (London: Verso, 2002). See also Raymond
Bellour, 'System o f a Fragment (on the Birds)', in The Analysis o f  Film, ed. Penley Constance 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000), pp. 28-69
79 Der Derian, Virtuous War. 2nd eds, pp. 240-241
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• 80Afghanistan with what Der Derian has termed ‘a counter air-stnke.’ A1 Jazeera 
aired on October 7, 2001 a video by Osama bin Laden. This video disrupted the 
MIME-NET manufactured war script for the Afghanistan campaign and immediately 
placed all of the media attention back on bin Laden and A1 Qaeda (see Chapter 
Three). After this the original script for Afghanistan was officially abandoned. 
What has since replaced it is a more open-ended campaign, with no quick solutions, 
an enemy (the Taliban) who have absolutely no intention of surrendering any time 
soon and an international terrorist (bin Laden) who has absolutely no intention of 
being physically found.
After the 1991 Gulf War and throughout the 1990s real-time news media developed 
what Piers Robinson describes as ‘the ability of real-time communications 
technology, via the news media, to provoke major responses from domestic 
audiences and political elites to both global and national events.’81 Historically, the 
media were able to elicit emotional responses from audiences in response to the 
aftermath of events like natural disasters and wars and mobilize audiences to send in 
their money and rally governments to organize aid to be sent to the victims. Whereas 
in the 1990s the real-time reporting of events like wars and natural disasters by CNN 
and other news broadcasters has meant that news is now disseminated to audiences 
while it is still unfolding rather than being consumed by audiences in the aftermath 
and when all the immediate policy decisions which need to be made have already 
been made. This has led some, like Robinson, to argue that there exists a “CNN 
Effect” where news broadcasters may elicit actual policy responses from 
governments rather than simply emotional responses from audiences. A key 
example of the CNN Effect is what happened in Somalia in 1992 when President 
George H. W. Bush partly as a reaction to the news coverage of humanitarian crisis 
ordered American military forces into the country. In 1993 The Battle of Mogadishu 
was covered by the media who also reported on how an American Black Hawk 
helicopter had been shot down over Mogadishu and footage was shown of a dead US 
Army Ranger being dragged through the streets. In response to the airing of this 
footage President Bill Clinton took the decision to withdraw American troops from
80 James Der Derian, 'In Terrorem: Before and after 9/11', in Worlds in Collision: Terror and the
Future o f  Global Order, eds. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2002), p. 109
81 Robinson, The CNN Effect, p. 2
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Somalia. This is again evidence of the media influencing the foreign policy 
decision-making process and of the shift in the military-media matrix. Turning to the 
present day, however, and the war on terror, A1 Jazeera is a powerful new media 
actor who today influences the foreign policy decision making process just as CNN 
did during the 1990s. Seib has further elaborated on this shift with his “A1 Jazeera
Effect” concept which accounts for the impact of A1 Jazeera and new media
82technologies on the foreign policy decision making process.
The hunt for bin Laden in the Tora Bora Caves has since descended into a protracted
th •game of cat and mouse. The October 7 bin Laden video has also led to a tit-for-tat 
mimetic battle playing out through A1 Jazeera and more recently over the internet. 
President George W. Bush, on September 20, 2001, in an address made to a joint 
session of Congress and the American people, stated that the war on terror would be 
‘unlike any other [war] we have ever seen.’ He even recognized that ‘[i]t may 
include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in 
success.’84 However, the war on terror has instead proven, to quote Paul Virilio: 
that ‘[w]e are always one war behind...there are not yet any experts in global 
terrorist warfare.’85
Western militaries are currently trapped, convinced that the war on terror will be won 
through a military campaign which is derived from principles developed from the 
most recent RMA and adapted for image warfare. Two of these adaptations, which 
were premiered during the 2003 Iraq War, are: the reviving of the press briefing 
centre and the embedding of journalists. A new press briefing centre was set up at 
Central Command (CENTCOM) in Doha, Qatar -  and this time it was a big budget 
military spectacle that shared all the hallmarks of a Hollywood blockbuster movie, 
not surprising given that it was designed by the Hollywood Art Director George 
Allison. The Pentagon had again built a central platform where senior military 
officials could appear in front of the gathered press to disseminate digests of
82 See Seib, The Al-Jazeera Effect
83 President George W. Bush, 20/09/2001. Address to a Joint Session o f Congress and the American
People, 20 September 2001. Available at:
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November 2008, p. 4
84 Ibid, p. 4
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information and show spectacular images and footage on large plasma screens. This 
centralized approach to disseminating information does not account though for the 
many new media actors and information sources available and it instead simply 
reinforced the outdated mass communication model and shows that America is still 
failing to respond to the challenges of the rhizomatic condition.
Embedded journalism was the Pentagon’s response to growing journalist 
dissatisfaction with the tight restrictions in place in the press pool system and it also 
represents a last attempt by the military to try and maintain control of its centralised 
mass media propaganda model. The idea behind embedded journalism was that 
journalists would be embedded in military units and then deployed within the theatre 
of operations. Allowing journalists to again operate within theatre, it was hoped, 
would give them the sense of freedom that journalists felt was lacking in the press 
pool system. However, the reality of embedded journalism was much the same as it 
had been with the press pool system; it was again all about the military maintaining 
control over the flow of information via a centralised mass media model. The 
military units that journalists were embedded with decided where journalists could 
go and what they could see and military censors also gave embedded journalists strict 
instructions about what they could and could not report on as they were operating in 
theatre.
This techno-supremacy was once a military advantage against a traditional enemy, 
especially during the 1990s, and against another traditional enemy it could once 
again be a decisive military advantage. But against an unconventional terrorist 
enemy (like A1 Qaeda) this warfighting model is outdated: warfare has moved on to 
an age of image warfare and a new theatre of war has opened up in the twenty-first 
century. Western militaries now need to respond to these new security challenges. 
According to Mary Kaldor, ‘Bush and Rumsfeld’s conception of a new war... is more 
like an updated version of old war, making use of new technology.’86 She instead 
argues that:
86 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. 2nd eds. (Cambridge Polity 
Press, 2006), p. 151
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if we are to understand the war in ways that are useful to policy-makers, then 
its novel character should not be defined in terms of technology. What is new 
about the war needs to be analysed in terms of the disintegration of states and
• • 87the changes in social relations under the impact of globalization.
Kaldor, in her assessment of the 2003 Iraq War, while offering important critical 
insights into the complex social and identity relations operating within Iraq (a 
reworking of her new wars thesis developed originally to explain warfare in the 
1990s) ultimately she offers no counter to the current war of images. The recent Iraq 
War was indeed a textbook case of how not to respond to these new security 
challenges. As Philip Hammond puts it:
It was as if Pentagon planners had read their Baudrillard and resolved that 
this time it really would be a ‘bloodless’ war-show. In a triumph of media- 
military synergy, the military campaign was propaganda and the propaganda 
was part of the military strategy.... The effectiveness of the propaganda was 
undermined by the way the news media self-consciously drew attention to its 
deliberately manufactured quality.88
Across the post-war periods the relationship between media and military has become 
ever more complex. At times the military has tried to control the outputs of media 
networks and at times the media has allowed them to do so. But as both media and 
military technologies have changed so too have the opportunities for journalists to 
show a story of their own choosing. As the speed and extent of media reporting has 
increased media information and imagery has moved ever more closely towards the 
inside of the military process, becoming a new kind of participant in the unfolding of 
war and not merely its observers. That has at times challenged military thinking but 
has also become incorporated within it. In the Iraq War the Pentagon tried to reduce 
the war to a series of powerful manufactured media spectacles which, according to
O Q
Diane Rubenstein, ‘evince the Baudrillardian logic of the non-event’ : the Saving 
Private Jessica Lynch episode; 90 the falling of Saddam Hussein’s statue in central
87 Ibid, p. 150
88 Philip Hammond, 'The Gulf War Revisited', in Jean Baudrillard: Fatal Theories, eds. David B.
Clarke, Marcus A. Doel, William Merrin and Richard G. Smith (London: Routledge, 2008), 
p. 123
89 Diane Rubenstein, 'Reality: Now and Then - Baudrillard and W-Bush's America', in Jean
Baudrillard: Fatal Theories, eds. David B. Clarke, Marcus A. Doel, William Merrin and 
Richard G. Smith (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 148
90 See David Campbell, 'Cultural Governance and Pictorial Resistance: Reflections on the Imaging of
War'. Review o f  International Studies 29 (2003), pp. 62-64 and Steve Tatham, Losing Arab
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Baghdad;91 and President George W. Bush’s “Mission Accomplished” speech from
Q9onboard the US aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln. Even when these manufactured 
media spectacles were discredited, the Bush administration responded by 
manufacturing yet more. Specifically, on November 27, 2003, the media covered 
President Bush’s visit to Baghdad where upon arriving he presented the troops with a 
turkey for Thanksgiving. Only later did it emerge that, as Nicholas Mirzoeff writes, 
‘this turkey was a fake, created by the military kitchen staff to generate a sense of 
holiday atmosphere.’93 But the Pentagon’s unwavering commitment to 
manufacturing media spectacles is proof that they misunderstand the contemporary 
media environment and continue to wage an RMA way of warfighting that is out of 
date. For, as I have shown, today the media are not a unified system but a complex, 
rhizomatic and unpredictable flow. There has been, as it were, a Revolution in 
Media Affairs (RMeA). The contemporary media environment instead of being 
dominated by a few powerful media actors is driven by a diversity of independent 
media actors (bloggers and YouTube video producers) who are producing and 
disseminating content beyond the control of government, military and media (see 
Chapters Three to Six). To respond more effectively to the challenges posed by the 
rhizomatic condition and to offer the Pentagon a credible alternative to its RMA way 
of warfighting new theories need to be developed which provide a more up-to-date 
understanding of media and images in war.
IR theorists are beginning to respond to these new challenges to security, in their 
efforts at conceptualising the September 11, 2001 attacks and the events of the war 
on terror. Many of these theorists approach the study of the war on terror from post- 
postivist or post-structuralist perspectives, within which my own research is 
embedded. I will now turn, then, to a critical exploration of the work of a number of 
post-positivist and post-structuralist inspired IR theorists and in particular their 
attempts to conceive of the construction and maintenance of a war on terror discourse
Hearts and Minds: The Coalition, Al Jazeera and Muslim Public Opinion (London C. Hurst 
& Co., 2006), pp. 58-59
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or meta-narrative, and also the role of images in the war on terror. I will also 
consider the complex media-entertainment matrix that currently resides at the centre 
of American strategic thinking about contemporary warfare. As I will show such 
work offers important critical insights into the interaction of media, images and war 
-  but as I will also show, IR theory needs to go further.
Images and W arfare in IR Theory
I have already discussed how society has undergone significant changes, moving 
from a centralised age of mass media to an information/rhizomatic age -  where the 
circulation of images is today increasingly deterritorialised and unpredictable. I have 
also identified how this has impacted on war: a shift from techno-war to image 
warfare. As a result, the discipline of International Relations needs to and is 
beginning to respond to these new security challenges. Numerous IR theorists now 
recognize the significance for this field of mass media, popular culture, discourse and 
images and have developed concepts and analytic tools of great significance that can 
contribute to the development of a theory of the weaponizing of the media and 
images.
An important contribution to this is F rancis Debrix’s Tabloid Terror: War, Culture 
and Geopolitics which develops a theory of the current ‘terror’/ ’war’ discourse via 
the tabloidization of geopolitics and popular culture. Debrix starts his analysis by 
exploring the fake risk surrounding the Y2K virus; he then shifts his study to 
terrorism, both these incidents are part of his wider discourse: tabloid geopolitics. 
According to Debrix, ‘tabloid geopolitics is a discursive public enterprise that seeks 
to proliferate narratives and images intended to saturate and satisfy (and satisfy by 
saturating) the global cultural landscape, or what is left of it.’94 This saturation of the 
global cultural landscape is thanks, in large part, to the recent proliferation of all 
things visual. In turn this tabloid reporting style has now crossed over from 
newspapers and it now populates the tele-visual medium also.95 This so-called 
tabloidization does not stop at television. Iver B. Neumann, in a review of this book, 
eloquently describes Debrix’s research: ‘geopolitics is so media-infested as to be
94 Francis Debrix, Tabloid Terror: War, Culture and Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 5
95 Ibid, p. 38
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inevitably tabloid.’96 Debrix has traced this tabloidization through the work of other 
International Relations theorists. He firstly discusses works by Robert D. Kaplan,97 
Samuel P. Huntington95 and Zbigniew Brzezinski99 and terms them tabloid 
realists.10° He has also shown, with reference to Julia Kristeva’s theory of 
abjection,101 just how much the West has become filled with equal feelings of 
rejection and fascination in relation to the war on terror thus cementing it as a 
perpetual crisis.102 In another review of Tabloid Terror Neha Sud has noted how:
Debrix contends that the US tabloid media’s coverage of the 9/11 period 
depicted a USA constantly in danger, a population vulnerable to attack, and, 
ultimately, an unyielding, terrorist-ridden world, where war was the only 
response. Politicians used the media to perpetuate the fear culture, while the 
media posed few questions and devoured the discourse on violence and 
instability. This mutually serving relationship between the tabloid media and 
the state created a war machine that explained the war against terror to US 
audiences in strict realpolitik terms.103
Debrix has also discussed three further works: by Robert D. Kaplan,104 Victor Davis 
Hanson105 and finally Michael Ledeen.106 Each of these tabloid realist books, Debrix 
believes, has helped to promote abjection -  towards the war on terror -  within 
society.107 The military are depicted post-9/11, according to Debrix, like Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s ‘war machine’108 and he has explored this idea109 with
96 Iver B. Neumann, 'Book Review: Tabloid Terror'. International Studies Review 10, no. 2 (2008), p.
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reference to the writings of Michael Hardt and Antonio N egri/70 General Tommy R. 
Franks,111 Samuel P. Huntington,112 Alain Joxe,113 Lawrence F. Kaplan and William 
Kristol77^  and finally David Frum and Richard Perle.115
Debrix has also shown how this tabloid aesthetic now dominates popular television 
drama. He discusses this with specific reference to Steven Bochco’s show Over 
There. The show follows an American army unit on patrol in Iraq, facing the daily 
threat of death and severe injury. It displays, according to Debrix, ‘a form of tabloid 
story-telling and tabloid-spectacle not unlike those produced by many geopolitical 
discourses and representations found in the US media (broadly defined) before and 
after 9/11.’116 A major problem with this though is that these fictional 
representations can be too close to reality and Over There found this out when, as 
Debrix notes, ‘viewing figures dropped by over 40 per cent over the course of the 
first five episodes’.117 The show was not re-commissioned. What has fared better in 
the current climate of the war on terror, because of their extreme pro-war/anti-war 
views, is the work of Bill O’Reilly within his infotainment show The O ’Reilly Factor 
and Michael Moore’s film Fahrenheit 9/11.
Debrix’s thesis is wide ranging and he recognizes the importance of the increased 
visualization of society. His argument focuses primarily, however, on the 
tabloidization of the media and the knock-on effect that this has had on his IR 
colleagues (a novel approach). Importantly, he also traces this tabloidization through 
popular culture. However, his examination of popular culture is very much a 
secondary concern compared with his discussion of tabloid geopolitics. The key 
insights I take from Debrix’s argument are that a tabloid aesthetic -  the tabloidization 
of IR and the tabloidization of popular culture -  dominates the war on terror
110 See Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000)
and Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age o f  Empire 
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discourse and that the recent proliferation of the visual has played a central role in 
the construction of this tabloid terror discourse. However, Debrix fails to adequately 
explore the impact of this tabloidization of popular culture. His conclusions about 
popular culture would have been more forceful if he had only extended his 
discussion of popular culture and balanced it with his discussion of tabloidization in 
JR. This discussion of IR theorists will now move on to look at Richard Jackson’s 
description of the war on terror discourse.
Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism by 
Richard Jackson is a more conventional analysis of the war on terror which offers a 
compelling account of official language in the war on terror. Jackson believes that 
language has played an important discourse forming function in the construction of 
the war on terror. However, questionably, Jackson uses language to describe ‘all the 
seals, flags, emblems, insignia, logos, letterheads, colour-coded warnings on 
websites, iconic images from ‘ground zero’ and Iraq, memorials and any other visual 
representation of the campaign.’118 Jackson argues that the war on terror is ‘the 
deliberate and systematic construction of a social climate of fear.’119 This fear is a 
discourse developed from a combination of elements from the above language. He 
believes that ‘[a]ll these symbols form part of the overall language and they 
reproduce and amplify the central meanings, assumptions and knowledge of the 
counter-terrorism campaign.’120
Jackson’s collection of symbols is diverse and for the purposes of his study he has 
concentrated almost exclusively on examining the language employed by members 
of the Bush administration within media interviews, public addresses and speeches
1^ 1
between September 11, 2001 and January 31, 2004. However, he has made a 
grave error in lumping together a diverse range of visual representations, describing 
them as language and then not discussing them, instead choosing to concentrate on 
examining the speeches and interviews of politicians during the war on terror. If the 
visuals he listed are part of a wider language then surely he should have set aside
118 Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 18
119 Ibid, p. 120
120 Ibid, p. 18
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more space to discuss them properly. Jackson, unlike Debrix, has clearly failed to 
properly understand the important role that images play in the war on terror.
Jackson argues that the war on terror discourse was bom directly from the 
nothingness which immediately followed 9/11. Taking his lead from David
1 0 0  10  0 tl i  •Campbell and James Der Derian, he describes September 11 as having created 
a ‘void of meaning’.
The ‘void of meaning’ left in the empty spaces where the towers had once 
stood was a direct consequence of the sheer visceral horror of the images -  
the massive explosions and walls of flame when the planes smashed into the 
structures, the bodies falling like rain as people leapt to their deaths, the 
unimaginable vision of two of the world’s biggest buildings falling down in a 
massive cloud of dust and debris. Such sights are inherently horrifying and 
extremely rare, being hardly ever captured on film as they occur; as such, 
they inevitably produce a moment of verbal paralysis and linguistic dyslexia 
as onlookers struggle to express the powerful emotions and thoughts 
engendered by the spectacle. Usually, we only see the aftermath of this kind 
of violence: burning buildings, stunned survivors, emergency services 
attending the wounded.124
What has risen, like a phoenix from the flames of Ground Zero, is an age of global 
terror -  fuelled by a perpetual fear and risk of terrorism -  that has led to the creation 
of a powerful and pervasive war on terror discourse. This primarily political 
discourse, Jackson argues, has also been reproduced and widely circulated by
• 125socially based institutions like the church, the media and also academia.
Jackson’s discussion of the war on terror discourse is distinct from Debrix’s. While 
Debrix discusses the role of institutions such as the media and academia, Jackson 
does not. He does, however, discuss the political speeches and interviews from the 
war on terror, something that Debrix does not include in his own analysis. Jackson’s 
discussion of political linguistic rhetoric during the war on terror is valuable, though 
his argument does fall down at the point whereby he describes his conception of 
language.
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Theory & Event 5, no. 4 (2001)
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The key insights I take from Jackson’s argument are about the central role of 
language in the construction of the war on terror discourse and his wide 
interpretation of what constitutes a language. For Jackson language does not 
distinguish between visual representations -  such as colour-coded warnings, flags, 
iconic images, logos, memorials -  and political speeches/interviews in the war on 
terror. My criticism of Jackson is that he has undermined his own argument about 
the power of official language in the war on terror by simply collapsing it with the 
diverse range of symbols operating in the war on terror and then not taking the time 
to unpick, decode and understand these diverse symbols and the important 
differences between them and official language in the war on terror. If the visuals he 
listed are part of his wider language then surely he should have set aside more space 
to discuss and understand their role within the complex war on terror meta-narrative. 
Jackson instead recognizes that there are diverse visual symbols operating in the war 
on terror but he then fails to properly integrate them into his meta-narrative. His 
argument ultimately lacks an examination of the visuals he identified; however, he 
could have avoided this simply by maintaining a distinction between language and 
visuals. My discussion of IR theorists will now move on to look at Stuart Croft’s 
analysis of the war on terror meta-narrative.
Stuart Croft in Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror has also explored the 
construction of the meta-narrative, the ‘war on terror’, though he has decided to do
• 1 Oftso through an examination of popular culture which situates visuals at the centre of 
his analysis. Croft’s recognition of the power of the visual dimension and his 
examination of it through popular culture is a significant achievement and also it is 
an analysis that was well overdue. Whereas Debrix only considered popular culture 
representations towards the end of his book, Croft has embedded them throughout his 
analysis. He strongly believes that some popular culture and political elites co­
produce discourse. He argues:
that the political elite and some producers of popular culture are mutually 
constructed in the contemporary United States. One cannot articulate a 
political project without impact upon popular culture; popular culture is not
126 Croft, Culture, p. 109
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comprehensible without considering the political. Not all political discourse 
is apparent in popular culture...; not all elements of popular culture are 
political in a sense understood by the political elite. But the articulation of a 
particular understanding of crisis, the formation of discourse, occurs both at 
the level of the political elite and at that of popular culture. Their mutual 
construction means that the way in which the crisis of 9/11 came to be 
understood was produced by both the Bush administration and many cultural 
producers in the United States.127
Croft charts this process through examining a diverse range of American popular 
culture directly affected or inspired by September 11 . He examines: art, bumper 
stickers, children’s TV, comics, computer games, evangelical religious literature, 
films, jokes, memorabilia for 9/11, music, novels, poetry about 9/11, political 
cartoonists’ work, prominently placed remembrance placards, remembrance books 
and finally tattoos. Each popular culture node has an important function to play 
within the overall production of what Croft has termed: the crisis cycle.
This ‘social crisis process’ is in fact made up of a complex ‘series of cycles’ and
1 98Croft has offered this description of them:
an event is of such magnitude that it requires (re)examination; meaning has to 
be ascribed. That event comes to the attention of a wider public, as well as of 
the policy-making community: that is, the event demands public 
understanding. There is therefore a contestation of different explanations, 
each of which is drawn from pre-existing narratives which may or may not 
have already found forms in which they can be clearly expressed. A crisis 
cannot be understood through an infinite number of explanations; it can only 
be given meaning by those that have elements that pre-exist. The crisis 
comes to be understood through the decisive intervention that defines it, but 
that decisive intervention itself has a pre-history, a genealogy that allowed 
one set of ideas to have a discursive power over others.129
Hence the many references to the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbour in the immediate
tliaftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks and films. Croft then goes onto state 
that:
[t]he crisis process therefore begins with an event that is understood to be a 
challenge to the existing way of thinking about a policy area. ...A decisive 
intervention successfully gives meaning to that event, and begins to create a
127 Ibid, p. 9
128 Ibid, p. 275
129 Ibid, p. 272-273
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new common sense through which all alternative narratives are seen to be 
‘weak’, ‘foolish’ or ‘theoretical’.130
The framing, by the Bush administration, of 9/11 in terms of a war on terror and also 
their identification of a so-called axis of evil are both powerful factors in the 
development of this war on terror discourse. Following on from this:
[a]n institutional restructuring begins which leads to particular organisations 
being (re)formed, practices being updated, laws being introduced or 
amended. That which exists is seen to be out of date, in need of remodelling. 
This affects in some ways all aspects of policy and of policy practice. At the 
same time, the institutional restructuring affects those outside of the policy 
world as well: in terms of the second American 9/11, it includes non­
governmental organisations, academia, the media, popular culture and the 111churches.
The next cycle is where stabilisation of the discourse is achieved within society. 
Although, as Croft is all too aware, this stability ‘inevitably has a limited shelf-life: it 
will be met at some point by contestation.’132 Contestation is the next cycle and it 
returns society again into a state of crisis.133 According to Croft after contestation 
there are two ways forward. First, ‘a new decisive intervention’134 driven by social 
resistance to the war on terror; which leads onto a strong backlash against changes 
and amendments to the law and the further erosion of civil liberties; second, the war 
on terror discourse responds to the contestation within society, the ‘discourse strikes
1 1 Sback’ and stabilisation is once again achieved. This state of stability again only 
has a short shelf-life as contestation will once again return.
The key insights I take from Croft’s argument are about the central role of popular 
culture and visuals in the construction of the war on terror meta-narrative. He 
explores this meta-narrative through a diverse range of popular culture nodes -  such 
as art, bumper stickers, films, jokes, novels, political cartoons, tattoos -  and the 
construction of the crisis cycle. However, though compelling, Croft’s crisis cycle 
shows that he is still confined by the desire and need to identify and centrally control 
information and that he does not in fact appreciate the unpredictable and
130 Ibid, p. 273
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uncontrollable nature of information in the contemporary rhizomatic condition. 
Debrix, Jackson and Croft’s theses, though distinct, each complement each other and 
together help to explain the construction and maintenance of the war on terror 
discourse/meta-narrative. Croft’s thesis, however, is the most inclusive of the three 
and also appears to be the most open towards the important and distinct role of visual 
representations in the war on terror. My discussion of IR theorists will now focus on 
Milena Michalski and James Gow’s examination of the image as a key weapon in 
contemporary war.
War, Image and Legitimacy: Viewing Contemporary Conflict by Milena Michalski 
and James Gow presents a timely account of the role of images in contemporary war. 
Their book opens:
The collapsing Twin Towers of September 11, the hooded figure in a web of 
electrodes at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, the frozen images on moving 
screens of those whose beheadings were available to those seeking them out 
on the internet, the emaciated Bosnian Muslim figure at the barbed wire fence 
of a Bosnian Serb concentration camp, the dancing flashes of detonators 
across the skylines of some capital -  Baghdad, Belgrade, or elsewhere -  as 
US-led air bombardment dealt blows to another ‘rogue’ regime and its long- 
suffering people: these images define contemporary conflict. More than that, 
they -  and whichever other images become available -  dominate the various 
environments in which the legitimacy of armed campaigns in an era of rapid 
international and transnational change is contested -  politically, socially, 
legally and communicatively. There is a competition over images -  the 
images, rightly or wrongly, appear to distil the essence of a conflict. They are 
the short cuts to understanding, and so at the heart of the competition for
hearts and minds in different quarters in modem war. Images are the key1weapons in contemporary warfare.
It is impossible not to concur with Michalski and Gow’s recognition of the fact that 
images are such weapons. However, I am concerned over the downplaying of still 
images in their analysis in favour of a focus on moving images137 and on ‘moving- 
image media narratives.’138 Michalski and Gow’s examination of feature films, 
actuality/documentary films and User Generated Content (UGC) footage from 9/11, 
Beslan and 7/7 is significant and important for IR. My concern in this respect is
136 Milena Michalski, and James Gow, War, Image and Legitimacy: Viewing Contemporary Conflict
(London: Routledge, 2007), p. 1
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shared with Katy Parry who, in her review of the book, writes that she too had ‘rather 
hoped for more reference to the scholarship in the fields of visual communication 
and culture which offer perceptive approaches to appreciating how images 
communicate.’139 She argues that despite ‘some excellent observations on the visual 
textures within films, at times this volume lacked detailed attention to the images 
themselves as communicative tools.’140
Another concern with Michalski and Gow’s inclusion of feature/documentary films 
in their wider discussion of moving images as the key weapons in contemporary 
warfare is that these mediated features and documentaries are made and released 
after the event has taken place. How can they then be termed powerful weapons -  as 
they cannot affect the course of these events as they are unfolding in real-time? 
Similarly Benjamin de Carvalho has identified that:
The collective memory of wars is today largely shaped by representations of 
warfare in popular culture. In the case of the Vietnam War, movies had a 
tremendous effect on reshaping the collective memory of the war both for 
those who did not experience it first-hand, and even for those who did}41
This form of collective memory building however takes place after an event has been 
concluded. Both Andreas Behnke and Benjamin de Carvalho have also drawn on the 
iconic event of Accidental Napalm to help cement their argument:
The images of the war which had formed the understanding of Vietnam 
during the conflict, such as the naked and frightened Vietnamese girl fleeing 
away from a napalm attack, were gradually being replaced by new images, 
only this time the images were Hollywood fiction. 42
Films do indeed play an important role, after the fact, in informing audiences about 
events but they are not the primary weapons in contemporary war and can only be 
properly understood if placed in the context of a broader understanding of the overall
139 Katy Parry, “War, Image and Legitimacy: Viewing Contemporary Conflict’ by Milena Michalski
and James Gow. London, Routledge, 2007’. Media, War and Conflict Journal 1, no. 1 
(2008), pp. 135-136
140 Jbid, p. 136
141 Benjamin de Carvalho, ‘War Hurts: Vietnam Movies and the Memory o f a Lost War’, Millennium:
Journal o f  International Studies 34, no. 3 (2006), p. 951
142 Andreas Behnke and Benjamin de Carvalho, ‘Shooting War: International Relations and the
Cinematic Representation of Warfare’, Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies 34, no. 3 
(2006), p. 936
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phenomena of image warfare within which such films are a mode of circulation. 
Hollywood manufactured images do not replace the original war images but re­
circulate and reinvent them.
UGC, the ABC produced videos of 9/11 and terrorist produced videos are, however, 
a distinct phenomenon. These videos, I concede, are weapons and I agree with 
Michalski and Gow when they argue that:
The events summarised by ‘September 11* are among the most significant 
ever in terms of TV news coverage, as well as for international relations 
generally. The event is significant for TV news coverage because many of 
the key early moments in the unfolding history were caught live and raw on 
television, most notably the second aircraft hitting the World Trade Center. 
Within minutes of the first attack, ABC television in New York, with others 
quickly following the lead, had cameras trained on the site of the incident. 
This made for remarkable images that not only defined the story, but also fell 
neatly into complementing the ‘terrorist’ strategy of the attackers: maximum 
visibility and coverage.143
The coverage of the 2005 London Bombings is another important example of 
powerful UGC moving image footage entering the news media in near real-time. 
The footage which has since come to define this event was captured by London 
Underground commuters (like Adam Stacey144) on their mobile camera/video­
phones, sent into the BBC newsroom and then circulated through multiple media 
platforms and social contexts. Such UGC and terrorist produced moving image 
footage (which is increasingly making up news coverage of events) can become a 
weapon in the war on terror (see Chapter Four). Michalski and Gow are right to 
recognise this but their examination fails to take account of important Visual Culture 
research and this leads them to discuss feature and documentary films alongside 
UGC footage, news footage and terrorist produced footage without fully appreciating 
the important differences between these different media texts. To help explore the 
important differences between these different media texts my discussion of IR
143 Michalski and Gow, War, p. 123
144 Anna Reading, 'The Global and the Mobile: Camera Phone Witnessing in an Age o f Terror', in
Collective Memory and Collective Knowledge in a Global Age - An Interdisciplinary 
Workshop (London School o f Economics: 2007), p. 8 and Daniel Rubinstein, and Katrina 
Sluis, 'A Life More Photographic'. Photographies 1, no. 1 (2008), p. 11
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theorists will now focus on Michael J. Shapiro and his examination of the new 
violent cartography and its counter-spaces in the war on terror.
Cinematic Geopolitics by Michael J. Shapiro examines the position that films, both 
fictional and documentary, have assumed within contemporary geopolitics. 
However, rather than arguing, as Michalski and Gow do, that moving images are the 
primary weapons within contemporary war Shapiro instead has revisited and adapted 
his earlier ‘violent cartographies’ thesis. His original argument was
that the bases of violent cartographies are the “historically developed, socially 
embedded interpretations of identity and space” that constitute the frames 
within which enmities give rise to war-as-policy. Violent cartographies are 
thus constituted as an articulation of geographic imaginaries and 
antagonisms, based on models of identity-difference.145
For example, he discussed the role and significance of the Treaty of Westphalia from 
1648 in the construction of violent cartographies, along with other examples which 
he believed have also aided in the construction of violent cartographies. This 
revision of violent cartographies for the information age and as a result of the recent 
RMA has led Shapiro to identify new violent cartographies. He recognises the 
central role of the Institute for Creative Technology (ICT) at the University of 
Southern California in the war on terror. Shapiro writes that:
the ICT justifies its role in the anti-terrorism info war by noting that it 
addresses two constituencies, military and academic; their “Experience 
Learning System” (ELS) “will teach soldiers and students about the future by 
having them ‘virtually’ go there.” Many of the prototexts for the dual 
pedagogy are provided by past Hollywood feature films. For example, in 
describing “the hub of the ICT’s research,” its “Experienced Learning 
System,” they liken it to “the Holodeck in Star Trek,” which they see as a 
model that allows one to “‘virtually’ go there.” This “virtual reality” 
thematic pervades the ICT’s educational strategy. For example, in the 
graphics lab, the goal is “to achieve ‘virtual reality,’ absolute realism in 
geometry, reflectance, lighting, dynamics and animation. The lab [they note] 
is doing groundbreaking research in active range sensing, global illumination, 
reflectometry, dynamic simulation, human and facial animation, and real-time 
rendering.” ...Part of the new violent cartography is to be found in the pages
145 Shapiro, Cinematic Geopolitics, p. 18, see also Michael J. Shapiro, 'The New Violent Cartography'. 
Security Dialogue 38, no. 3 (2007), pp. 291-313 and Michael J. Shapiro, Violent 
Cartographies: Mapping Cultures o f War (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
1997)
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of many daily newspapers, often in feature sections rather than national and 
international news reports.... Nevertheless, in recent months some of the 
independent media is asserting itself, rather than allowing its space to be 
incorporated within the new violent cartography.146
Shapiro sees art (especially the series of paintings, Abu Ghraib, by the Colombian 
artist Fernando Botero), films (both documentary and fictional), film festivals and 
some sections of the news media as important and powerful ‘counter-spaces to the 
new violent cartography.’147
However, Shapiro has decided to focus his attention exclusively on film and film
1 48festival counter-spaces. He sees the film festival as a ‘cinematic heterotopia’ and 
a direct counter-space to the ICT at the University of Southern California.149 Shapiro 
draws this distinction because of two particular though equally compelling points: 
Firstly, because of his firsthand experiences as a juror at the 2005 Tromso 
International Film Festival in Norway. He has recounted how he and four other 
jurors -  ‘Eva Gran, the director of the Tromso branch of Norway’s UN information 
agency, Margreth Olin, a Norwegian fllmaker and director, Ola Lund Renolen, the 
cultural director for the municipality of Trondheim, Norway, and Alberto Valiente 
Thoresen, a student in the Peace Studies program at the University of Tromso’150 -  
considered ten nominated films for The Norwegian Peace Film Award {Den Norske 
Fredsfilmprisen). After careful and lengthy deliberation the award was presented to 
Beautiful City by the Iranian Director Asghar Farhadi. Shapiro returned to Norway, 
in 2007, for the Tromso International Film Festival to again act as a juror for The 
Norwegian Peace Film Award.
Secondly, Shapiro has identified the screening by the Department of Defense, in 
2003, in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq, of Gillo Pontecorvo’s 1966 film The 
Battle o f Algiers as significant. The film was shown to American military personnel 
as an example of how a successful counter-terrorism military campaign should be 
executed. It famously shows a number of extreme interrogation scenes: including
146 Shapiro, Cinematic Geopolitics, p. 32
147 Ibid, p. 33
148 Ibid, p. 1
149 Ibid, p. 37
150 Ibid, p. 1
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deliberate electric shock, controlled drowning, blowtorch burning, and a man 
hanging upside-down.151 Shapiro sees parallels here with Josef Goebbels 
appropriation, during World War Two, of Sergei Eisenstein’s The Battleship 
Potemkin as a benchmark for National Socialist filmmakers to aspire to. Eisenstein 
famously wrote an open letter to Goebbels condemning the appropriation of his film 
by the Nazi party.152
Having a greater understanding of the effects of cinema on geopolitics is especially
thimportant in the war on terror given that on September 11 , according to Cynthia 
Weber, the ‘blurring of reality and film -  of real time and reel time -  was endlessly 
repeated on CNN Headline News.’153 Importantly, Shapiro does not make the 
mistake -  as Michalski and Gow have -  about moving images being the primary 
weapons in the war on terror. Rather he sees moving images (specifically 
documentary and fictional films) and film festivals as playing a mobilizing rather 
than a weaponizing role. Significantly, unlike Debrix, Jackson, Croft, Mickalski and 
Gow, Shapiro has decided to theorize the new space which has recently opened up in 
geopolitics. He has revised his earlier violent cartographies thesis and applied it here 
because it acts as an ideal framework for this current debate. He recognizes that 
there are problems with the new violent cartography, the ICT at the University of 
Southern California, and he also has explained how powerful visually driven 
counter-spaces -  like art, films, film festivals and some sections of the news media -  
currently pose significant challenges to it.
The key insights I take from Shapiro’s argument concern the central role of the ICT 
(the new violent cartography) in the war on terror, the role of counter-spaces -  such 
as art, films, film festivals and sections of the news media -  to the new violent 
cartography and how films and film festivals play a mobilizing role rather than a 
weaponizing role in the war on terror. I also take Shapiro’s distinction between 
productive and representative images as it will help me to further distinguish 
between original weaponized images and circulated and remediated weaponized
151 Ibid, p. 3
152 Ibid, p. 3
153 Weber, Imagining America at War, p. 3 see also Klaus Dodds, 'Screening Terror: Hollywood, the
United States and the Construction o f Danger'. Critical Studies on Terrorism 1, no. 2 (2008), 
p. 237
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images. But to deepen this appreciation of the ICT my discussion of IR theorists will 
now turn to James Der Derian and specifically to his thesis concerning the role of the 
MIME-NET.
Der Derian has spent his academic career researching at the interface between 
different disciplines. He has done much to open communications between IR and 
media and IR and technology. As Jef Huysmans has noted, a key aspect of Der 
Derian’s work is that ‘he does not limit his sources to written ones but also pays 
attention to images.’154 In 1990, Der Derian wrote: ‘the war of perception and 
representation deserves more of our attention and resources... in the field of 
international relations.’155 Again, in 1995, he stated that: ‘the instantaneity of 
communication, the ubiquity of the image, the flow of capital, the video-graphic 
speed of war have made reality ever more transitory, technologically contingent 
phenomenon.’156 And, in 2000, he wrote: ‘People will live and die, figuratively and 
literally, by the power of images, previewed by the famine child that drew American 
troops into Somalia, and of the dead US Ranger dragged through the streets that 
hastened their departure.’157 This statement might now be read as a forewarning of 
the dangers now present within image warfare in the war on terror.
In On Diplomacy: A Genealogy o f Western Estrangement, Der Derian posed the 
following question: ‘the spread of instant communications, and the burgeoning of 
espionage, are frequently cited as factors leading to the imminent demise of 
diplomacy. But does this constitute a crisis, or even something new, in the history of 
diplomacy?’158 In order to try and answer this question he undertook a detailed 
assessment of Western diplomacy examining; mytho-diplomacy, proto-diplomacy, 
diplomacy, anti-diplomacy, neo-diplomacy and techno-diplomacy. With regard to 
diplomacy and anti-diplomacy he identified that:
154 Jef Huysmans, 'James Der Derian: The Unbearable Lightness o f Theory', in The Future o f
International Relations: Masters in the Making, eds. Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever 
(London: Routledge, 1997), p. 343
155 James Der Derian, 'The (S)Pace o f International Relations: Simulations, Surveillance, and Speed'.
International Studies Quarterly 34, no. 3 (1990), p. 308
156 James Der Derian, 'A Reinterpretation of Realism: Genealogy, Semiology, Dromology', in
International Theory: Critical Investigations, ed. James Der Derian (Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press Ltd., 1995), p. 369
157 James Der Derian, 'Virtuous War / Virtual Theory'. International Affairs 76, no. 4 (2000), p. 775
158 James Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy o f  Western Estrangement (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell Ltd., 1987), p. 1
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the content of diplomacy is negotiation between states, while that of anti­
diplomacy is propaganda among peoples. In short, the purpose of diplomacy 
is to mediate estranged relations: anti-diplomacy’s aim is to transcend all 
estranged relations.159
These twin themes of ‘propaganda’ and ‘mediation’ run throughout Der Derian’s 
work.
In Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War Der Derian argues that ‘in the 
[First] Gulf War the tightly controlled, abstractly clean images presented an 
appealing portrait of military technology solving intractable diplomatic problems -  
what we might call the “aesthetics of antidiplomacy.’” 160 He also believes that the 
manufacture of these clean images, the ‘videos of videos of smart bombs unerringly 
hitting their targets, cruise missiles seemingly reading street signs as they made their 
way down the boulevards of Baghdad,’161 were indeed spectacular images for news 
audiences to watch. This clinical military campaign finally turned out to be more
1 ff)risk-free than the Gulf War war-games which had preceded it. At the time this 
outcome was billed by the military as a perfectly executed military campaign; but, as 
critics like Baudrillard challenged the simulation of war in Iraq, the military’s 
perception of perfection soon unravelled. Alarm bells should have then immediately 
begun to ring and Pentagon resources should have been immediately mobilised to 
work out why these manufactured media spectacles were so problematic. In reality, 
the Pentagon instead decided to pump its significant resources into developing yet 
more new military technologies -  a product of its RMA mindset -  and thus virtually 
ignore the important role of images in contemporary war. Der Derian was already 
clearly critical of the Pentagon’s decision not to try and understand why the media 
spectacles of the 1991 Gulf War were now unravelling and instead channelling its 
significant resources into the development of yet more new military technologies.
159 Ibid, p. 136
160 James Der Derian, Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
1992), p. 163
161 Ibid, p. 163
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Der Derian, in the years since the 1991 Gulf War, has dedicated much of his research 
to investigating the Pentagon’s RMA mindset and also its preoccupation with 
developing new military technologies and simulations and controlling the spectacle 
of war. This in turn has led him to document a fascinating journey, as it were, right 
into ‘the belly of the beast.’163 His 1998 essay, All But War Is Simulation, offers an 
intriguing glimpse into his journey through the American military machine which is 
now so dominated by technology and simulation. Der Derian recalls how he first 
encountered the phrase ‘All But War Is Simulation’ at an annual 
Interservice/Industrial Training Systems and Education (I/ITSEC) Conference in 
Orlando, Florida where it was used time and again. Der Derian remembers how he 
quizzed a colonel attending the conference about the phrase and was given a brief 
history of STRICOM (Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation Command), the 
strangest command post in the US military.164
This I/ITSEC conference in Orlando was just the first stop on Der Derian’s journey. 
He stopped off there specifically because it was where many new military 
technologies developed by the ‘Simulation Triangle’ (‘the military, new media, and 
Mickey’165) were being shown off. According to Der Derian this
trip to the Simulation Triangle left me with a heightened sense of danger. 
When military forces and entertainment industries join in mimesis, when war 
games and language games become practically indistinguishable (“All but 
war is simulation”), when the imitative, repetitive, and regressive powers of 
simulation negate any sense of original meaning, more than just peace is at 
risk. I felt as if reality itself, like light being sucked into a black hole, was 
disappearing in the Simulation Triangle.166
In 1999, Der Derian journeyed, for The Nation and Wired magazines, to the opening 
of the Institute for Creative Technology (ITC) at the University of Southern 
California. According to Der Derian, the ICT is essentially STRICOM (Simulation, 
Training and Instrumentation Command) but in Los Angeles. He has explained that 
STRICOM moved to LA ‘to find the tools and the skills for simulating and, if
163 Der Derian, 'Virtuous War / Virtual Theory', p. 777
164 James Der Derian, "All but War Is Simulation", in Rethinking Geopolitics, eds. Gearoid O' Tuathail
and Simon Dalby (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 262
165 Der Derian, Virtuous War. 2nd eds, p. 82
166 Ibid, p. 96
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necessary, fighting wars of the future’167 and the ICT was developed ‘as a vehicle 
for integrating the simulation and entertainment industries into this much-heralded 
“Revolution in Military Affairs.’” 168
In 2001, Der Derian published, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial- 
Media-Entertainment Network, a travelogue of his journey through the American war 
machine. Through this book he aimed to present a virtual theory that would ‘provide 
the “red pill” for understanding and challenging the power of an all-too-real Matrix, 
the MIME-NET.’169 Der Derian’s account of the MIME-NET, a product of techno­
warfare, does include an engagement with images -  though they are referred to as 
simulations and spectacles (which are images that are manufactured and tightly 
controlled) -  and this serves to reinforce my argument that the Pentagon are trapped 
in a mass communication model mindset and believe that they can still centrally 
control the flow of information and images. In the course of his journey he travelled 
to Orlando, Florida to attend a conference on technology and simulation in war (as 
discussed above); he then went to the East Mojave Desert to witness a digitized war 
game; he went on to Central Command, Tampa to see how the lessons of the First 
Gulf War were being programmed ready for future wars; then on to Fort Knox, 
Kentucky to watch a SimNet tank exercise; to Hohenfels, Germany to see the First 
Armored Division ‘peacegame’ the Bosnia intervention; to the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to leam about the Synthetic Theater of War 
(STOW); then back to Orlando to visit Simulation, Training and Instrumentation 
Command (STRI-COM). This was followed by trips to the Bay Area to watch an 
‘Urban Warrior’ experiment with the navy and the marines; to Vincenza, Italy to 
examine the air campaign in Kosovo and then on to the Pentagon to interview the 
director of the Office of Net Assessments, Andrew Marshall, whom Der Derian 
refers to as the ‘Yoda’ of the Revolution in Military Affairs and also the former 
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Wesley Clark. Der Derian 
concluded his first road trip in Los Angeles, where the Pentagon and Hollywood 
announced a new collaborative project at the University of Southern California.
167 James Der Derian, 'Virtuous War and Hollywood: The Pentagon Wants What Hollywood's Got', in
Critical Practices in International Relations Theory: Selected Essays, ed. James Der Derian
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Over $40 million was to be spent to establish an “Institute for Creative 
Technologies,” where the best military gamers, computer graphic artists, and
170entertainment executives can gather to prepare for the next war.
Virtuous War immediately received a mixed reception from the IR community. 
Notably in an International Affairs review of this book, Susan L. Carruthers wrote: 
‘Der Derian’s ‘road trip into the cyborg heart of the military-industrial-media- 
entertainment network’ is dizzying less for the ‘warp-speed’ we’re promised than for 
the looping route that results when one travels without maps but lets Baudrillard, 
Virilio and Deleuze take the wheel.’171 John Garofano, in a Political Science 
Quarterly review of the same book, concluded that he remained unconvinced by Der 
Derian’s ‘argument about either the mimetic relationship between technology and 
war or its moral bankruptcy.’172 What should always be remembered though is that 
Der Derian’s travelogue is ‘dizzying’ and massively technologically deterministic 
precisely because his journey is charting techno-warfare.
With Virtuous War Der Derian has developed ‘a cross-disciplinary theory for other 
travellers’173 to follow. In this book he has theorized that ‘war is ascending to an 
even “higher” plane, from the virtual to the virtuous.,174 He has also argued that 
‘virtuous wars promote a vision of bloodless, humanitarian, hygienic wars.’175 His 
journey shows me just how much the American military have become hypnotised, 
since the most recent RMA, into seeing ‘digital technologies operating as “force- 
multipliers.’” 176 According to Der Derian, the MIME-NET is the result of the next 
step taken by the US military after the 1991 Gulf War. It seeks to integrate 
technology and simulation into every level of the American military machine. Der
170 Ibid, pp. xxxvii-xxxviii
171 Susan L. Carruthers, "Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment
Network1 by James Der Derian. Westview, Oxford, Boulder, Co, 2001. 'Degrading 
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Derian cautions against relying too much on simulation technologies because, he 
believes, they cannot fully prepare soldiers for the realities of battle.
In the movie Aliens, when the Colonial Marines are being buffeted as they 
enter the atmosphere of the planet where the unknown awaits them, Ripley 
(Sigourney Weaver) asks the obviously anxious Lieutenant how many 
combat drops this is for him. He replies “Thirty-eight,” pauses, and then adds 
Simulated.” He quickly proves incapable of responding to situations that 
do not follow his simulation training.177
Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace, the commander of US ground forces in the 2003 Iraq 
War, similarly argued that: ‘“The enemy we’re fighting is a bit different than the one 
we war-gamed against....’” 178
Der Derian has also noted that ‘the new MIME-NET runs on video-game imagery, 
twenty-four-hour news cycles, multiple nodes of military, corporate, university, and
179media power, and microchips, embedded in everything but human flesh (so far).’
Yet no resources are set aside within RMA warfare, to try and understand the
important role of images and there unpredictable circulation in war. Instead, more
and more resources are being channelled into the R&D of new military technologies
-  such as simulation technologies -  something which Der Derian is critical of. Der
Derian has often wondered ‘if the ICT, like other elements of virtuous war, was more
deus ex machina than war machine.’180 The MIME-NET is a vision of next
181generation warfare but the American military are always one war behind. This is
evidenced by the fact that war has now accelerated beyond RMA war into an age of
182 • •image warfare. Der Derian’s description of a Borg-like soldier conjures ideas of a 
Q-like figure, as seen in the James Bond films, in the military laboratory at the 
University of Southern California developing new military technologies for techno­
war when instead image warfare now dominates. Der Derian remains unconvinced 
by the real world military impact of the ICT:
177 Der Derian, Antidiplomacy, p. 194
178 Jim Dwyer, 'A Nation at War: In the Field - V Corps Commander; a Gulf Commander Sees a
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It is not yet evident that it can run a project, a battlefield simulation, let alone
an intergalactic war. However, cutting edge or opening wedge, the Institute
for Creative Technology does look to be Hollywood’s -  and the Pentagon’s -1premier laboratory for virtuous war.
He is all too aware though that once in ‘it is hard to find one’s way out from the
184military-industrial-media-entertainment labyrinth. ’
On September 11, 2001 next generation warfare finally crashed onto the scene. It 
was not as the Pentagon had war-gamed. Techno-war was instead replaced by image 
warfare. In October 2001, Der Derian stated: ‘After the looped footage of the
collapse of the towers began to take on the feeling of deja vu, I seriously wondered if
1RS •the media-entertainment matrix had not taken a fatal blow.’ Instead of abandoning 
his MIME-NET journey though Der Derian continued, expanding his travelogue with 
a second edition of Virtuous War. He has argued that, post-9/11, for the Bush
administration ‘[t]he goal was the same: combine technical and ethical superiority to
186actualize violence from a distance with minimum casualties when possible.’ He 
also described the Pentagon’s virtuous war response to September 11th as ‘an auto­
immune response’187 -  ‘primed by the military-industrial-media-entertainment 
network. ’188
Der Derian has also turned his attention to discussing how A1 Qaeda mobilized 
multiple forms of media on 9/11, in order to successfully execute their attack. He 
has reflected on how -  for less than US $50000,000 -  flight simulations, hawala fund 
transfers, the internet and mobile phones were used by the 9/11 hijackers to 
transform commercial airplanes into kinetic weapons of mass destruction; how the 
18-minute gap between the first and second attacks on the World Trade Center was 
used by A1 Qaeda to transform the attacks from a local catastrophe into a global 
terror event and finally how bin Laden strategically produced and deployed
183 Ibid, p. 177
184 Der Derian, Virtuous War, 2nd eds, p. 245
185 James Der Derian, '9.11: The Media-Entertainment Network', INFOinterventions, 2001. Available
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videotapes in the aftermath of the attacks.189 Der Derian here provides strong 
evidence of the fact that A1 Qaeda cannot compete on traditional military terms 
against America and so on 9/11 exploited existing technology and media systems and 
mobilized them to serve there own ends: commercial airplanes were transformed into 
kinetic weapons of mass destruction and the media were used to transform the 
attacks into a spectacular global event.
He has also described how the opening scenes of the air war in Afghanistan, on 
October 7, 2001, was played out through the media and borrowed many of its visual 
cues from the 1991 Gulf War and the Kosovo Campaign: like spectacular night 
vision footage of air attacks over Kabul and the appearance of politicians, journalists 
and military officials giving a running commentary on events.190 This is further 
compelling evidence which shows how the Pentagon still mistakenly thinks that it 
can stage-manage war.
Der Derian has also examined how bin Laden was able to disrupt the Pentagon’s 
carefully planned Afghanistan war script. He argues that bin Laden, in response to 
the first air strikes against Kabul, on October 7, 2001, made a ‘counter air-strike’ 
against America by appearing in a video -  first aired on A1 Jazeera.191 This October 
7th video was also a stylistic mimetic of the political communications of President 
George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair (see Chapter Three).
What is clear from this whole sequence of events is that A1 Qaeda has a better 
understanding of the power of images than the Pentagon which simply rolled out yet 
another techno-war in response to September 11th. On October 9, 2001 Prime 
Minister Blair decided to engage with bin Laden, through A1 Jazeera, followed 
quickly by President Bush and a whole host of other British and American 
politicians. Again, this response was a copy of their earlier media appearances, 
during the 1991 Gulf War, the Kosovo Campaign and the opening scenes of the War
189 James Der Derian, 'The Question of Information Technology in International Relations'.
Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies 32, no. 3 (2003), pp. 448-449
190 James Der Derian, '9/11: Before, after and in Between', in Terrorism, Media, Liberation, ed. J.
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in Afghanistan. This time they were appearing on A1 Jazeera rather than CNN or the 
BBC.
The 2003 Iraq War -  like the opening scenes of the war in Afghanistan -  was yet 
another re-run of the earlier 1991 Gulf War and the Kosovo Campaign and, 
according to Der Derian, the Bush administration is currently playing directly into
1 Q n
bin Laden’s hands through reacting time and again to his ‘mimetic traps’. Der 
Derian has urged the Bush administration to avoid bin Laden’s ‘mimetic traps’ 
because
[d]ead or alive, prophet or crackpot, symptom or disease, Bin Laden as well 
as Hussein require a mimetic foe. Without a reciprocal hatred their 
prophecies lose their self-fulfilling powers. As is often the case with 
narcissistic psychopaths, the worst thing we could do is to deprive them of 
their reflections.193
However, so far, the White House has not heeded these warnings. Instead it has 
managed to escalate mimesis, perpetuate the current war of images and pump yet 
more money and resources into its development of new military technologies.
To witness first hand whether or not the war on terror has changed the MIME-NET, 
Der Derian went back on the road. He returned to the Mojave Desert to where he 
began his MIME-NET journey. On his return journey Der Derian quickly realized 
that he was using the same map to navigate his way around as he had used back in 
1994 (an interesting metaphor for the MIME-NET).194 Der Derian’s travelogue 
shows that ‘it would seem that we had gone full circle, out of Borges’s labyrinth and 
once more back into Baudrillard’s simulacrum:’195 To quote Baudrillard:
Today abstraction is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the 
concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a 
substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a 
hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map that precedes the map, 
nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory -  
precession o f simulacra -  that engenders the territory, and if one must return
192 James Der Derian, 'Imaging Terror: Logos, Pathos and Ethos'. Third World Quarterly 26, no. 1
(2005), p. 32
193 Ibid, pp. 32-33
194 Der Derian, Virtuous War, 2nd eds, p. 275
195 Ibid, p. 278
82
to the fable, today it is the territory whose shreds slowly rot across the extent 
of the map. It is the real, and not the map, whose vestiges persist here and 
there in the deserts and that are not longer those of the Empire, but ours. The
desert o f the real itself196
One major change which has been integrated into the MIME-NET, post-9/11, are 
cultural war-games. Der Derian witnessed two so-called ‘cultural awareness 
operations’ firsthand: at the Riverside March Air Reserve Base and then again at
1 07Twentynine Palms where some virtual Iraqi villages had been built. To further 
add to the reality of these simulations, Iraqi role-players were employed to play the 
role of virtual Iraqi villagers. According to Der Derian:
at the bottom of the Twentynine Palms pecking order were the Iraqi role- 
players. Marines were cordial towards them during the exercise -  that was 
the purpose after all -  but on more than one occasion I overheard Marines 
perform some classic in-group, out-group behaviour.198
In conclusion, not only is the RMA way of warfighting (promoted by the MIME- 
NET) out of date, little attention is still being paid to the meanings of images 
(something which is vital in an age of image warfare), but also the MIME-NET’s 
‘cultural awareness operations’ appear to not be working as effectively as they 
perhaps should be.
Der Derian’s work is insightful precisely because it opens connections between IR 
and media, IR and technology and IR and images. He is able to show, as he travels 
through the American RMA war machine, how ineffective techno-war is in the war 
on terror and how the Pentagon has failed to respond to the threat of A1 Qaeda and 
the new security challenges of the twenty-first century. Der Derian, in my opinion, 
offers the best description of American techno-war. However, Der Derian with this 
second edition of Virtuous War unfortunately does not critically engage enough with 
the important issues of new media and images in the war on terror. After all, we 
currently live in an information age where new media and images increasingly 
dominate our lives and our wars. He is highly critical of the institutional
196 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation. Translated by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor, MI:
The University o f Michigan Press, 1994), p. 1
197 Der Derian, Virtuous War, 2nd eds, p. 287
198 Ibid, p. 292
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relationships between the military, technology industries, the media and Hollywood 
and their attempts to control the spectacle of war. However, he does not offer the 
Pentagon an alternative to the MIME-NET or indeed how it could be employed more 
efficiently in the age of rhizomatic media.
Conclusion
This chapter has surveyed the relationship between war and images and critically 
considered some of the ways in which IR theorists and analysts have sought to make 
sense of it. I started by identifying how society has shifted from a mass media 
system (connected to a twentieth century notion of propaganda) to a rhizomatic 
media system (connected with new media and the deterritorialised circulation of 
information). I also showed how the relationship between war, images and 
propaganda is age-old but how in contemporary war these relationships have 
changed as media have become ever more rhizomatic in nature, a development which 
IR theory has yet to fully address. Although IR theorists recognize the importance of 
information, news and images for war they do not fully grasp the extent to which in 
the present day there no longer exists a mass media through which there can be 
control of the flow of information, news and images in war. Information, news and 
images in war are today rhizomatic, uncontrollable and unpredictable.
I saw some aspects of this development as part of a discussion of the historically 
variable relationship between media and war, from the Vietnam War, the first 
television war, where the Pentagon failed to control the information leaving the war 
theatre to the First Gulf War and the premiering of techno-war, where the Pentagon 
dominated the information leaving the war theatre and the Kosovo Conflict, where 
war finally went online. I also saw how with 9/11 and the war on terror, the 
circulation and production of images was such that it has become necessary to 
conceive of images as a part of the theatre of war, weaponized yet still rhizomatic in 
nature.
I have also seen how International Relations theorists have explored the new security 
challenges of the war on terror and image warfare. Debrix has theorised the 
construction of a ‘risk’ or ‘terror’ discourse firstly with reference to the work of other
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IR theorists and secondly with reference to popular culture. His conclusion is that a 
tabloid aesthetic dominates the war on terror discourse. This is an important 
discussion that could have been supplemented by further attention to the role of 
popular culture in the construction of this discourse. Jackson’s assessment of the 
role of language in the construction of the war on terror discourse is also thought 
provoking but mistakenly he lumps together visuals, speeches and interviews under 
the term ‘language’. Croft’s analysis is the most inclusive examination of the 
construction of a war on terror meta-narrative. It places visuals and popular culture 
at the centre of analysis, something definitely missing from the other theorisations 
about the war on terror discourse/meta-narrative.
Michalski and Gow have presented a compelling case about the role of images in 
contemporary war with their bold argument that moving images are the key weapons 
in contemporary war. However, their argument is flawed. Michalski and Gow argue 
that all moving images are key weapons in contemporary war rather than identifying 
the important distinctions between different kinds of moving images: documentary 
and feature films, news footage and UGC footage. They fail to properly get to grips 
with the specificity of modes of image production, circulation and meaning-creation. 
They overlook the fact while some moving images (news footage and UGC footage) 
can become weaponized, most moving images (documentary and feature films) only 
have the potential for mobilization. It is necessary, therefore, to develop a broader 
and more nuanced conception of the ways in which images enter into, come out of 
and participate in the theatres of war and, in particular, of how they form a distinct 
theatre within which diverse processes and events can be identified.
Shapiro has successfully theorised the mobilization of moving images with a 
reworking of his earlier thesis of ‘violent cartography’. He also identifies the 
counter-spaces to this violent cartography, and makes visible a broad and complex 
field of activity. Finally, in reviewing the important work of James Der Derian I saw 
just what is at stake. The Pentagon is out of touch with the reality of war, relying too 
much on technologies and war-games simulations which have not been programmed 
with image warfare scenarios.
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These arguments open up new avenues of exploration and certainly help me to pose 
the right questions. But as I have shown they do not all fully grasp the specificity of 
the war of images. It is still necessary to develop concepts that help me understand 
this distinct theatre of conflict. That requires bringing IR into a more sustained and 
deeper conversation than hitherto, in fields of study more attuned to the formation 
and affects of images. My next chapter will therefore develop a general theorisation 
of image warfare through an examination of a wide variety of literatures ranging 
from War Studies to Media Studies and Visual Culture, making clearer the theatre 
within which the war of images takes place and enabling me to begin to develop 
conceptual terms and tools for use in further understanding it.
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Chapter Two 
Theorising Image Warfare
Introduction
In Chapter One I argued that the production and circulation of images in 
contemporary society take place in ways that break with the past. The positions of 
producer and consumer are sometimes indeterminate and the overall process is best 
thought of as rhizomatic in nature, as images flow and spread horizontally 
establishing new connections and new contexts sometimes far beyond that of their 
‘original’ production. I also saw reasons to think that this has specific effects on the 
conduct of military activity. This revolution in media has therefore resulted in the 
deterritorialised and unpredictable circulation of images and consequently it has also 
had the effect of a paradigm shift in war: techno-war to image warfare.
International Relations and Strategic Studies have sought to respond to these 
developments, and to refine conceptual and methodological tools for their 
explication, interpretation and analysis, in a number of ways. The innovations of 
theorists and analysts such as Debrix, Jackson and Croft as well as interventions by 
Michalski and Gow, Shapiro and Der Derian have clarified the scope and 
significance of image-based media for contemporary conflict and, significantly, have 
made clear that it is now possible and necessary to conceive of these as constitutive 
of a distinct realm of activity and not merely an adjunct to techno-war. It remains, 
however, to clarify further the nature of that realm and the activity it calls forth. As I 
show in this chapter that requires a fuller engagement by International Relations with 
work found in those fields specifically concerned with the contemporary culture of 
the image.
I will begin with an exploration of the RMA literature in which I will show how its 
focus on technology has resulted in the important roles of media and images in 
contemporary war being neglected by traditional IR/Strategic Studies theorists. Such 
neglect has led to a misunderstanding of the extent to which it is still possible to
87
control the flow of images in contemporary war. In order to correct this I need to 
supplement such studies with the insights of other disciplines, especially from Media 
Studies and Visual Culture. Exploring the transformation of propaganda from 
something produced centrally and disseminated from the top-down, into information 
that flows from decentralized sources in multiple directions I will closely consider 
the impact of new media technologies such as the internet, blogs and mobile phones 
on contemporary war-making. This relates directly to theories of ‘postmodern war’ 
found in the work of Jean Baudrillard and Paul Virilio both of whom have been 
especially interested in the impact upon war of real-time communications. However, 
as I will show, where Baudrillard sees only the negations and containments of mass 
mediation and real-time communication, Virilio points the way to understanding the 
new forms of activity and agency made possible by new media and real-time 
communication. He offers a prophetic glimpse of the shift from the centralized mass 
media age to the rhizomatic information age.
In this chapter I will also see how conceptual resources can be further enriched 
through drawing on research into photography, especially that of Susan Sontag, as 
well as recent work on image production, circulation and interpretation by writers 
such as W. J. T. Mitchell, Nicholas Mirzoeff and Robert Hariman and John Louis 
Lucaites. In combination these will help me to more adequately conceptualise the 
complex circulation and meaning-production effects of images. On the basis of these 
readings I will develop three key conceptual terms: ‘image munitions’, ‘counter­
image munitions’ and ‘remediation battles’. These concepts help me to bridge the 
gaps between International Relations, Media Studies and Visual Culture and also 
draw attention not only to the ways in which images enter the theatre of war and are 
contested by different media actors but also to the historically specific ways in which 
images are produced and consumed. These will be tested through an analysis of two 
iconic historic images and their contemporary appropriations: The Flag Raising at 
Two Jima and The Unknown Rebel (or Tank Man). Finally, I will also discuss the 
methodology employed in this thesis before developing my conceptual terms in the 
case studies which make up Chapters Three to Six.
War Studies in the Age o f Image W arfare
According to Martin C. Libicki ‘The United States is midway through what may be 
called a revolution in military affairs’,199 a transformation as Andrew Latham argues, 
‘in the technologies, techniques and organizational forms of warfighting.’200 It is 
through the concept of the RMA that War Studies, as distinct from Security Studies, 
has sought to understand the ways in which, since the end of the Cold War, both 
warfare and society have been fundamentally transformed. This literature can 
usefully be divided up into two: theories concerned with the changing value of 
human life in war; and theories that are concerned with discussing the role of new 
military technologies in contemporary war. Neither literature properly engages with 
either the mediation of war or with images that depict war, both of which are central 
to understanding image warfare in the war on terror. Indeed, War Studies theorists, 
start with the intention of establishing how best to control and manage war 
spectacles. In so assuming the potential for control they misunderstand the very 
nature of the contemporary rhizomatic media environment.
Recent work has engaged specifically with the displacement of humans from the 
centre of military operations. Edward N. Luttwak has proposed the highly influential 
concept of ‘post-heroic warfare.’201 He argues that American military policy and 
warfare has been fundamentally altered by the distancing of human forces from the 
theatre of operations and their gradual replacement by airpower (putting distance 
between military personnel and the operational theatre). Chris Hables Gray has 
theorized postmodern war,202 the role of the postmodern citizen -  in what he terms 
the posthuman age,203 and the role of posthuman soldiers within the postmodern 
theatre of war.204 In Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond, Michael Ignatieff argues that:
[t]he Kosovo conflict looked and sounded like a war... For the citizens of the
NATO countries, on the other hand, the war was virtual. They were
199 Martin C. Libicki, ‘Illustrating Tomorrow’s War’, in McNair Paper 61 (1999), p. 1
200 Andrew Latham, 'Re-Imagining Warfare: The 'Revolution in Military Affairs", in Contemporary
Security and Strategy, ed. Craig A. Snyder (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999), p. 210
201 Edward N. Luttwak, 'Towards Post-Heroic Warfare'. Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (1995), pp. 109-22
and Edward N. Luttwak, 'A Post-Heroic Military Policy'. Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4 (1996), 
pp. 33-44
202 See Gray, Postmodern War
203 See Chris Hables Gray, Cyborg Citizens: Politics in the Posthuman Age (London: Routledge, 
2002)
204 Chris Hables Gray, 'Posthuman Soldiers in Postmodern War'. Body & Society 9, no. 4 (2003), pp.
215-26
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mobilized, not as combatants but as spectators. The war was a spectacle: it 
aroused emotions in the intense but shallow way that sports do.205
Colin Mclnnes’ analysis of modem warfare Spectator-Sport War: The West and 
Contemporary Conflict takes Michael Mann’s concept of ‘spectator sport 
militarism’206 and makes an eloquent argument -  from a War Studies perspective -  
about the displacement of humans from warfare and the centrality of media in 
contemporary war. However, even he (like other War Studies theorists) fails fully to 
engage with media outputs. Mclnnes does not fully subscribe to “the CNN 
Effect”.207 Rather, he argues that audiences cannot but maintain a distance where an 
engagement is limited to spectatorship without risk or direct participation in the first 
instance. This critical distance marks an important shift in the relationship between 
the media and its audience: one where spectacle becomes increasingly important. 
Mclnnes thus acknowledges the fact that:
although consumers of the media may not be “absorbent sponges,” they 
remain spectators. What is striking is that the debate is couched in terms not 
of galvanizing public action but of influencing public opinion to allow others 
to act (or not to act, as the case may be). In this sense, the role of the media 
in contemporary war is very different from that of propaganda in previous 
wars.208
As a result, contemporary war is increasingly concerned with the manufacture of 
media spectacles. According to Philip Hammond, during the 2003 Iraq War the US 
military felt compelled to manufacture media spectacles209 or ‘pseudo-events’210 (key 
war moments) -  such as the Saving Private Lynch episode, the pulling down of 
Saddam Hussein’s statue in central Baghdad or Bush’s “Mission Accomplished” 
speech -  and to make sure that these events were circulated. He has also noted how 
‘the effectiveness of the propaganda was undermined by the way that the news media
205 Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (London: Vintage, 2001), p. 3
206 See Michael Mann, States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1988)
207 See Robinson, The CNN Effect
208 Mclnnes, Spectator-Sport War, p. 147
209 See Hammond, Media, War and Postmodernity
210 See Daniel J. Boorstin, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America. 25th Anniversary ed 
(New York, NJ: Vintage Books, 1992)
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self-consciously drew attention to its deliberately manufactured quality.’211 He is 
also aware that:
Today’s media culture is one in which there is an acute awareness of image 
manipulation. School students practice deconstructing television programmes 
for their Media Studies GCSEs, advertisers frequently appeal to us on the 
basis of our awareness of advertising techniques, and Hollywood films such 
as The Truman Show, The Matrix and Wag the Dog play with the idea that the 
media produce illusions of reality. The War on Terrorism is not immune 
from culture. Digitisation, the Internet, and the growth of global media 
audiences all play a role in promoting a greater self-consciousness about 
image construction.212
All of these factors have resulted in people becoming increasingly wary of the 
manufactured spectacle of war. Thus Naomi Klein was able to announce that 2003
was the year when fakeness ruled: fake rationales for war, a fake President 
dressed as a fake soldier declaring a fake end to combat and then holding up a 
fake turkey. An action movie star became governor and the government 
started making its own action movies, casting real soldiers like Jessica Lynch 
as fake combat heroes and dressing up embedded journalists as fake soldiers. 
Saddam Hussein even got a part in the big show: He played himself being 
captured by American troops.213
Such accounts seem to imply that the spectacle of war is very much under the control 
of military planners or media corporations. But such spectacles have in fact become 
increasingly uncontrollable in the age of new media, and in ways that undermine 
Western military strategic thinking. Indeed, A1 Qaeda has instead demonstrated a 
more sophisticated understanding of the new relationship between audiences and the 
media. According to Mclnnes:
The spectator-sport metaphor also helps us to understand the events of 11 
September 2001, when hijacked aircraft were deliberately crashed into the 
Pentagon and World Trade Center. These terrorist acts created not only 
spectacular images but also rendered the West empathic spectators -  in 
watching the destruction, the citizens of the West were made aware of their 
vulnerability to subsequent acts. Being a spectator was used by the terrorists
211 Hammond, Media, War and Postmodernity, p. 59. See the Centre for Research on Globalisation. 
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not to distance citizens of the West from the attacks but to bring them 
closer.214
Mclnnes’ recognition that acts of terrorism are also acts of communication is highly 
significant. However, its importance has largely been missed within much of the 
postmodern War Studies literature.215 Yet A1 Qaeda has clearly realized that -  when 
deployed at strategically significant moments in the news-cycle -  images can become 
weaponized and in their own way are as powerful as bullets or bombs. Indeed, given 
that they cannot compete on traditional military terms against techno-war such 
weaponizing of images is a vital tactic for organizations such as A1 Qaeda: the
tVi •weaponization of images on September 11 gave them an immediate strategic 
advantage in the war on terror against the Pentagon which was instead primed for 
RMA warfare.
Martin Shaw has argued that since the watershed of the 1991 Gulf theatre of 
operations, society has been in a ‘post-military’216 situation. Shaw recognizes that as 
warfare changed fundamentally during this time so too did society’s relationship with 
it. Although audiences were witnessing the mediated spectacle of war unfolding in 
real-time in the distant theatre of operations, the majority of the audience were not 
actually directly affected by the events: they were merely spectators. In 2005 he 
added a further term to the lexicon of War Studies, ‘risk-transfer war.’217 Shaw’s 
risk-transfer war thesis sees techno-war taken to its logical conclusion. The 
increased Western military reliance on technology has led to the transfer of the risks 
of war away from human life and onto technology. This transfer of risk is also 
reproduced in the West as society has become increasingly removed from the risks of 
war. Paul Rogers has similarly described this new way of warfare as ‘war against 
real estate’218 and has gone on to argue that Western war now appears ‘kinder’ and 
‘more humane.’219
214 Mclnnes, Spectator-Sport War, p. 151
215 For a detailed discussion about terrorism as communication see, Joseph S. Tuman, Communicating 
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Christopher Coker also picks up on this humane theme in his exploration of media 
representations in contemporary warfare.
War becomes humane not only when it appears to take place on a television 
screen in one’s home, but when it enlists societies in humane ways. With the 
end of conscription it no longer requires the actual participation of the citizen. 
Because of the bypassing of representative institutions it no longer requires 
democratic consent. And because wars are short and relatively cheap, 
governments do not even have to raise special taxes as Germany and Japan 
did in the [First] Gulf War... We have become so intoxicated by the idea of 
precise, risk-free warfare that we believe what we want to believe.220
In his book Waging War Without Warriors? Coker has discussed the significance of 
the media’s role within the 1991 Gulf War. An average of 600 million viewers 
watched the war unfold through CNN’s media coverage221 and yet
[f]ew gruesome pictures were shown during the Gulf War. Of the 1,104 
Desert Storm photographs that appeared in... three major news magazines, 
only thirty-eight showed actual combat, whereas 249 were catalogue-style 
photographs of military hardware.222
He concluded that because of the disappearance of soldiers from the images of war 
and their replacement with images of the latest military technologies, wars are now 
waged without warriors in their traditional sense. Traditional warriors are being 
phased out to make way for new technology -  thus significantly reducing the threat 
to military personnel. In 2007, Coker argued:
Some years ago I wrote a book, War Without Warriors, which argued that the 
increasing instrumentalisation of war (which the United States has led, if not 
pioneered) was making warriors as a class increasingly redundant. Since it 
was published, warriors have come to hold centre stage in the war on terror. 
Special forces are increasing in numbers all the time. Warriors are back in 
the news. I still wonder, though, whether they can survive long into the 
twenty-first century.223
220 Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 150
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Coker’s work is significant because it shows how, just as warriors are being phased 
out to make way for new military technologies in contemporary warfare, so are 
images of soldiers in battle being replaced by images of the latest military 
technologies. In this respect then Coker recognises that something important is 
happening with regard to the representation of war. However, he remains ambivalent 
on the role of Special Forces personnel in contemporary warfare -  especially over the 
fact that they played a central role in the Saving Private Lynch episode. As Alastair 
Finlan notes, the Lynch episode was a rather unusual situation:
the entire mission was ‘filmed’ by the assaulting Special Forces, a highly 
unusual set of circumstances bearing in mind that the soldiers should have 
been totally concentrating on the mission rather than dedicating specific 
assets to recording it -  more appropriate to a training exercise, rather than a 
live mission.224
Finlan’s bewilderment is instructive: he fails to realise that the filming of the mission 
was not a subsidiary element but central to it. As Hammond argues ‘in more recent 
years the point of the missions undertaken by the Western military has often seemed 
to be primarily their propaganda value rather than, say, the acquisition of territory or 
the achievement of some strategic goal.’225
A central claim of such research into the RMA is that it involves the replacement of a 
revaluation of the life of soldiers and, consequently, attempts to reduce the extent to 
which they are deployed in the field of battle. However, a corollary of this -  noted 
but not always explored by theorists of the RMA -  is a transformation in the 
importance of the representation of soldiers in battle and an increase in the conscious 
deployment of them for the purpose of producing successful and significant 
representations of operations as opposed to operations that are indeed successful and 
significant in their own right. It should therefore be of little or no surprise that so- 
called ‘Neocortical Warfare’, a model of warfare designed specifically to subdue 
‘adversaries without violence’226 has been popular with certain RMA inspired
224 Alastair Finlan, Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror: Warfare by Other Means 
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military planners, such as those at the Institute for Creative Technology (ICT) at the 
University of Southern California. Spectacles are a central feature of contemporary 
war in which elite warriors are mobilised not just for their warfighting abilities but
227for starring roles in MIME-NET manufactured media spectacle.
The second key strand of theory and analysis within the RMA literature concerns the 
role of new military technologies in contemporary war which has been transformed 
by ‘revolutions’ in airpower, precision munitions and new communication systems -  
techno-war. Colin S. Gray, in 1998, identified seven different ‘schools’ of thought 
which help to characterise the information-age RMA debate. These also demonstrate 
the contestability of the RMA even within the Strategic Studies literature: 
‘Cyberwar, or Strategic Information Warfare,’ ‘Information-led Warfare: The 
Radical Vision,’ ‘Information-led Warfare: The Digital Overlay,’ ‘Much Ado About 
Nothing Much,’ ‘Air is the Real Revolution,’ ‘Space is the Real Revolution’ and ‘A 
Revolution in Security Affairs.’228 Gray’s seven schools also reveal how these 
different explanations depart from one another and how the RMA is indeed central to 
a diverse range of debates in Strategic Studies. He has also outlined his own 
tentative conclusion regarding the RMA’s impact, which has since proven to be 
inaccurate, writing that:
I-war is not akin to war in the geographically specific media, and I-power is 
not a sibling to airpower, seapower, landpower, and spacepower. Timely, 
accurate and appropriate information, rapidly and securely disseminated to 
‘sharp-end’ military users, may be the advantage most critical to success 
(though I doubt it; human virtues of judgement, discipline, and courage are 
likely to be more important).229
Gray is dubious about the impact of the RMA while Lawrence Freedman is far more 
willing to acknowledge that the information revolution has already had a massive 
impact on the waging of war, remarking that:
227 See Der Derian, Virtuous War. 2nd eds.
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defence analysts write about command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence and battle management in the same vein. Although ‘C4I/BM’ is 
something of a mouthful, it conveys the view that information systems have 
become essential to an extremely wide -  indeed comprehensive -  range of 
functions and that they are also, in some critical sense, inter-dependent.230
Freedman understands that the information revolution has impacted on all aspects of 
the military and has transformed contemporary war -  making new information 
systems central to contemporary war. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Admiral William A. 
Owens have also both recognized the vital role that information is playing in 
contemporary warfare. They both go even further than Freedman and argue that 
information has had a massive ‘force multiplier’231 effect upon warfighting. In fact 
Nye, Jr. and Owens believe that: ‘The information age has revolutionized not only 
military affairs but the instruments of soft power and the opportunities to apply 
them.’232 Admiral Owens is also credited with developing the concept of the system 
o f systems which has since been the driving theoretical force behind the military’s 
current preoccupation with ‘network-centric war’233 where real-time communications 
can be established and maintained between all arms of the military.
To sum up, there is considerable agreement among War Studies theorists that warfare 
in the post-Cold War era has undergone a significant and pervasive shift. As these 
scholars have shown this contemporary military revolution has in turn impacted on 
the participants, audiences and strategists of war. Thus, as technology has succeeded 
the soldier in battle, and as war has become a distant media spectacle, so military 
strategists have accounted for these changes conceptualising airpower as central to 
military operations, emphasising the importance of precision and stressing the 
significance of spinning war.
However, although recognising the increased significance of media images and 
spectacles and the strategic importance of information and its movement, war 
theorists have underestimated the importance of these and, consequently, have under­
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theorised their impact in the war on terror. To more fully grasp the significance and 
character of such developments I need to look beyond the International Relations 
literature. In the following section I will examine briefly the wider study of 
propaganda. Historically, and as I noted in Chapter One, propaganda models have 
been prominent in attempting to understand the impact upon politics of media and 
images. The development of new media technologies -  such as the internet, blogs 
and mobile phones -  mean that image production has now become increasingly 
decentralized and unpredictable as an increasing number of new media actors are 
creating and uploading their own content. This reaffirms the need for a more 
sophisticated understanding of the contemporary media system: where information is 
no longer thought of as being controlled from the top-down but is instead seen as 
being rhizomatic and decentralized.
W ar and Propaganda in the Age of New Media
Philip M. Taylor’s seminal work on the history of propaganda outlines the long 
relationship propaganda has had with war.234 The first and second editions of this 
book were divided into five sections: ‘Propaganda in the Ancient World’, 
‘Propaganda in the Middle Ages’, ‘Propaganda in the Age of Gunpowder and 
Printing’, ‘Propaganda in the Age of Revolutionary Warfare’ and ‘Propaganda in the 
Age of Total War and the Cold War.’235 Significantly, in 2003, the third edition of 
this book included a new sixth section entitled: ‘The New World Information 
Disorder.’236 These sections are indicative of more pervasive assumptions of 
continuity of image usage in warfare.
Taylor makes his own position on propaganda perfectly clear from the outset: ‘Once 
war has broken out, propaganda has proved to be a weapon of no less significance
234 Another excellent collection of essays on the history o f propaganda is: Mark Connelly and David
Welch, eds., War and the Media: Reportage and Propaganda, 1900-2003 (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 2005)
235 Philip M. Taylor, Munitions o f the Mind: War Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Nuclear
Age. 1st eds. (Wellingborough, Northamptonshire: Patrick Stephens Limited, 1990), Philip 
M. Taylor, Philip M. Taylor, Munitions o f the Mind: A History o f  Propaganda from the 
Ancient World to the Present Day. 2nd eds. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995)
236 Philip M. Taylor, Munitions o f  the Mind: A History o f Propaganda from the Ancient World to the
Present Day. 3rd eds. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003)
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than swords or guns or bombs.’237 Its power lies in its unique ability to compel 
others to do the propagandists will without the direct threat of violence. Unlike 
Hammond,238 Taylor has chosen not to redefine the role of propaganda within 
contemporary war. Rather he sees propaganda as having maintained its traditional 
and central function. Nor does he challenge centralised models which conceive of 
propaganda flows as unidirectional. This said, in his discussion of propaganda 
during the Second World War, he does identify two distinct forms of propaganda. 
Firstly white propaganda, ‘namely propaganda emanating from a clearly identifiable 
source,’239 such as, for example the BBC and, secondly, black propaganda which 
‘describes material emanating from an undisclosed source.’240 This division of 
propaganda between ‘white’ and ‘black’ has remained the dominant division for a 
number of years and is evidence of the dominance of propaganda in the mass media 
age. Taylor, in War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War 
shows how persuasive the coalition’s propaganda campaign during the 1991 Gulf 
War actually was, attending in particular to the now iconic footage filmed by the 
planes which launched PGM’s against Baghdad: ‘Television war addicts were in a 
sense mesmerised by the live coverage, reducing their capacity to stand back from 
the images objectively or critically.’241
Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky in Manufacturing Consent have developed 
an alternative influential centralised propaganda model which helps to describe the 
role of propaganda in the age of mass media and more recently the information age, 
concentrating on manufacturing the public’s consent.242 Put quite simply, this 
consent, as discussed by Herman and Chomsky, is manufactured in response to an 
event through an intertextuality of
a series of government leaks, press conferences, white papers, etc., or with 
one or more of the mass media starting the ball rolling... If the other major
237 Taylor, Munitions o f  the Mind. 2nd eds., p. 5
238 Hammond, Media, War and Postmodernity
239 Taylor, Munitions o f  the Mind. 2nd eds., p. 222
240 Ibid, p. 225
241 Taylor, War and the Media, p. 14
242 See also Anthony R. Pratkanis, and Elliot Aronson, Age o f  Propaganda: The Everyday Use and
Abuse o f  Persuasion (New York, NJ: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2001), Rampton and 
Stauber, Weapons o f  Mass Deception and Nicholas Jackson O'Shaughnessy, Politics and 
Propaganda: Weapons o f Mass Seduction (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004)
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media like the story, they will follow it up with their own versions, and the 
matter quickly becomes newsworthy by familiarity.243
Herman and Chomsky are also aware of the fragility of propaganda within the news 
system: ‘If a theme collapses of its own burden of fabrications, the mass media will 
quietly fold their tents and move on to another topic.’244
However, this centralized propaganda model, of one-way information flows, is no 
longer adequate. The age of single information sources like press conferences and 
government white papers is over. As Dan Gillmor puts it, ‘the press release culture 
is beginning to die’.245 The mass media age is now over and has instead been 
replaced by a rhizomatic media age where information is now beyond the control of 
a few dominant media actors. This is because the number of other possible ways for 
journalists and audiences to get their hands on information has proliferated in the 
information age. After 9/11 non-traditional information sources have been used 
more and more to get information such as bin Laden videos, suicide videos and 
hostage videos (see Chapters Three, Four and Five) although these information 
sources do indeed share similarities with both official political communications and 
press conferences (see Chapter Three). From here this information has been 
circulated throughout the mainstream media both television and print.
An important example of this shift is the increasing prominence of the A1 Jazeera 
news network, which currently acts as an information conduit between the non­
mainstream and the mainstream news media. Indeed, perhaps such media services 
should now be regarded as sources of grey propaganda.246 They are clearly 
identifiable news sources but at the same time consistently preview footage like 
Osama bin Laden videos which originate from undisclosed sources. Two other 
media phenomena should also be added to the growing list of grey propaganda
243 Edward S. Herman, and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy o f  the
Mass Media (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 34
244 Ibid, p. 34
245 Dan Gillmor, We the Media: Grassroots Journalism by the People, fo r  the People (Sebastopol,
CA: O'Reilly Media, Inc., 2006), p. 68
246 Scot Macdonald, Propaganda and Information Warfare in the Twenty-First Century: Altered
Images and Deception Operations (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 33
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sources. Firstly, war-blogs offer a vital source of information during times of war, 
where civilians such as Salam Pax in Baghdad can comment on events in real-time 
from within the theatre of operations. This becomes particularly significant either 
when journalists are absent or when specific blog entries can be used to support 
claims made by journalists within their news reports (bloggers therefore have now 
assumed a kind of eyewitness role). Secondly, the website YouTube, founded in 
February 2005, has become another powerful media conduit for a number of 
controversial videos, such as suicide videos, hostage videos and ‘War Pom’ footage 
(see Chapters Four, Five and Six). All of these new technologies have been vital in 
opening up new lines of communication which intensify the decentralization of 
information within conflict scenarios. Manuel Castells has termed this ‘a space of 
flows.’247 According to Daya Kishan Thussu: ‘The global media landscape in the 
first decade of the twenty-first century represents a complex terrain of multi-vocal, 
multimedia and multi-directional flows.’248 Traditional theories of propaganda are 
insufficient for conceptualising and understanding these developments.
New media technologies have played a vital role in helping to create the ‘multi­
directional flows’ of the postmodern ‘mediascapes’249 and they have also directly 
affected warfare in the information age. What are now traditional communication 
technologies such as the telephone, radio and television helped to revolutionise the 
First World War, Second World War and the Vietnam War respectively.250 A similar 
transformation appears to be taking place in contemporary global life: an increase in
247 See Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume 1. 2nd eds., Castells, 
The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume 2 and Castells, The 
Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume 3. 2nd eds.
9 4 8 Thussu, 'Mapping Global Media Flow and Contra-Flow', p. 12
249 Mediascapes refer both to the distribution o f the electronic capabilities to produce and disseminate
information (newspapers, magazines, television stations, and film-production studios), which 
are now available to a growing number of private and public interests throughout the world, 
and to the images o f the world created by these media. These images involve many 
complicated inflections, depending on their mode (documentary or entertainment), their 
hardware (electronic or preelectronic), their audiences (local, national, or transnational), and 
the interests o f those who own and control them. What is important about these mediascapes 
is that they provide (especially in their television, film, and cassette forms) large and complex 
repertoires o f images, narratives, and ethnoscapes to viewers throughout the world, in which 
the world o f commodities and the world o f news and politics are profoundly mixed. What 
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the visualising of war and the liberation of the spectacle of war from control. 
According to Philip Seib:
We are seeing a comprehensive reconnecting of the global village and 
reshaping of how the world works. ...Al Jazeera is a symbol of this new, 
media-centric world. ...More than that, Al Jazeera is a paradigm of new 
media’s influence. Ten years ago, there was much talk about “the CNN 
effect,” the theory that news coverage -  especially gripping visual storytelling 
-  was influencing foreign policy throughout the world. Today, “the Al 
Jazeera effect” takes that a significant step farther. Just as “the CNN effect” 
is not about CNN alone, so too is “the Al Jazeera effect” about much more 
than the Qatar-based media company. The concept encompasses the use of 
new media as tools in every aspect of global affairs.”251
Seib’s ‘Al Jazeera effect’ concept describes how with access to new media 
technologies today’s new media actors -  Al Jazeera, bloggers, Al Qaeda and others -  
are influencing the foreign policy process. In order to explore further this ‘Al 
Jazeera effect’ (or what Der Derian additionally describes as ‘the Nokia-effect’252) I 
will now focus upon the impact of three specific new media technologies: the
internet, blogs, and mobile phones. In each case I can see how the contemporary 
flow of media information and images cannot be fully grasped by a model of 
centralised propaganda dissemination, and demands a more nuanced concept of 
complex and multi-directional rhizomatic flows.
The internet is a media platform -  like television, radio and print -  which facilitates 
communication. Nicholas Negroponte,253 Howard Rheingold254 and Manuel Castells 
have been instrumental in promoting debate about the increasing significance of the 
internet. According to Castells:
The internet is a communication medium that allows, for the first time, the 
communication of many to many, in chosen time, on a global scale. As the 
diffusion of the printing press in the West created what McLuhan named the
251 Seib, The Al Jazeera Effect, pp. ix-x
252 James Der Derian, 'Paul Virilio', in Critical Theorists and International Relations, eds. Jenny 
Edkins and Nick Vaughan-Williams (London: Rouledge, 2009), p. 337 
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‘Gutenberg Galaxy’, we have now entered a new world of communication: 
the Internet Galaxy.255
This ‘Internet Galaxy’ has, as noted by Castells, opened up a world of new 
possibilities for real-time communications. For example, it allows Al Qaeda to 
disseminate bin Laden videos and hostage videos with better accuracy, inserting 
them into particular news-cycles and timing them to coincide with specific 
anniversaries and events (see Chapters Three and Five). YouTube video producers 
are also able to use the internet to bring existing content to the attention of new 
audiences, produce new content to challenge official content and adapt and remediate 
existing content by inserting it into new political situations (see Chapters Three to 
Six). The internet has, therefore, played an important part in the decline of mass 
communication and top-down propaganda and in the rise of the unpredictable 
rhizomatic condition (see Chapter One).
Blogs are another technology which pose a serious challenge to controlling the 
information of war. Again, anyone, in any location with access to a working 
computer, live electricity supply or batteries, and an internet connection can 
immediately post material for anyone to read and comment on. This is a significant 
technological advance and it also opens up a new and valuable information source 
that gives a voice to people who sometimes find themselves in extraordinary 
situations, like war-zones. Of course many bloggers are just people writing about 
their everyday lives on their home PCs. But some blogs do come to be considered 
along with mainstream journalism, as credible information sources and therefore are 
potentially a forum for contesting white propaganda. Salam Pax’s blog about the 
2003 Iraq War is just such a case. This blog has successfully managed to transcend a 
number of different media platforms -  with his blog entries now collected together 
within a book The Baghdad Blog256 -  so that his commentary on the war has become 
known beyond the blog itself. We Are Iran by Nasrin Alavi257 is another important 
book which sees for the first time a collection of Iranian blog entries being published 
other than on the internet. My point here is that it is not just spectacles that cannot
255 Manuel Castells, The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business and Society (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 2-3
256 See Salam Pax, The Baghdad Blog (London: Guardian Books, 2003)
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now be controlled, but also information, as blog entries are collected, repackaged and 
remediated.
Mobile phones first emerged during the 1980s, although it was not until the mid to 
late-1990s when, in parts of the world, they rose to prominence. Soon the mobile 
phone was routinely used by journalists and civilians alike to inform the media of 
events as they were taking place. Dan Gillmor has discussed the role of SMS text 
messaging within the recent SARS outbreak in China noting that ‘...the first inkling 
among journalists of China’s SARS epidemic came in an SMS from sources inside 
the medical profession there.’258 However, for this thesis, the most significant 
development with mobile phones has been the development of camera phones and 
video phones. According to Gillmor, ‘mobile phones... [are now] able to send 
information and images to individuals and groups, and publish to web pages in close 
to real time.’259 The July 7, 2005 London Bombings was a major turning point in 
terms of the relationship between the mobile phone, the media and civilians. 
Commuters -  like Adam Stacey -  who were caught up in the bombings, quickly 
began recording what was happening around them. These people then sent this 
footage to the media for immediate circulation. Since 7/7, news networks now make 
regular pleas for viewers to send in their footage and so news audiences have become 
re-agentialized (see Chapter Four).
The most important feature of the new media revolution, however, has been the 
convergence of old and new media into a mediated reality whereby information 
including images can now effortlessly move from one media platform to another and 
circulate with little restraint. Without these new technologies a technology deficit 
would still exist, obstructing the circulation of information and images. In fact, 
maybe image warfare in its current manifestation would not be possible at all. 
Anyone located anywhere -  with access to ‘minimum media’ -  whether Osama 
bin Laden in a cave or a disenfranchised teenager in their bedroom, can now
Gillmor, We the M edia, p. 33
259 Ibid, p. 35
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manufacture an image weapon with a damaging yield and potential international 
impact. Henry Jenkins has discussed a localised effect of this media convergence:
Intoxicated students at a local high school use their cell phones spontaneously 
to produce their own soft-core pom movie involving topless cheerleaders 
making out in the locker room. Within hours, the movie is circulating across 
the school, being downloaded by students and teachers alike and watched 
between classes on personal media devices.261
He has also employed the example of the appropriation of the Bert character from 
Sesame Street (“Bert is Evil”) by someone called Ignacio. This appropriation takes 
Bert, a popular children’s television character, and gives him a subversive edge with 
the caption ‘Bert is Evil’ and his pairing with nefarious figures. The appropriation 
has since gone on to not only become an internet phenomenon but also to cross over 
into the mainstream media as a social phenomenon right across the world. Jenkins 
has described this image’s journey as follows:
In the world of media convergence, every important story gets told, every 
brand gets sold, and every consumer gets counted across multiple media 
platforms. Think about the circuits that the Bert is Evil images travelled -  
from Sesame Street through Photoshop to the World Wide Web, from 
Ignacio’s bedroom to a print shop in Bangladesh, from the posters held by 
anti-American protestors that are captured by CNN and into the living rooms 
of people around the world. Some of its circulation depended on corporate 
strategies, such as the localization of Sesame Street or the global coverage of 
CNN. Some of its circulation depended on tactics of grassroots 
appropriation, whether in North America or in the Middle East.262
New media actors and technologies have made possible a realm of decentralised and 
multi-directional information and image flows. In this super-networked society the 
spectacle of war is no longer controllable. Images are in fact contradicting some of 
the assumptions of the advocates of a techno-war led RMA. The challenge, then, is 
to find a way to theorise such images that is able to account for their form and 
function in ways that also meets the needs and capacities of theories of war and 
strategy. One possible way of so theorising is that developed under the name of 
‘postmodern war’ and it is to a consideration of these that I now turn.
261 Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide (New York, NJ: New
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Theorising Postmodern W ar
If the scholarship conducted in the name of the RMA is limited when it comes to the 
fuller comprehension of transformations in military technologies and their impact on 
contemporary war, then there are resources within the fields of cultural theory and 
philosophy that can take us far -  perhaps even too far -  beyond them. This is a large 
literature and I will here examine two leading figures: Jean Baudrillard and Paul 
Virilio whose research into real-time communications and war has sparked 
widespread interest and, in the case of Baudrillard’s well-known book The Gulf War 
Did Not Take Place, courted some degree of controversy. Patton’s introduction 
conveys Baudrillard’s argument about the 1991 Gulf War as:
At the time, the TV Gulf War must have seemed to many viewers a perfect 
Baudrillardian simulacrum, a hyperreal scenario in which events lose their 
identity and signifiers fade into one another. Fascination and horror at the 
reality which seemed to unfold before our very eyes mingled with a pervasive 
sense of unreality as we recognised the elements of Hollywood script which 
had preceded the real (the John Wayne language and bearing of the military 
spokesmen), and as the signifiers of past events faded into those of the 
present (the oil-soaked sea bird recycled from the Exxon Valdez to warn of 
impending eco-disaster in the Gulf). Occasionally, the absurdity of the 
media’s self-representation as purveyor of reality and immediacy broke 
through, in moments such as those when the CNN cameras crossed live to a 
group of reporters assembled somewhere in the Gulf, only to have them 
confess that they were also sitting around watching CNN in order to find out 
what was happening. Television news coverage appeared to have finally 
caught up with the logic of simulation.263
Patton also offers a description of the Baudrillardian principle of ‘hyperreality’ -  ‘the 
fusion of the virtual and the real into a third order of reality.’264 Invoking 
Baudrillard, Debrix also believes that: ‘The Gulf War... can only make sense in the 
context of hyerreality, as a trompe Toeil war’265 of simulacra and simulations. 
Baudrillard argues that real-time information
loses itself in a completely unreal space, finally furnishing the images of 
pure, useless, instantaneous television where its primordial function irrupts,
263 Jean Baudrillard, The Gulf War D id Not Take Place. Translated by Paul Patton (Sydney: Power
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namely that of filling a vacuum, blocking up the screen hole through which 
escapes the substance of events.266
He concludes his assessment of the role of the media in the First Gulf War as 
follows:
CNN seeks to be a stethoscope attached to the hypothetical heart of the war, 
and to present us with its hypothetical pulse. But this auscultation only 
provides a confused ultrasound, undecidable symptoms, and an assortment of 
vague and contradictory diagnoses.267
Paul Virilio in Desert Screen: War at the Speed o f  Light offers an alternative critique 
of the 1991 Gulf War. He introduces the idea of the media as a new weapon of war 
in two distinct ways: firstly, as ‘weapons of mass communication’268 and secondly, as 
‘weapons of instantaneous communication.’269 In identifying the media as having 
become weaponized in these two distinct ways Virilio is making an important 
comment here about how during the 1991 Gulf War the Pentagon was able to -  with 
its press pool system -  use the media as a weapon of mass communication to 
centrally distribute information to audiences via the waiting press. Virilio is also 
making an important point here about the fact that during the 1991 Gulf War the 
Pentagon was able to exploit the media as a weapon of instantaneous communication 
to mesmerise journalists and audiences alike. For example, the Pentagon made 
night-vision video footage of air raids over Baghdad available to journalists in the 
press pools and then allowed these journalists to submit this footage to news 
networks who then circulated it. As argued below, I believe that in the war on terror 
the Pentagon are still slaves to the idea of the media being a weapon of mass 
communication and a weapon of instantaneous communication when instead the 
media system has now changed and is more rhizomatic and unpredictable.
During the First Gulf War the media did indeed fall into the trap of real-time 
communication, enabling the Pentagon to manufacture and stage-manage a series of 
spectacular media spectacles. Baudrillard believed that the development of real-time
Baudrillard, The Gulf War, p. 31
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transfers of information signalled the end of any meaning for the disseminated 
information. He wrote the following epitaph for the 1991 Gulf War: ‘War implodes 
in real time, history implodes in real time, all communication and all signification 
implode in real time.’270 Baudrillard believed that all reality in the First Gulf War 
imploded and was instead replaced by simulacra and simulation. He dismissed real­
time war even before it had taken place: ‘The Gulf War Will Not Take Place.’ He 
then criticised it while it was taking place: ‘The Gulf War: Is It Really Taking 
Place?’ And after the war ended he remained critical of it: ‘The Gulf War Did Not 
Take Place’. Baudrillard was right to dismiss the 1991 Gulf War as a mere 
simulacrum of war. However, he too quickly dismissed all real-time warfare. This is 
proven by the fact that in response to the September 11th attacks Baudrillard was 
forced to reverse his position on real-time communications and war and concede that 
9/11 was ‘the absolute event.’ He gave this reflection:
Throughout the stagnation of the 1990s, events were ‘on strike’ (as the 
Argentinian writer Macedonio Fernandez put it). Well, the strike is over 
now. Events are not on strike any more. With the attacks on the World 
Trade Center in New York, we might even be said to have before us the 
absolute event, the ‘mother’ of all events, the pure event uniting within itself 
all the events that have never taken place.271
Virilio, by contrast, saw the 1991 Gulf War and real-time transfers of information as 
heralding a new age of meaning for communication. His assessment of the First Gulf 
War is prophetic and offers a glimpse onto a future step-change in war that was 
finally realised with the September 11 terror attacks: image warfare.
Theorists of postmodern war have been particularly focused upon the development of 
real-time communications. Baudrillard was immediately critical of the First Gulf 
War and all real-time communication, arguing that ‘reality’ imploded with the war in 
the Gulf and was instead replaced by a simulacrum of war. He was correct to draw 
attention to the extent to which the First Gulf War, as experienced by media 
audiences was something that ‘did not take place’ outside of its own simulation. 
However, he too quickly dismissed all real-time communication and war and was
270 Baudrillard, The Gulf War, p. 49
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forced to reverse his position after ‘the absolute event’ of 9/11. Virilio, in contrast, 
realised that the 1991 Gulf War was the start of a new era in communication and war 
and so developed the idea that the media are ‘weapons of mass communication’ and 
‘weapons of instantaneous communication.’ Virilio’s prophetic words about a new 
era in communication and war were eventually realized with the 9/11 terror attacks 
and the launching of image warfare. But the challenge of more fully comprehending 
this still remains. In order to develop an adequate understanding I must, as I have 
already shown, look beyond the disciplinary boundaries of International Relations. 
That is why I will now turn to research in the field of Visual Culture in search of a 
more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of images and there relationship to 
media technologies and institutions in image warfare.
Theorising Image W arfare
Scot Macdonald in Propaganda and Information Warfare in the Twenty-First 
Century: Altered Images and Deception Operations has shown that the literature on 
information warfare currently misunderstands propaganda and particularly altered 
images within contemporary war.272 In an attempt to better understand the role of 
such images, Macdonald takes us beyond the information warfare literature explored 
above. He argues that in the past the producers of propaganda material used 
rudimentary methods to alter images for use in deception operations and that these 
unsophisticated altered images were often easily identifiable. He then goes on to 
make the claim that in the wars of today the producers of propaganda material again 
create it for deception operations but they now use computers and other sophisticated 
technologies to make their propaganda and as such altered images are not so easy to 
identify. Another development in propaganda operations, noted by Macdonald, is 
that altered images can now be disseminated globally in near real-time. Therefore, 
he argues, increasingly altered images are being employed in deception operations in 
attempts to try and gain a military advantage against superior military forces such as 
America.
272 Macdonald, Propaganda, p. 4
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Macdonald is undoubtedly correct to draw attention to the deployment of images in 
military contexts. However, he remains fixated upon a model of propaganda 
formation and dissemination that is based on the mass communication model 
discussed in Chapter One. He fails to recognise the importance and extent of the 
rhizomatic nature of contemporary media production and dissemination which 
requires, in turn, different concepts and reference points. In search of these I will 
now turn to research from within Visual Culture. This literature is important to my 
study of image warfare because it offers a perspective on images, something which is 
limited within the JR literature and it also helps me to clarify the institutional 
relationships between actors, objects and subjects.
In her seminal work On Photography Susan Sontag explores how images help to 
construct and reconstruct our understanding of the world, acting as important 
instruments of knowledge.273 According to Sontag: ‘Photographed images do not 
seem to be statements about the world so much as pieces of it, miniatures of reality 
that anyone can make or acquire.’274 Photography, she argues, encourages people to 
take ownership of and document the world around them such that: ‘After the event 
has ended, the picture will still exist, conferring on the event a kind of immortality 
(and importance) it would never otherwise have enjoyed.’275 However, she is equally 
aware that:
Photographs, which fiddle with the scale of the world, themselves get 
reduced, blown up, cropped, retouched, doctored, tricked out. They age, 
plagued by the usual ills of paper objects; they disappear; they become 
valuable, and get bought and sold; they are reproduced. Photographs, which 
package the world, seem to invite packaging. They are stuck in albums, 
framed and set on tables, tacked on walls, projected on slides. Newspapers 
and magazines feature them; cops alphabetize them; museums exhibit them; 
publishers compile them.276
Beyond encouraging a rethink of the ways in which images (and their meanings) are 
transformed, Sontag further explores the important relationship between ‘context’ 
and ‘image’. In fact she identifies two distinct types of context. The first of these is,
273 Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1990), p. 3
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as discussed above, the conditions under which an image is displayed; the second is 
the intertextual relationship an image shares with other images. Sontag writes:
The photograph that the Bolivian authorities transmitted to the world press in 
October 1967 of Che Guevara’s body, laid out in a stable on a stretcher on 
top of a cement trough, surrounded by a Bolivian colonel, a U.S. intelligence 
agent, and several journalists and soldiers, not only summed up the bitter 
realities of contemporary Latin American history but had some inadvertent 
resemblance, as John Berger has pointed out, to Mantegna’s “The Dead 
Christ” and Rembrandt’s “The Anatomy Lesson of Professor Tulp.” What is 
compelling about the photograph partly derives from what it shares, as a 
composition, with these paintings. Indeed, the very extent to which that 
photograph is unforgettable indicates its potential... for becoming a timeless
277image.
Here Sontag explains how photographs get taken and then circulate, becoming 
repackaged. She also argues that ‘[a] photograph passes for incontrovertible proof 
that a given thing happened.’278 As I will see below this is an important observation, 
for anyone seeking to understand the circulation, repackaging and remediation of 
images in the war on terror, and one usefully developed by the Visual Culture 
theorist W. J. T. Mitchell who has theorised the so-called ‘pictorial turn’, taking his 
inspiration from the earlier linguistic turn and drawing attention to ‘the sense that we 
live in a world of images, a world in which, to paraphrase Derrida, there is nothing 
outside the picture.’279
Mitchell takes up Sontag’s themes, while pointing to the omnipresence of images 
today. He has since turned his attention to theorising the role of Visual Culture in the 
war on terror, noting that terrorism has become ‘cloned’. Mitchell has represented 
this connection pictorially with specific reference to an image, first photographed by 
Mikey Flowers, which shows the dust and smoke filled scene from Ground Zero. 
This image was then manipulated by the artist Kevin Clarke as he laid a DNA code
Ibid, pp. 106-107
278 Ibid, p. 5
279 W. J. T. Mitchell, Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation (Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 41. “There is nothing outside o f  the text” by Jacques 
Derrida, O f Grammatology. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (London: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 158
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on top of the original image.280 Mitchell, with his ‘cloning terror’ concept, has made 
a compelling connection between ‘the acephalic clone’281 (which is a headless cloned 
body) -  as discussed by Baudrillard -  and the bodies which appear like acephalic 
clones in the war on terror. Mitchell argues:
The acephalic figure has cloned itself in a wide variety of forms in the war on 
terror. The decapitation of hostages as a spectacle to be recorded and 
circulated in the mass media is only the most literal and hideous of these 
images. Other variations on this obsession with the head include the 
famously staged photo-op of the hooding of Saddam Husseins statue on the 
entrance to Baghdad, first with an American flag (which was quickly 
removed as excessively provocative) and then with a canvas tarp; and the 
scenes of Saddam Hussein’s capture which feature an endlessly repeated 
video tape of his dental examination, the dentist’s light illuminating the 
interior of the nefarious head of state. ...But perhaps the most widely 
publicized headless figures were the torture victims of Abu Ghraib prison, 
their naked bodies exposed to humiliation while their heads are concealed 
under hoods.282
According to Mitchell, an ‘image cannot be destroyed; it comes back to life’283 and 
Tike clones, the Abu Ghraib photographs now have a life of their own quite 
antithetical to the intentions of their producers.’284 The same can also be said about 
the other powerful images currently circulating and remediating across multiple 
media platforms and image contexts in the war on terror such is the uncontrollability 
of the spectacle of war in the rhizomatic media age.
Nicholas Mirzoeff, also building on Sontag’s ideas about image circulation and the 
repackaging of images and Mitchell’s work on the omnipresence of images, argues 
that ‘[modem life takes] place on screen... Human experience is now more visual 
and visualized than ever before... In the era of the visual screen, your viewpoint is
280 W. J. T. Mitchell, 'Cloning Terror: The War of Images, 9/11 to Abu Ghraib', in Baker-Nord 
Seminar Series: "Information", Baker-Nord Center for the Humanities, Case Western Reserve 
University, Cleveland, OH. 30 November 2006. Available at:
http://www.voutube.com/watch?v:=vqb8eTK 1 aMs. Accessed on 13 August 2008 and W. J. T.
Mitchell, 'Cloning Terror: The War of Images, 9/11 to Abu Ghraib'. History & Theory (Bezalel 
Academy o f Art and Design: Jerusalem), no. 10 (2008. Available at:
http://bezalel.secured.co.i1/8/mitchell.htm. Accessed on 14 May 2010, Unpaginated
281 Jean Baudrillard, The Vital Illusion. Translated by Julia Witwer (New York, NJ: Columbia 
University Press, 2000)
282 W. J. T. Mitchell, 'The Unspeakable and the Unimaginable: Word and Image in a Time o f Terror'.
ELH12, no. 2(2005), p. 298 
W. J. T. Mitchell, 'Picturing Terror: Derrida's Autoimmunity'. Critical Inquiry 33, no. 2 (2007), p. 
290
284 Mitchell, 'The Unspeakable', p. 300
111
crucial.’285 Mirzoeff has also turned his attention to theorising Visual Culture in the 
war on terror but, in contrast to Mitchell, he is critical of the images of the 2003 Iraq 
War. According to Mirzoeff, ‘the war marks the end of a globalization in which a 
new visual Tower of Babel fell.’286 He believes that:
In the second Gulf War, more images were created to less effect than at any 
other period in human history... More journalists were present in combat than 
ever before, using all the advantages of new digital technology to transmit 
reports even as fighting was taking place. What was in retrospect remarkable 
about this mass of material was the lack of any truly memorable images. For 
all the constant circulation of images, there was still nothing to see... To 
adopt a phrase from Hannah Arendt, the war marked the emergence of the 
banality of images. There is no longer anything spectacular about this 
updated society of the spectacle... The war itself offered the low farce of 
“Saving Private Lynch” and the staged destruction of Saddam Hussein’s 
statue.287
He likens the coverage of the Iraq War to a relentless flow of weapon-images -  
constructed by the American military with the intention of controlling the spectacle 
of war, correctly citing as key instances the cases of Saving Private Jessica Lynch, 
the pulling down of Saddam Hussein’s statue and President Bush declaring the 
official ending of the war on the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (an event Robin 
Andersen refers to as a ‘million-dollar pseudo-event’).288 However, Mirzoeff also 
believes that these weapon-images and others are in fact banal as news audiences are 
today increasingly able to identify MIME-NET manufactured media spectacles. For 
instance, they were quick to see that these events were, according to Mirzoeff, just 
‘re-runs: of Saving Private Ryan (1998), the revolutionary destruction of statues 
since 1776 and the action film Top Gun (1986).’289 There is an important point here 
but Mirzoeff is mistaken in categorising all images as part of the same banal 
dynamic, even those showing the lynching of coalition soldiers, the death images of 
Uday and Qusay Hussein and the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Certainly 
some images may be experienced as banal, too generic and too reminiscent of oft- 
seen fictional representations. But others retain a power sufficient to powerful
285 Nicholas Mirzoeff, An Introduction to Visual Culture (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 1
286 Mirzoeff, Watching Babylon, p. 2
287 Ibid, p. 67
288 Andersen, A Century o f  Media, p. xix
9RQ Mirzoeff, Watching Babylon, pp. 67-68
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‘image munitions’ (as I will see when I consider these in Chapters Five and Six). 
The 2003 Iraq War, according to Douglas Kellner, was indeed proof of the ‘new 
culture of media spectacle... with its proliferating media spectacle, megaspectacles, 
and interactive spectacles.’290 It was also proof that the spectacle of war cannot be 
controlled and since then this new culture of media spectacle has indeed proliferated, 
deepening the crisis brought about by the new image warfare theatre of war.
No Caption Needed: Iconic Photographs, Public Culture, and Liberal Democracy by 
Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites, again building on Sontag’s ideas about the 
circulation and repackaging of images, Mitchell’s discussion of the omnipresence of 
the image and M irzoeff s claim about ‘a banality of images’ in the 2003 Iraq War, 
examines how visual arts are ‘remediated in varied combinations within new 
media.’291 They examine a selection of iconic historic images and their 
contemporary appropriations showing how ‘copying, imitating, satirizing, and other 
forms of appropriation are a crucial sign of iconicity.’292 Hariman and Lucaites argue 
that iconic images are those images which circulate widely, appearing in multiple 
contexts: the front cover of a history of the twentieth century, an advert for a World 
War Two retrospective, a web memorial of protests in the 1960s, the work of 
political cartoonists, commercial advertising, referred to in fiction and poetry, 
parodied on the internet and discussed in scholarly studies of photojournalism and 
photography and beyond.293 According to Hariman and Lucaites iconic images are 
subject to
complex patterns of appropriation whereby images are taken from the mass 
media into many smaller circuits of private consumption, social display, retail 
distribution, subcultural articulation, political advocacy, and so forth, and 
back again into other public arts and media such as cartoons and books, and 
then again reproduced in major media retrospectives, celebrations, and other 
performances. Throughout this process the images are continually subject to 
alteration, repositioning, and other forms of translation.294
290 Douglas Kellner, 'Media Culture and the Triumph of the Spectacle', 2004. Available at:
http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/facultv/kellner/papers/medculturespectacle.html. Accessed on 29 
November 2007, p. 16
291 Robert Hariman, and John Louis Lucaites, No Caption Needed: Iconic Photographs, Public 
Culture, and Liberal Democracy (Chicago, MI: The University o f Chicago Press, 2007), p. 
296
292 Ibid, p. 37
293 Ibid, p. 5
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As they further write: ‘The [iconic] image proves to be aesthetically powerful yet 
politically elastic, and circulation includes not merely mechanical reproduction but 
also artistic improvisation and complex forms of viewer responses.’295 Hariman and 
Lucaites have examined what makes particular images ‘iconic’ and therefore distinct 
from other images which disappear quickly. They have explored how iconic images 
are instantly recognizable images which have the ability to also enter into complex 
patterns of appropriation and be repackaged without becoming unrecognizable. 
Their study reveals that iconic images are powerful precisely because of the fact that 
they can be picked up and reused and inserted into new contexts and still be 
recognized. Their insights about iconic images are important as they help me to 
better understand the circulation and remediation of weaponized images in the war 
on terror.
The study of visual culture, then, draws attention to the ways in which images retain 
a life, remaining available for continued circulation and transformation into and out 
of varied environments within which they can be reused, replayed, redefined: 
circulation and remediation are the fundamental capacities of iconic images in 
contemporary cultures. In this sense it serves as a powerful reminder of the fact that 
IR/Strategic Studies theorists -  despite some recent moves to account for aesthetics, 
images and visuals -  still largely fail to understand the complex dynamics of images. 
What is needed is a synthesis of these distinct traditions in a way that enables me to 
explore the complex dynamics of images and which offers IR/Strategic Studies a 
conceptual framework for exploring image warfare. Central to that synthesis will be 
recognition of the shift from the ‘mobilization of images’ to the ‘weaponization of 
images’, made possible by the transformation of society from the mass media age to 
the rhizomatic information age and as a result of which contemporary techno-war has 
now given way to image warfare.
To get a clearer understanding of this contemporary situation -  and to first apply 
insights gained from reviewing research in Visual Culture, Postmodern Warfare and 
Strategic Studies -  I will now consider two universally recognized iconic images:
295 Ibid, p. 20
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Accidental Napalm and Accidental Electrocution. Both share iconic status and both 
have had a significant political impact yet they are also distinct from one another in 
terms of their production and dissemination.
The photograph known as Accidental Napalm was shot during the Vietnam War on 
June 8, 1972 by Nick Ut. This famous image shows five children followed by four 
soldiers fleeing from a Napalm attack. In the centre of this image is the shocking and 
now iconic figure of a naked Vietnamese girl, her arms outstretched, silently 
screaming with pain as her skin melts. A powerful and emotive image, with great 
visceral power, it was quickly used by activists and mobilized against the Vietnam 
War. However, at the time, released into a slow news-cycle and in a world without 
easy access to the technologies of media manipulation and circulation its use was 
limited. Recently, however, it has been subject to a number of creative 
redeployments or ‘remediations’. For example, in 1994, the cartoonist Tom Toles 
drew “Disney Napalm”. Toles drew this cartoon as a protest against the planned 
building of a Disney theme park near the historic Manassas battlefield. He inserted 
Goofy into the scene of Accidental Napalm, showing him running beside the girl in a 
visual indictment of the proposed neighbourly relationship between Disney and a 
historic landmark.296 In 1997, the cartoonist Jeff Danziger drew “Just Do It!” taking 
the Accidental Napalm image and employing it to make a powerful statement against 
US run factories in Vietnam. The screaming girl (now a woman as twenty-five years 
had passed since the image was first shot) is here transformed into a spokeswoman 
for the female work force of US run Vietnamese factory assembly lines.297 In 2000, 
the artist Jon Haddock produced “Children Fleeing” showing Accidental Napalm 
from ‘an isometric perspective’ (like in a computer game), shifting our perspective 
and shifting attention away from the children, onto the soldiers and thus making it 
appear as though the children are running away from the soldiers rather than from a 
Napalm attack.298 Finally, the British artist Banksy has used Accidental Napalm as 
the subject of his painting Napalm isolating the iconic image of the girl and painting 
her (as if skipping along) with Mickey Mouse holding her right hand and Ronald
Ibid, pp. 200-201
297 Ibid, p. 201
298 Ibid, p. 180
115
McDonald holding her left hand: the intention is to advance a damning indictment of 
American Capitalism.
Accidental Electrocution was shot during the 2003 Iraq War and has become a 
definitive image of the US presence in the country. It shows a hooded man -  an Iraqi 
prisoner -  standing on a box with wires leading from his hands and genital area, thus 
-  I, like he, assume -  ready for electrocution. In its title this image references the 
earlier one. And like it this image of the hooded man has also become iconic and 
subject to extensive redeployment. These similarities are important, indicative of the 
fact that the formation, circulation and contest of images have been a part of warfare 
since before the war on terror. And, yet, the differences between the ‘careers’ of the 
two images is also striking. Firstly, the image of Accidental Electrocution was not 
taken by a war photographer but by a serving soldier in an unofficial capacity. Its 
initial release was not sanctioned by any military or media agency. Indeed, its 
presence within the public sphere indicates the extent to which such agencies are not 
the only forces at work. Secondly, the image was circulated rapidly and repeatedly 
through national and international official and unofficial networks from there finding 
itself incorporated into political graffiti and posters within a very short space of time. 
And, thirdly, as an image that was already digital and therefore easily manipulatable 
it found itself abstracted and reinserted into various challenging and incongruous 
contexts (including famously, one which re-presented the electric wires as the 
headphone leads of an iPod).
I will explore the form and circulation of Accidental Electrocution in much more 
detail in Chapter Six. The point here has been to show how, although there are 
similarities in the fates of images from two conflicts just thirty years apart there are 
also immense differences. The politicisation and weaponisation of the later image, is 
indicative of our departure from the traditional centralized model of propaganda to 
the unpredictable and rhizomatic model of information. Images today are liberated 
from the controls of government, military and media institutions as new actors (in the 
case of Accidental Electrocution, US soldiers) have taken to producing, circulating 
and remediating weaponized images. In the war on terror all these different actors 
are producing and releasing weaponized images for a variety of different reasons that 
range from government and military (attempts to control the spectacle of war), media
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(attempts to maximise their audience) to anti-war protesters and artists (attempts to 
discredit the official spectacle of war) and advertisers (attempts to exploit the 
spectacle of war to help advertise their own products).
Such weaponized images are never launched indiscriminately. Rather they are 
launched by actors with very specific intentions and with whatever news-cycle is 
present at that moment in time in mind. There is intention and direction and a 
complex process of decisions behind all weaponized images. The producers of 
weaponized images want their images to have the greatest possible impact on news- 
cycles and beyond by effecting changes in the military and political decision making 
processes. However, this does not mean that weaponized images never get misfired 
-  like conventional munitions occasionally do in traditional war theatres. They may 
be misjudged, as for example with the release of Uday and Qusay Hussein death 
images and the capture/trial/execution of Saddam Hussein (see Chapter Six). 
Furthermore, they also get reused and recycled in complex and unpredictable ways. 
And one way the comparison of the two Accidental images shows this is with the 
changing speed of such appropriation. In a mass media society actors like anti-war 
protesters, artists and advertisers would have had to wait for government, military 
and media institutions to release images before circulating and remediating them. 
However, in our rhizomatic society actors such as anti-war protesters, artists and 
advertisers no longer have to wait for government, military and media institutions to 
officially release images before they can circulate and remediate them. Instead all of 
these processes may take place simultaneously and unfold within the same 
temporality: a twenty-four hour real-time news-cycle. Therefore, the gap between an 
event taking place and images of that event being disseminated has now shrunk. 
This means that image munitions can be inserted with greater accuracy into the 
news-cycle so they can be timed to coincide with events, such as Prime Minister 
Tony Blair’s keynote speech to the 2004 Labour Party Conference and the Kenneth 
Bigley video which coincided with the speech (see Chapter Five) and the bin Laden 
video which coincided with the 2004 American Presidential Election (see Chapter 
Three). But it also means that the time between an image munition being first 
deployed and it being remediated for different political purposes has also collapsed. 
So, for example, today, before images get released by either government, military or 
media institutions they can sometimes already be found circulating on the internet
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having been appropriated and remediated by anti-war protesters, artists and 
advertisers. For example, footage of the London Bombings began circulating on the 
internet without first being filtered by government, military and media institutions 
(see Chapter Four). In our rhizomatic society images and the spectacle of war can no 
longer be controlled by the military or indeed the mainstream media.
The comparison of these two Accidental images, in the context of our reflections 
upon changes in media technologies and organisation, the theory of the RMA and the 
insights of Visual Culture, suggests that it is necessary to treat the production and 
circulation and consumption of images in warfare as a conceptually distinct moment 
or field within conflicts. Images are ‘launched’ as a kind of munition and, in 
response, other actors may launch countering images. These can be circulated 
rapidly and widely across a diverse range of media platforms where they may 
become the subject to intense conflict over their mediation and remediation, picked 
up and used by different actors for different political purposes. I reflect upon these 
three key themes or ideas which emerge as ripe for conceptual development and 
clarification: images as weapons or ‘image munitions’; images launched in response 
to other images or ‘counter-image munitions’; and conflict over the redeployment of 
images or ‘remediation battles’. In the following sections, I will develop an 
understanding of these terms and their relationships and show how they may provide 
a framework through which to explore the varying functions that images have 
performed in the contemporary war on terror.
Image M unitions
For centuries military strategists have been theorising about deploying weapons and 
the impacts of these weapons on war. Sophisticated military strategies299 -  such as
299 Michael Howard, and Peter Paret, eds. Carl Von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1989), Julian Corbett, 'Command of the Sea', in War, ed. Lawrence 
Freedman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 225-28, Giulio Douhet, 'Command 
o f the Air', in War, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 
228-31 and B.H. Liddell Hart, 'The Indirect Approach', in War, ed. Lawrence Freedman 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 231-32
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Blitzkrieg300 -  have been developed to gain military advantage in war. However, 
IR/Strategic Studies has largely overlooked the increasing significance of images in 
war and have instead chosen to focus their attention on technology in war. 
Traditional military arsenals contain different munitions: bullets, bombs, missiles and 
mines. Each of these different munitions is used by militaries (land, sea and air) in 
order to gain a specific strategic advantage over the enemy. Bullets are used by 
soldiers in the combat theatre to main and kill enemy soldiers. Bombs are deployed 
by militaries to destroy either large enemy areas or specific enemy targets. Missiles 
are launched by militaries to take out enemy targets and mines are set to main and 
kill enemy personnel. Today, the media and images constitute a distinct theatre of 
war -  alongside land, sea and air -  with images as key weapons (equivalent to 
bullets, bombs, missiles and mines) used to gain a specific strategic advantage over 
the enemy.
The term image munition represents a convergence of Visual Culture/Media Studies 
terminology in order to name a range of different images: from real-time images to 
post-hoc images and images of diverse mediums of capture. Something that is 
shared by all image munitions is a strong auratic presence. Of course images do not 
cause damage or harm in the same way as traditional munitions. One way to 
understand the power of these images is through their ‘auratic presence’. Walter 
Benjamin employed the term aura to describe how artistic representations of ancient
- j n i
idols and religious icons, such as a statue of Venus or Madonna, in their 
uniqueness contain a kind of presence and sacred force in the form of ‘an aura’. But, 
Benjamin argued, it is precisely this that ‘withers in the age of mechanical 
reproduction’ when works are no longer unique and may be expenenced removed 
from any sort of conventional context. In the process of copying pieces of art the 
aura of the original is not transferred. However, contemporary theorists of Media 
Studies and Visual Culture are taking issue with this claim. For instance, Jay David 
Bolter and Richard Grusin argue that ‘remediation does not destroy the aura of the
300 F. O. Miksche, 'Blitzkrieg', in War, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1994), pp. 232-35
301 Walter Benjamin, 'The Work of Art in the Age o f Mechanical Reproduction', in Illuminations, ed.
Hannah Arendt (London: FontanaPress, 1992), pp. 217-218
302 Ibid, p. 215
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• 303work of art; instead it always refashions that aura in another media form.’ 
Hariman and Lucaites believe that ‘[t]he same “mechanical reproduction” that 
destroys the aura of the fine art work can at the same time create an aura for the 
lesser images.’304 This is because as new media technologies have opened up new 
possibilities for image production and circulation so Benjamin’s conception of the 
nature of aura has become too restrictive.305 Mitchell also believes that technology 
now allows for exact copies to be made of originals and for the aura contained within 
the original to be transferred to the copy: he proclaims that society has now shifted
306from an age of mechanical reproduction to an age of biocybemetic reproduction. 
This force or power of images -  their capacity to induce affect and to ‘awe’ us is 
something that I will explore in later chapters, in the context of case studies of 
particularly significant examples (especially Chapter Three).
T07 • •An aspect of this power lies in the peculiarities of the gaze, the way in which
308figures in images appear to be able to gaze out and look at their audience. People 
represented in an image munition -  whether Osama bin Laden, President George W. 
Bush, Prime Minister Tony Blair, a hostage or a suicide bomber -  may seem to reach 
out from their images and connect with audiences. This is particularly important for 
A1 Qaeda which has a shadowy presence in the war on terror and therefore uses its 
image munitions as a way to manufacture a mediated presence. For bin Laden his 
tapes allow him to exist like ‘the evil eye’309 and be everywhere and nowhere 
simultaneously, inserted into the news-cycle to partake in and affect political debates 
(see Chapter Three). For suicide bombers suicide video wills are important because
303 Jay David Bolter, and Richard Grusin, Remediation: Understanding New Media (Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press, 2000), p. 75. See also Jay David Bolter, Blair MacIntyre, Maribeth Gandy, 
and Petra Schweitzer, 'New Media and the Permanent Crisis o f Aura'. Convergence: The 
International Journal o f Research into New Media Technologies 12, no. 1 (2006), pp. 21-39
304 Hariman, and Lucaites, No Caption Needed, pp. 37-38
305 For a further discussion o f ‘aura’ in the contemporary age, see: Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, and
Michael Marrinan, eds. Mapping Benjamin: The Work o f Art in the Digital Age (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2003)
306 W. J. T. Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves o f  Images (Chicago, IL: The
University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 309-336
307 See Jacques Lacan, 'Of the Gaze as Object Petit A', in The Four Fundamental Concepts o f
Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques Alain Miller (London: The Hogarth Press, Ltd., 1977), pp. 67- 
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Kingsley Shorter (London: Verso, 1985), p. 244
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they are released in the aftermath of attacks and because they help to keep particular 
suicide bombings in the news-cycle (see Chapter Four). For hostage-takers image 
munitions of hostages are important precisely because they help to give the hostages 
a presence even though they are physically absent and this helps to keep the hostage 
newsworthy and it also allows hostages to partake in political debates (see Chapter 
Five). All of these A1 Qaeda produced image munitions have indeed had an 
important force-multiplier effect as they have dramatically increased A1 Qaeda’s 
presence in the war on terror.
Image munitions are also subject to and invoke dynamic power relations. A1 Qaeda, 
through its image munitions, has repeatedly sought to discredit and undermine 
America and the West. For example, making hostages wear orange coloured jump­
suits when appearing in hostage videos -  a reference to the unlawful combatants 
detained at Guantanamo Bay (see Chapter Five). America and Britain have similarly 
both sought to discredit A1 Qaeda with their image munitions and counter-image 
munitions. For example, releasing video footage showing bin Laden celebrating A1 
Qaeda coming together with Islamic Jihad (see Chapter Three) and releasing 
humiliating images of Saddam Hussein after his capture (see Chapter Five). 
American and British soldiers, as I have already remarked, have unwittingly 
provided A1 Qaeda with powerful image munitions in the form of photographs 
depicting the abuse of Iraqi prisoners that have since proven very damaging for 
America and Britain in the war on terror (see Chapter Six). These abuse images are 
now referred to as War Pom (because of the pornographic nature of the abuses on 
display) and they also serve to reinforce perverse Orientalist310/Imperialist 
stereotypes of Islam. Because image munitions are not developed and deployed 
indiscriminately but rather are produced and deployed with a clear intention and 
direction in mind an analogy can be drawn here between image munitions and 
PGM’s as they are also never launched indiscriminately but allow militaries to take 
out targets while minimising collateral damage.
310 See Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin Books, 2003)
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To conclude, image munitions in the war on terror have already been deployed 
strategically by A1 Qaeda and also (although less effectively) by Western 
governments, such as America and Britain (further evidence of A1 Qaeda’s embrace 
of image warfare and America’s and Britain’s continuation with an outdated techno­
war agenda).
Counter-Im age M unitions
In traditional warfare, attacks are often followed by counter attacks. To help explain 
this I offer an analogical assist: Army A and Army B are engaged in a battle over 
Position Z. Army A launches air strikes against Army B supply lines and Army B 
quickly initiates a counter-attack against Army A by deploying missiles against its 
communication nodes. Army A responds by launching yet another set of air strikes, 
this time against the communication nodes of Army B, and follows this up with a 
ground offensive pushing towards Position Z. Army B responds by deploying yet 
more missiles against Army A supply lines and follows this up with a ground 
offensive pushing towards Position Z. Army A and Army B finally engage each 
other directly in a series of ground battles (attacks and counter-attacks) and 
eventually Army B wins control of Position Z.
In image warfare the battles are similar to the one outlined above, only this war 
theatre is media based and bullets and bombs have been replaced by image 
munitions. For example, the opening episodes of the war on terror can be read as a 
battle of attacks and counter attacks. In attacking the World Trade Centre and the 
Pentagon, and in attempting to attack The White House, A1 Qaeda had purposefully 
selected targets which it knew would yield a number of powerful image munitions 
(see Chapter Four). America’s counter attack to September 11 was its declaration 
of a war against Afghanistan and its spectacular air attacks against Kabul. America 
had simply rolled out yet another techno-war and a re-run of the opening scenes of 
the 1991 Gulf War and the Kosovo Conflict (see Chapter Two). The Pentagon 
misunderstood the war on terror and the fact that a new image warfare theatre of war
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has opened up, because they thought that their spectacular air attacks would be 
followed by a quick ground offensive and the taking of Kabul and the capturing of 
bin Laden -  reminiscent of the 1991 Gulf War. They had failed to adequately take 
account of the power of image munitions and underestimated A1 Qaeda’s ability to 
launch a counter-attack with a bin Laden counter-image munition. On October 7, 
2001 a bin Laden video was aired by A1 Jazeera and it immediately took attention 
away from the Pentagon’s Afghanistan war script and instead returned media 
attention to A1 Qaeda, it also forced the Pentagon to revise its war script and it 
resulted in Prime Minister Tony Blair, President George W. Bush and a host of other 
British and American politicians and military officials appearing on A1 Jazeera in a 
series of counter-image munitions and so engaging bin laden in a dangerous game of 
mimetic one-upmanship (see Chapter Three).
Counter-image munitions are deployed in an attempt to replace an image munition 
within the news-cycle and thus shift attention away from the message an opponent is 
trying to deliver with their original image munition. A significant issue with 
counter-image munitions in contemporary times though is that the producer of a 
counter-image munition often mistakenly assumes that they have the ability to 
control the image once it has been inserted into the news-cycle this, however, does 
not take account of the unpredictable nature of the rhizomatic media system.
Remediation Battles
As I showed in my discussion of the iconic images of Accidental Napalm and 
Accidental Electrocution image munitions are subject to reuse and redeployment. 
Indeed, this is one of the most significant features of image munitions and of capital 
importance for understanding the nature of image warfare in the era of rhizomatic 
media. Once deployed, even if their deployment and detonation is successful, image 
munitions are not destroyed but remain, as it were, pristine and ready for use by 
anyone who can pick them up re-presenting and re-deploying them in what are 
sometimes incongruous contexts. In understanding this a clear distinction needs to
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be drawn between those images that are direct copies of the original image munition 
(for example, Osama bin Laden appearing on CNN) and those images which alter 
and adapt an image munition for a different political purpose (for example, bin 
Laden and the “Bert is Evil” poster which is discussed in Chapter Three). If 
‘circulation’ refers to the process by which an original image munition remains intact 
and is simply disseminated through different media platforms then ‘remediation’ -  
according to Bolter and Grusin -  describes the process whereby one medium is 
represented in another.311 For example painting is remediated in photography and 
theatre is remediated in film. Remediation, Bolter and Grusin explain, also describes
where ‘[t]he content has been borrowed, but the medium has not been appropriated
 ^1 ?or quoted.’ For example Jane Austen novels are frequently the subject of 
adaptation. These adaptations are faithful to the original novels but they do not
"5 1 'J
explicitly acknowledge that they are adaptations of novels. I therefore recognize 
remediation to be where the meaning of an original image munition is altered and 
adapted by different actors for different political purposes: essentially the content is 
borrowed, but the medium is not appropriated.
Remediation battles therefore are an important feature of image warfare in the war on 
terror as the rhizomatic media system now enables more people to produce and 
upload content than ever before and as the control of information by a few powerful 
media actors, such as government, military and media, has been eroded. Just as 
Bolter and Grusin argue that remediation is not a new phenomenon but that it is key 
to the new media age,314 so people subverting the official statements of governments, 
militaries and the media for their own political purposes is also not a new 
phenomenon but is central to the information age. People have long been producing 
protest placards and graffiti and organizing mass protest rallies and people are still 
using these same methods to get their protests recognized by government, military 
and media institutions and by the public. What is different in the rhizomatic 
condition is that the outlets for people to subvert the political process have multiplied 
as new technologies, such as the internet, mobile/camera/video phones, YouTube,
311 Bolter, and Grusin, Remediation, p. 45
312 Ibid, p. 44
313 Ibid, p. 44
314 Ibid, p. 45
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blogs and Social Networking sites, have been developed and as the ‘global village’ 
has become reconnected via decentralised networks rather than a centralized system.
The “Bert is Evil” poster is an important example of protest in the new media age. It 
shows how a new media actor -  a teenager -  can now manipulate an image on his 
home computer and then immediately upload it onto the internet and how this image 
can then be picked up and remediated by people protesting globally to appear in 
surprising new contexts, for example on T-shirts and protest placards. Both the 
circulation and remediation of images sets in motion a potentially endless set of 
chain reactions as image munitions are relocated and redirected.
There are, however, different phases in the dissemination of image munitions: 
original image munitions get launched, they circulate via news networks, as jihadi 
internet propaganda and they also get parodied. By identifying these different phases 
I am not suggesting that there is always a simple and linear process. Indeed to make 
any such claim would be to misunderstand the deterritorialised nature of the 
rhizomatic media system. In fact after an image munition gets launched it is free to 
get picked up and be disseminated by anyone and so these phases can unfold in any 
combination. These different phases will however prove analytically useful for 
discussion of the dissemination of image munitions (as I will see in Chapters Three 
to Six).
Circulating Flag Raisins at Iwo Jima and The Unknown Rebel (or Tank Man)
Image munitions, counter-image munitions and remediation battles: these are three 
key concepts that will help immensely in the identification and analysis of the 
military and political impact of images in contemporary warfare. These will be 
further developed and clarified through the major case studies of this thesis. But, in 
order to provide immediate clarification, I will now explore two historic image 
munitions, counter-image munitions and remediation battles. I have already seen 
hints of this kind of analysis in my brief discussion of Accidental Napalm.
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Flag Raising at Iwo Jima, shot on February 23, 1945 by Joe Rosenthal, shows five 
US Marines raising an American flag on Mount Suribachi at the Battle of Iwo Jima. 
This image munition quickly emerged as the iconic image of the Pacific War. 
Hariman and Lucaites note that:
The permanent monument was not unveiled until 1954, but by mid-March 
Congress had appropriated the Rosenthal image as a symbol for the Seventh 
War Loan Drive; at the same time the photograph became the subject of a 
public campaign to have the U.S. Post Office issue a special “Iwo Jima” 
stamp. More than 3,500,000 posters bearing an artist’s rendition of the 
photograph were produced for the bond drive, as well as nearly 15,000 large 
billboards and over 175,000 cards to be placed on the sides of streetcars and 
buses; the postage stamp sold over three million copies on the first day and 
137 million copies before going out of print in 1948.315
Rosenthal’s image has since been appropriated and become the subject of a number 
of remediation battles. In 1969, Flag Raising at Iwo Jima became the subject of a 
remediation battle when Ronald Bowen and Karen Bowen inserted the image into a 
protest art piece against the Vietnam War. They removed the background of the 
image, isolating the figures and the flagpole and replacing the flag with a bright pink 
rose. In 2000, the cartoonist Steve Benson drew “Ego Jima”. This cartoon features 
four figures (George W. Bush, A1 Gore, Dick Cheney and Joe Lieberman) the 
presidential and vice-presidential candidates of the 2000 election. Benson has 
remediated the Iwo Jima image -  a symbol of unity and comradeship -  and used it to 
instead represent the egos and the political infighting on display during the 
presidential election race. He does this by giving each of the four figures their own 
American flag and depicting them fighting to plant their flag atop of Mount 
Suribachi.316
On September 11, 2001, Flag Raising at Iwo Jima again became the subject of a 
remediation battle, this time by photographer Thomas E. Franklin with his image 
Raising the Flag at the World Trade Center. It reveals how the Iwo Jima image
315Hariman and Lucaites, No Caption Needed, p. 94
316 Ibid, pp. 121-122
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contains an enduring discourse of patriotism which can be mobilized whenever it is 
deployed. David Friend has described how Franklin came to forge this image:
Out of the comer of his eye, Franklin saw a flash of motion and color through 
the haze. “I see the three firemen fumbling with the flag,” he remembers. He 
was standing across the street, a hundred feet away, talking to photographer 
James Nachtwey, of all people. “They look dusty and chalky. There’s 
[supposedly] tens of thousands of people dead at this point. In this setting, at 
the time, my antennae are up: this is something I should be shooting.”
He swivelled his 245-mm lens toward the action. “I almost missed the shot,” 
he says. “I’m not quite sure whether the flag’s going up or going down. 
They’re not quite raising it. I’m anticipating.”
Over the next minute and forty-five seconds, Franklin triggered twenty-four 
frames. In each shot the composition is confused, the figures clustered in odd 
ways. But in frame number fourteen, snapped at 5:01 p.m. -  at a shutter 
speed of 1/640 of a second and an aperture of f9 -  the elements align. 
“They’re fussing with the flag,” says Franklin. “The flag going up casts a 
shadow on the firefighter in the middle. And then I shoot it.” All three men 
look up, the flag unfurls. The glare of the late-day sun highlights their figures 
against a curtain of wreckage, which rises above and behind them, slightly 
out of focus.
Johnson, in that instant, steps back, hands on his hips. McWilliams, in the 
center, and Eidengrein, to the right, work the halyard, lofting the colors up the 
pole.317
This image -  with its strong evocation of Iwo Jima -  promoted courage and 
determination in the face of adversity; a powerful counter-image munition for the 
‘home front’ after 9/11.
Flag Raising at Iwo Jima has also been the subject of further remediation and this 
shows just how flexible an image munition can be and just how widely it can 
circulate. Hariman and Lucaites have discovered a number of Iwo Jima cultural 
artefacts that use the Iwo Jima image. They have shown how the Iwo Jima image 
has been used to frame things politically, hence its appearance on the front cover of 
books and on government reports. They have also shown how the Iwo Jima image 
has been widely appropriated as a symbol of patriotism and used in many products: 
movies, comic books and toys and how the Iwo Jima image has also been used to
317 David Friend, Watching the World Change: The Stories Behind the Images o f  9/11 (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 2007), p. 318
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give a commercial object a novelty factor: Iwo Jima Motel, personal checks, a virtual 
postcard, hip-hop CD covers and condoms318 -  proof also that the enduring discourse 
of patriotism which can be mobilized when the Iwo Jima image is deployed can 
equally be subverted by those who use the image.
A second example of an image munition is The Unknown Rebel (or Tank Man), shot 
variously during the Tiananmen Square protests on June 5, 1989 by Charlie Cole, 
Stuart Franklin, Arthur Tsang Hin Wah and Jeff Widener. The image munition 
shows a man with a shopping bag in one hand and a coat in his other hand standing 
defiantly in front of a line of Chinese tanks. Cole has since recounted how, from his 
vantage point within the Beijing Hotel overlooking the square, he had to hide his 
camera film containing the now iconic image munition in the toilet cistern of his 
hotel rooms bathroom. Later, he returned having had all of his other films seized by 
members of the Chinese police, and from there the image was circulated through the 
newswires to newsrooms across the globe. Similarly, Franklin has since discussed 
how, from the Beijing Hotel, he had to smuggle his film out inside a packet of tea 
before submitting it to the newswires.319 This shows how in the pre-internet age the 
time between an image munition being shot and disseminated was delayed, whereas 
in the internet age the time between most image munitions being shot and 
disseminated has shrunk considerably (see Chapters Three to Five).
The Unknown Rebel (or Tank Man) has become the subject of a number of 
remediation battles. In 2000, the cartoonist Bruce Plante drew “Would You Like 
Fries with That?” This cartoon shows the rebel as a fast food employee asking the 
tanks driver: if  he wants fries with that? A negative reflection on how American 
corporations like McDonalds operate.320 In 2006, the artist David Wheeler produced 
“Google under the Gun”. According to Hariman and Lucaites, this image shows ‘the 
man sitting at a computer terminal placed inside the barrel of the tank.’321 This 
remediation battle was a response to the announcement by Google that it would be
318Hariman and Lucaites, No Caption Needed, p. 108
319 Patrick Witty, ‘Behind the Scenes: Tank Man of Tiananmen’, in The New York Times. Available
at: http://lens.blogs.nvtimes.com/2009/06/Q3/behind-the-scenes-tank-man-of-tiananmen/.
Accessed on 08 September 2009, Unpaginated
320 Hariman and Lucaites, No Caption Needed, pp. 230-231
321 Ibid, p. 236
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adding filters to Google in China, blocking certain searches such as the Tiananmen 
Square protests and The Unknown Rebel (or Tank Man) image. In 2004, the Chick- 
Fil-A Corporation ran a television advertisement remediating this image munition. 
This advert was part of a campaign to get people to eat fewer hamburgers. The cow 
featured in this advert is a rebel, standing up for the rights of other cows, like the 
unknown rebel who stood up for Chinese Democracy and reform during the 
Tiananmen Square protests. The cow is shown blocking the path of a line of 
bulldozers that are meant to be clearing the way for a new burger shack. The adverts 
message is reinforced by the following graffiti statement: “Eat Mor Chikin.”322
Flag Raising at Iwo Jima and The Unknown Rebel (or Tank Man) are examples of 
just how flexible image munitions are and how widely they can circulate. Although 
they may be precisely formed and targeted image munitions they are also often 
uncontrollable. This is why it is important for Western military forces to grasp fully 
the nature of the contemporary media environment and the ways in which images can 
be reproduced and circulated. This is also why it is important to develop concepts -  
such as image munitions, counter-image munitions and remediation battles -  in order 
to orient thought and analysis. Scholars of IR, Strategic Studies, War Studies and so 
on, have certainly begun -  as I saw in Chapter One -  to incorporate into the field the 
study of media, images, popular and mass culture. But -  as I have seen -  their 
efforts do not go far enough and do not fully recognise the extent to which media 
images are not merely a secondary or adjunct feature of warfare but rather are an 
internal and intrinsic dimension of it. It is to aid in the theorisation of this 
dimension, of the image warfare theatre of war, which this thesis seeks to develop 
with the concepts of image munitions, counter-image munitions and remediation 
battles and deploy in an analysis of four case studies from the war on terror.
M ethodology
The overarching concern of this thesis is the way in which information and images 
now circulate differently as society has shifted from a mass media age to that of an 
information age or a rhizomatic condition. I theorize this shift as a move from the
322 Ibid, pp. 239-340
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‘mobilization of images’ (linked with the twentieth century notion of propaganda and 
mass media) to the ‘weaponization of images’ (associated with the 
networked/rhizomatic society and new media). More explicitly, I am concerned with 
how British and American governments and the military are failing to manage image 
warfare in the war on terror because they are still trying to control the flow of 
information and images and how A1 Qaeda appears to be responding better to the 
challenges of image warfare. I have explored this via diverse literatures from fields 
such as IR, Media Studies and Visual Culture and bridged the gaps between these 
literatures by introducing three new conceptual terms to the lexicon of IR/Strategic 
Studies: ‘image munitions’, ‘counter-image munitions’ and ‘remediation battles.’
This thesis will test these claims and conceptual terms through a broadly qualitative 
research approach which combines case study analysis and discourse theory and 
employs a snowball sampling technique. I adopt two different research methods here 
because although case studies are the best method for collecting and organizing 
pertinent information relevant to testing my claims, case study analysis is not 
sufficient in itself to engage fully with my diverse range of sources. To help close 
this methodological gap I integrate discourse theory into my research design. I will 
now discuss case study analysis in more detail and also the snowball technique 
before returning to discuss discourse theory.
Case studies are employed when undertaking an in-depth study of particular events, 
groups or themes. They also draw on a diverse range of empirical materials for their 
data.323 According to Robert K. Yin, case studies help to define topics broadly and 
they support complex multivariate conditions.324 Yin also recognizes that ‘[c]ase 
studies are the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, 
when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.’325 I am researching a 
contemporary phenomenon (image warfare) which is embedded in a real-life context 
(the war on terror) and consequently I have little control over events. My research
323 Jacques Hamel, Stephane Dufour, and Dominic Fortin, Case Study Methods. Translated by
Maureen Nicholson (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1993), p 45
324 Robert K. Yin, Applications o f Case Study Research. 2nd eds. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications, 2003), p. xi
325 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 2nd eds. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications, Inc., 1994), p. 1
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therefore fits perfectly within Yin’s description of what kind of research is best 
suited to case study analysis. My thesis adopts a multiple case study approach and to 
quote Yin again, ‘[i]n a multiple-case study, one goal is to build a general 
explanation that fits each of the individual cases, even though the cases will vary in 
their details. The objective is analogous to multiple experiments.’326 This idea is also 
supported by Bill Gillham who writes that: ‘No one kind of source or evidence is 
likely to be sufficient (or sufficiently valid) on its own. This use of multiple sources 
of evidence, each with its strengths and weaknesses, is a key characteristic of case
9^7study research.’
Taking all of these different factors into account I conduct four case studies, 
pertaining to four prominent themes in the war on terror: political communications 
(both ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ communications), suicides (propaganda showing acts 
of terrorism), executions (the intentional weaponizing of hijackings/hostages and the 
misfiring of Uday, Qusay and Saddam Hussein image munitions) and abuses (the 
unintentional weaponizing of abuse image munitions). Together these four themes 
describe the new image warfare theatre of war which currently operates in the war on 
terror. In selecting the events for inclusion in my four case studies I chose events 
that are documented visually and are diverse so as to afford me with sufficient 
material with which to make my argument.328 For example, televised statements by 
President George W. Bush, Prime Minister Tony Blair and Osama bin Laden, the 
September 11th attacks, the London Bombings, the Failed London Bombings, suicide 
terrorism in Iraq, hijackings/hostages, Uday, Qusay and Saddam Hussein, Abu 
Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, Extraordinary Rendition, The Daily Mirror fake abuses, 
the Camp Breadbasket abuses and President Barack Obama’s early moves to increase 
transparency. However, although each of my four thematic case studies engages
™Ibid, p. 112
327 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Bill Gillham,
Case Study Research Methods (London: Continuum, 2000), p. 2. See also Alexander L. 
George, and Andrew Bennett, Case Study and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(London: MIT Press, 2005), John Gerring, Case Study Research (New York, NJ: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), Roger Gomm, Martyn Hammersley, and Peter Foster, eds. Case 
Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts (London: Sage Publications, 2000), Robert E. Stake, 
The Art o f  Case Study Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1995), Max 
Travers, Qualitative Research through Case Studies (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
2001)
328 See Jennifer Milliken, 'The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research
and Methods'. European Journal o f  International Relations 5, no. 2 (1999), p. 234
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with a wide range of different images I am not primarily concerned with 
understanding the semiotics of the images themselves. Instead, I am interested in the 
movement of these images between the different institutions and actors in the war on 
terror -  government, military, media, A1 Qaeda and civilians.
An alternative study of images in the war on terror has been made by Andrew Hill 
who examines them via case studies ‘ordered in broadly chronological terms -  
opening with the September 11 attacks’329 and using ‘seeing’, ‘waiting’ and 
‘travelling’ as organizing themes.330 However, I decided against doing a similar 
chronological case study analysis because I felt that it would be too restrictive, 
considering the uncontrollable and unpredictable movement of images in the 
information age. I instead decided to conduct thematic case study analysis because it 
allows me to draw parallels and highlight distinctions between different events, 
media actors, objects and subjects operating in the image warfare theatre of war.
To construct my thematic case studies and select relevant examples within them I 
first conducted internet research, carrying out Google searches. For sampling 
purposes I employed a ‘snowball technique’331 which traditionally, according to 
Roland Atkinson and John Flint, ‘offers real benefits for studies which seek to access 
difficult to reach or hidden populations.’332 Atkinson and Flint here specifically 
identify criminals, drug addicts, prostitutes, people with stigmatised illnesses (like
i ' l l
AIDS sufferers) and young unemployed men. However, the snowball technique is
329 Andrew Hill, Re-Imagining the War on Terror: Seeing, Waiting, Travelling (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009), p. 6
330 Ibid, p. 2
331 Patrick Biemacki, and Dan Waldorf, 'Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques o f Chain
Referral Sampling1. Sociological Methods and Research 10, no. 2 (1981), pp. 141-63
332 Roland Atkinson, and John Flint, 'Accessing Hidden and Hard-to-Reach Populations: Snowball
Research Strategies', in Social Research Update 2001, Available at: 
http://www.soc.surrev.ac.uk/sru/SRU33.html. Accessed on 23 February 2010, Unpaginated
333 Ibid, Unpaginated. For example see a study of Internet use by Breast Cancer patients. Shani
Orgad, 'From Online to Offline and Back: Moving from Online to Offline Relationships with 
Research Informants', in Virtual Methods: Issues in Social Research on the Internet, ed. 
Christine Hine (Oxford: Berg, 2005), pp. 51-67. See also J. Faugier, and M. Sargeant, 
'Sampling Hard to Reach Populations'. Journal o f  Advanced Nursing 26, no. 4 (1997), pp. 
790-97, Teela Sanders, 'Researching the Online Sex Work Community', in Virtual Methods 
in Social Research on the Internet ed. Christine Hine (Oxford: Berg, 2005), pp. 67-81, M. A. 
Eland-Goossensen, L. A. M. Van der Goor, E. C. Vollermans, V. M. Hendricks, and H. F. L. 
Garetsen, 'Snowball Sampling Applied to Opiate Addicts Outside the Treatment System'. 
Addiction Research 5 (1997), pp. 317-30 and Kath Browne, 'Snowball Sampling: Using
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increasingly now also being employed in studies about internet use and material. 
According to Steven M. Schneider and Kirsten A. Foot, a snowball technique is 
useful precisely because new media actors in response to an event, such as a political 
scandal and the example they use is the President Bill Clinton/Monica Lewinsky 
affair, can now immediately post content online in response to a scandal.334 They 
argue that just as a snowball technique is effective in giving researchers access to 
hard-to-reach populations it is also effective in allowing researchers to respond 
quickly and start collecting information when a ‘web storm’ develops surrounding a 
political scandal.335 The snowball technique has also been employed by researchers 
studying blogs.336 Studies into September 11th internet memorials have also used the 
snowball technique. For example, Lee Jarvis has studied six 9/11 online memorials. 
Jarvis identified these six websites via a combination of Google searches and 
clicking on links between memorial websites. The result of this is a study of six 
diverse internet memorials offering a compelling snapshot of the online 
memorialisation of 9/11,337
As well as carrying out Google searches I also followed links between web pages to 
give me a diverse sample of images: news images, bin Laden videos, hostage videos, 
suicide terrorism footage, Abu Ghraib images, films, YouTube videos, street art, 
gallery art, cartoon images, advertisements and beyond. I was aware throughout the 
research process that I could not trace every appropriation and remediation. This 
was because of the sheer amount of information available on the internet and also 
because appropriation and remediation is an ongoing process with no end point. To
Social Networks to Research Non-Heterosexual Women'. International Journal o f  Social 
Research Methodology 8, no. 1 (2005), pp. 47-60
334 Steven M. Schneider, and Kirsten A. Foot, 'Web Sphere Analysis: An Approach to Studying
Online Action', in Virtual Methods: Issues in Social Research on the Internet, ed. Christine 
Hine (Oxford: Berg, 2005), p. 162
335 Ibid, p. 162
336 See Susan C. Herring, Inna Kouper, John C. Paolillo, Lois Ann Scheidt, Michael Tyworth, Peter
Welsch, Elijah Wright, and Ning Yu, 'Conversations in the Blogosphere: An Analysis "From 
the Bottom Up'", in 38th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (Hilton 
Waikoloa Village, Isand o f Hawaii (Big Island): 2005). Available at:
http://www.computer.org/plugins/dl/pdf/proceedings/hicss/2005/2268/04/22680107b.pdf7te 
mplate= 1 &loginState= 1 &userData=anonymous-IP%253A%253A 1.97.130.63. Accessed on 
08 January 2010, p. 4
337 See Lee Jarvis, 'Remember, Remember, 11 September: Memorialising 9/11 on the Internet'.
Journal o f  War and Culture Studies 3, no. 1 (2010). See also Aaron Hess, 'In Digital 
Remembrance: Vernacular Memory and the Rhetorical Construction o f Web Memorials'. 
Media, Culture & Society 29, no. 5 (2007), pp. 816-817
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paraphrase Gillian Rose, I had to make a firm decision over when to stop making 
appropriation and remediation connections.338 This was when I had a big enough 
sample to carry out my analysis. My diverse samples are evidence indeed that in the 
information age institutions and actors are now liberated from traditional top-down 
institutional constraints imposed by government, military and media. Institutions 
and actors now have greater freedoms to adapt and appropriate images, therefore, 
images of actions are increasingly unstable and subject to ever more surprising 
appropriation and remediation by newly liberated actors, such as terrorists and 
ordinary members of the public (see Chapters Three to Six).
To better appreciate these changing institutional relationships I have turned to 
discourse theory. Since its introduction, back in the 1970s, discourse theory has 
evolved from merely understanding semantic phenomena, to understanding semiotic 
phenomena to understanding all social phenomena. Jacob Torfing elaborates this 
shift: ‘The first generation of discourse theory defines discourse in the narrow
linguistic sense of a textual unit that is larger than a sentence, and focuses on the 
semantic aspects of the spoken or written text.’339 Torfing continues:
[t]he second generation of discourse theory defines discourse in a broader 
way than the first generation. Discourse is not restricted to spoken and 
written language, but is extended to a wider set of social practices.... 
Discourse is defined as an empirical collection of practices that qualify as 
discursive in so far as they contain a semiotic element.340
According to Torfing, ‘[t]he third generation of discourse theory further extends the 
notion of discourse so that it now covers all social phenomena.’341 Today discourse 
theory is more inclusive.342 This more inclusive understanding of what constitutes a 
discourse is crucial as Jennifer Milliken believes that it has opened up ‘new’ 
information sources and ‘a new domain of inquiry for discourse scholarship in
338 Gillian Rose, Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to the Interpretation o f Visual Materials. 2nd
eds. (London: Sage Publications, 2007), p. 169
339 Jacob Torfing, 'Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments and Challenges', in Discourse Theory
in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance, eds. David Howarth and Jacob 
Torfing (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 6
340 Ibid, pp. 6-7
341 Ibid, p. 8
342 Ibid, p. 9
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International Relations.’343 Milliken refers to the third generation of discourse 
analysis as the ‘popular culture approach, analysing the ‘everyday’ cultural 
conditions of novels, comic books, television and film and how they render sensible 
and legitimate particular state actions’344 It is these ‘new’ kinds of information 
sources which I explore in my four thematic case studies.
To further examine discourse theory I now turn to Rose on discourse theory. Michel 
Foucault’s work on ‘discursive formation’, ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’ is weaved 
throughout her discussion of discourse. She divides discourse analysis into two 
parts: ‘text, intertextuality, context’ and ‘institutions and ways of seeing.’ Rose’s 
discussion of ‘text, intertextuality, context’ focuses on the images themselves. She 
argues that discourse can be constructed ‘through all sorts of visual and verbal 
images and texts’345 and studied via the intertextual connections between images and 
texts.346 She believes that the intertextual nature of discourse demands eclecticism of 
sources347 and these sources can then be analysed either by iconography (the way 
images look) or by ‘the rhetorical organization of discourse’348 (its social context). 
Rose is also mindful though of the fact that this focus on images and texts and 
eclecticism of sources also presents researchers with two potential problems -  
‘knowing when to stop making intertextual connections and... grounding those 
connections empirically.’349 However, in adopting a snowball technique to find 
sources I was able to stop my search when I felt that I had a large enough sample to 
undertake my analysis. Also, my four thematic case studies allow me to ground the 
intertextual connection I make empirically. Conversely though as this thesis is 
concerned specifically with the movement of images in the war on terror rather than 
with the images themselves I will now turn to the second part of Rose’s discussion of 
discourse theory, her discussion of ‘institutions and ways of seeing’.
This discussion rather than focussing on images instead focuses on the institutions 
and actors who produce the sources which go to make up a discourse. Consequently
343 Milliken, 'The Study o f Discourse', p. 240
344 Ibid, p. 240
345 Rose, Visual Methodologies. 2nd eds., p. 142
346 Ibid, p. 142
347 Ibid, p. 149
348 Ibid, p. 156
349 Ibid, p. 169
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the kinds of sources which are employed in this discussion of discourse are similar to 
those discussed above; however, attention is focussed on the institutions engaged in 
the production of the source material rather than on the actual images themselves. 
Employing Foucault’s terminology Rose argues that photography is an example of an
350institutional technology that gets displayed in different institutional apparatuses. 
Rose concludes her discussion of institutional discourse by stating that:
[t]his second type of discourse analysis follows Foucault in understanding 
visual images as embedded in the practices of institutions and their exercise 
of power. It thus pays less attention to visual images and objects themselves 
than to the institutional apparatus and technologies which surround them and 
which, according to this approach, produce them as particular kinds of images 
and objects.351
To conclude, an institutional discourse approach is therefore central to this thesis 
because it enables me to get a better understanding of government, military and 
media power over images in the mass media age and also understand the increasingly 
complex, uncontrollable and dencentralised circulation of images in the 
contemporary rhizomatic condition. It also helps me to develop a more nuanced and 
sophisticated understanding of the different media actors and their impacts on the 
circulation of image munitions in the war on terror.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the RMA literature, showing how mainstream IR theory is 
still concerned with issues about technology -  a throwback to techno-war -  and still 
generally dismissive of the important role of media and images in contemporary war. 
I have shown how this has fostered a misperception among International Relations 
theorists about the fact that it is still possible to control information in war. In reality 
the flow of information is no longer centrally controlled, instead information flows 
are increasingly unpredictable and uncontrollable. To help better understand this 
situation I looked beyond IR and turned to other literatures, such as Media Studies 
and Visual Culture, for insights. My examination of the Media Studies literature 
revealed just how much the role of propaganda and information has changed in the
350 Ibid, pp. 174-175
351 Ibid, p. 193
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wake of new technological developments (the internet, blogs and mobile phones) and 
as society has moved from a mass media to a rhizomatic media system. I then 
theorized postmodern war -  as discussed by Baudrillard and Virilio. I discussed how 
Baudrillard was immediately critical of real-time communications and war and how
thhe was forced to rethink this position after the September 11 attacks; whereas 
Virilio, in his critique of the 1991 Gulf War, was more open to the possibilities of 
real-time communication (identifying the media as ‘weapons of mass 
communication’ and ‘weapons of instantaneous communication’) offering a 
prophetic glimpse of image warfare. Finally, I turned to Visual Culture to gain a 
better understanding of images: Sontag’s contribution to our understanding of 
photography; Mitchell’s work on the pictorial turn and his theory about ‘cloning 
terror’ in the war on terror; Mirzoeff s discussion of weapon-images and his theory 
of ‘a banality of images’ in the war on terror and Hariman and Lucaites important 
work on the meaning, appropriation, circulation and remediation of iconic historic 
images.
Having drawn important insights from both Media Studies and Visual Culture about 
media and images in contemporary war, I then sought to bridge the gaps between 
these diverse literatures and make them more accessible to an ER/Strategic Studies 
audience by introducing three new conceptual terms: ‘image munitions’, ‘counter­
image munitions’ and ‘remediation battles’ and illustrating them via a discussion of 
two historic image munitions and some of their contemporary appropriations. I 
concluded this chapter with a discussion of my methodology. Showing how and why 
I use thematic case studies, why I employ a snowball sampling technique (Google 
searches and clicking on links) to find images and finally why I use an institutional 
discourse theory to study the circulation and remediation of image munitions in the 
war on terror.
The next four chapters will develop the empirical part of my thesis, testing how 
America and Britain are currently failing to respond effectively to the challenges of 
image warfare, while A1 Qaeda appears to be responding more effectively to the 
challenges of image warfare. I will test these claims through my three conceptual 
terms: ‘image munitions’, ‘counter-image munitions’ and ‘remediation battles’ and
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via my four original thematic case studies: political communications, suicides, 
executions and abuses.
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Chapter Three 
Political Communications
Introduction
In Chapters One and Two I explored the societal shift from an era of mass 
communication, where media are centrally controlled and information flows from the 
centre outwards, to a rhizomatic era of communication characterised by the 
horizontal proliferation and flow of information and images in an uncontrollable and 
unpredictable circulation. I also saw that this has impacted on contemporary war and 
how a misplaced emphasis on a particular kind of techno-war has obscured the fact 
that the spectacle of war cannot be controlled, image warfare now dominates and A1 
Qaeda appears to have the greatest appreciation of weaponized images. I also saw 
how IR theorists are beginning to theorise the distinct challenges posed by images 
but also that IR has further to go in this respect. Through an in-depth review of the 
techno-war literature and an engagement with other disciplines including Media 
Studies and Visual Culture I developed three conceptual terms: ‘image munitions’, 
‘counter-image munitions’ and ‘remediation battles’ intended to help bridge the gaps 
between Media Studies, Visual Culture and War Studies. I have shown, briefly, how 
these can be mobilised in analysing iconic images and their appropriations, through a 
consideration of The Flag Raising at Iwo Jima and The Unknown Rebel (or Tank 
Man). It is now time to carry out a much deeper and more sustained case study 
analysis.
In this chapter -  the first of four case studies -  I am specifically concerned with 
tracing out some aspects of political communications in the war on terror, understood 
as forms of image munitions. I will explore how ‘official’ political communications 
by leaders have become an important instrument in disseminating information from 
the seat of power to the people in times of war and peace, and how new media 
technologies have played an important part in the development of contemporary 
political communications. I will look in particular at the political communications of 
American Presidents and British Prime Ministers who pioneered the use of
139
leadership video addresses, a genre which has taken on a significant role in the war 
on terror. As I will show, the format of Presidential and Prime Ministerial television 
addresses has since been adopted by A1 Qaeda and applied to bin Laden’s video 
addresses. In order to explore this in detail bin Laden’s post-9/11 tapes will be 
discussed chronologically, up to 2009, with particular emphasis on the way they are 
shaped by ‘place’, ‘symbolism’ and ‘mimesis’. Drawing on Andrew Hill’s Lacanian 
analysis of the bin Laden tapes I will consider the ghostly and lingering presence of 
bin Laden in the war on terror. Hill’s analysis is distinct from the work of 
Baudrillard and Virilio because while they offer a perspective which is focussed on 
the media he offers a nuanced understanding of the important contemporary role of 
images. However, his chronological discussion of events from the war on terror 
while offering an intriguing description ultimately fails to see that these events are 
taking place within a much wider image, warfare theatre of war. I instead offer a 
thematic discussion of the war on terror which accounts for this wider image warfare 
theatre of war. British and American responses to the bin Laden tapes, I will see, are 
also mimetic in form and play directly into the hands of A1 Qaeda.
Attention will then turn towards a discussion of the circulation of bin Laden’s 
counter-image munitions, drawing on Binoy Kampmark’s work on the spectre of bin 
Laden. I will then consider the complexity of such images by closely examining the 
remediation of bin Laden’s counter-image munitions and their manifestation in a 
number of different interventions. In conclusion, this chapter will show that bin 
Laden is a sophisticated communicator and a savvy manipulator of new media 
technologies. He manages to evade physical capture whilst maintaining his strong 
visual presence through his perpetual circulation and remediation within new image 
contexts.
‘The Oval Office’ and ‘10 Downing Street’
The ‘official’ political communications of leaders have always been important as 
centralised mechanisms for disseminating information from the seat of power to the 
public in times of war and peace. Products of the mass communication age, these 
official statements are orchestrated by press offices with the aim of stage-managing 
journalists. Press releases -  digests of information, also produced by press offices -
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similarly help to frame a statement in advance and control its entry into the news- 
cycle. Spin doctors also play an important role in the production of ‘official’ 
political communications as they work closely with political leaders, speech writers 
and the press office to package the information included in statements. The formal 
character of ‘official’ political communications also means that certain ‘places’ and 
‘symbols’ are consistently present. A1 Qaeda have also picked up on the importance 
of political communications for disseminating information and as a source of 
powerful image munitions (for a detailed description of this term, see Chapter Two) 
and thus have developed there own ‘unofficial’ political communications, featuring 
Osama bin Laden, and a repetition of spaces and symbols. The media also play a 
fundamental role here as the conduit by which these ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ 
political communications are delivered. As the ways in which political 
communications are disseminated have evolved, so too has their format.
In the newspaper age, political communications often began life as press releases and 
journalistic notes which were then repackaged by journalists. Up until the mid­
twentieth century leaders were often media shy. Politicians preferred instead to 
engage with their voters’ directly through public meetings rather than indirectly 
through the media. Jeremy Paxman in his 2007 James MacTaggart Memorial 
Lecture at the Edinburgh International Television Festival observed of Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill that:
The only occasion on which he held a press conference was on December 
23rd 1941. He was visiting Washington. Roosevelt belonged to a different 
political culture. He persuaded a baffled Churchill to undergo the ordeal. 
The transcript in the Roosevelt papers reads as follows:
“The President. ‘And so I will introduce the Prime Minister. I wish you’d 
stand up for one minute and let them see you.’” Churchill then stands on a 
chair and takes a dozen or so questions from the reptiles, almost all of whom 
address him as ‘sir’, and not one of whom follow up his original inquiry with 
any persistence or repetition. Occasionally, perhaps because he genuinely 
was going deaf, perhaps to give himself time to think, Churchill says he can’t 
hear the questions, and it is repeated, slowly. At the end, the Prime Minister 
is thanked by the press corps.352
352 Jeremy Paxman, 'Never Mind the Scandals: What's It All For?' Paper presented at the The James 
MacTaggart Memorial Lecture, Edinburgh International Television Festival 2007. Available 
at:http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/2007/08/the iames mactaggart memorial lecture. 
html. Accessed on 10 March 2009, Unpaginated
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Today’s leaders are simply not able to have such a distant relationship with the press 
and media management has today become an integral part of being a leader.
In the radio age Winston Churchill became famous for his radio addresses. On a 
number of occasions he addressed the nation from 10 Downing Street seemingly 
addressing people directly as they sat in their living rooms in front of the radio. 
Because Churchill would pre-record his radio addresses he did not have to deal 
directly with journalists, only with his advisors, script writers and BBC technicians. 
Because he was addressing the nation via the radio he only had to concentrate on 
delivering his address clearly and did not have to concentrate on his visual presence.
The advent of television radically changed political communications. The 
visualising of leadership addresses meant that no longer did politicians have only to 
concentrate on delivering their policy plans in pitch-perfect speeches, but body 
language and other visual concerns traditionally reserved for person-to-person 
communication needed to be taken into account. In today’s media-driven political
• • 353climate politicians are constantly concerned with projecting the nght image. 
According to John Street:
This process begins with personal appearance and dress, and continues into 
the way party conventions and conferences are designed. It is evident in the 
way political advertisements increasingly mimic the conventions of 
commercial advertising; it is blatantly demonstrated in the crafting of sound 
bites and photo-opportunities. In many ways, the latter two are the most 
important because they are intended to appear in regular news broadcasts, and 
as such acquire the legitimacy and veracity of news.... Whatever the format 
or forum, the intention is to create images and slogans which are easily 
recognized or digested, and which spark a series of associations that 
crystallize a political response.354
353 See Max Atkinson, Our Masters' Voices: The Language and Body Language o f  Politics (London:
Routledge, 1988), Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power. Translated by Gino 
Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), Bob Franklin, Packaging 
Politics: Political Communications in Britain's Media Democracy. 2nd eds. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004) and Howard Kurtz, Spin Cycle: Inside the Clinton Propaganda 
Machine (London: Pan Books, 1998)
354 John Street, Mass Media, Politics and Democracy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 189-190
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This process has also been discussed by Alan Finlayson who has described a 
snapshot, a prepared broadcast, from the New Labour media campaign during the 
1997 British General Election.
Here a British bulldog is seen falling asleep while the voiceover explains that, 
despite all our talents, we have been too long under the same master and ‘in a 
rapidly changing world we seem, somehow, to have lost our sense of 
purpose’. The film cuts to footage of Blair getting out of a jag, pressing 
through a crowd, meeting with Nelson Mandela and Bill Clinton, while we 
hear that, ‘Now, someone has emerged who is determined to give it back to 
us. He is the most talked about politician of his generation... in three short 
years his energy and leadership have transformed his party’. Blair takes up 
the screen space, once again talking to the side of the camera, discussing 
crime, Europe and tax, and saying that ‘we’ (Britain) can make the country 
better, but ‘I will not promise anything I can’t deliver’. Indeed we are not 
urged to vote Labour but to ‘Give Tony Blair your mandate on May 1st 
[1997] and let him give Britain back its sense of purpose’. The image of the 
bulldog, typically associated with a Conservative form of nationalism, is thus 
linked to the new man and the new style. Blair himself will place his hand on
355the dog and command him to rise up and walk once more.
What is clear from this style of campaigning, according to Finlayson, is that New 
Labour had made the conscious decision that Tony Blair should take ‘the lead in the 
representation of the party, and at all times in ways that seek to reduce the distance 
between him and the people he wants to represent.’
British Politics had reached a critical juncture during the 1997 General Election -  
politics became more personable. Tony Blair broke the party leadership mould, 
traditionally someone who is distanced from the electorate. Instead, as the leader of 
New Labour Tony Blair spoke directly to the electorate. He managed to tap directly 
into the Zeitgeist of the mid-1990s. This is thanks, in part, to a combination of the 
development of new communication technology and to Alistair Campbell, Tony 
Blair’s Director of Communications and Strategy (spin doctor) from 1994-2003, who 
effectively stage-managed the way in which the media could interact with New 
Labour and later the Blair government. A number of lessons were also drawn from 
the Conservative Party’s earlier use of the advertising agency Saatchi and Saatchi 
and from previous American Presidential election campaigns. These advertising
355 Alan Finlayson, Making Sense o f  New Labour (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 2003), p. 53
356 Ibid, p. 51
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lessons were expanded and applied to every aspect of the Blair government. At the 
beginning of Labour’s 1997 General Election campaign the party was totally re­
branded: New Labour.
This also coincided with the age of real-time television -  meaning that leaders now 
have to respond to events, often while these events are still unfolding. In the first 
half of the twentieth century Winston Churchill was able largely to avoid press 
conferences, while in the late twentieth century and the first years of the twenty-first 
century Tony Blair actively encouraged the press, holding weekly press conferences. 
He also became a regular on talk shows like The Des O ’Connor Show and Parkinson 
and even appeared in an episode of The Simpsons. Throughout his premiership he 
was presented as more than just a leader. His public image was carefully crafted so 
as to become a metonym for New Labour and over time Blair also developed his own 
signature presentation style which went hand in hand with his public persona 
sometimes referred to as his ‘People’s Princess-style’ (a reference to his public 
address made outside his local church in his Sedgefield Constituency on Sunday 
August 31, 1997, shortly after news of the death of Diana, the Princess of Wales).
The internet age has again forced political communications to evolve. Both the 
American and British governments were quick to realize its importance and created 
interactive White House and 10 Downing Street websites. The launch of YouTube, 
back in February 2005, allowed President Bush and Prime Minister Blair to further 
expand their use of the internet in a drive to reconnect with a younger generation
• 357who -  it was feared -  were becoming increasingly disengaged from politics. 
President Bush and Prime Minister Blair quickly began exploiting this new media 
platform, posting video addresses on both YouTube and on the White House and 10 
Downing Street websites. The fact that these video addresses were internet based 
makes them globally available in real-time -  even perhaps to A1 Qaeda.
Attention will now turn to look at the visual aspects of the political communications 
made by American Presidents and British Prime Ministers in more detail. I consider
357 For more information about this ongoing debate see Gerry Stokes, Why Politics Matters: Making 
Democracy Work (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) and Colin Hay, Why We Hate 
Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 2007)
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the political communications of American Presidents and British Prime Ministers to 
be important sources of image munitions. This is because political communications 
are made when the leader is welcoming an official dignitary, making an 
announcement or responding to a crisis. As such these broadcasts are produced with 
the intention of conveying a specific message to the audience and therefore, as with 
traditional weapons, they are deployed with a specific target in mind. Both 
countries’ leaders work hard to construct and maintain an image of their leadership 
through their press conferences, fixed broadcasts and photo opportunities. Here, 
‘place’ and ‘symbols’ are vital.
The US President delivers his addresses from three key White House locations. 
Firstly, he most often addresses the nation from The Oval Office -  the ‘place’ (within 
the White House) which contains the physical seat of power, the Presidents’ desk and 
chair. Secondly, the President often holds press conferences in the East Room of the 
White House. Either appearing alone in front of the gathered press or, appearing 
with official dignitaries. Thirdly, the President also holds frequent press conferences 
in the White House Rose Garden (whose backdrop is The West Wing and The Oval 
Office) again appearing by himself and also with official dignitaries.
‘Place’ is also important in the addresses of British Prime Ministers, though it is very 
different to America. This difference is because of the fact that the British Prime 
Minister does not work from the official seat of power: indeed there is no physical 
seat of power and the Prime Minister is not the Head of State. Because of this the 
British Prime Minister does not have an equivalent Oval Office from which to 
address the nation. Instead 10 Downing Street is, however, a symbol of the place of 
a Prime Minister’s power. The shiny black door of Number 10 acts as a metonym 
for the official residence of the British Prime Minister and so many of the Prime 
Ministers’ addresses to the nation take place in front of this door it is also where they 
often hold press conferences when welcoming official guests. Consistency of ‘place’ 
is all important in these addresses because ‘place’ instantly frames these political 
communications for audiences. When American Presidents and British Prime 
Ministers address their nations in the wake of a national crisis, like 9/11 or 7/7, a 
consistency of ‘place’ reaffirms their leadership and reassures the public that the 
‘place’ of power is still secure.
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‘Symbols’ are also important in the official addresses of world leaders. The ‘place’ 
will change along with the leader -  between the political communications of 
different countries -  but largely the ‘symbols’ remain the same. American 
Presidential addresses from The Oval Office show the President sitting behind a desk 
with an American flag over his right shoulder, the seal of the President of the United 
States over his left shoulder and a window as a backdrop. The Stars and Stripes flag 
represents the United States of America right across the world -  from the flagpoles 
of American Embassy’s to the flagpoles at medal ceremonies where American 
athletes have won gold, silver or bronze -  the American flag is as symbolic as the 
American National Anthem. The American flag is made up of thirteen alternating 
red and white stripes which each represent one of the thirteen original colonies and in 
the top left comer of the flag is a blue square with fifty white stars on it. These fifty 
white stars represent the fifty states which make up the United States of America. 
Taking all of this into account it makes perfect sense that this symbol of America 
should appear in the background of Presidential addresses because nothing 
symbolizes America more visually than its flag. The political communications of 
some other world leaders also contain their own nation’s flags for precisely the same 
reasons. Also, when American Presidents and British Prime Ministers host other 
world leaders -  at either the White House or 10 Downing Street -  they are always 
presented to the press standing side-by-side with the President or Prime Minister in 
front of their respective nation’s flags. The presence of a flag behind visiting leaders 
is also meant to show audiences that although the visiting leader is away from their 
seat of power they are acting on behalf of their nation abroad.
The Union flag is set against a dark blue background. The white cross is taken from 
the St. Andrew’s cross flag of Scotland, the red cross from the St. Patrick’s Cross of 
Ireland and finally the red cross from the St. George Cross of England. The Union 
flag represents the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland the world 
over. The Union flag is also present in the flags of some of the Commonwealth 
member states, for example Australia and New Zealand. However, in contrast to 
American Presidents, the British Prime Minister does not have a seal or standard -  
this is because he or she is not the Head of State, but rather the Head of the 
government.
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I will now move on to discuss -  stressing once again the importance of ‘place’ and 
‘symbols’ -  some press conferences and photo opportunities featuring President 
Bush and Prime Minister Blair. It is important to remember though that each of 
these examples is a manufactured image munition which carries specific meanings 
for the target audiences as they were all made by Bush and Blair at specific times and 
about specific things.
President Bush has -  along with a number of his predecessors -  also hosted official 
dignitaries at the Western White House (the official second residence of the 
American President). For George W. Bush this has been his Prairie Chapel Ranch in 
Texas, where he takes his vacations. This ‘place’ immediately frames images 
differently from images taken of the President at the White House. The Prairie 
Chapel Ranch is his ‘place’ of vacation and the White House is his ‘place’ of work. 
Therefore, when the President is shown at the ranch he often appears looking more 
relaxed: with no tie, no suit jacket and with a Stetson on his head. However, when 
hosting official dignitaries he still holds press conferences standing behind a lectern 
which displays the seal of the President of the United States. Thus he manages to 
strike a formal/informal balance. Similarly, Prime Minister Blair has also hosted 
official dignitaries at Chequers (the official country retreat of the British Prime 
Minister). Chequers is his ‘place’ of retreat and 10 Downing Street is his ‘place’ of 
work. However, when hosting official dignitaries he still holds official press 
conferences and therefore, like President Bush, manages to get a balance between the 
formal and the informal.
Since the 2003 Iraq War both Bush and Blair have made numerous visits to Iraq to 
see their troops. These visits are perfect for photo opportunities and the manufacture 
of positive image munitions for the press to then circulate. President Bush made a 
surprise visit to see US troops in Iraq on Thanksgiving Day 2003. He met some 
troops in a hanger and presented them with a turkey and all the trimmings. 
Thanksgiving is a significant holiday in America and often American families get 
together to have a big feast which traditionally features a turkey. The ‘place’ of his 
visit -  the Iraqi theatre of operations -  was important because it projected an image 
of Bush which showed that he was willing to put himself at some considerable risk in
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order to visit his troops. His presentation of a turkey with all the trimmings was also 
highly symbolic because it was supposed to show the troops, and also the American 
public, that although these brave men and women are thousands of miles away they 
are still in America’s heart, mind and prayers and also that America appreciates all 
their hard work and sacrifices. However, this spectacle has since somewhat 
unravelled as it has emerged that the turkey was in fact pre-prepared by military 
chefs, presented to President Bush who then presented it to the waiting troops.
On December 17, 2006, in the run-up to Christmas, Prime Minister Blair made a 
similar surprise visit to Iraq to see British troops and also to manufacture similar 
positive image munitions to be circulated by the media. He met with British troops 
in Basra in a hanger and praised them for their continued hard work and sacrifices. 
As with Bush’s earlier visit, the ‘place’ of Blair’s visit -  the Iraqi theatre of 
operations -  was significant because it showed that he too was willing to risk his own 
safety to visit his troops. The timing of his visit was also highly symbolic. Like 
Bush’s earlier visit which was timed to coincide with Thanksgiving, an important 
national holiday, so Blair’s visit was also meant to show the troops and the British 
public that these brave men and women will be in Britain’s thoughts and prayers 
during the festive season. The style and setting, symbolism and place of such 
representations of the US President and British Prime Minister should be borne in 
mind as I now turn to the ‘unofficial’ political communications of Osama bin Laden.
M ediated Contact with Osama bin Laden
I will now examine Osama bin Laden’s ‘unofficial’ political communications as they 
are evidence of A1 Qaeda using the media, like President Bush and Prime Minister 
Blair do, to deliver their messages to the news audience. A widely held view about 
bin Laden is that his video appearances only started after the September 11th attacks. 
This is in fact wrong. He had already appeared in a number of videos prior to 9/11, 
for example after the attack against the USS Cole in 2000, and had established a 
strong media presence. According to Philip Seib:
A1 Qaeda’s sophistication in media matters can [also] be seen in the
establishment of its own production company, the As-Sahab Foundation,
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which produces videos of bin Laden’s statements and infomercials about al 
Qaeda and jihad. As-Sahab is part of the media department bin Laden 
established when al Qaeda was created in 1988.358
However, it was not until his video appearance on October 7, 2001 that bin Laden 
finally received a level of media coverage on a par with world leaders such as 
President Bush or Prime Minister Blair. My interest lies with bin Laden’s post-9/11 
political communications -  or counter-image munitions (for a detailed description of 
this term, see Chapter Two) -  up until 2009. As such, what now follows is a
1  C Q
chronological discussion of bin Laden tapes.
Bin Laden’s October 7th video appearance -  the first to be released in a time of image 
warfare -  coincided with the start of US air strikes against Afghanistan and it is 
important precisely because it shows Al Qaeda weaponizing images in order to gain 
a military advantage back from Coalition forces operating in Afghanistan. Der 
Derian has described this video as bin Laden’s ‘counter air-strike to the USA.’360 
For instance, the timing of the release was significant because it interrupted the 
Pentagon’s carefully planned war script for the campaign against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. The original plan was to mesmerise international news audiences with 
an impressive air campaign, as had been achieved previously during the 1991 Gulf 
War and the Kosovo Conflict. Al Qaeda, unable to compete militarily with the 
unfolding Afghanistan media spectacle, manufactured a bin Laden video, a counter­
image munition, which could act as a weapon drawing attention away from the West 
and back onto Al Qaeda. This video was a huge success. It successfully diverted 
attention away from the unfolding made for TV media spectacle (see Chapter One). 
Audiences of the video were immediately confronted by the following chilling
thstatement from bin Laden about the events of September 11 :
God has struck America at its Achilles heel and destroyed its greatest 
buildings, praise and blessings to Him. America has been filled with terror 
from north to south and from east to west, praise and blessings to God. What 
America is tasting today is but a fraction of what we have tasted for decades. 
For over eighty years our umma has endured this humiliation and contempt.
358 Seib, The AlJazeera Effect, p. 104
359 During this same period a number o f other tapes were also released which featured al Qaeda’s 
second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri. These tapes will not be discussed here though apart from 
where bin Laden and al-Zawahiri appear together.
360 Der Derian, 'Imaging Terror1, p. 30
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Its sons have been killed, its blood has been shed, its holy sanctuaries have 
been violated, all in a manner contrary to that revealed by God, without 
anyone listening or responding. So when God Almighty granted success to 
one of the vanguard groups of Islam, He opened the way for them to destroy 
America utterly. I pray to God Almighty to lift them up to the highest 
Paradise. When these men retaliated on behalf of their poor, oppressed sons, 
their brothers and sisters in Palestine and in many of the other lands of Islam, 
the whole world cried out. The infidels cried out [in protest at 9/11], and the 
hypocrites followed them.361
With this statement bin Laden successfully managed to strike fear once more into the 
hearts of Western audiences with his conspiratorial tone, echoing The X  Files and 
Oliver Stone films.362 He reminded audiences that terror no longer takes place only 
at a distance. Although the opening phase of the war on terror was unfolding in the 
distant Afghanistan theatre of operations his words reminded audiences that at any 
given time terror could again return to the West.
The visual elements which make up this video are particularly important because 
they set the standard for later bin Laden tapes. The October 7 video reproduces the 
format of conventional political communications in minute detail. It is shot as a set- 
piece to camera -  like Presidential addresses from the Oval Office and Prime 
Ministerial addresses from 10 Downing Street. With bin Laden delivering his timely 
message straight to camera it feels almost as if he is somehow addressing his 
audience members personally. In the background of the video is an AK-47 assault 
rifle. This weapon has since become a common feature within bin Laden videos -  
either in the background (like in this particular video) or with him holding one. It 
symbolizes the ongoing struggle that Al Qaeda is engaged with against Western 
infidels. Al Qaeda is not a state and therefore it does not have a flag. But like those 
displayed in the background of political communications by legitimate world leaders, 
the AK-47 has come to embody all that flags do.
Just as ‘place’ was central to Presidential and Prime Ministerial addresses so ‘place’ 
is important to bin Laden in his own addresses. Because the hunt for bin Laden was 
unfolding in Afghanistan and because the Pentagon believed that bin Laden was
361 Bruce Lawrence, ed. Messages to the World: The Statements o f  Osama Bin Laden. Translated by
James Howarth (London: Verso, 2005), p. 104
362 Faisal Devji, Landscapes o f the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity (London: C. Hurst &
Company, 2005), p. 6
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hiding somewhere in the Tora Bora Caves, the logical place from which to launch his 
‘counter air-strike’ against Afghanistan was a cave. The cave wall could just as 
easily have been covered up as it has been in later videos. However, in his October 
7th video bin Laden appeared sitting in a cave. This cave has since become 
synonymous with bin Laden. In fact the cave has since become bin Laden’s 
equivalent to The Oval Office or 10 Downing Street.
Bin Laden released another video or counter-image munition on December 26, 2001
tVi *-  marking the three month anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Again this 
video took the form of a political communication with him directly addressing 
audience members in a statement delivered directly to the camera. Again the AK-47 
was present but this time he appeared sitting in front of generic brown sheeting 
instead of his now familiar cave background. However, the ‘place’ of the address 
was just as important as it had been in his previous video. The cave had become so 
cemented in the public consciousness (following the October 7th video) that it made 
no sense for Al Qaeda to risk giving away bin Laden’s exact location through giving 
US intelligence officials yet another cave background to analyze. Consequently the 
cave background disappeared from bin Laden’s counter-image munitions -  though 
he would forever be associated with the Tora Bora caves. This video was also 
released because it showed that bin Laden had survived the American air 
bombardment of Afghanistan, although it did also show that bin Laden had 
seemingly aged significantly in the short space of time since his last video 
appearance.
Bin Laden did not appear again until November 12, 2002 when he decided to break 
his silence with the release of an audio tape, broadcast by Al Jazeera. In it he stated 
that:
The road to safety begins with the cessation of hostilities, and reciprocal 
treatment is a part of justice. The events that have taken place since the 
attacks on Washington and New York, like the killing of the Germans in 
Tunisia, the French in Karachi, the bombing of the giant French tanker in 
Yemen, the killing of marines in Failaka and of the British and Australians in 
the Bali explosions, the recent operation in Moscow, and various other 
operations here and there: these are all reactions in kind perpetrated by the
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zealous sons of Islam in defence of their religion and in response to the order 
of their Lord and their Prophet.
The fact that this communication is only in audio makes verifying it somewhat 
problematic. However, the statement is widely believed to be by bin Laden. On 
February 11, 2003 another audio address by bin Laden was broadcast by Al Jazeera, 
this time urging Iraqis to commit suicide attacks against US forces in Iraq. In another 
audio tape, released on April 8, 2003, bin Laden called Muslims in Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to arms.
Bin Laden’s audio addresses are a product of necessity rather than of choice. This is 
because in an age of real-time communications it is not always possible for Al Qaeda 
to produce and disseminate a video address quickly enough to make a timely 
response. Audio addresses are quicker to produce and therefore are sometimes the 
only viable option available to bin Laden in an age of real-time media.
For the second anniversary of the 9/11 attacks a video along with an audio tape, was 
released to Al Jazeera, on September 10, 2003. The counter-image munition showed 
bin Laden and al-Zawahiri walking through some mountains. This video should still 
be considered a political communication, like the other videos, even though it does 
not adopt the traditional style of a set-piece statement. Rather it adopts a style more 
befitting of a party political broadcast showing Western audiences a more relaxed bin 
Laden in consultation with his second in command. There is a further reference here 
to Western leaders who are also sometimes shown in news footage consulting with 
their deputies. The fact that the video is accompanied by an audio statement shows 
that bin Laden is indeed acutely aware of the problems with audio addresses. He is 
also aware that videos carry a higher news value than audio tapes. The audio 
statement, however, explicitly mentions the second anniversary of the September 11th 
attacks, thus immediately placing it into a contemporary context.
On October 18, 2003 a media package containing a number of counter-image 
munitions: two further bin Laden audio tapes and a series of recent suicide video 
wills were broadcast by Al Jazeera. On January 4, 2004 another bin Laden audio
363 Lawrence, ed. Messages to the World, pp. 173-174
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tape was broadcast by Al Jazeera. Then on April 15, 2004 another bin Laden audio 
tape was broadcast which denounced the recent killing of the Hamas spiritual leader 
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. This once again proved that bin Laden was still alive. In an 
audio message, released on May 7, 2004, bin Laden offered a reward of gold to 
anyone who could kill either Paul Bremer, the Director of Reconstruction and 
Humanitarian Assistance for post-war Iraq, or Kofi Annan, then the Secretary 
General of the UN. He also offered smaller rewards of gold to anyone who killed 
soldiers and civilians from members of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’.
In the final run up to the 2004 US Presidential election bin Laden disrupted President 
Bush’s final days of campaigning -  by deploying a counter-image munition -  
drawing attention away from the American election spectacle and back onto the war 
on terror. In this October 29, 2004 video he admitted Al Qaeda’s complicity in the 
9/11 attacks and ‘claimed that they were first inspired by the 1982 Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in which towers and buildings in Beirut were destroyed in the siege of the 
capital.’364 The counter-image munition itself, according to Douglas Kellner, shows
[a] calm bin Laden slowly read[ing] a long speech in an 18-minute video 
attacking both Kerry and Bush, demonstrating that it was a recent tape, and 
mocking Bush for reading a goat story on September 11 after the first plane 
attacked the Twin Towers, suggesting bin Laden may have seen Michael 
Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11 film.365
This counter-image munition is also the strongest indicator so far that bin Laden is 
purposefully manufacturing political communications like those produced and 
released by official world leaders. Whereas Presidents and Prime Ministers make 
their addresses to their respective nations, bin Laden -  in his tapes -  is delivering his 
messages instead to two distinct audiences: a Western audience and the global 
ummah.366 To Western audiences, his addresses are meant as chilling warnings. 
‘What the United States tastes today is a very small thing compared to what we have 
tasted for tens of years.’ And to the global ummah, his addresses are meant as a call 
to arms for Muslims worldwide to join the jihad against the West.367 In this video
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bin Laden also appears mimetically sat behind a desk, in homage to President Bush’s 
addresses to the nation from The Oval Office: it is an alterative Presidential address.
December 16, 2004 saw the release of another audio tape but then bin Laden 
disappeared for the whole of 2005 -  replaced instead by al-Zawahiri -  fuelling much 
media speculation about whether bin Laden was indeed dead or alive. His silence 
was then broken, on January 19, 2006, by the release of a new audio tape. On April 
24, 2006 bin Laden released another audio tape in which he referred to the conflict in 
Darfur and also to the new Hamas government. These recent events helped to date 
the tape as there had been discussion about whether in fact bin Laden was dead and 
he had secretly stockpiled videos for every occasion before his death. The fact 
that this audio tape mentions contemporary events partially dispels this possibility. 
However, as was identified earlier, there always remains a problem of identifying bin 
Laden audio tapes because the possibility always remains that someone is merely 
purporting to be bin Laden. To further allay speculation over whether bin Laden was 
in fact dead or alive and also to comment on more contemporary events he released 
another audio tape on May 24, 2006. In this tape he attempted again to undermine 
the Bush administrations’ war on terror, claiming that Zacarias Moussaoui, the only 
man so far to be charged in connection with the September 11 attacks had had 
nothing to do with the plot. On June 30, 2006, in an audio message, bin Laden 
eulogised Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, who had 
recently been killed in a US airstrike in Iraq. This audio tape is supposed to act as 
proof that bin Laden is still alive and also that bin Laden’s resolve is steadfast 
regardless of al-Zarqawi’s death. July 1, 2006 saw the release of another audio tape 
in which bin Laden again criticised the continued American military occupation of 
Iraq.
The latest bin Laden video was released, on September 7, 2007, to coincide with the 
sixth anniversary of the September 11th attacks. However, as Andrew Hill observes:
this appearance took a form quite different from that of his preceding video 
appearances.... This video contained no moving image footage of Bin Laden, 
instead presenting a still image of Bin Laden accompanied by a voice
368 Hill, 'The Bin Laden Tapes', p. 45
154
assumed to be his.... [L]ittle mention was made of the unusual nature of the 
visual presence of Bin Laden assumed in this footage, or of the difficulty in 
attributing the voice heard on the video to Bin Laden...Instead, the references 
in the video to recent developments -  Nicholas Sarkozy and Gordon Brown 
were referred to -  were focused upon as providing evidence of the recent date 
of its production.369
Hill thinks that this response is strange:
It is almost as if -  after the lengthy absence of video appearances by Bin 
Laden -  the still photograph this footage contained was enough to satisfy the 
desire for a sighting of him, when the very absence of moving images of Bin 
Laden might be taken as evidence that he has indeed passed away (or was too 
sick to appear). Indeed, the very absence of questions about the nature of the 
visual form Bin Laden assumed in this video can be read as suggestive of a 
certain desire for Bin Laden to still remain alive.370
tbHill therefore believes that as the September 11 attacks become an increasingly 
distant memory, as bin Laden is still a fugitive and because the war on terror has 
been constructed around bin Laden as the enemy other then any visuals (even a still 
image) are today enough to constitute a sighting of him. This counter-image 
munition is further evidence of bin Laden inserting himself into the news agenda, via 
an alternative Presidential address pre-empting and undermining President Bush’s 
official address to mark the sixth anniversary of the September 11th attacks. Since 
then eight more bin Laden audio tapes have been released: on November 29, 2007, 
December 29, 2007, March 19, 2008 (where he responded to cartoons of the Prophet 
Mohammad), March 20, 2008, May 16, 2008, May 18, 2008, January 14, 2009 
(released in the final days of the Bush administration) and June 3, 2009 (to coincide 
with President Barack Obama’s first visit to Saudi Arabia). Further evidence indeed, 
according to Hill, of ‘Bin Laden’s continued capacity to haunt the West: his status as 
spectral metonym for an enemy that refuses to be exorcised.’371
Hill believes that bin Laden ‘has come to function as a metonym for Al Qaeda and 
the enemy more broadly in the War on Terror.’372 Hill has divided the bin Laden 
videotapes into two distinct categories: videos that were made for release to the
Hill, Re-Imagining, p. 140
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media; and videos apparently not meant for public broadcast.373 The counter-image 
munitions released by Al Qaeda to the media, are bin Laden’s political 
communications and the unofficial videos released, for example by the Pentagon, are 
meant as counter-image munitions to bin Laden’s continued visualization throughout 
the war on terror.
Hill has interpreted these videos drawing on the Lacanian concepts of ‘the 
imaginary’ and ‘the gaze’. He argues that the bin Laden tapes help ‘to confirm Bin 
Laden’s continued wellbeing and ability to remain active as the head of Al Qaeda’374 
and are used by Bin Laden ‘as a platform for statements in which he has issued 
threats and demands, attempted to rally his followers, and appealed for greater 
support.’375 As such they are ‘not simply a means but perhaps the primary means 
through which Al Qaeda is able to challenge and intimidate its opponents at the level 
of the imaginary.’376 They are also an important weapon in the war on terror as they 
enable Al Qaeda to gain a military advantage against traditionally superior militaries 
forces. In response the Pentagon has attempted to disrupt and control Western 
audiences’ imaginary and gaze of bin Laden. The Bush administration wanted to 
regain control of the spectacle of the war on terror and defuse bin Laden’s counter­
image munitions. They attempted this in a few different ways. They realized that 
they could not disrupt the dissemination of the bin Laden videos at their initial point 
of reception (Al Jazeera and the internet) but they could instead try and disrupt their 
circulation through other Western news networks.377 This is further evidence of the 
Bush administration misunderstanding the diverse and unpredictable nature of the 
rhizomatic media environment and instead continuing to believe that they can impose 
some form of top-down control on the flow of information and images. Hugh Miles 
recounts how, on October 10 , the White House revealed that it had asked the five 
major US television networks to censor Al Qaeda footage and not to show bin Laden 
videos. Shamefully, he writes:
all five network executives conceded they would vet all their clips from 
Afghanistan and not use any of Al Jazeera’s footage live. ‘Prerecorded
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374 Ibid, p. 37
375 Ibid, p. 38
376 Ibid, p. 39
377 See Der Derian, 'In Terrorem', p. 111
156
statements from representatives of Al Qaeda could be communicating hidden 
messages to their members’, said Walt Disney Co.’s ABC News. NBC 
would ‘apply journalistic judgement before deciding which portions, if any, 
we will broadcast’, said a spokesman. ‘We’ll do whatever is our patriotic 
duty,’ said Australian-bom media mogul Rupert Murdoch, whose company 
News Corp owned the Fox News channel, Fox Television, Twentieth Century 
Fox, other television stations and a large stable of newspapers. ‘Our policy is 
to avoid directly transmitting any report we think will facilitate any terrorist 
action,’ reasoned CNN in a statement. ‘To determine what should be 
transmitted, CNN will take the advice of the pertinent authorities.’
The US First Amendment, it was stressed, was not at stake in this instance 
because Rice had phrased her concerns as a request and not as an order, but 
the pressure from the White House was obvious.
The Blair government was exerting similar pressures on the British Press and busy 
spinning quasi-guidelines on what was acceptable to report and what was not. 
Alastair Campbell, Director of Communications for Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
wrote to broadcasters urging them to air Al Qaeda information with a ‘health 
warning’.379 This is also evidence of the Blair government also being trapped in a 
mass media mindset and not understanding the uncontrollable flow of information 
and images in the internet age.
As America and Britain were busy trying to make these counter-image munitions of 
bin Laden disappear they were simultaneously trying to discredit bin Laden’s wider 
image (with their release of counter-image munitions of him condemning the West 
and similarly celebrating the coming together of his organization with the terrorist 
group Islamic Jihad). Bush and Blair hoped that in releasing counter-image 
munitions they could win the battle against bin Laden’s counter-image munitions. 
Bin Laden, however, had been concentrating on remaining a fugitive figure and had, 
according to Hill, ‘effectively engineered his own disappearance.’380 The Pentagon 
underestimated this fact and failed to realise the significance of his move, they saw it 
as a retreat by bin Laden rather than what it actually was, a strategic withdrawal by
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bin Laden. Since, bin Laden’s presence has continued to haunt the West but 
physically he has remained at large. Richard Devetak believes:
bin Laden seems to combine monstrosity with invisibility or ghostliness, 
hiding in shadows and underground networks, operating by stealth and 
spreading fear through surprise acts of terror.... [B]in Laden is an
underexposed other; he is an elusive ‘incorporeal presence’, present and 
visible to the West only as an image on film, or a voice on audiotape.381
As Baudrillard put it: ‘The photo preserves the moment of disappearance and thus 
the charm of the real, like that of a previous life.’382 It is because of this 
disappearance that bin Laden is seemingly effortlessly able to continue to break away 
from and rejoin the events of the war on terror almost at will. He can reinsert 
himself -  ‘via these videos’383 and counter-image munitions -  back into the media 
spotlight in response to events as and when they occur. Hill believes that:
[tjhese recordings have served as a repeated reminder to Western audiences 
of the threat Bin Laden and Al Qaeda continue to present to their lives. And, 
they have played a principle role in establishing the figure that Bin Laden can 
be said to have come closest to resembling for Western audiences -  that of 
the demon -  the personification of evil that exists in highly similar forms 
across cultures, and typically combining features that include an intense 
capacity for evil, with a shifting ontological profile and the capacity to appear 
and disappear at will.384
Hill is again emphasising the fact that bin Laden has been constructed as the enemy 
other in the war on terror: a demon, he also argues that the Bush administration has 
not disrupted bin Laden’s image. Rather, ‘It is almost as if Bin Laden’s image has 
metamorphosised into a form of weaponry, as if his gaze has acquired the power of 
“extramission”, or come to function as a version of...“the evil eye”.’385 As 
previously remarked, bin Laden seems to address each individual audience member 
with his video statements, and Hill’s reference to extramission and the evil eye 
connects with Walter Benjamin’s observations of figures gazing out of images
381 Richard Devetak, 'The Gothic Scene of International Relations: Ghosts, Monsters, Terror and the
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creating the illusion of being able to actually see their spectators. Hill sees ‘Bin 
Laden as a type of ghostly presence’387 in the war on terror concluding his discussion 
of the bin Laden tapes with the remark that: ‘The ‘impossibility’ of destroying Bin 
Laden adds a further dimension to the critique of the United States and its allies for 
instigating a conflict of the scale of the War on Terror against an adversary of Bin 
Laden’s nature.’388 Invoking Derrida, Hill argues that:
[w]hile ghosts may not be able to be captured or killed, they might...be 
negated, dissipated, or exorcised -  processes that entail seeking to remove 
their presence through addressing the causes of their coming into being. And 
yet, in the period since the September 11th attacks, addressing the processes 
through which Bin Laden has come to assume the status he has for many in 
the Muslim world has been accorded far less importance than confronting and
'y o q
destroying him.
According to Hill, rather than trying to find, confront and destroy bin Laden and his 
mediated presence, a more effective tactic would be to address why bin Laden has 
been able to become such a powerful omnipotent presence in the war on terror, 
understand his visual presence and as a result exorcise him from his support base. 
Hill’s discussion of the bin Laden tapes is important precisely because he presents a 
perspective about bin Laden which has largely been overlooked by academia and 
governments. His discussion also offers important insights into possible ways of 
dealing with bin Laden’s counter-image munitions.
Tony Blair and George W. Bush have underestimated bin Laden, believing his 
counter-image munitions and their counter-image munitions simply to be political 
manoeuvres in a game. Unwittingly engaging him instead in what Der Derian terms 
a ‘mimetic war of images’390 they have played directly into his hands. In engaging 
him in a mimetic war of images and opening up a mimetic communication loop via 
their counter-image munitions, Britain and America have enabled bin Laden to 
continue to haunt the West. Stephen McVeigh has written of how:
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On 17 September 2001, less than a week after the terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President Bush was responding to 
questions from the press about America’s mobilization for the so-called War 
on Terrorism. One reporter asked, “Do you want bin Laden dead?” Bush 
replied, “I want justice. There’s an old poster out west, as I recall, that said, 
‘Wanted: Dead or Alive.’391
Following this, according to David Friend:
the design team at the New York Post laid out a mock Wild West poster 
showing the face of Osama bin Laden, with the headline: WANTED, DEAD 
OR ALIVE. It would appear as a foldout in the next morning’s paper, and
• 392would be plastered on walls and windows throughout the city.
According to Der Derian:
Dead or alive, prophet or crackpot, symptom or disease, Bin Laden as well as 
Hussein require a mimetic foe. Without a reciprocal hatred their prophecies 
lose their self-fulfilling powers. As is often the case with narcissistic 
psychopaths, the worst thing we could do is to deprive them of their 
reflections.393
This ongoing mimetic battle all started with Tony Blair appearing on Al Jazeera after 
bin Laden’s October 7, 2001 video address. Since then, a host of other British and 
American officials (including George W. Bush) have made similar appearances on 
Al Jazeera and more recently on the internet.
As has already been discussed, bin Laden seeks to carefully construct and control his 
image, in a similar fashion to American Presidents and British Prime Ministers. Bin 
Laden is able to do this because of new media technologies. But these same new 
media technologies and the unpredictable rhizomatic condition of the contemporary 
media system have simultaneously also opened up a world of images that cannot be 
controlled. Hence, bin Laden’s counter-image munitions have become an object of 
conflict as America and Britain continuously fail to control them with their own 
counter-image munitions and as new media actors engage in remediation battles so 
as to take bin Laden’s counter-image munitions and insert them into new political
391 Stephen McVe;gh, The American Western (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), p. vii
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contexts. This remediation is a vital aspect of the phenomenon of image warfare and 
it is to a discussion of this that I will now turn.
Circulating bin Laden’s Image
Bin Laden’s counter-image munitions -  since their initial deployment -  have become 
the subject of uncontrollable circulation and the focus of numerous unpredictable, 
surprising and intense remediation battles (for a detailed description of this term, see 
Chapter Two); each one setting off a complex and potentially endless set of chain 
reactions as they get picked up and remediated by new media actors. Binoy 
Kampmark has eloquently argued with regards to the remediation of bin Laden’s 
image, that because he is still a fugitive evading physical capture he remains trapped 
in ‘deauratized forms.’394 According to David Friend:
Within days, his image would be paraded through the streets of Peshwar, 
Jakarta, and Gaza, his likeness often cribbed from magazines or downloaded 
from the Internet; within weeks it would appear on everything from sheets of 
novelty toilet paper in New York (for $19 a roll, 10 percent of the profits 
earmarked for charity) to targets at U.S. rifle ranges. In Pakistan’s kiosks, 
bazaars, and open-air markets, Osama’s face appeared on T-shirts, ballpoint 
pens, bottles of cologne, and candy wrappers.395
Kampmark believes that ‘[tjhese forms of representation become the substitute for 
physically finding him,’396 allowing bin Laden to continue to circulate as a powerful 
and pervasive spectre throughout society. Therefore, his image is removed from the 
control of specific social groups.397 Friend has argued that:
Digital scanners had cribbed bin Laden’s image from published sources. 
Digital printers allowed protesters to paste them hither and yon. Digital 
cameras had then photographed people holding posters with the pirated shots. 
The Internet then completed the cycle, zapping pictures of the pictures to the 
news shows, the wire services, and computer desktops everywhere. Bin 
Laden was more than an idle beneficiary of this image traffic. He was a
O Q O
shrewd propagandist and spin doctor himself.
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To help explain this better Kampmark has drawn on the work of Walter Benjamin, 
specifically his work on the ‘aura’. Benjamin argues that what makes a piece of art 
unique is its aura, the sacred sense derived from its singularity.399 However, as he 
writes, ‘that which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the 
work of art.’400 Benjamin concludes that: ‘To an ever greater degree the work of art 
reproduced becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility. From a 
photographic negative, for example, one can make any number of prints; to ask for 
the ‘authentic’ print makes no sense.’401
According to Kampmark ‘[wjhere the aura has been estranged from the original 
subject, the alienated image circulates within a sign system that simulates bin 
Laden’s physical reality.’402 Kampmark has also written about the so-called ‘product 
substitution’ of aura with reference to bin Laden’s image:
[T]he product substitution of aura, has been frequent with bin Laden. These 
have tended to involve various ‘products’ of his image: commodities where 
the bin Laden emblem becomes a material object that circulates as an object 
of commerce; virtual ‘capture’ of bin Laden through a modem form of pillory 
and stockade in cyberspace; and forensic substitutions of his body through 
DNA samples from his family.403
By way of conclusion Kampmark has argued that: ‘For bin Laden, the aura is never 
reproducible; it has been severed by endless mechanical duplications, from the 
moment his own cameraman has filmed him, to the times he has been pictured on Al 
Jazeera and CNN.’404 Friend believes that ‘[o]nce bin Laden went into hiding after 
the September 11 attacks, he ceased to exist as a bona fide “public” figure and, 
instead, became his image.’405 Arguably, however, Kampmark misunderstands the 
nature of aura in the contemporary age. Hariman and Lucaites instead believe that: 
‘The same “mechanical reproduction” that destroys the aura of the fine art work [or 
indeed bin Laden’s image] can at the same time create an aura for the lesser
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images.’406 According to W.J.T Mitchell society with the advent of the information 
age has now moved from a period of mechanical reproduction to one of 
biocybemetic reproduction. And this, he writes:
reverses the relation of the copy to the original. Now we have to say that the 
copy has, if anything, even more aura than the original... The digital 
reproduction of sounds and visual images, for instance, need not involve any 
erosion of vividness or lifelikeness, but can actually improve on whatever 
original material it starts with. Photographs of artworks can be “scrubbed” to 
remove flaws and dust; in principle, the effects of aging in an oil painting 
could be digitally erased, and the work restored to its pristine originality in a 
reproduction. Of course this would still constitute a loss of aura that 
Benjamin associated with the accretion of history and tradition around an 
object; but if aura means recovering the original vitality, literally, the 
“breath” of life of the original, then the digital copy can come closer to 
looking and sounding like the original than the original itself. And the 
miraculous programming framework of Adobe Photoshop even preserves the 
“history” of transformations between original and copy so that any 
transformations can be reversed.407
It is precisely this altered relationship between the copy and the original and new 
media technologies that enables bin Laden’s counter-image munitions to circulate so 
widely and to carry with them auratic traces.
Kampmark is right to argue that the product substitution of bin Laden is the 
substitute for finding him. However, his understanding of the relationship between 
aura and original images is incompatible with my own conceptual schema about bin 
Laden’s counter-image munitions. If I accept his argument that the aura of an image 
munition is indeed severed after its initial deployment then the circulations and 
remediations of his image are deauratized. This cannot be the case though because I 
do not believe that circulating and remediating image munitions would have the 
impacts that they do if they were devoid of an aura. Instead, Hariman and Lucaites 
and Mitchell’s understanding of the nature of aura in the contemporary age are more 
compatible with my conceptual schema as they account for the fact that circulating 
and remediating image munitions also contain auras.
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Bin Laden has become a household name, a celebrity terrorist if  you like. He has 
successfully managed to get his counter-image munitions copied across multiple 
media platforms, according to Hill, becoming ‘a metonym for Al Qaeda and the 
enemy more broadly in the War on Terror.’408 The only thing missing from his 
extensive media portfolio -  unlike Tony Blair -  is an invitation to appear on The 
Simpsons. Bin Laden, since 9/11, has proved that he has a sophisticated 
understanding of the media and how to play the media game. In mimicking the style 
of established Western political communications he intentionally packages his 
addresses for a wide circulation in the West. The similarities between the bin Laden 
tapes and Western political communications gives Western audiences an immediate 
level of familiarity with the tapes and it also helps to give them legitimacy with 
Western audiences. The fact that the bin Laden tapes follow the same media 
conventions as Western political communications also means that the Western media 
are able to insert them into existing news frames with relative ease and because the 
bin Laden addresses were designed to be repackaged it has been relatively easy for 
producers of jihadi internet propaganda to pick up his counter-image munitions. Bin
t hLaden has been edited together with footage of the September 11 attacks, with 
videos of insurgent attacks in both Afghanistan and Iraq, with footage of the terror 
attacks in Bali, Madrid and London, with videos of terrorists in remote training 
camps and with the suicide video wills of suicide bombers.
Beyond the news networks and jihadi internet propaganda the spectre of bin Laden 
has continued to remediate via a variety of interventions made by groups and 
individuals with divergent motivations that are totally distinct from those of Al 
Qaeda. Thus posing a significant challenge to the authenticity of bin Laden’s image 
and also proving that the spectacle of war cannot be controlled. These interventions, 
however, can be usefully explored and recorded thematically.
Politically a significant remediation has been made by Aaron McGruder, who has 
returned time and again to the subject of bin Laden, with his political cartoon series 
The Boondocks in The Chicago Tribune. McGruder’s cartoon series is a satirical 
look at American society and it’s stereotyping of race, however, he does also weave
408 Hill, Re-Imagining, p. 33
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other major issues effecting American society into his cartoons. In one particular 
episode bin Laden is depicted calling for his followers to pursue stem cell research409 
thus invoking two of America’s greatest fears in the early twenty-first century: 
terrorism and genetic engineering.
A number of subversive interventions have also been made with the specific 
intention of undermining the public image that bin Laden had carefully begun to
tViconstruct of himself after the September 11 terror attacks. These subversive 
interventions go further than government and military attempts to discredit bin 
Laden’s public image (for example the videos of bin Laden released by the Pentagon 
to the media). This is also further compelling evidence showing how in the 
rhizomatic media age an increasing number of new media actors with diverse and 
unpredictable intentions are now able -  independently of Al Qaeda, government and 
military -  to pick up bin Laden counter-image munitions insert them into surprising 
new contexts and redeploy them over the internet.
A key outlet has been internet based jokes. Jokes have circulated through email, and 
more recently through YouTube, with images and video footage of bin Laden doing 
the most unlikely things. These jokes range from the subtitles in his videos being 
changed to surreal ramblings, to famous speeches, to extracts from comedy shows, to 
bin Laden doing Karaoke, ordering a takeaway meal to his cave or phone voting for 
the latest reality TV show. Bin Laden has also become the subject of an internet joke 
which parodies a MasterCard advert:
Trip to Afghanistan: $800
High powered sniper rifle: $1000
Hotel stay with accessible roof: $100
Scoring a head shot on Osama bin Laden: Priceless
For everyone else there’s Cruise Missiles
Bin Laden has become the subject of a parody of the Star Wars: The Empire Strikes 
Back movie poster ‘Tali Wars: America Strikes Back’, where he appears as Darth
409 Mitchell, 'Cloning Terror'
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Vader. Members of the Bush administration appear as Luke Skywalker, Princess 
Leia, Yoda and Han Solo. Star Wars is essentially a story about good versus evil and 
it operates here as a metaphor for the war on terror. The person who produced ‘Tali 
Wars’ was clearly mindful of this and also the fact that by superimposing the face of 
bin Laden onto Darth Vader (the bad guy) and the faces of President Bush and other 
senior members of the Bush administration onto the faces of the good guys they were 
intentionally subverting Al Qaeda’s official message and reinforcing the Bush 
administration’s official message.
Other subversive interventions include a Finding Nemo film poster parody ‘Finding 
Osama’ -  which is a clear criticism of the Bush administrations failure to find bin 
Laden -  and a Teletubbies parody ‘Tali-tubby’ -  which operates from a position of 
heteronormativity and also reinforces colonial discourses about Islamic terrorists 
being immoral and exotic.410 The image shows Tinky Winky (the purple Teletubby) 
with his red leather bag -  which has courted controversy in the past because it looks 
very much like a woman’s handbag -  and this character has been criticised for being 
a children’s television character which could be interpreted as gay. Tinky Winky has 
been Photoshopped with the symbols of bin Laden -  his trademark beard, turban and 
AK-47 -  and therefore transformed into a satirical representation of bin Laden. The 
producer of ‘Tali-tubby’ in selecting Tinky Winky rather than one of the other 
Teletubbies for inclusion in their image was clearly wanting to pair the criticisms 
over Tinky Winky’s sexuality with bin Laden as the archetypal Islamic terrorist and 
so present bin Laden as not just immoral but also exotic.
Bin Laden’s image has also been appropriated, appearing with Bert from Sesame 
Street on some versions of the infamous ‘Bert is Evil’ poster. Other versions of the 
‘Bert is Evil’ poster include: Bert with Adolf Hitler, with Ayatollah Khomeini, with 
Josef Stalin, with Saddam Hussein, with Robert Mugabe, with members of the Ku 
Klux Klan (KKK), Bert the Unabomber, Bert the Ripper and Bert at the JFK 
assassination. The Bert and bin Laden poster was first produced by someone called 
Ignacio who published it on the internet and it has since become something of an 
international phenomenon. It has been adapted and copied, appearing on numerous
410 See Amit S. Rai, 'Of Monsters: Biopower, Terrorism and Excess in Genealogies o f Monstrosity'.
Cultural Studies 18, no. 4 (2004), p. 538
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websites and printed and used at protests internationally.411 Thus reflecting the 
uncontrollable flow of images in the internet age and how even parody images can 
themselves end up in surprising new contexts which the producers could never have 
imagined.
Commercially an interesting intervention has been made by Morgan Spurlock in his 
documentary Where in the World is Osama bin Laden. Spurlock takes it upon 
himself to try and track down bin Laden the mysterious spectral figure who has been 
haunting society since September 11th. Spurlock’s search for bin Laden though is a 
MacGuffin412 enabling him instead to journey through the Middle East dispelling 
Western constructed attitudes and prejudices about Muslims, such as the idea that 
they are all committed to jihad against the West.
A number of artistic interventions have also taken place. Bin Laden’s image was 
appropriated, according to Friend:
by the progressive political activists at TomPaine.com (just as American was 
laying the groundwork for taking out Saddam). The ad, widely downloaded 
from the Web, shows bin Laden as Uncle Sam. He points toward the viewer, 
daring Americans to throw their support behind a war that could, as the ad 
copy reads, “distract [the U.S.] from fighting A1 Qaeda...divide the 
international community... [and] destabilize the region.” The picture’s 
headline: “I WANT YOU TO INVADE IRAQ.”413
This poster was already familiar to many Americans thanks to its references: J. M. 
Flagg’s 1917 recruitment poster, which in turn references Alfred Leete’s 1914 Lord 
Kitchener recruitment poster, where Uncle Sam (the metonym of the United States) 
states “I WANT YOU FOR U.S. ARMY.”
Ben Langlands and Nikki Bell have also produced an installation entitled: The House 
o f Osama bin Laden. Hill has explained how:
411 Jenkins, Convergence Culture, pp. 2-3
412 A mere plot device to draw us into story but not necessarily central to it -  for instance the stolen 
money in Hitchcock’s Psycho or, indeed, the Weapons of Mass Destruction that drew us into the war 
in Iraq (see Slavoj Zizek, Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle (London: Verso, 2004), pp. 11-19)
413 Friend, Watching the World Change, p. 179
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[i]n October 2002 the artists visited Afghanistan and pursued rumours of a 
house occupied by Bin Laden in the late 1990s. They located the building 
west of Jalalabad and used the material they gathered there to construct a 
virtual model of the house and its immediate surroundings that is then 
projected onto a gallery wall, with a joystick provided for navigation through 
the virtual abode. The experience of moving through this environment bares 
close similarity to that of playing a first person shooter game, in which the 
player moves through an enemy’s lair, confronting and destroying them.414
This installation gives visitors to the gallery a first person experience -  albeit virtual 
-  of the hunt for bin Laden. Bin Laden’s image has also found its way onto the walls 
of many cities, through street art. For example, in one particular graffiti image, bin 
Laden is the subject of a missing person poster which reads: ‘Missing: Have you 
seen me?’ A clear criticism of the Bush administrations ongoing hunt for bin Laden 
and how their high-tech hunt might just as well be replaced by a low-tech missing 
person poster campaign.
These numerous interventions reveal the uncontrollable nature of bin Laden’s 
counter-image munitions, they also confirm Hill’s view that it is impossible to 
destroy bin Laden’s image415 and Kampmark’s ideas about the spectral nature of bin 
Laden. These remediated images of bin Laden are also evidence that in the internet 
age A1 Qaeda has successfully been able to bring the war on terror to the attention of 
new audience demographics as a result of his appearance in surprising new contexts; 
for example, people who do not watch the news are not free from bin Laden’s gaze in 
fact they are still haunted by bin Laden’s image. This is because the free floating 
nature of his image means that people can now engage with him in surprising new 
places. People do not need to consume television or print media to come into contact 
with his image; they need only walk down the street to be confronted by bin Laden 
staring back at them from a graffiti image on a wall, visit a gallery and see bin 
Laden’s image framed on a wall, check their emails and receive the latest bin Laden 
joke or go to the cinema and be confronted by bin Laden staring back at them from 
on the screen. For example, bin Laden has featured in The Boondocks cartoon in The 
Chicago Tribune; he has also been paired with Star Wars, Finding Nemo, 
Teletubbies, Bert from Sesame Street and more. These remediated images of bin
414 Hill, Re-Imagining, p. 36
415 Ibid, p. 42
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Laden -  which have all been produced and disseminated by new media actors with 
divergent intentions from A1 Qaeda, the Bush administration and the Blair 
government -  show how traditional, top-down information management systems 
centred around control and censorship (still dominant in America and Britain) are no 
longer appropriate or indeed relevant in the war on terror; given the fact that once a 
new bin Laden counter-image munition has been deployed by A1 Qaeda it can then 
immediately be picked up and deployed by multiple, globally dispersed new media 
actors. A1 Qaeda have realised this fact and instead of getting too caught up with 
trying to control the circulation and remediation of their bin Laden counter-image 
munitions, after their release, they instead focus all their attention on producing bin 
Laden counter-image munitions which will have the biggest immediate impact; thus 
putting them at a strategic advantage in the war of images over the more traditional 
American and British government and military ways of managing images.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ political communications 
made by President Bush, Prime Minister Blair and bin Laden in the war on terror. Its 
main focus, however, has been on the bin Laden tapes and how A1 Qaeda has used 
them to produce and deploy a number of powerful counter-image munitions. To help 
better understand the significance of bin Laden’s counter-image munitions though I 
had to place them into a wider political communications context. To this end I 
briefly discussed how ‘official’ political communications -  supported by the work of 
press offices and spin doctors -  play an important role in communicating information 
in times of war and peace and currently in the war on terror. I also reviewed the 
development of political communications from the newspaper age, the radio age, the 
television age to the real-time and the internet age. What emerged from this was a 
clear understanding of just how important ‘place’ and ‘symbolism’ are within visual 
political communications. ‘Place’ and ‘symbolism’ were then examined in detail 
with reference to press conferences, fixed broadcasts and photo opportunities made 
by both President Bush and Prime Minister Blair in the war on terror.
Having placed the bin Laden videos into a wider political context, attention then 
turned to examine them chronologically up until 2009. What I discovered was that
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A1 Qaeda has drawn directly from the style of the political communications of 
American Presidents and British Prime Ministers and how, in terms of ‘place’ and 
analogous to the Oval Office and 10 Downing Street, the Tora Bora caves became 
significant for bin Laden. ‘Symbolism’ is also important in the bin Laden videos. 
The AK-47 has assumed the role of a flag and bin Laden’s use of a desk in his 
October 29, 2004 video is a definite reference to the desk in The Oval Office. My 
discussion of the bin Laden videos has also revealed the important connections 
between these videos as political communications and as weapons of war, or counter­
image munitions, in the war on terror.
I then turned to Hill’s discussion of the bin Laden tapes where he discusses how bin 
Laden is indeed in control of his presence in the war on terror, having ‘effectively 
engineered his own disappearance,’416 enabling him to reinsert himself back into the 
war on terror whenever he likes and also to disappear again whenever he chooses to 
do so. Hill offers important insights about how to deal with the circulation of bin 
Laden’s counter-image munitions. I then explored the circulation of bin Laden’s 
image with reference to Kampmark’s work on bin Laden’s ‘deauratized’417 image 
and I quickly disputed this position, favouring instead Hariman, Lucaites and 
Mitchell’s arguments that auratic presences are not just present in original image 
munitions but they can also be found in subsequent image appropriations. I then 
looked at bin Laden’s circulation and remediation from news networks to jihadi 
internet propaganda, to political, subversive, commercial and artistic interventions. 
What this shows is that the spectacle of war cannot be controlled as Bin Laden’s 
image will always be remediated by people operating beyond the control of 
governments or A1 Qaeda. Furthermore, such political communications are but one 
feature of the new image theatre of war.
The next chapter will examine another: suicide terrorism, but rather than discussing it 
as a purely physical tactic I will instead explore the symbolic dimension of suicide 
bombings and how it is a source of powerful image munitions, counter-image 
munitions and remediation battles.
416 Hill, 'The Bin Laden Tapes', p. 40
417 Kampmark, 'The Spectre of Bin Laden', p. 3
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Chapter Four
Suicides
Introduction
Chapters One and Two outlined the theoretical and methodological basis of this 
thesis: in the contemporary media environment information and images circulate 
rhizomatically; they may still sometimes move up and down a single hierarchical 
structure, but they also, and increasingly, flow across fields laterally and in ways that 
enable their combination and recombination, deployment and redeployment in 
uncontrollable and unpredictable ways. I have also shown how America and Britain 
have failed to recognize the significance of this shift for contemporary war, while A1 
Qaeda appears to have a more sophisticated understanding of this uncontrollability 
and of how to deploy weaponized images in the war on terror. To assist IR theorists 
in understanding what I have called ‘image warfare’ I developed three conceptual 
terms: ‘image munitions’, ‘counter-image munitions’ and ‘remediation battles’. 
These help to map out the stages of image warfare from the launching of weaponized 
image munitions and the counter-response they provoke, to the complex remediation 
of such images and the struggle to appropriate and reappropriate them.
In Chapter Three I discussed one form of image warfare, exploring the ‘official’ and 
‘unofficial’ political communications made by President Bush, Prime Minister Blair 
and Osama bin Laden in the war on terror, and identifying the launching of image 
munitions, counter-image munitions and remediation battles. This revealed the 
complex and unpredictable circulation and remediation of Bush, Blair and bin Laden 
image munitions.
In this chapter I turn to another, and in many respects more complex, form of image 
munition -  that related to suicide terrorism, a key terrorist strategy. Suicide terrorism 
might seem an unlikely form of image munition since it is to obviously a physical- 
force tactic employed by terrorists to gain a military advantage. But suicide 
terrorism also contains a powerful symbolic dimension which is exploited by
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terrorists to manufacture propaganda around acts of terror. I will, then, first seek to 
conceptualise this symbolic dimension of suicide terrorism with a particular focus on 
the way in which it may be a source of powerful image munitions, counter-image 
munitions and remediation battles.
A1 Qaeda’s suicide terrorism is a perfect counter to RMA techno-war as I will see 
through a discussion of an indicative case study: the suicide bombing of The Canal 
Hotel, the UN’s headquarters in Iraq, on August 19, 2003. I will then return to 
September 11, 2001 and a detailed discussion of the symbolism of those attacks, their 
constitution as image munitions and as counter-image munitions and their 
subsequent circulation and remediation. This includes the efforts of the Bush 
administration and also popular forms such as the movie dramatisation of events 
found in the film United 93, and also A1 Qaeda’s use of suicide video wills. I will 
also show, in the context of image warfare, that these suicide video wills have 
become an important means by which terrorists try and control the remediation of 
their attacks long after the event.
Suicide terrorism -  and the image munitions it produces -  will be further explored 
through examination of another case study -  the coordinated triple suicide bombing 
of Firdos Square in Baghdad, a highly symbolic target, on October 24, 2005. Here I 
will show how a concern with image munitions shapes the strategic planning of such 
an operation. Then, turning to the July 7, 2005 London Bombings (and the July 21, 
2005 Failed London Bombings) I will explore the circulation of image munitions and 
counter-image munitions. This includes the activities of the Blair government and 
the UK media establishment and the production and circulation of stories of heroism, 
like that of Paul Dadge a London commuter turned first aider who helped Davina 
Turrell another injured London commuter, it also includes the activities of A1 Qaeda, 
and the production and circulation of the suicide video wills of Mohammed Sidique 
Khan and Shehzad Tanweer.
After exploring these instances of image munitions and counter-image munitions I 
will examine a number of interventions produced by new media actors with 
intentions that are distinct from those of A1 Qaeda, the Bush administration and the 
B lair government and which are further evidence of the complex and unpredictable
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rhizomatic flow of images in ways that exceed the control of central authorities and 
that complicate remediation battles.
Conceptualising A1 Qaeda’s Suicide Terrorism
The RMA changed contemporary Western ways of warflghting making them more 
clinical. This new kind of warfare was first unveiled during the 1991 Gulf War in 
which -  as I have shown -  airpower played a central role, soldiers were distanced 
from the conflict theatre by new military technologies and the campaign was a series
4 1 8of powerful media spectacles. RMA inspired techno-war was once again rolled 
out, this time by NATO forces, in the Kosovo Campaign. This military campaign 
took the form of a series of internet-based psychological operations, airstrikes and 
finally the deployment of NATO peacekeeping ground forces419 (see Chapters One 
and Two).
Then on September 11, 2001 RMA warfare was dealt a massive blow when suicide 
terrorism hit America. No longer did technological superiority automatically 
guarantee success. Instead, A1 Qaeda had escalated its use of suicide terrorism 
striking a significant physical/symbolic blow at the heart of America’s warflghting 
machine and American capitalism. Rather than suicide bombers being a threat only 
in distant theatres of operation, they were now a real threat to mainland American 
national security (and a threat also felt by the rest of the West). With suicide 
terrorism A1 Qaeda had found the perfect counter to techno-war.
David R. A. Hatcher has identified the two extremes of suicide terrorism: ‘At one 
extreme, there is the use of a simple single person-borne device and, at the other, is 
the use of a large passenger aircraft as the bomb, such as the attacks on the World 
Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001.’420 Both these suicide 
terrorism extremes guarantee mass civilian casualties. According to Bruce Hoffman 
‘[sjuicide bombers are inexpensive and effective. They are less complicated and
418 See Shaw, Post-Military Society
419 See Ignatieff, Virtual War
420 David R. A. Hatcher, 'Self-Sacrifice Terrorism (the Suicide Bomber): Global Threat or Tactical
Weapon?' in Seaford House Papers, ed. Lieutenant General Sir Christopher Wallace KBE 
(London: Royal College of Defence Studies, 2004), p. 75
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compromising than other kinds of terrorist operations.’421 Even when a suicide 
bombing is conducted on the scale of the 9/11 terror attacks, terrorists do not need to 
have their own sophisticated technologies. This is because, in the case of September 
11th, the hijackers exploited America’s own technologies (the commercial planes). 
Because A1 Qaeda cannot compete on traditional military terms against superior 
military forces they, like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, have turned instead to 
weaponizing their bodies in order to gain a strategic advantage against conventional 
military forces. According to Renuka Gusain ‘[t]he increased use of suicide bombers 
is an example of how central the body has become in this proliferation of terror’ 
and Achille Mbembe has described the transformation of bodies into bombs thus:
The candidate for martyrdom transforms his or her body into a mask that 
hides the soon-to-be-detonated weapons. Unlike the tank or the missile that 
is clearly visible, the weapon carried in the shape of the body is invisible. 
Thus concealed, it forms part of the body. It is so intimately part of the body 
that at the time of detonation it annihilates the body of its bearer, who carries 
with it the bodies of others when it does not reduce them to pieces. The body 
does not simply conceal a weapon. The body is transformed into a weapon,49”}not in a metaphorical sense but in the truly ballistic sense.
Once the body of the suicide bomber has undergone its metamorphosis (with the 
putting on of the suicide bomber vest) the bomber is immediately transformed into an 
armed ballistic weapon. Hoffman sees suicide bombers as ‘the ultimate smart 
bomb,’424 a term that is usually reserved for discussions about the recent RMA and 
which emphasises the precision capabilities of certain missiles. Hoffman’s 
appropriation of this term is significant precisely because it emphasises the opposite 
-  the indiscriminate nature of suicide bombings -  whilst simultaneously reflecting 
attention back towards its original mirror-term used within debates about the RMA. 
As Rene Girard has remarked. ‘The more a tragic conflict is prolonged, the more 
likely it is to culminate in a violent mimesis; the resemblance between the
421 Bruce Hoffman, 'The Logic of Suicide Terrorism', The Atlanic Monthly, June 2003. Available at:
http://www.theatlanic.com/doc/200306/hoffman. Accessed on 21 June 2008, p. 1
422 Renuka Gusain, 'The War Body as Screen of Terror', in The War Body on Screen, eds. Karen
Randell and Sean Redmond (New York, NJ: Continuum, 2008), pp. 43
423 Achille Mbembe, 'Necropolitics' translated by Libby Meintjes. Public Culture 15, no. 1 (2003), p.
36
424 Hoffman, 'The Logic of Suicide Terrorism', p. 1
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combatants grows ever stronger until each presents a mirror image of the other.’425 
W. J. T. Mitchell also argues that:
[t]he final result and the whole tendency of the smart bomb and the suicide 
bomber are the same, namely, the creation of a biocybemetic life-form, the 
reduction of a living being to a tool or machine, and the elevation of a mere 
tool or machine to the level of an intelligent, adaptable creature.426
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have eloquently described the ‘violent mimesis’ of 
suicide terrorism and RMA warfare: ‘The suicide bomber is the dark opposite, the 
gory doppelganger of the safe bodyless soldier’427 -  certainly distinct from post­
heroic warfare.428
It is clear, then, that a symbolic element can be found at the very heart of suicide 
terrorism. The very gesture of turning a body into a weapon, devastatingly effective 
against even the most sophisticated of technological weapons, confronts ‘safe’ 
techno-war with its perverse mirror-image. It is thus not surprising that such an act 
lends itself easily to deployment within the theatre of image warfare. Suicide 
bombings are not just planned to maim and kill the most people. They are also 
designed as political communications that maximise symbolic potential (see Chapter 
Three). A1 Qaeda understands that the media is an important front in its war with the 
West and when used effectively it can be a significant tool for gaining a strategic 
advantage. According to Chase Laurelle Knowles:
the current wave of would-be A1 Qaeda-style martyrs understand the mass 
media -  particularly the internet -  as one of the most important fronts in their 
jihad: to quote bin Laden, ‘It is obvious that the media war in this century is 
one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total 
preparation for the battles’. Furthermore, it has a ready audience.429
425 Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred. Translated by Patrick Gregory (London: Continuum, 2005),
p. 50
426 Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want?, p. 313
427 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, p. 45
428 See Luttwak, 'Towards Post-Heroic Warfare', pp. 109-22 and Luttwak, 'A Post-Heroic Military
Policy', pp. 33-44
429 Chase Laurelle Knowles, 'Towards a New Web Genre: Islamist Neorealism'. Journal o f  War and
Culture Studies 1, no. 3 (2008), p. 360
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Consequently, A1 Qaeda takes great care when planning its suicide attacks. A1 
Qaeda appears to select its targets with two key factors in mind: they often select 
targets that have some kind of pre-existing symbolism (an important building or a 
landmark -  because their symbolism can be hijacked and used to produce powerful 
image munitions) or targets with immediate surrounding areas that the media will be 
able to report on. This allows journalists to report on a bombing while it is still 
unfolding or to report on its immediate aftermath and so quickly disseminate image 
munitions through the media.
A significant example of an attack conducted more for its symbolic impact than for 
its immediate physical impact is the suicide bombing of the UN headquarters in 
Baghdad on August 19, 2003. A single suicide bomber drove a truck at The Canal 
Hotel, the UN’s headquarters in Iraq since 1991. The building was of course subject 
to high levels of security. If suicide bombings were committed solely to maximise 
casualties then the UN headquarters would not have been a target. But the Canal 
Hotel was targeted for its symbolism. It was a metonym for the UN’s presence in 
Iraq and any attack against it would immediately be seen as an attack against the 
wider presence of the UN in Iraq. Indeed, in the wake of the attack the UN began to 
withdraw all UN staff from Iraq. The timing of the attack was also significant: 
coming just five days after the formation of the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Iraq (UNAMI) it coincided with a news conference, as a consequence of which news 
crews were already on the scene and able to immediately report on the aftermath of 
the bombing.
One of the fatalities was the newly appointed Special Representative of UNAMI, 
Sergio Vieira de Mello, a Brazilian bom UN diplomat. Some media reports have 
since claimed that the target of this attack was de Mello himself. Whether de Mello 
was the target for attack or whether The Canal Hotel was the target, the bombing was 
clearly a success -  not because of the number of casualties or deaths, but rather 
because of the fact that the bombing was symbolically powerful and thus received 
massive international media attention. According to Shaul Shay ‘[a] suicide attack, 
like all other terror attacks in the modem era, is primarily meant to provide its
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perpetrators with maximum media coverage, thus magnifying “a powerful self-
Suicide bombers have three distinct media presences. The first comes through 
footage of their attacks (image munitions); the second through footage released by 
the authorities in the aftermath of their attacks (counter-image munitions); and the 
third through their suicide video wills (counter-image munitions). These three 
different media presences offer compelling evidence that fierce image battles are 
currently being fought through the media. For example, after the footage of the 
September 11th attacks had been circulating for a while information about each of the 
nineteen hijackers and footage -  including CCTV images showing their final 
moments before boarding the four planes -  was made public and the media then used 
this information to reconstruct the lives of the hijackers. This information was then 
widely circulated.
After the London Bombings again information about the lives of the four suicide 
bombers and also footage -  including CCTV images showing their final moments on 
the day of the attacks -  was released to the media in an attempt to help reconstruct 
the lives of the bombers and also to help construct a timeline of the bombers 
movements on July 7th. Gillian Rose has discussed this process as follows:
One [piece of information] was a photograph from a closed circuit television 
camera of the four men at Luton station on their way to London, carrying the 
rucksacks which contained the bombs. The papers also used school photos, 
or photos from family events; and The Times found photographs of one, 
Mohammad Sidique Khan, at work as some sort of teacher. These photos 
were usually cropped into headshots and used again and again by all the 
papers, in report, analysis and commentaries.431
This was one way for the authorities and the media to try and gain control of the 
circulation of suicide terrorism.
430 Shaul Shay, The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks. Translated by Rachel Lieberman (New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004), p. 2
431 Gillian Rose, 'Spectacle and Spectres: London 7 July 2005'. New Formations 62 (2007), p. 7. This
links in with Sontag’s work regarding the repackaging o f images. See Sontag, On 
Photography and Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain o f  Others (London: Penguin Books, 
2004)
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I have discussed how suicide terrorism in the war on terror is a ‘violent mimesis’ of 
clinical RMA warfare and how there is more to suicide terrorism than committing 
mass casualty attacks. It also contains a significant symbolic dimension which is 
integral to the production of image munitions. The following section will discuss the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, their symbolic impact and the production of powerful 
image munitions.
September 11, 2001 and United Airlines Flight 93
The September 11, 2001 terror attacks killed 2,749432 and injured thousands more. 
9/11 was also significant symbolically. In fact these attacks are responsible for 
creating a number of powerful image munitions -  which have since been widely 
circulated -  and represent the spectacular opening scenes of A1 Qaeda’s image war 
against the West. This section will discuss the events of September 11th, the attacks’ 
symbolic impact and the resulting counter-image munitions (especially over United 
Airlines Flight 93).
September 11th started, like any other day, in New York and Washington D.C., with 
people going about their daily lives -  travelling to work, to school and to the shops 
(this is represented in the film World Trade Center) -  this everydayness, however, 
was soon interrupted by the first plane hitting the North Tower of the WTC at 
08.46am. This plane was American Airlines Flight 11. It had taken off from Logan 
International Airport in Boston, Massachusetts and was scheduled to fly to Los 
Angeles International Airport. Immediately news of this event and footage of the 
towering infemo were shown in the international media at the same time journalists 
were also starting to speculate about the nature of the event. At this time there was 
no mention of terrorism. The event was initially reported as a horrible accident.
While journalists were still speculating on the accident and while TV cameras were 
still being trained on the Twin Towers, a second plane was captured on camera as it 
crashed into the South Tower at 9.03am. This plane was United Airlines Flight 175.
432 Jenny Edkins, 'Missing Persons: Manhattan, September 2001', in The Logics o f  Biopower and the 
War on Terror: Living, Dying, Surviving, eds. Elizabeth Dauphinee and Christina Masters 
(New York, NJ: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 38
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It had also taken off from Logan International Airport in Boston, Massachusetts and 
was also scheduled to fly to Los Angeles International Airport. According to 
Rosalind C. Morris:
When the second plane hit the World Trade Center in New York, it not only 
proved that this was not an accident but an intentionally produced event, it 
inaugurated a period of constant imagistic repetition, the function of which 
was not to explain the event but to declaim it as having occurred and, thus, to 
produce a reality effect.433
This attack was unlike anything America had ever witnessed before, other than in 
Hollywood fiction. Historically when hijackers have taken control of planes they 
have diverted them to isolated runways and then made demands (see Chapter Five). 
Never before had commercial airplanes been hijacked and then transformed into 
kinetic weapons of mass-destruction. According to Douglas Kellner:
The live television broadcasting brought a “you are there” drama to the 
September 11 spectacle. The images of the planes striking the WTC, the 
buildings bursting into flames, individuals jumping out of the windows in a 
desperate attempt to survive the inferno, the collapse of the towers, and the 
subsequent chaos provided unforgettable images viewers would not soon 
forget.434
9/11 was manufactured specifically as a powerful media spectacle by A1 Qaeda 
precisely because (as already discussed) they could not hope to compete militarily 
with America and had to mobilize what they could -  their bodies, commercial 
airplanes, the media and images -  in order to gain a strategic advantage.
tViThe coordinated terrorist attacks on September 11 were planned and executed with 
mass media coverage in mind. The level of A1 Qaeda’s planning of 9/11 is still 
contested. What is clear though is that ‘place’ was important when the WTC was 
selected as a target. The terrorists knew that the financial district of New York City 
would have a large concentration of cameras and journalists. They also knew that
433 Rosalind C. Morris, 'Images o f Untranslatability in the US War on Terror'. Interventions:
International Journal o f Postcolonial Studies 6, no. 3 (2004), p. 405
434 Kellner, Media Spectacle, p. 28
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this strong media presence would guarantee the attack immediate media coverage. 
The choice of target was also important. As Fuery and Fuery write:
[t]he Twin Towers were already established images, existing in so many of 
the visual representations of New York (and synecdochially, the USA), and 
the terrorists would have known that their acts would be captured by a variety 
of media. And it is the images of the towers that remain most vivid in 
people’s minds.435
What is still unclear is the significance of the seventeen minute gap between the first 
plane hitting the North Tower and the second plane hitting the South Tower. 
Whether deliberate or otherwise, this seventeen minute gap -  as with the collapsing 
of the WTC towers -  certainly worked in A1 Qaeda’s favour. It has been suggested 
though, by W. J. T. Mitchell, that the seventeen minute gap was manufactured ‘in the 
full expectation that hundreds of video cameras would capture the event live, and 
broadcast it over and over again around the world.’436
The Pentagon was also attacked at 09.37am on September 11th by a hijacked 
commercial airplane which was transformed into a kinetic weapon of mass 
destruction. This plane was American Airlines Flight 77. It had taken off from 
Washington Dulles International Airport and was scheduled to fly to Los Angeles 
International Airport. In targeting the Pentagon ‘place’ was again an important issue. 
The Pentagon is the headquarters of the US Department of Defense and symbolically 
this target represented a strike against the heart of the American military machine, 
‘Fortress America’. In targeting the Pentagon the hijackers were guaranteed that the 
event would receive extensive media coverage and send a strong political message to 
the Bush administration and to the rest of the world about just how vulnerable 
America actually was. For all of the billions of dollars that the American 
government had spent on developing a technologically sophisticated military 
machine (with a supposedly impenetrable headquarters) it only took five hijackers 
taking control of a commercial airplane and transforming it into a kinetic weapon of 
mass destruction to threaten this military machine.
435 Fuery and Fuery, Visual Cultures, p. 69
436 Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want?, p. 324
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The fourth attack was supposed to be a suicide bombing of the White House (the 
official residence of the President of the United States of America).437 Instead 
United Airlines Flight 93 which had taken off from Newark International Airport and 
was scheduled to fly to San Francisco International Airport crash landed in a field 
near Shanskville, Somerset County, Pennsylvania at 10.03am -  killing all on board. 
If United Airline Flight 93 had been successful and had crashed into the White 
House then A1 Qaeda would have succeeded in coordinating its planned quadruple 
attack against the three symbols of American power: capitalism, the military and 
democracy. A1 Qaeda would also have succeeded in manufacturing a complete set of 
powerful image munitions. But the passengers of United Airlines Flight 93 
prevented A1 Qaeda from completely succeeding on 9/11 and this particular attack 
was a massive strategic failure. Not only did the plane fail to reach its target (the 
White House) but it also failed to crash anywhere near cameras and journalists and 
so A1 Qaeda’s opportunity to manufacture and circulate a powerful image munition 
of the crash was lost.
However, the Bush administration immediately seized upon the tragedy of United 
Airlines Flight 93, and used it to construct a counter-attack to 9/11, circulating 
counter-image munitions and stories about the heroism of the crew and passengers 
on board the doomed flight. Cynthia Weber has noted that:
[wjhile conspiracy theories about faked phone conversations, doctored 
transcripts based on the plane’s recovered voice recorder, and military 
intervention to shoot down the plane unofficially circulate, an official story of 
the self-sacrificing heroism of the passengers and crew of UAF93 began to 
take hold.438
She has also argued that:
The uniqueness of what happened on UAF93... lies in its location as an 
historical, linear, meaning-making event that was narrated as such as the very 
moment it was occurring by the passengers and crew who experienced it even 
though it took place in the broader context of trauma time. All of this makes
437 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report o f  the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States (New York, NJ: W. W. Norton, 2004), p. 14
438 Weber, 'Popular Visual Language', p. 139. For more information about ‘trauma time’ see Jenny
Edkins, Trauma and the Memory o f  Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)
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the story of UAF93 more easily recoverable as a centrepiece of official 
American history.439
Weber’s point is supported by the fact that in the days following September 11th, and 
as more and more information became available, further stories of heroism about 
United Airlines Flight 93 circulated through the international media. A significant 
counter-image munition was manufactured when President George W. Bush 
addressed a Joint Session of Congress and the American people on September 20, 
2001. In this address Bush talked about Todd Beamer, a passenger on United 
Airlines Flight 93, before then introducing his widow Lisa Beamer -  amid rapturous 
applause -  to Congress and the American People. Weber discusses how:
Beamer [had] reportedly used a GTE air phone while in flight to ring his wife 
but was connected instead to GTE supervisor Lisa Jefferson. Beamer
reported the hijacking as it was taking place, and Jefferson gave him
information about what was happening with other airplanes. When her 
conversation with Beamer ended, Jefferson claims that Beamer dropped the 
phone, leaving the line open, and it was then she heard him say ‘Let’s roll’, a 
phrase that soon stood for the rallying cry of the passengers and crew.440
According to Weber, ‘[b]y naming Todd Beamer, the President provides the 
American people not only with a figure through whom they could access first-hand 
what had occurred on UAF93, but an action hero who stood for the activities of all 
Americans.’441 The story of United Airlines Flight 93 has since been reported within 
The 9/11 Commission Report442 and circulated via documentaries such as The Flight 
That Fought Back, Flight 93 and the film United 93. United Airlines Flight 93, 
therefore, quickly became a powerful counter-narrative of heroism to the dominant 
9/11 narrative of death, destruction and terror and so helped to shift the
meaning/status/significance of the event with the public. At the same time though,
A1 Qaeda have continued to try and hijack the media with their own counter-image 
munitions, such as suicide video wills, thus shifting attention away from counter­
narratives of 9/11 and back onto the dominant 9/11 narrative. Attention will now 
turn to discuss such suicide video wills, their roles and their symbolic impact.
439 Ibid, p. 140
440 Ibid, p. 141
441 Ibid, p. 142
442 See The 9/11 Commission Report
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The 9/11 Suicide Video Wills
Suicide video wills appear when media attention starts to ebb away in the aftermath 
of an act of suicide terrorism. They are an important form and also a source of image 
munitions and a central element of the strategy of suicide terrorism and image 
warfare. They form an essential part of the final preparations for a suicide bombing 
and, according to Bruce Hoffman, ‘[a] film crew makes a martyrdom video, as much 
to help ensure that the bomber can’t back out as for propaganda and recruitment 
purposes.’443 But suicide video wills are, perhaps above all, an information and 
recruitment tool. They give terrorists media coverage without the threat of being 
found by intelligence officials; help to cement the reputations, as martyrs, of suicide 
bombers; and afford an opportunity to place an act of suicide terrorism into a wider 
political context -  such as, for example, the Arab-Israeli Conflict.
Through such video wills, in Andrew Hoskins’ and Ben O’Loughlin’s phrase, 
‘[m]aximum exposure of terror acts is guaranteed through use of minimum 
media.’444 This ‘minimum media’ comprises a digital video camera, a computer, 
some domestic video editing software and an internet connection. The production 
team do not have to have taken video production or computer courses. They can 
produce suicide video wills at isolated terrorist training camps and also in their own 
homes before releasing them in the name of the As-Sahab Foundation and A1 Qaeda 
either through internet remailers to Arabic news networks such as A1 Jazeera or 
directly to jihadi propaganda websites. At this point they can be understood as an 
attempt to lift an act of suicide terrorism back up the news agenda.
But to understand the place of suicide video-wills in the larger theatre of image war 
we need to consider more than the process of their production and dissemination. 
These videos communicate using powerful symbols, and take an almost generic form 
repeating stylistic elements: the bomber sits in front of a set position camera and 
delivers a monologue (echoing the political communications of leaders). This 
repetition has developed continuity in form, style and aesthetic between suicide 
video-wills and this has helped to construct it as a genre that is drawing heavily on
443 Hoffman, 'The Logic of Suicide Terrorism', p. 3
444 Hoskins, and O'Loughlin, Television and Terror, p. 127
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both ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ political communications (see Chapter Three). The 
manner in which suicide bombers deliver their addresses -  straight to camera -  helps 
give the impression that, to refer to Benjamin again, bombers are also able to see 
their audience445 and address them individually. The content of the statements in 
suicide video wills is also clearly structured: bombers give praise to Allah, talk at 
length about their enemy and justify their actions to international audiences and their 
families 446 This is visible in the video wills of the 9/11 hijackers.447
The first 9/11 suicide video will was released on April 16, 2002. This video will 
features Ahmed Ibrahim al-Haznawi (one of the United Airlines Flight 93 hijackers). 
The fact that al-Haznawi was a hijacker onboard United Airlines Flight 93 and that 
his suicide video will was the first to be released is perhaps no coincidence. As the 
Bush administration’s counter-image munitions of United Airlines Flight 93 were a 
powerful counter to the other 9/11 suicide spectaculars, so al-Haznawi’s video will 
was a calculated counter-counter-response. This video will was the first opportunity 
for audiences to see a 9/11 hijacker, other than in grainy CCTV footage or in old 
pictures. It was also the first opportunity for audiences to hear from one of the 
suicide bombers. The ‘place’ where al-Haznawi’s address was filmed is anonymous; 
however, he does appear sitting in front of a background showing an image, from 
September 11th, of the WTC towers on fire. The insertion of an image of the burning 
WTC towers into the background of this video will is symbolically representative of 
an A1 Qaeda declaration of war against America and Western infidels. It also helps 
to remind Western audiences of their vulnerability to attack from A1 Qaeda and adds 
authenticity to this attempt to appropriate the event. The video also features images 
of the other 18 9/11 hijackers. Al-Haznawi’s statement can thus be understood as 
delivered on behalf of all the hijackers. Further, their appearance, united within a 
single suicide video will, is a mimetic counter of the stories of the heroism of the 
passengers and crew onboard United Airlines Flight 93 -  especially Todd Beamer -  
and by the emergency services on September 11th.
445 Benjamin, One-Way Street, p. 244
446 Meir Hatina, Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement (Ramat Aviv: The
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2001), p.
123
447 Many believe that all 19 hijackers have pre-recorded suicide video wills and that al Qaeda intends 
to keep releasing them, thus inserting the events o f September 11th back into international news 
agendas.
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Im September 2002 another 9/11 suicide video will, or counter-image munition, was 
released to the media this time featuring Abdulaziz al-Omari (one of the American 
Airlines Flight 11 hijackers). The timing of the release of this video was significant 
because it aired around the time of the first anniversary of the September 11 attacks. 
In  this video al-Omari made his address in a set-piece to camera -  echoing the style 
o f  so many previous suicide video wills and also the political communications of 
leaders. To paraphrase Hill, suicide video wills are like weapons with the power of 
‘extramission’, functioning like ‘the evil eye’.448 Al-Omari’s video will also enabled 
A1 Qaeda -  paraphrasing Susan L Carruthers -  ‘to hijack the news agenda’449 and 
partake in the first anniversary of the September 11th attacks. In the background of 
this video was an image of The Pentagon on 9/11, symbolically powerful and 
reemphasising the fact that there is no longer a ‘Fortress America’, The image of 
The Pentagon also helps to immediately frame al-Omari’s video will in relation to 
the events of September 11th.
On October 1, 2006 a new counter-image munition was released to the media this 
time featuring the 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta, who was a hijacker on American 
Airlines Flight 11, and Ziad Jarrah, a hijacker on United Airlines Flight 93. 
Although this video is not a perfect stylistic match with previous suicide video wills, 
because two suicide bombers appear in the same video and the footage is also cut 
with footage of bin Laden, this video should still be considered a video will. This 
video will is evidence that suicide video wills have evolved over time as editing 
capabilities have become increasingly sophisticated. Also, it shows the flexibility of 
the 9/11 suicide wills and their ability to be repackaged. This video will is similar 
symbolically to bin Laden’s political communications, particularly that which 
featured al-Zawahiri and was released to A1 Jazeera on September 10, 2003 to 
coincide with the second anniversary of the 9/11 terror attacks (see Chapter Three). 
But the Atta/Jarrah video will is also symbolically similar to other suicide video wills 
and bin Laden videos because it features an AK-47, a symbol of A1 Qaeda’s 
continuing struggle against Western infidels, echoes of Cold War struggles and, in
448 Hill, 'The Bin Laden Tapes', p. 41
449 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), p. 171
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the case of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, a symbol of the ongoing struggle with Israel. 
Also, as the AK-47 has assumed the role of a flag -  within bin Laden’s political 
communications -  so, the AK-47 again here assumes the role of a flag.
To conclude, the 9/11 suicide video wills as well as being important for raising 
September 11th back up the international news agenda, are also important examples 
of counter-image munitions, manufactured and released by A1 Qaeda with the 
intention of striking a significant blow at America and thus giving A1 Qaeda an 
advantage in the new image theatre of war. I will explore this further as I move on to 
look at, firstly, a coordinated suicide bombing from Iraq in 2005, secondly, the 
London bombings, the Failed London Bombings and the 7/7 suicide video wills. I 
will focus on the symbolic aspects of each attack and on how they ‘hijacked’ the 
news agenda and became powerful image munitions.
Iraq, 7/7 and 21/7
The triple suicide bombing of Firdos Square in Baghdad on October 24, 2005 is an 
important example of suicide terrorism from Iraq. It shows terrorists actually 
executing an attack and also manufacturing powerful image munitions. In Iraq itself, 
Firdos Square and specifically the Palestine and Sheraton Hotels, have increasingly 
become known, according to Kirk Semple, as ‘symbols of the foreign presence in 
Iraq.’450 It is thus not surprising that this ‘place’ was specifically targeted by a 
coordinated suicide bombing. Firdos Square was also a centre of high media activity 
dunng the 2003 Iraq War -  it was where the statue of Saddam Hussein had been 
puled down -  and the site of the Palestine and Sheraton Hotels where many Western 
journalists based themselves during the first phases of military operations and when 
reporting from Baghdad.
Firdos Square is thus a ‘place’ of familiarity for international news audiences 
because numerous news reports, filed by many different journalists, have the square 
as Iheir backdrop. This familiarity with ‘place’ is important because it immediately
450 lirk Semple, '3 Bombers Strike at Baghdad Hotels', The New York Times, 25 October 2005. 
Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/25/international/middleeast/25iraq.html? r=l&pagewante
d=print&oref=slogin. Accessed on: 12 May 2008, Unpaginated
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frames these commentaries for news audiences. These commentaries are framed as 
dispatches directly from the conflict theatre rather than as dispatches from 
neighbouring neutral territories. By attacking Firdos Square with suicide bombers the 
terrorists were guaranteeing themselves mass media coverage. All of the elements 
needed to transform a terrorist attack from an isolated incident into a media spectacle 
were already set-up in the Palestine and Sheraton Hotels. When the first of three 
coordinated suicide attacks exploded the media were able to respond immediately to 
the situation and report on the events as they were happening.
The triple suicide bombing at Firdos Square -  which has yielded a number of 
powerful image munitions -  unfolded in a staged sequence. When the first suicide 
bomber exploded the attention of journalists in the Palestine and Sheraton Hotels was 
immediately caught. While the journalists were still reeling from the first attack a 
second suicide bomber struck causing even more confusion. This time, however, the 
cameras were already filming and caught on camera the moment of the bomber’s 
detonation. Then, while cameras were trained on the sites of the first and second 
suicide bombings a cement mixer broke through the perimeter of the Palestine and 
Sheraton Hotels. International audiences and journalists watched the cement mixer 
as it got caught up in the barbed wire fencing protecting the main entrances of the 
hotels and as the bomber then blew himself up.
This coordinated suicide bombing has been singled out (along with The Canal Hotel 
bombing) for discussion, over other acts of suicide terrorism which have rocked Iraq 
since the war in 2003, because it was played out through the media in real-time 
rather than reported after the fact. The Firdos Square bombings were almost a
fV»textbook example, like September 11 , of how to commit a coordinated suicide 
bombing: Firdos Square and the Palestine and Sheraton Hotels were symbolically 
powerful; the terror attacks were audacious and ‘spectacular’ (even though the third 
suicide bomber failed to fully break the perimeter of the Palestine and Sheraton 
Hotels); and the international media were also present, ready to mediate the attack. 
These suicide attacks were perpetrated more for their symbolic impact -  designed 
specifically for image warfare -  rather than for their capacity to main and kill large 
numbers. The media, able to report on it while it was still happening, thus
187
participated in the manufacture of a reality effect, rather than merely reporting on the 
chaotic aftermath of the three suicide bombings.
July 7, 2005 was when something which New York and Washington D.C. had 
already experienced, finally struck London. The capital was no stranger to bombings 
-  having already survived the Blitz (something journalists made frequent reference to 
in the immediate aftermath of the bombings) and also IRA bombing campaigns. 
However, suicide terrorism was a completely new phenomenon. The London 
Bombings confirmed that the events of September 11th were not just an isolated 
incident but part of a wider A1 Qaeda strategy to deploy suicide bombers in the West 
and to manufacture ‘spectacular’ and powerful image munitions for immediate 
circulation by the media.
July 7th was the day after London had won the bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games. 
It was also just after the Live 8 Concerts had taken place and the first full day of the 
31st G8 Summit at the Gleneagles Hotel in Scotland. Britain was, therefore, already 
the focus of much of the world’s media and, with hindsight, it makes perfect sense 
that suicide bombers would choose July 7th to attack London. It was the perfect 
opportunity for A1 Qaeda to hijack the news media, disrupt the G8 Summit and also 
divert attention away from the recent international focus on the 2012 Olympics and 
poverty and instead refocus attention back on the war on terror.
The four coordinated suicide attacks on 7/7 were planned to cause maximum damage 
and destruction to the London Underground and maximum chaos for commuters. 
This is why the bombers stmck during the morning rush hour. Three of the four 
bombers detonated themselves within seconds of each other at 8.50am (presumably 
the bombers had earlier synchronized their watches). The first bomber, Shehzad 
Tanweer, hit an eastbound Circle Line train travelling between Liverpool Street and 
Aldgate Station. The second bomber, Mohammad Sidique Khan, hit a westbound 
Circle Line train which was departing Edgware Road for Paddington Station. The 
third bomber, Germaine Lindsay (a Jamaican bom Muslim convert) hit a southbound 
Piccadilly Line train travelling between King’s Cross St. Pancras and Russell Square 
Station. The fourth bomber, Hasib Hussain, was originally supposed to hit a 
Northern Line train but on the morning of July 7, 2005 the Northern Line was
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temporarily suspended. Instead Hussain hit a number 30 red double-decker bus, at 
09.47am, in Tavistock Square.451
During the planning stages of the London Bombings the bombers would have been
i.t_
aware of the fact that, in contrast to the September 11 attacks, in choosing to target 
the London Underground system there would be no media coverage directly from the 
scenes of the explosions. Therefore, no powerful image munitions of the attacks 
themselves would exist. However, there would be powerful image munitions of the 
aftermath of the bombings. This runs counter to the other examples of suicide 
terrorism which I have already discussed, where media coverage directly from the 
bombing scenes has been a key concern for A1 Qaeda. Julian Stallabrass has argued 
that the London ‘bombings were not meant primarily to create images, but to spread 
the terror of living burial among the city’s populace.’452 The bombers were aware 
that the media would be able to get to the ground level of the scenes quickly and also 
that it would take time for survivors to start emerging from the London 
Underground. They calculated that the media would instead be able to report on the 
walking wounded as they emerged from the exits of London Underground stations. 
Two particular image munitions showing these were: firstly, a picture of Davina 
Turrell with an emergency bums pack on her face with a concerned man (Paul 
Dadge) guiding her away from the scene; secondly, an image of a man with a 
bloodied and bandaged face being led to an ambulance by Paramedics. This man 
was later identified as John Tulloch, a Professor in the School of Social Sciences and 
Law at Brunei University who has since been vocal against certain appropriations of 
his image. He has also written a book about his experiences of the London 
Bombings.453
What the London Bombers had not factored into their planning, and something 
which has ultimately worked in their favour, was the fact that many London 
Underground commuters had camera-phones and, like Adam Stacey,454 took pictures
451 See House of Commons, 'Report of the Official Account o f the Bombings in London on 7th July
2005'. Available at: http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hcl0/1087/1087.pdf. Accessed on 11 May 2006, pp. 1- 
41
452 Julian Stallabrass, 'Spectacle and Terror', New Left Review (2006), p. 4
453 See John Tulloch, One Day in July: Experiencing 7/7 (London: Little, Brown Book Group, 2006)
454 Reading, 'The Global and the Mobile', p. 8
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and videos of the scenes and then circulated this User Generated Content (UGC) to 
newsrooms to be circulated internationally. The advent of camera-phones now 
means that anyone with access to this technology can potentially now become a 
media actor and produce a powerful image munition which they can then send 
immediately into a news broadcaster for circulation. This is a significant example of 
‘sousveillance.’455 Sousveillance has since become an important dimension in the 
rhizomatic media world because the advent of new media technologies and the 
‘multi-directional flows’456 of information and images now means that ordinary 
citizens are today not just witnesses but reporters of events -  citizen journalists. In 
Douglas Kellner’s phrase, the UGC footage brought a “you are there” drama to the 
July 7th spectacle.457 The camera-phone footage has since been widely circulated and 
one particular image showing passengers making their way in an orderly fashion 
through the dark, smoke-filled tunnels and to the surface became the front cover of
A C O
Crispin Black’s book 7-7 The London Bombings: What Went Wrong? '
Hasib Hussain -  who bombed the number 30 red double-decker bus, at 9.47am, in 
Tavistock Square -  unintentionally, with his last minute change of target, 
manufactured a powerful image munition of a bombed bus which has since become a 
metonym for the London Bombings. This particular bombing is proof of just how 
adaptable suicide bombers can be when they are faced with real-time challenges that 
cannot be factored into their original plans. When Hussain realized that the Northern 
Line was temporarily suspended he quickly adapted his plan in order to successfully 
carry out his bombing. He targeted the next available mode of public transport. This 
last minute change of plan, coupled with the fifty seven minute delay between the 
first wave of attacks and his suicide bombing, worked in A1 Qaeda’s favour and had 
an impact on the symbolism and the media afterlife of the London Bombings. The 
bus was above ground and the media were able to report and to circulate footage
455 ‘Sousveillance (roughly French for undersight) is the opposite o f surveillance (roughly French for
oversight).’ See Steve Mann, 'Secrecy, No Privacy, May Be the True Cause o f Terrorism', 
2002. Available at: http://wearcam.org/sousveillance.html. Accessed on 8 February 2009, 
Unpaginated, Steve Mann, Jason Nolan, and Barry Wellman, 'Sousveillance: Inventing and 
Using Wearable Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments'. 
Surveillance & Society 1, no. 3 (2003): pp. 331-55 and Steve Mann, '"Sousveillance": Inverse 
Surveillance in Multimedia Imaging'. MM'04 (New York, NJ, 10-16 October 2004), pp. 620- 
27
456 Thussu, 'Mapping Global Media Flow and Contra-Flow', p. 12
457 Kellner, Media Spectacle, p. 28 and see Reading, 'The Global and the Mobile'
458 See Crispin Black, 7-7: What Went Wrong? (London: Gibson Square, 2005)
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thdirectly from the scene (as in the September 11 attacks). In reporting from the 
scene, a ‘place’ of focus for journalists on the ground and for news audiences at 
home was immediately established. In the aftermath of the attacks, the number 30 
red double-decker bus in Tavistock Square became the backdrop of many news 
reports. In the weeks following the attacks, 7/7 continued to be framed in the media 
through the use of the image munition of the bombed number 30 red double-decker 
bus.
On July 21st another British based A1 Qaeda cell launched what was planned to be 
another ‘spectacular’ coordinated series of suicide attacks against London -  
thankfully though the five would-be suicide bombers bombs failed to explode. Later, 
after analysis, it was determined that all the bombs had failed to detonate correctly 
because the bomb maker had used faulty detonators. But each bomb contained 
enough explosives to cause massive damage and potentially maim and kill many 
casualties. Muktar Said Ibrahim, Yasin Hassan Omar, Hussein Osman, Ranzi 
Mohammed and Mafo Asiedu wanted to play on the horror of commuters being 
buried alive and thus strike fear into the hearts of Londoners. They targeted trains at 
Shepherd’s Bush, Warren Street, Oval Station and a bus on the Hackney Road. The 
fact that another coordinated suicide bombing was able to be planned and executed 
(even though the bombs did not detonate properly) so soon after 7/7, was a major 
embarrassment for MI5 and the London Metropolitan Police.
The July 7lh Suicide Video W ills
In the weeks and months following the London Bombings media interest in the 
attacks began to fall away. But A1 Qaeda has released suicide video wills -  counter­
image munitions -  featuring the London Bombers in order to raise the London 
Bombings back up the international news agenda. These suicide video wills were 
also a way of framing the London Bombings in terms of wider political contexts, 
such as the ongoing struggle between Israel and Palestine.
The first video will featured Mohammed Siddique Khan, the so called ringleader of 
the London bombers, and was released on September 1, 2005. This video was the 
first opportunity for audiences to see one of the London bombers (other than in
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grainy CCTV footage or old pictures) and to hear their reasons for the attacks. In his 
video statement Khan assumed the role of both leader and spokesman for the London 
bombers. Stylistically there is a strong parallel between his address and the 
addresses made by other leaders, like President Bush, Prime Minister Blair and 
Osama bin Laden (see Chapter Three). Stylistically Khan’s address is similar 
because he delivers his statement in a set piece to camera thus making it appear as 
though Khan is addressing audience members individually.
The ‘place’ where this suicide video will was filmed is anonymous. Khan appears 
sitting in front of a crimson, white and black horizontal striped patterned wall 
covering. Symbolically Khan’s video will makes a direct visual connection with the 
Arab-Israeli issue. He appears wearing a red and white check keffiyeh (similar to the 
black and white check keffiyeh’s worn by Yasser Arafat). The sophistication of this 
video will is evidenced by the fact that Khan’s statement has been edited together 
with footage of A1 Qaeda’s second in command, Ayman al-Zawahri. Al-Zawahri’s 
own statement is made in front of a generic brown sheeting background (similar to 
that in many bin Laden videos) and he has an AK-47 over his right shoulder (again 
similar to bin Laden). The presence of the AK-47 in this video is again as a flag for 
A1 Qaeda.
Khan’s statement also shows that he is acutely aware of the way in which the 
Western media will have already framed him. He says: ‘I’m sure by now the 
media’s painted a suitable picture of me, this predictable propaganda machine will 
naturally try to put a spin on things to suit the government and to scare the masses 
into conforming to their power and wealth-obsessed agendas.’459 Khan’s statement 
also shows that he is politically savvy and fully aware of the globalized nature of the 
media because he immediately frames his action, and the actions of the other London 
bombers, in terms of the wider stmggle between Islam and the West rather than 
limiting their struggle to just Britain:
459 Mohammad Sidique Khan, London Bomber: Text in Full, BBC News, 01 September 2005. 
Available at:
http://newsvote.bbc.co.Uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4206800.stm. 
Accessed on 30 May 2008, Unpaginated
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I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our 
driving motivation doesn’t come from tangible commodities that this world 
has to offer. Our religion is Islam -  obedience to the one true God, Allah, 
and following the footsteps of the final prophet and messenger Muhammad... 
This is how our ethical stances are dictated. Your democratically elected 
governments continuously perpetrate atrocities against my people all over the 
world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am 
directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and 
sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the 
bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop 
this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the 
reality of this situation.460
With this statement Khan is addressing two distinct audiences: to Western audiences 
his words are meant as a threat; to the ‘global ummah’ his words are meant to 
mobilize and radicalize. This suicide video will has been widely circulated since its 
release and it has also produced a powerful counter-image munition of Khan which 
has disrupted the circulation of the grainy CCTV footage of the London bombers at 
Luton station on the morning of July 7th. With this suicide video will A1 Qaeda have 
successfully been able to reinsert Khan back into the current news-cycle.
The next battle over 7/7 began on the eve of the first anniversary of the London 
bombings (July 6, 2006) when another video will, or counter-image munition, was 
released to the media by A1 Qaeda featuring Shehzad Tanweer, one of the other 
London bombers. Tanweer’s statement is filled with A1 Qaeda rhetoric: ‘What you 
have witnessed now is only the beginning of a string of attacks that will continue and 
become stronger... until you pull your forces out of Afghanistan and Iraq.’461 Like 
Khan’s earlier video, Tanweer’s video will was also constructed as an address to two 
distinct audiences: Western infidels and the ‘global ummah’. Stylistically and 
symbolically this video will is also similar to Khan’s suicide video will. Tanweer 
delivers his statement in a set piece to camera. Tanweer also appears sitting in front 
of a crimson, white and black horizontal striped wall covering (this background looks 
exactly like the wall covering in the background of the earlier Khan video) and like 
Khan he is wearing a red and white check keffiyeh. The visual continuities between 
Khan and Tanweer’s suicide video wills mean that ‘place’ (although anonymous in
460 Ibid, Unpaginated
461 Shehzad Tanweer, Video of 7 July Bomber Released, BBC News, 06 July 2006. Available at:
http://newsvote.bbc.co.Uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk/5154714.stm. 
Accessed on 30 May 2008, Unpaginated
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the Khan video) after the release of the Tanweer video becomes important -  this 
crimson, white and black background has become the London bomber’s equivalent 
to bin Laden’s cave background or the American President’s Oval Office or the 
British Prime Minister’s 10 Downing Street. The presence of the red and white 
check keffiyeh in both videos also clearly helps to frame both statements within an 
international context, specifically the Arab-Israeli issue. The Tanweer suicide video 
will is also edited together with a video message from al-Zawahri and with footage 
purportedly showing A1 Qaeda fighters celebrating after hearing news of the 7/7 
bombings.
The release of Tanweer’s suicide video will was timed to coincide with the first 
anniversary of the London bombings, to take control the news agenda, divert 
attention away from official remembrance ceremonies and an address by Prime 
Minister Blair about 7/7, and to enable A1 Qaeda to hijack the first anniversary of the
thJuly 7 attacks. It is further evidence that A1 Qaeda has a sophisticated 
understanding of the new image theatre of war.
To conclude, paraphrasing Hill, following the release of the Tanweer video will it 
may be the case that the other London bombers have recorded their own suicide 
video wills which are awaiting their own release date and opportunity to hijack the 
news agenda.462 In the future maybe suicide video wills, or counter-image 
munitions, by Lindsay and Hussain will also be released. But the image of the 
suicide bomber produced by news footage and video wills also circulates 
uncontrollably. It is to this circulation and proliferation that I now turn.
Circulating Suicide Terrorism Footage
This section will explore the remediation of footage of suicide terrorism beyond 
news networks and jihadi internet propaganda. In the new image theatre of war such 
footage is remediated and copied by varied individuals and groups with divergent 
motivations, and appearing across multiple media platforms testament to the 
uncontrollability of the spectacle of war.
462 Hill, 'The Bin Laden Tapes', p. 45
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For instance, political cartoonists have made a number of political interventions that 
attempt to demonstrate the ridiculousness of suicide terrorism. I will here examine 
six cartoons or image munitions, the first two of which formed part of the 2005 
Danish cartoon controversy which has been the subject of much international 
political, media and academic debate and commentary. I will firstly though discuss 
some of the key events which contributed to these cartoons of the Prophet 
Mohammad becoming a global controversy. The origins of the Danish cartoon 
controversy lie with a children’s book by Kare Bluitgen called Koranen ogprofeten 
Muhammeds liv (The Qur’an and the Life o f the Prophet Mohammad). This book 
was written as an introduction for children to both the Qur’an and the life of the 
Prophet Mohammad. Bluitgen initially struggled to find someone willing to 
illustrate his book and in the end he found an illustrator who would only do so 
anonymously. This reluctance to draw the Prophet Mohammad is closely linked with 
Islamic doctrine for which His greatness cannot be captured within an image. There 
is also a noted history of strong reaction to controversial representations of Islam. In 
1988, Salman Rushdie published the novel The Satanic Verses and, in 1989, in 
response to the book’s publication, Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa against 
Rushdie and anyone associated with the book. On November 2, 2005 Theo van 
Gogh, the director of the film Submission, was murdered in Amsterdam by 
Mohammed Bouyeri a Dutch-Moroccan Muslim. Van Gogh’s film controversially 
featured a scene where Koranic verses appear on the bare flesh of a woman. It was 
against this backdrop that Flemming Rose editor of the Danish daily newspaper 
Jyllands-Posten responded to Bluitgen’s difficulties to find an illustrator and 
commissioned cartoonists to draw images of the Prophet Mohammad. In an article 
for The Washington Post, Rose described his intentions:
I commissioned the cartoons in response to several incidents of self­
censorship in Europe caused by widening fears and feelings of intimidation in 
dealing with issues related to Islam. And I still believe that this is a topic that 
we Europeans must confront, challenging moderate Muslims to speak out. 
The idea was not to provoke gratuitously -  and we certainly didn’t intend to 
trigger violent demonstrations throughout the Muslim world. Our goal was 
simply to push self-imposed limits on expression that seemed to be closing in 
tighter....At the end of September, a Danish stand-up comedian said in an 
interview with Jyllands-Posten that he had no problem urinating on the Bible 
in front of the camera, but he dared not do the same thing with the Koran.
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This was the culmination of a series of disturbing instances of self- 
censorship.463
On September 30, 2005 twelve cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad were published 
in the newspaper, soon afterwards a number of Danish Imams complained about the 
publication of the cartoons and on October 19, 2005 protesters gathered outside 
Jyllands-Posten’s offices. On October 17, 2005 the Egyptian newspaper El Fayr 
published an article denouncing the Prophet Mohammad cartoons and it also 
reprinted six of them, however, this article and the reprinting of some of the Prophet 
cartoons were not subject to an international backlash. On October 19, 2005 the 
Ambassadors of ten Muslim countries requested a meeting with Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen, the Danish Prime Minister, to discuss the Prophet cartoons but 
Rasmussen declined to meet with them. In October 2005 Muslim groups in 
Denmark also lodged a legal complaint against Jyllands-Posten, citing blasphemy, 
but their complaint was dismissed. This illustrates how the Prophet cartoons were 
not immediately controversial in fact there was a delay between their publication and 
the Danish Imams complaining about them and the subsequent chain of events being 
set in motion which would result in a full blown international controversy. Also, up 
until this point the controversy surrounding the Prophet cartoons was largely 
contained within Denmark.
However, in November and December 2005 a delegation of Danish Imams set off on 
a tour of the Middle East with a forty three page document (‘Dossier About 
Championing the Prophet Muhammad Peace Be Upon Him’) which included the 
twelve Prophet Mohammad cartoons, examples of anti-Muslim hate mail, a 
television interview with Ms. Ayaan Hirsi Ali a Danish MP and three other images: 
First, a cartoon which portrays the Prophet Mohammad as a demonic pedophile -  an 
image which was clearly meant to cause insult to Muslims. Second, an image 
showing a Muslim man being mounted by a dog whilst praying -  an image which 
was probably shot spontaneously and finally, an image of a contestant in a French
463 Flemming Rose, 'Why I Published Those Cartoons', The Washington Post, 19 February 2006. 
Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dvn/content/article/2006/02/17/AR2006021702499.html. Accessed on 17 April 2009, 
Unpaginated
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pig-squealing contest accompanied by the caption ‘Here is the real image of 
Mohammad’. This particular image of a contestant at a French pig-squealing contest 
is further evidence of the uncontrollability of images in a rhizomatic media system. 
The fact that this image was taken to document a French pig-squealing contest, it was 
then picked up and paired with the caption ‘Here is the real image of Mohammad’ -  
which immediately transformed it into a controversial image about the Prophet 
Mohammad -  and it was then circulated and was finally inserted into the Danish 
Imams forty three page document about the Prophet Mohammad cartoons. It was 
this tour and this document which helped to transform the cartoon controversy from a 
controversy which was largely contained within Denmark into an international 
controversy. This is evidenced by the fact that on January 26, 2006 Saudi Arabia 
recalled its Ambassador from Denmark and called for a boycotting of Danish 
products. In response, on January 29, 2006 Jyllands-Posten printed a statement 
again defending its decision to publish the Prophet Mohammad cartoons and the 
publication of this statement was quickly met by the burning of Danish flags in 
Palestine. On February 2, 2006 Prime Minister Rasmussen appeared on the Saudi 
Arabian news channel Al-Arabiya in an attempt to calm the situation. Also, on 
February 2, 2006 the Jordanian newspaper Al-Shihan reprinted the twelve Prophet 
Mohammad cartoons and the editor was quickly sacked. On February 3, 2006 the 
Spanish newspaper El Pais printed a cartoon of the Prophet Mohammad made of the 
words ‘I must not draw Muhammad’ -  a show of support for Jyllands-Posten’s 
decision to publish the Prophet Mohammad cartoons and for freedom of
464expression.
A new controversial chapter in the Danish cartoon controversy came to light around 
the time of the first anniversary of the publication of the cartoons in Jyllands-Posten. 
A video was released which showed young members of the Danish People’s Party 
(DPP), an anti-immigration party, drawing satirical images of the Prophet 
Mohammad. One of the cartoon images featured in this video depicts a camel with
464
See ‘Timeline: The Muhammad Cartoons'. The Times, 06/02/2006 2006, Unpaginated. See also 
Tariq Modood, Randell Hansen, Erik Bleich, Brendan O'Leary, and Joseph H. Carens, 'The 
Danish Cartoon Affair: Free Speech, Racism, Islamism, and Integration'. International 
Migration 44, no. 5 (2006), pp. 3-62. Sune Laegaard, 'The Cartoon Controversy: Offence, 
Identity, Oppression?' Political Studies 55, no. 3 (2007), pp. 481-99 and Shawn Powers, 
'Examining the Danish Cartoon Affair: Mediatized Cross-Cultural Tensions?' Media, War & 
Conflict 1, no. 3 (2008), pp. 339-59
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the head of the Prophet and with beer cans for humps -  offensive not only for its 
depiction of the Prophet, but also for its linking of the Prophet with alcohol 
(something which Islam strictly forbids).465 This video and the images featured in it 
are further evidence of the uncontrollability of images and the proliferation of images 
into new and surprising contexts in the information age. The Danish cartoon 
controversy also shows how cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad have been deployed 
by all sides: by Jyllands-Posten in the name of freedom of expression, by Danish 
Imams to promote the cartoon controversy in the Middle East and by members of the 
DPP in an attempt to denigrate Muslims. The Danish cartoon controversy has been 
the subject of much academic debate. For example in 2006 the journal International 
Migration published a debate between Tariq Modood, Randall Hansen, Erik Bleich, 
Brendan O ’Leary and Joseph H. Carens about whether Jyllands-Posten should or 
should not have published the Prophet Mohammad cartoons.466 I will now turn to 
discuss two of the twelve Prophet cartoons commissioned by Fleming Rose.
Two of the image munitions from Jyllands-Posten establish a connection between 
the image of the Prophet Mohammad and suicide terrorism. The first, by Kurt 
Westergaard, is a headshot of the Prophet Mohammad with a bomb as his turban. 
This cartoon has frequently been misinterpreted. It does not depict the Prophet 
Mohammad as a suicide bomber but it is meant to be a wider statement about 
militant jihadism. However, Kurt Westergaard was clearly aware of the 
confrontational nature of his choice of composition and also the possibility that his 
cartoon’s meaning would become lost in translation. This is also evidenced by the 
fact that in February 2008 Westergaard was the subject of a foiled assassination plot 
when three men of North African origin were arrested by Danish police. In response, 
Jyllands-Posten decided to reprint Westergaards controversial Prophet Mohammad 
cartoon.
465 See Stephen Castle, 'Anti-Muslim Video Sparks New Outrage against Denmark1. The Independent,
10 October 2006. Available at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/antimuslim-video-sparks-new-outrage- 
against-denmark-419392.html. Accessed on 18 February 2010, Unpaginated
466 Modood, Hansen, Bleich, O'Leary, and Carens, 'The Danish Cartoon Affair', pp. 3-62. See also
Laegaard, 'The Cartoon Controversy', pp. 481-99 and Powers, 'Examining the Danish 
Cartoon Affair', pp. 339-59
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The second cartoon, by Jens-Julius, depicts the Prophet Mohammad standing on a 
cloud at the entrance to Heaven. On the same cloud are four suicide bombers, stood 
in a line, looking disappointed. Having been promised seventy-two virgins when they 
get to heaven they are instead met by the Prophet announcing: ‘STOP STOP we have 
run out of virgins!’ This cartoon has also frequently been misinterpreted. It should 
not be read as suggesting the sanctioning of suicide terrorism but as a comment on 
the farcical reward for those men willing to blow themselves up in the name of 
Allah.
These are just two examples of political cartoonists representing suicide bombing, 
but those which have not featured the Prophet Mohammad have not attracted 
international controversy. However, they all present a similar satirical view of 
suicide terrorism. For instance, a cartoon by Karsten Schley shows a taxi with the 
number plate ‘Tel Aviv’ parked up at the side of the road with the driver stood in 
front, talking to a potential passenger, the former wearing a suicide bomber belt. The 
caption reads: ‘No, thanks. I’ll take a bus.’ This cartoon is a clear statement about 
the indiscriminate nature of suicide attacks.
Another, by Canary Pete, depicts a customer and a shop assistant in front of a full 
length mirror in a gent’s outfitter. The scene is fairly ordinary except that the 
customer is wearing a suicide bomber belt. The caption reads: ‘This model really 
sells like hot cakes.’ Canary Pete, with this cartoon, is showing how suicide 
terrorism is becoming increasingly popular, almost an industry in itself, in certain 
parts of the Arab world. Another Canary Pete cartoon is set on a bus and shows two 
men (one sitting behind the other). The man sitting in front is turning back and 
talking to the man sat immediately behind him and who is wearing a suicide bomber 
vest. The caption reads: ‘Are you sure that this bus does not go all the way to 
Jerusalem?’ The suicide bombers replies: ‘Yep.’ This cartoon, like the first cartoon, 
draws attention to the fact that suicide bombers intentionally target places where they 
can maximise civilian casualties, like buses.
A fourth cartoon, by Chris Grosz, shows a group of coalition soldiers in an 
observation post watching a group of men wearing suicide bomber vests walking 
under a banner which reads ‘Martyr Brigade’. The caption says: ‘Oh...Oh I think
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we’ve found their weapons of mass destruction.’ Grosz here is drawing attention to 
the fact that the real weapons of mass destruction, in the war on terror, are not 
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons but rather suicide bombers and their 
weaponized bodies.
A number of other interventions have also been made about suicide terrorism. The 
interventions show that suicide terrorism has indeed been remediated by groups and 
individuals for a variety of different reasons. One image circulating on the internet 
for a number of years features a Palestinian baby boy (maybe 18 months old) dressed 
up as a suicide bomber, with red wires leading to a fake suicide bomber belt around 
his waist, and a red Hamas bandana on his head. This image has been widely 
condemned because it shows the staged initiation of a child into a martyr brigade; it 
is similarly condemned because it suggests that his innocence has been tainted by his 
association with suicide terrorism. This image has come to embody the lifelong 
Palestinian struggle.467 Another image circulating on the internet shows a boy 
wearing a suicide bomber Halloween costume. This costume is comprised of two 
red rectangular blocks labelled TNT strapped to his chest and a detonator switch, 
with a black wire leading back to the suicide bomber-belt, in his right hand. The boy 
is also shown wearing an Islamic style keffiyeh. This image is particularly 
interesting because Halloween today is mainly about turning scary mythical figures 
like ghosts, witches and horror film characters into objects of comedy-horror through 
the wearing of comedy-horror costumes by children out trick-or-treating, or by adults 
at Halloween themed fancy dress parties. The suicide bomber comedy-horror 
costume is a way for people to turn the credible threat of suicide terrorism, during 
Halloween, into a comedy-horror figure.
In January 2005, an unauthorized viral advert for Volkswagen cars appeared on the 
internet. As Stephen Brook explains, it ‘shows a man hopping into a car wearing the 
distinctive check scarf made famous by the late Yasser Arafat. He drives around the 
city before blowing himself up -  apparently killing himself but leaving the car intact
467 See Mark Robson, 'The Baby Bomber'. Journal o f  Visual Culture 3, no. 1 (2004), pp. 63-76
200
outside a restaurant. Then the slogan, “Polo: small but tough”, appears.’468 
Volkswagen, according to Brook, was eventually able to distance itself from ‘the 
spoof ad -  which was made by London-based advertising creatives Lee Ford and 
Dan Brooks for their show reel but was emailed around the world -  creating a public 
relations headache for the German car maker.’469
In 2008, a free video game -  developed by an anonymous man in Houston, Texas -  
appeared on the internet, featuring, as Matthew Moore explains, ‘an Arab-looking 
cartoon man who players direct along a busy street. Points are awarded for every 
man, woman and child who dies when the bomber detonates the hidden grenades 
strapped to his body.’470 The video game was immediately criticised by the families 
of victims of suicide bombings. The games creator responded, according to Moore, 
by stating that his intention ‘was to satirise rather than celebrate terrorism.’471
A number of artistic interventions about suicide terrorism have also been made. The 
artist Simon Tyszko has produced Suicide Bomber Barbie a Barbie doll with a 
suicide bomber-belt around her waist and a detonator switch in her right hand, with 
wires leading directly to the bomber-belt. Tyszko has taken the Barbie Doll, a 
popular girls toy for over fifty years (famous for such dolls as Southern Belle Barbie 
and Marilyn Monroe Barbie, dolls that little girls can aspire to), and linked her with 
suicide terrorism.
In 2004, suicide terrorism was again the subject of artistic intervention, when Zvi 
Mazel, the Israeli Ambassador to Sweden attacked an art installation at the Museum 
of National Antiquities in Stockholm. The installation entitled Snow White and The
468 Stephen Brook, 'Spoof Suicide Bomber Ad Sparks Global Row', The Guardian, 20 January 2005.
Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2005/ian/20/media.newmedia.
Accessed on 5 February 2009, Unpaginated
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June 2009, Unpaginated
470 Matthew Moore, 'Suicide Bomber Video Game Condemned by Terror Victims', The Telegraph, 06
November 2008. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/3388318/Suicide- 
bomber-video-game-condemned-bv-teiTor-victims.html. Accessed on 8 March 2009, 
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Madness o f Truth by the Israeli-born Swedish composer Dror Feiler and his Swedish 
artist wife Gunilla Skold-Feiler consisted of a long rectangular pool filled with red 
coloured water (representing blood). Floating around in this pool was a little white 
boat named ‘Snow White’ and sitting on this boat was a picture of the sixth female 
Palestinian suicide bomber, Hanadi Jaradat, who had blown herself up on October 4, 
2003 inside the Maxim restaurant in Haifa, Israel. Accompanying the installation 
was Johann Sebastian Bach’s Cantata 199, Mein Herze Schwimmt im Blut {My Heart 
Swims in Blood), playing in a loop in the background. Also, accompanying the 
installation was a reworking of the narrator’s opening words from Snow White and 
the Seven Dwarfs:
Once upon a time in the middle o f winter
For the June 12 deaths of her brother, and her cousin 
and three drops of blood fell
She was also a woman
as white as snow, as red as blood, and her hair was as black as ebony
Seemingly innocent with universal non-violent character, less suspicious of 
intentions
and the red looked beautiful upon the white
The murderer will yet pay the price and we will not be the only ones who are 
crying
like a weed in her heart until she had no peace day and night
Hanadi Jaradat was a 29-year-old lawyer
I w ill run away into the wild forest, and never come home again
Before the engagement took place, he was killed in an encounter with the 
Israeli security forces
and she ran over sharp stones and through thorns
She said: Your blood will not have been shed in vain
and was about to pierce Snow W hite’s innocent heart
She was hospitalized, prostrate with grief, after witnessing the shootings
The wild beasts will soon have devoured you
After his death, she became the breadwinner and she devoted herself solely to 
that goal
“Y es”, said Show White, “with all my heart”
Weeping bitterly, she added “If our nation cannot realize its dream and the 
goals of the victims, and live in freedom and dignity, then let the whole world 
be erased”
Run away, then, you poor child
She secretly crossed into Israel, charged into a Haifa restaurant, shot a 
security guard, blew herself up and murdered 19 innocent civilians 
as white as snow, as red as blood, and her hair was as black as ebony
And many people are indeed crying: the Zer Aviv family, the Almog family, 
and all the relatives and friends of the dead and the wounded
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and the red looked beautiful upon the white.473
Zvi Mazel attacked the installation because he saw it as being anti-Semitic and as 
glorifying suicide terrorism. The artists have, however, rejected this interpretation 
claiming that the installation is essentially about tolerance.
Suicide terrorism has also been the subject of commercial interventions. In October 
2007, an episode of South Park called ‘Imaginationland -  Episode 1* featured a 
scene showing the coordinated suicide bombing of Imaginationland. The bombings 
began when the Mayor of Imaginationland introduced Stan, Kyle, Cartman, Kenny 
and Butters to the waiting crowd made up of iconic figures from the imaginations of 
children: Santa, Ronald McDonald, SpongeBob SquarePants, Cheetara and Snarf 
(from ThunderCats), a Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtle, Mario (the Italian-American 
plumber from Nintendo video games) and a host of other characters, past and 
present.474 Thus again reflecting the indiscriminate nature of suicide terrorism.
In 2007, Chris Morris (creator of the highly controversial The Day Today and Brass 
Eye series of satirical programmes about: animals, drugs, science, sex, crime, decline 
and paedophilia) announced that he was ‘preparing to demolish one last comic taboo 
-  suicide bombers.’475 The title of this film is Four Lions and it is about a group of 
Pakistani suicide bombers, aged between 17 and 38, living in Britain.476 Cahal 
Milmo, reporting in The Independent, has discussed how Morris ‘told an audience... 
[at Bournemouth University] that he wanted to make “the comedy version of United 
93”’477 Initially this idea may seem like a pretty unsympathetic plan by Morris. 
However, Morris has justified his plans by arguing that he seeks ‘to do for Islamic 
terrorism what Dad’s Army, the classic BBC comedy, did for the Nazis by showing
473Snow White and the Madness o f Truth, Available at: 
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February 2009
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them as “scary but also ridiculous”.’478 Four Lions was premiered at the 2010 
Sundance Film Festival in January and received mixed reviews. Kaleem Aftab for 
The Independent wrote: ‘Morris does a great job of balancing poignancy and comedy 
in a hard-hitting finale that shows a humanity and observational brilliance.... In 
doing so he exposes a myth of terrorist bombers being trained assassins but instead 
exposes them as being confused young men.’479 While Jeremy Kay for The 
Guardian wrote: ‘It takes serious guts to poke fun at terrorists, sheer idiots or not.... 
So for this, Morris must be applauded as he tries to shed some light on an aspect of 
terror -  the farcical cock-ups -  that has slipped through the wall-to-wall media 
coverage of the past decade.’480 However, Kay believes that ‘the switching back and 
forth from jihadi thriller to farce suggests Four Lions doesn’t really know what it 
wants to be.’481 The films UK premiere was held at the Bradford International Film 
Festival in March 2010 and it is set for a nationwide release in the UK in May 2010.
These image remediations reveal the uncontrollable and unpredictable nature of the 
spectacle of suicide terrorism in the information age. They also show how the 
liberation of information and images from the control of top-down information 
management systems (concerned with controlling and censoring the flow of 
information and images) allows suicide terrorism footage to now circulate globally, 
beyond the mainstream media and jihadi internet propaganda: thus bringing them to 
the attention of new audiences. The free floating character of suicide terrorism 
image munitions also allows people to come into contact with suicide terrorism in 
surprising new places; for example, online in games and email jokes (a picture of a 
baby suicide bomber, a suicide bomber Halloween costume and an unofficial 
Volkswagen viral advert), in art galleries {Suicide Bomber Barbie and Snow White 
and The Madness o f Truth), on the television screen in South Park and on the cinema
478 Richard Brooks, 'Satirist Turns Terrorists into Dad's Army', The Times, 13 January 2008. Available
at:
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480 Jeremy Kay, 'Chris Morris's Four Lions: A Mixed Dish That Fails to Satisfy'. The Guardian, 25
Janurary 2010. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2010/ian/25/four-lions-chris- 
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screen in Four Lions. The ability of new media actors to pick up, play with the 
context of and deploy suicide image munitions with their own intentions that are 
entirely distinct from A1 Qaeda’s original objectives means that suicide terrorism 
footage can indeed no longer be controlled or censored following its initial 
dissemination. This is a lesson that is still to be learnt by both America and Britain 
in the war on terror, whilst A1 Qaeda appears to have already leant this important 
lesson. Instead of getting bogged down with trying to control their image munitions 
after their initial deployment A1 Qaeda have focussed attention on making the 
biggest impact with their suicide terrorism image munitions.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the central role of suicide bombers in the new image 
warfare theatre of war. My discussion of A1 Qaeda’s suicide terrorism began by 
situating it in relation to techno-war, showing that A1 Qaeda is fully aware that they 
cannot compete on traditional military terms against technologically superior military 
forces. In order to gain an advantage, they have instead weaponized their bodies, 
images and the media through their use of suicide terrorism. Attention then turned 
towards an examination of the symbolism and image munitions of suicide terrorism, 
with reference to the bombing of The Canal Hotel in Baghdad (the UN’s 
headquarters in Iraq) on August 19, 2003. This discussion was then expanded into 
an examination of the coordinated September 11, 2001 terror attacks. The failure of 
United Airlines Flight 93 to attack its target (the White House) was singled out 
specifically here because of its important role as a counter-image munition in the 
battle over 9/11 between the Bush administration and A1 Qaeda and their counter­
image munition suicide video wills.
Suicide terrorism, and its symbolism, was further explored with reference to the 
coordinated triple suicide bombing of Firdos Square in Baghdad on October 24, 2005 
-  a metonym for the continued presence, in Iraq, of coalition forces and a place 
where many international journalists were based. The introduction of suicide 
terrorism to the streets of Britain on July 7, 2005 (and the Failed London Bombings 
on July 21, 2005) were discussed with particular attention given to the symbolism 
and image munitions of both attacks. The battle over 7/7 between the Blair
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government and A1 Qaeda -  the circulation of counter-image munitions of acts of 
heroism by the emergency services, ordinary members of the public, along with the 
Khan and Tanweer suicide video wills were discussed. Finally, a number of 
political, subversive, commercial and artistic interventions were explored. Revealing 
how the spectacle of suicide terrorism cannot be controlled because people other than 
governments and A1 Qaeda now have the power to remediate suicide terrorism 
footage for their own purposes.
The next chapter will examine another feature of the new image warfare theatre of 
war: executions. I will explore the symbolism of hijackings, hostage-takings and 
hostage executions and how they are all sources of powerful image munitions. I will 
also discuss how, in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of Iraqis, the Bush 
administration mistakenly transformed the killing of Uday and Qusay Hussein into a 
media spectacle, producing damaging image munitions. Similarly, the 
capture/trial/execution of Saddam Hussein was also transformed into a series of 
misjudged media spectacles and damaging image munitions by the Bush 
administration and the new Iraqi government.
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Chapter Five
Executions
Introduction
In Chapters One and Two I developed the theoretical part of this thesis, identifying 
the increasing uncontrollability of the circulation of images and how this has 
impacted on contemporary war. I then moved onto explore the empirical part of this 
thesis. In Chapter Three, I focussed on the production, circulation and remediation 
of ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ political communications made by President Bush, 
Prime Minister Blair and Osama bin Laden in the war on terror -  all sources of 
image munitions. In Chapter Four, I moved onto examine how suicide terrorism is 
not just an important physical tactic for A1 Qaeda in the war on terror but how it also 
contains a significant symbolic dimension that facilitates the production of powerful 
image munitions which can then be deployed in the war of images.
In this chapter I am interested in executions in the war on terror, another source of 
powerful image munitions. This discussion will, however, include an examination of 
three related though distinctive terrorist tactics which are each symbolically 
powerful: hijackings, hostage-takings and hostage executions. Hijackings and 
hostage-takings are tactics traditionally employed by terrorists so as to gain a media 
presence where a strong distinction is manufactured between us and them and so 
media interest is maintained for the duration of the crisis via the release of images 
and footage. These may be thought of as early image munition experiments. 
Hostage executions are a tactic also employed by terrorists to manufacture a strong 
media presence and emphasise the distinction between us and them, but they are also 
designed with the intention of producing and deploying sophisticated image 
munitions.
The chapter begins by situating executions historically with reference to pre-9/11 
airplane hijackings, the Achille Lauro cruise ship hijacking, the hostage-taking and 
murder of Aldo Moro and the 1980s Beirut hostage crisis. In examining this recent
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history I show the ever increasing sophistication of hijacking/hostage-taking visuals. 
I will then conceptualise hostage-taking and hostage execution with reference to 
‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ hostages and Jean Baudrillard’s discussion of 
‘symbolic exchange’ in relation to hostages. I then turn to a lengthy discussion of 
four contemporary hostage situations -  specifically Daniel Pearl, Nick Berg, Kenneth 
Bigley and Alan Johnston -  showing how hostage image munitions have become 
increasingly sophisticated. However, although hostage executions appear to have 
now been abandoned in Iraq over fears that they may be counterproductive, the 
Johnston hostage-taking, in the Gaza Strip, offers strong evidence that these kinds of 
hostage-takings are still symbolically powerful. Such hostage-takings could still take 
place in Britain and are now even being referenced in popular culture. Hostage 
execution image munitions are also subject to uncontrollable and increasingly 
unpredictable circulation and this will be explored via a number of image 
remediations, produced by people with objectives that are totally distinct from A1 
Qaeda’s original intentions.
Attention will then shift to discuss the hunt for Uday, Qusay and Saddam Hussein. 
In turning these into image munitions, the Pentagon and the new Iraqi government 
made serious misjudgements in their attempts to win the hearts and minds of the 
Iraqi public. The airing of Uday and Qusay Hussein death images produced a 
number of damaging image munitions which have since been picked up and used by 
A1 Qaeda and also by new media actors with intentions that are distinct from both the 
Bush administration and A1 Qaeda. Similarly, the transformation of the capture, trial 
and execution of Saddam Hussein into a series of media spectacles also produced a 
series of damaging image munitions which have been redeployed by A1 Qaeda 
against the Bush administration and the new Iraqi government, and also reused by 
various new media actors who’s intentions are, again, distinct from those of both the 
Bush administration and A1 Qaeda.
Hijackings and Hostage-takings in History
Hijackings and hostage-takings are important terrorist strategies because, like suicide 
terrorism (see Chapter Four), they allow terrorists to gain a strategic advantage 
against conventional military forces and guarantee a strong media presence. The
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important role of the media in communicating hijackings and hostage-takings is 
represented by the taking hostage of the Israeli Olympic team at the 1972 Munich 
Olympic Games. The authorities failed to take into account the fact that there were 
televisions in the Olympic village and that the hostage-takers (members of Black 
September) were able to watch journalists reporting from the scene and so keep 
abreast of events taking place outside the compound, such as an attempt by West 
German authorities to storm the Olympic village. This event was also a potential 
turning point for terrorists as they drew important lessons from it, realizing that they 
could use the media to their advantage and manipulate it for their own purposes. To 
properly explore this issue a selection of historical cases will now be discussed, 
starting with airplane hijackings.
On September 11, 2001 four airplanes were transformed from hijack targets into 
spectacular kinetic weapons, changing the complex relationship between terrorists 
and airplanes. Prior to this airplanes were routinely hijacked. According to Luca 
Ricolfi:
From the 1950s to the late 1970s, air hijackings were frequent. Over 200 
episodes have been counted in three decades, almost one a month, with peaks 
of almost one hijacking per week in 1969-72. Then, as of 1980, resort to this 
type of action started to fall, and almost completely ceased during the 
1990s.482
During this period, rather than being hijacked and transformed into kinetic weapons 
airplanes were hijacked specifically because terrorists knew that such events on 
isolated runways produced good media spectacles and were good sources of images 
and footage and thus guaranteed mass media attention for the event and their 
particular cause. Brigitte L. Nacos has described the TWA aircraft hijacking of June 
1985:
During the entire incident, the three networks [ABC, CBS, and NBC] opened 
most of their early evening broadcasts with the hijacking drama... The 
networks devoted an average of nearly two thirds of their entire evening 
broadcasts to the TWA spectacular.483
482 Luca Ricolfi, 'Palestinians, 1981-2003', in Making Sense o f  Suicide Missions, ed. Diego Gambetta
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 101-102
483 Brigitte L. Nacos, Terrorism & the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the Oklahoma City
Bombing (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 56-57
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She puts this high level of media coverage ultimately down ‘to an unprecedented 
degree of news management by the TWA hijackers and their allies in Beirut.’484 The 
aim of pre-9/11 airplane hijacker’s was to stretch out their hijacking, maximise 
media attention and transform the event into an episodic event that would capture the 
attentions of the media, the authorities and news audiences for the duration of the 
hijacking. A hijacked airplane situated on an isolated runway also quickly becomes 
a powerful ‘place’ of focus and familiarity for news audiences because it is seen 
night after night on the news.
Violence, during pre-9/11 airplane hijackings, was often symbolic. This is because 
the hijackers had to negotiate a fine balance where violence was concerned. 
Airplane hijacking violence could easily get out of control and therefore escalate the 
crisis to such a degree that the authorities would be forced to storm the plane, thus 
ending the hijacking sooner than the terrorists would have wanted.
A real challenge for hijackers in such situations was to consistently provide the 
media with new dramatic stories and footage to refuel media interest in the ongoing 
crisis and therefore counter the somewhat monotonous situation of an airplane sitting 
on an isolated runway, while simultaneously avoiding escalating the crisis to the 
point where the plane would be stormed. One way in which hijackers achieved this 
was through the issuing of new threats of violence which in turn enabled the media to 
constantly keep updating their news-cycle and their news audiences with breaking 
news items.
Airplane hijackings were a central weapon in the military arsenal of the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). This is emphasised by the fact that the 
PFLP’s founder George Habash, in 1970, in Der Stern, famously remarked: ‘When
AQ C
we hijack a plane it has more effect than if we kill a hundred Israelis in battle.’ 
Clearly, Habash saw airplane hijackings as having a powerful force multiplier effect
484 Ibid, p. 64
485 Edmund L. Andrews, and John Kifner, 'George Habash, Palestinian Terrorist Tactician, Dies at
82'. The New York Times, 27 January 2008. Available at: 
http://www.nvtimes.com/2008/0l/27/world/midd1eeast/27habash.html? r=l&pagewanted=pr 
int&oref=slogin. Accessed on 15 April 2008, Unpaginated
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over Israel, a superior conventional military force. Hijacked airplane passengers and 
crew were, pre-9/11, also more valuable alive than dead to the terrorists (especially 
to the PFLP). After a hijacking had been concluded -  because they were 
eyewitnesses -  these passengers and crew could help stretch the media afterlife of a 
hijacking event with their testimonies, initially through media interviews and again 
later through autobiographies and much later through feature films.
Another example of the pre-9/11 media strategy behind hostage-takings is provided 
by the hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro off the coast of Egypt by members 
of the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), on October 7, 1985. This is interesting 
precisely because of its media presence and the way in which it unfolded as an 
episodic drama which news audiences kept tuning into for the latest news updates. 
Cruise ship hijackings are rare events, when compared with the number of airplane 
hijackings in the second half of the twentieth century. Ships seizures are usually the 
reserve of pirates. For instance, Somali pirates operating in the Indian Ocean are
AOS
increasingly the focus of international media attention. However, the same 
conventions which govern pre-9/11 airplane hijackings also apply to cruise ship 
hijackings. The hijackers of the Achille Lauro were aiming to manufacture a 
powerful media presence and thus draw international media attention to the event 
and to their cause. The hijackers were quick to issue a demand -  the release of 
Palestinian prisoners from Israeli custody and simultaneously threatened to use 
violence against the passengers and crew if their demands were not met. The 
hijackers were mindful, however, like airplane hijackers, not to escalate the crisis to 
a degree where authorities would be left with no other option than to board the ship 
and bring the hijacking to a swift conclusion. Also, instead of an isolated runway the 
Achille Lauro was ordered to sail to the port of Tartus, Syria. However, when the 
hijackers were nearing Tartus they were forced to quickly change their plans because 
Syrian authorities refused to let the ship enter the port. The hijackers response was 
hasty. They panicked escalating their violence from symbolic to actual with the 
execution, on October 8th, of Leo Klinghoffer, a wheelchair bound Jewish-American 
businessman who was on holiday with his wife celebrating their wedding
486 See Roger Middleton, 'Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars', 
Chatham House, October 2008. Available at:
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12203 1008piracvsomalia.pdf. Accessed on 11 April 
2009, pp. 1-12
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anniversary. His execution gave the media a new angle from which to report on the 
hijacking: the execution of a hostage.
Klinghoffer was singled out because he was American and also because he was 
Jewish. The hijackers shot him dead and then threw his disabled body overboard. 
This escalation of violence sealed the fate of the hijackers. Because an American 
citizen had been murdered and because of the Reagan administration’s increasingly 
aggressive stance towards terrorism orders were given to capture the hijackers dead 
or alive. After Klinghoffer’s execution the Achille Lauro sailed back towards Port 
Said. Two days later the hijackers agreed that the passengers, crew and cruise ship
tVicould be exchanged for a getaway airplane. On October 10 the exchange was made 
and the hijackers boarded a plane for Tunisia. However, before the hijackers could 
reach Tunisian airspace American air fighters intercepted the plane, forced it to land 
at a NATO airbase in Sicily and thus concluded the hijacking.
The Munich hostage-taking, the TWA hijacking of 1985 and the seizure of the 
Achille Lauro are all early examples of image munitions. They were carried out with 
the intention of manufacturing a strong media presence. Terrorists had realized that 
they could exploit the media and use it to their own advantage by releasing new 
demands, new images and new footage which would then help to transform the 
hijacking into an episodic drama and would also circulate widely within the media. 
However, the extent to which this could predominate in the planning and carrying 
out of such actions was limited, in large measure because of the structure and 
technology of media systems. As media technologies have become more adaptable 
and accessible and as access to media outlets have become simpler so too the image 
munition strategies of terrorists have also changed as I will now see as I turn from a 
consideration of hijackings to hostage-takings.
From H ijacking to Hostage-taking
Unlike airplane and cruise ship hijackings which were played out through the media 
with a strong emphasis on ‘place’ -  an isolated airplane or a cruise ship -  pre-9/11, 
individual hostages’ periods in captivity usually took place out of sight and therefore 
without a ‘place’ of focus. This is because if authorities knew where a hostage was
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being held then they could launch a rescue mission, thus bringing the hostage-taking 
to a swift conclusion. Hostage-takers need to keep the locations of their hostage’s 
secret because this enables them to stretch out the hostage-taking for days, weeks, 
months and even years -  thus giving the terrorists’ cause consistent international 
publicity. News-cycles are another important factor here because the longer a 
hostage crisis goes on the more news-cycles it has to pass through and the greater the 
chances that it will drop off the news-cycle altogether unless inventive ways can be 
developed to keep the crisis current and newsworthy. A solution which hostage- 
takers had found to counter this problem, guaranteeing a hostage crisis remained 
newsworthy as it passed through multiple news-cycles, was to produce and 
disseminate early image munitions which helped to keep the hostage-taking current.
Aldo Moro, a twice former Italian Prime Minister and a Christian Democrat 
politician, was kidnapped on March 16, 1978, held captive for over fifty days and 
later murdered by members of the Red Brigades. During his period in captivity a 
photograph, or image munition, was released to the media which showed Moro 
sitting on the floor, holding a copy of the April 20, 1978 edition of the newspaper La
487Repubblica, looking straight into the camera, with a wall covering behind him. 
The way in which Moro appears in this image looking straight into the camera links 
with Benjamin’s conception of figures gazing out of images creating the illusion of
J Q O
being able to actually see their spectators, thus capturing the audiences’ gaze and 
eliciting emotional responses. This black and white photograph was released to 
prove that Moro was indeed still alive and also to help refuel media interest in 
Moro’s lengthy hostage-taking.
The wall covering in the background of this Moro photograph is particularly 
important because it is the unofficial flag of the Red Brigades. It comprises a yellow 
five point star within a yellow circle and the words Brigate Rosse, in yellow, above 
and below the logo, all set against a red background. Because the Red Brigades were
487 This image immediately appeared on the front pages o f over forty international newspapers on 
April 21, 1978. The photographer and artist Sarah Charlesworth -  as part o f her Modern History 
series -  has since collected together these front pages, removed the text (or copy), kept the newspaper 
titles and dates and reproduced the images on each o f these front pages in their original context. Sarah 
Charlesworth’s reworked front pages are available at: http://www.sarahcharlesworth.net/series- 
view.php?album id=34&subalbum id=53. Accessed on 28 May 2009
488 Benjamin, One-Way Street, p. 244
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unable to produce a hostage video as contemporary hostage-takers do, the presence 
of the unofficial Red Brigades flag in the background of the Moro hostage 
photograph is vital precisely because the media and news audiences were made 
immediately aware that Moro had been kidnapped by the Red Brigades. This then 
enabled the media to quickly insert the Moro photograph into existing news frames, 
particularly about the Red Brigades. The Moro hostage photograph was singled out 
for discussion here because it shares a number of parallels with contemporary 
hostage videos: his appearance in a set-piece to camera and also the symbolic 
presence of the unofficial Red Brigades flag in the background of this image. The 
Moro photograph is also echoed by other image munitions from the war on terror, 
like political communications (see Chapter Three) and suicide video wills (see 
Chapter Four).
During the 1980s Beirut hostage crisis a number of Western hostages were held, 
sometimes for years, and some were even executed. The majority of this hostage 
crisis was conducted out of sight (unlike airplane and cruise ship hijackings). The 
absence of hostage images during the Beirut hostage crisis was because the available 
technology prevented the hostage-takers from producing and releasing images and 
videos like hostage-takers often do today. But it was also due to the fact that hostage 
locations needed to be kept secret so that the authorities could not attempt rescue 
missions, as hostage images could quite easily give the authorities visual clues to the 
locations of hostages. However, the Beirut hostage-takers were also mindful that 
they needed to provide the media and authorities with some visuals so as to kick-start 
and maintain interest in the hostage-taking.
Often, the hostage-takers compromise was to release mug shot images of the 
hostages, early examples of image munitions. Traditionally mug shots are taken of 
prisoners by both the police and prison authorities as a way of cataloguing their 
prisoners. Mug shots show prisoners looking straight into the camera and behind 
them are generic backgrounds. The mug shots of hostages produced by the Beirut 
hostage-takers are similar stylistically to prisoner mug shots. The hostages appear 
looking straight into the camera, sitting in front of a generic background, giving the
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authorities no visual clues as to the ‘place’ where the hostages are being held. There 
is also a similarity here between these hostage images and obituary photographs.489
The impact and wide circulation of hostage mug shot images within the international 
media is evidenced by the fact that a selection of thirteen hostages -  including mug 
shots of Joseph Cicippio and Terry Waite -  appeared on the front cover of the 
August 14, 1989 edition of Time magazine. On a couple of other occasions the 
Beirut hostage-takers managed to release more sophisticated image munitions. In 
fact the hostage-takers managed to produce and release gruesome hostage videos 
which can be understood as something of a benchmark for subsequent videos. 
Hostage videos, back in the 1980s, were neither easy to produce nor easy to 
disseminate and they risked leaving authorities with an information trail which could 
potentially lead right back to the hijackers (after all there were no anonymous 
internet remailers).
The first hostage video featured Alec Collett -  a British journalist assigned to the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestinian refugees. He 
was kidnapped in Lebanon on March 25, 1985 and just over twelve months later, in 
April 1986, a video was released to the media which showed his gruesome hanging. 
Zaid Hassan Safarini, an eyewitness to Collett’s execution, has since recounted how:
Collett was dragged from his cell, hooded and handcuffed. The guards 
shuffled him towards the gallows where a group of gunmen had gathered. As 
the rope was placed around Collett’s neck, he realised his fate. “What, what, 
no,” he cried. 90
Significantly, what this video shows is that even back in the 1980s terrorists had an 
acute awareness of the media -  ‘the oxygen of publicity’491 -  and how to manipulate 
it. The Collett video was prepared with the intention of being widely circulated 
throughout the mainstream media. The main lesson to be drawn from the Collett
489 See Bridget Fowler, 'Collective Memory and Forgetting: Components for a Study of Obituaries'.
Theory, Culture & Society 22, no. 6 (2005), pp. 53-72
490 Roger Beam, 'Executed Briton's Last Terrified Words: Witness Solves 19-Year Mystery', The
Times, 01 May 2005. Available at:
http://www.timeonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article387164.ece. Accessed on 27 March 2009, 
Unpaginated
491 This phrase was used by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher with reference to the 
appearance o f Sinn Fein and the IRA on British media.
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case is that his hostage execution video today is echoed throughout contemporary 
hostage videos.
Another Beirut hostage, Lt. Col. William Richard (“Rich”) Higgins, who was 
kidnapped in Lebanon on February 17, 1988, was (like Collett) the lead in his own 
gruesome hostage execution video. Again, the Higgins hostage execution video is 
echoed within contemporary hostage videos. The Higgins execution video surfaced 
in July 1989 and it was clearly a copy of the earlier Collett video. However, after 
detailed examination the authorities later concluded that the video was a fake. The 
video, according to Richard Lacayo, does indeed feature Higgins -  ‘bound and 
gagged, dangling from a makeshift scaffold’492 -  but it is not an execution video. 
Rather Higgins had died earlier and his hostage-takers had simply staged his body in 
the video to make it appear as though they had executed him after authorities had 
failed to take their threats of violence seriously. The hostage-takers had clearly 
shown initiative turning the death of Collett into an opportunity to release a new 
image munition which would in turn keep Collett in the news-cycle for a while 
longer. The Collett execution video was also used to remind the media, authorities 
and news audiences once again that threats of violence made by Beirut hostage- 
takers against hostages were not to be dismissed as merely symbolic but should be 
taken seriously. The Collett execution video again shows that Beirut hostage-takers 
did indeed have a sophisticated understanding of the media and just how to produce a 
video which could circulate widely throughout the international media.
The Moro photograph, the mug shots of hostages and the Collett and Higgins hostage 
execution videos are all early examples of image munitions. They also show an 
escalation of violence which has since become commonplace in contemporary 
hostage videos. These particular hostage executions videos are a part of the same 
publicity dynamic as the Moro photograph and the hostage mug shots. The aim of 
the Beirut hostage-takers was always to transform the hostage crisis into an episodic 
drama which the media would continue to report on and that news audiences would 
continue to consume. Thus guaranteeing the hostage-takers’ cause consistent
492 Richard Lacayo, 'Not Again a Grisly Image o f a Dead Hostage Outrages the U.S.', Time, 14 August 
1989. Available at: http://www.time.corn/tirne/printout/0,8816.958340.00.html. Accessed on 
24 March 2009, Unpaginated
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international media publicity across a number of news-cycles and for the duration of 
the hostage crisis.
What each of the above cases shows is that terrorists -  with their careful selection of 
targets and careful use of violence -  are acutely aware of how to manufacture media 
drama, something which Pierre Bourdieu has theorized: ‘Television calls for
dramatization, in both senses of the term: it puts an event on stage, puts it in images. 
In doing so, it exaggerates the importance of that event, its seriousness, and its 
dramatic, even tragic character.’493 Hijackings and hostage-takings call for 
dramatization in the same way. This is because ‘[w]ith television, we are dealing 
with an instrument that offers, theoretically, the possibility of reaching 
everybody.’494 Television also helps to transform events into media events.495 
Media events also construct a sense of community as audiences collectively watch 
events as they unfold. So, to paraphrase Susan L. Carruthers, the intention of 
terrorists is ultimately to hijack the news agenda with their made-for-media 
dramas496 such as hijackings and hostage-takings. However, as these image 
munitions were produced before the internet age and as the media operated within a 
delayed news-cycle their accurate dissemination could not be guaranteed, like bin 
Laden videos (see Chapter Three), the Moro, Collett and Higgins image munitions 
were guaranteed though to be picked up and circulated by the media. Thanks to their 
newsworthy content. What the hostage-takers had little control over was when the 
media would get hold of these image munitions. Therefore, the Moro, Collett and 
Higgins image munitions could not be timed to coincide with and hijack a particular 
news-cycle -  featuring say an important anniversary or an important speech by a 
political leader -  instead they were inserted into whatever news-cycles were around 
when the media received the image munitions. Attention will now turn to look at the 
ways in which the Beirut hostage crisis was kept in the media spotlight when the 
hostages were so often out of sight.
493 Pierre Bourdieu, On Television and Journalism. Translated by Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson
(London: Pluto Press, 1998), p. 19
494 Ibid, p. 14
495 See Dayan and Katz, Media Events
496 Carruthers, The Media at War, p. 171
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On April 17, 1986, John McCarthy, a British journalist, was taken hostage. Jill 
Morrell, his then girlfriend, was quick to mobilize journalist colleagues and friends 
to raise awareness for his plight. Morrell was acutely aware of the fact that John 
McCarthy’s absence as a hostage meant that the media would be likely more quickly 
to loose interest in his hostage crisis than say a murder investigation (where the 
media are able to focus on the body of the victim and the police search for the killer). 
Murder investigations usually unfold as episodic dramas which suit the news media 
as the story can be inserted and reinserted into multiple news-cycles as new 
information about the case is made public. Because of the media’s bias towards 
stories which unfold as episodic dramas Morrell committed herself to transforming 
his hostage-taking into a series of episodic events which helped to keep his plight 
and the plights of the other Beirut hostages newsworthy. She sought to replace the 
absent John McCarthy with a series of media spectacles which would give the media 
something tangible to focus their reporting on. Through her actions Morrell quickly 
assumed the role of a new media actor. Morrell also enlisted the help of the 
advertising agency Bartle Bogle Hegarty. One of their first jobs was to come up 
with a series of powerful slogans to capture media and public attention. One such 
slogan was: ‘Out of Sight, Not Out of Mind’,497 a clever play on words which 
emphasised that although the Beirut hostages, other than in mug shots and rare 
gruesome hostage execution videos, were kept largely out of sight they had definitely 
not been forgotten.
However, Morrell soon realized that keeping John McCarthy in the news was going 
to be a full time job and in February 1988 she officially set up the Friends of John 
McCarthy (FOJM) campaign to act as the driving force behind the John McCarthy 
media campaign. The FOJM centred their campaign on a series of carefully 
choreographed media spectacles, or image munitions, which guaranteed continued 
media coverage for John McCarthy and the other Beirut hostages: candle lit vigils to 
mark milestone events, billboard campaigns, printed t-shirts, posters, and banners 
with updated days in captivity counts. They also disseminated petitions (that were 
presented to the Thatcher government at 10 Downing Street) and even organized a 
club night ‘An Evening without John McCarthy’ at Sanctuary in the Camden Palace,
497 John McCarthy, and Jill Morrell, Some Other Rainbow (London: Corgi Books, 1994), p. 386
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on April 17, 1988. They toured the country with a cage containing a blindfolded 
dummy (representing John McCarthy) and sometimes the dummy was even replaced 
by a celebrity and for Christmas 1990 they even produced a Christmas card. All of 
these image munitions successfully kept the Beirut hostage crisis newsworthy, right 
up until John McCarthy’s eventual release on August 8, 1991. The FOJM had also 
built up enough media momentum to help ensure that the remaining Beirut hostages 
remained newsworthy.
Visualizing Contemporary Hostages
As I have shown there is a history to hijacking and to the hostage image munitions 
that circulate through the media. Before moving on to discuss the visualization of 
contemporary hostages, hostages will firstly be situated within a wider theoretical 
framework. Irene Herrmann and Daniel Palmieri expound a persuasive argument 
examining the history of the hostage. In their paper they draw upon a classic 
dichotomy which, they argue, has determined the role of hostages throughout history. 
This distinction is the voluntary hostage vs. the involuntary hostage. The voluntary 
hostage, Herrmann and Palmieri contend, denotes a time ‘when high-ranking 
individuals handed themselves over to benevolent jailers as guarantors for the proper 
execution of treaties.’498 This process is now redundant.499 However, the second 
term still applies to hostage-taking today. The involuntary hostage
like the voluntary hostage...can serve as a strategic asset in forcing an 
adversary to make concessions... In this case the involuntary hostage is 
valuable merchandise for which the abductor hopes to obtain a good price, 
and is therefore usually well cared for while awaiting the payment of
498 Irene Herrmann, and Daniel Palmieri, 'A Haunting Figure: The Hostage through the Ages', in 
International Review o f  the Red Cross, 2005. Available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/review-857- 
p!35/$File/irrc 857 Palmieri.pdf. Accessed on 7 March 2006, p. 135
499The authors o f this paper identify clearly that the defining factors, which finally signalled the end of 
the voluntary hostage, was a combination between the emergence o f ‘all-out war’ (in the 19th 
Century), followed later by the development o f the ‘laws o f war’ (in the first half o f the 20th Century). 
For their original account o f this hostage evolution, see Herrmann and Palmieri, 'A Haunting Figure', 
p. 139
500 Herrmann and Palmieri, 'A Haunting Figure’, p. 240
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Herrmann and Palmieri conclude that contemporary ‘hostages no-longer represent 
any value to their abductors except perhaps the value their own world places on 
them’501 through their images circulated within the media.
As the technology deficit has collapsed so the visualization of hostages has 
increased. The new media ecology -  the shift from localized to globalized and 
centralized to decentralized -  now also means that A1 Qaeda and Western 
governments have access to the same media and can respond to events in the West.502 
For example the release of a Kenneth Bigley hostage video was timed to coincide 
with Prime Minister Tony Blair’s keynote speech at the 2004 Labour Party 
Conference in Brighton.
A1 Qaeda is also fully aware of the power of ‘symbolic exchange’. Baudrillard has 
written of ‘symbolic exchange’ and terrorism (specifically hostage-taking): ‘The
hostage has a symbolic yield a hundred times superior to that of the automobile 
death, which is itself a hundred times superior to natural death.’503 This is because, 
according to Baudrillard, ‘natural death’ is ‘commonplace’ and as a result such 
deaths do not contain anything worthy of exchange whereas hostage deaths have a 
‘symbolic yield’ which can be exchanged.504 It is clear that Baudrillard’s perspective 
still resonates within contemporary debates about hostages because, according to 
Rinella Cere, ‘[t]he circulation of images of hostages, mainly in the form of videos, 
has become a large part of the Iraq War.’505 Having situated hostages within a wider 
theoretical framework attention will now turn to discuss specific contemporary 
hostage cases.
Jeff Lewis has noted how all contemporary jihadi hostage-takings follow a similar 
script:
501 Ibid, p. 143
502Thomas L. Friedman in his book has highlighted an instance whereby Osama bin Laden has clearly 
shovn that he holds an intimate up-to-date knowledge of Western news, see Thomas L. 
Friedman, The World Is Flat: The Globalized World in the Twenty-First Century. 2nd eds. 
(Loidon: Penguin Books, 2006), p. 489
503 Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death. Translated by Iain Hamilton Grant (London:
Sage, 1998), p. 165
504 Ibid, pp. 164-165
505 Rinella Cere, 'The Body of the Woman Hostage: Spectacular Bodies and Berlusoni's Media', in The
Wai Body on Screen, eds. Karen Randell and Sean Redmond (New York, NJ: Continuum, 
20(B), p. 245
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The victim is videotaped, kneeling before three hooded men who are reading 
their demands. It appears that the captive is not aware whether he [or she] is 
to be executed at that moment or simply exposed to public scrutiny through 
the iteration of demands; in a sickening revelation to audiences, however, the 
kidnappers indicate their intention to execute a victim when they are wearing 
gloves -  demonstrating, no doubt, that they do not want to contaminate their 
hands with infidels’ blood. On occasions, certain kidnap groups will 
videotape the victim pleading for his/her life or importuning governments to 
meet the kidnappers’ demands.506
Daniel Pearl, Nick Berg, Kenneth Bigley and Alan Johnston -  four contemporary 
hostages -  will now be examined. These four hostages have been singled out for 
discussion because they each mark a step-change in the course of contemporary 
hostage-taking in the war on terror. Many other people, from all around the world,
C A T
have been taken hostage and executed since the start of the war on terror; however, 
I will not focus on their cases here. Pearl, Berg, Bigley and Johnston each show how 
new media technologies have changed the way that symbolism is produced, 
disseminated and repeated. They also point to the weaponizing of hostage images 
and the manufacture of powerful image munitions.
Daniel Pearl -  a journalist with the Wall Street Journal -  was kidnapped in Karachi, 
Pakistan, on January 23, 2002, on his way to meet Sheikh Mubarak Ali Gilani, whilst 
researching a story about Richard Reid the ‘Shoe Bomber.’ Pearl was also a Jewish- 
American and this made him even more of a prime kidnap target (just like 
Klinghoffer). Contemporary hostage-takings take place today in the internet age and 
as such new media technologies facilitate the wide circulation of hostage image 
munitions. As a result, hostage execution videos have become an integral part of 
contemporary hostage-takings. This is because videos can be produced with 
‘minimum media’508 and uploaded anonymously (often through internet remailers) 
onto jihadi websites, for immediate international circulation and remediation.
506 Jeff Lewis, Language Wars: The Role o f  Media and Culture in Global Terror and Political
Violence (London: Pluto Press, 2005), p. 224
507 Including Edwin Dyer, Margaret Hassan, Paul Marshall Johnson, Jr., Seif Adnan Kanaan, Shosei 
Koda, Piotr Stanczak, Kim Sun-il and Fabrizio Quattrocchi.
508 Hoskins and O'Loughlin, Television and Terror, p. 127
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Pearl’s hostage-taking and execution, however, marks an important step-change in 
terms of contemporary hostages. Where traditionally hostages have been taken to 
produce media presences and episodic dramas, Pearl was instead kidnapped and 
executed to produce image munitions which A1 Qaeda could then deploy in the war 
of images. The way A1 Qaeda chose to achieve this was through breaking a Western 
taboo. Foucault has explored how, in the West, ‘torture as a public spectacle’509 and 
‘punishment as a spectacle’510 has been removed from public view. A1 Qaeda 
reversed this trend though by making Pearl’s execution a public spectacle, with the 
release of his hostage execution video over the internet.
What made this execution video even more shocking was the fact that it was so 
unexpected even though not long after Pearl had been kidnapped an email was sent 
to the Wall Street Journal demanding that all Pakistani prisoners be released from 
Guantanamo Bay and that Pearl would be killed if these demands were not met. 
Also, attached to this same email were a series of image munitions of Pearl. The 
Pearl hostage-taking had so far followed the same script as previous hostage-takings. 
These Pearl image munitions were like so many other hostage mug-shot images that 
are released to prove that hostage-takers have hostages and that their hostages are 
still alive. In order to help date these images, in a couple, Pearl can be seen holding 
an English edition of the Pakistani newspaper Dawn (a visual mimetic of the Aldo 
Moro image where he appeared holding a copy of the Italian newspaper La 
Repubblica).
The hostage-takers were also mindful, as in so many previous hostage-takings, not to 
give away Pearl’s location. Therefore, in all of these images Pearl appears sitting in 
front of a generic blue background, thus echoing the background in bin Laden’s 
videos (see Chapter Three). However, these image munitions are strikingly different 
from other hostage mug shot images, in one important respect. Two show Pearl being 
threatened with a handgun. With hindsight the presence of this handgun was perhaps 
an allusion to the fact that the hostage-takers already intended to escalate their 
violence against Pearl from the symbolic to the actual by executing him, rather than
509 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f  the Prison. Translated by Alan Sheridan
(London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 7
510 Ibid, p. 8
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merely threatening it in their email to the Wall Street Journal. However, at the time 
no one dared to guess the eventual gmesome outcome of the Pearl hostage-taking. 
Rather, all thoughts were focussed on Pearl’s hostage-takers making his hostage- 
taking an episodic drama to be concluded by his eventual release.
Instead, on Febmary 21, 2002, a gmesome execution video showing the beheading of 
Pearl (on Febmary 1, 2002) was released over the internet. Pearl’s execution video 
had been shot in front of the same generic blue background as had been featured in 
his earlier images, therefore, a continuity of ‘place’ had been achieved as in other 
videos, like those featuring bin Laden or indeed the 7/7 London Bombers suicide 
video wills (see Chapters Three and Five). The video also did not spare audiences 
any of the gmesomeness. Foucault has argued that historically ‘a hidden execution 
was a privileged execution, and in such cases it was often suspected that it had not 
taken place with all its customary severity.’511 A1 Qaeda, with the release of the 
Pearl execution video, could not be accused of carrying out a ‘privileged execution’ 
because Pearl’s gmesome execution was presented on video for all to see. It also set 
the trend for future hostage videos. The Pearl execution video was produced with the 
intention of being circulated widely across multiple media platforms: a powerful 
image munition, threatening other Western infidels with a similar fate. Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed, a detainee at Guantanamo Bay and the suspected mastermind 
behind a number of terrorist attacks including the 1993 WTC Bombing and the Bali 
Bombings, has since also admitted that he executed Daniel Pearl.
Pearl’s gmesome execution footage was quickly circulated: becoming the subject of 
an intense remediation battle between jihadi terrorists and his family, friends and 
colleagues. Jihadi terrorists located across the world were able -  with the use of 
‘minimum media’512 -  to take the original Pearl image munitions and edit them 
together with other footage (such as audio from anti-Western sermons, footage of 
statements being read out by senior A1 Qaeda members, footage showing suicide 
bombings, footage of the September 11 attacks, unlawful combatants at 
Guantanamo Bay and clips from terrorist training videos) and so produce jihadi 
internet propaganda, new image munitions.
5U Ibid, p. 58
512 Hoskins, and O'Loughlin, Television and Terror, p. 127
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Pearl’s family -  his parents Ruth and Judea Pearl, his widow Mariane Pearl, a 
freelance journalist -  and his friends and colleagues at the Wall Street Journal were 
shocked and appalled by his gruesome mediated execution, but they were equally 
disturbed by the proliferation of Pearl related jihadi internet propaganda after his 
death. All of this jihadi propaganda was having a negative impact on the memory of 
Daniel Pearl and so his family, friends and colleagues decided to use all of the media 
resources at their disposal to orchestrate and produce a number of powerful counter­
image munitions to disrupt A1 Qaeda’s representations of Pearl -  the execution -  and 
instead shift attention back to representations of Pearl -  the man -  and use his tragic 
death to promote a positive message. Here are just a few examples of Pearl counter­
image munitions: The Daniel Pearl Foundation was set up in his memory to promote 
understanding and cultural diversity; it employs an image of Daniel Pearl from his 
wedding day -  smiling, wearing glasses, a cream suit, a white shirt, a copper tie, a 
copper waistcoat and copper handkerchief -  featuring it on their website and in all 
other publicity material. This image is a clear example of a counter-image munition 
which has been released to rival the gruesome image munitions showing Pearl’s 
kidnapping and execution. His parents (Ruth and Judea Pearl) also decided to use 
their sons’ final words T am Jewish’ to try and inspire others. They did this by 
editing a book where famous and influential Jewish people gave personal reflections 
about being Jewish.513 Judea Pearl has also contributed a chapter to a book entitled 
After Terror: Promoting Dialogue Among Civilizations,514 he has also written a 
number of op-ed articles. For example, to mark the seventh anniversary of his sons’
513 See Judea Pead, and Ruth Pearl, eds. I Am Jewish: Personal Reflections Inspired by the Last
Words o f  Daniel Pearl (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights Publishing, 2004). Contributors to 
this volume include: Ehud Barak, Sylvia Boorstein, Edgar M. Bronfman, Alan Colmes, Alan 
Dershowitz, Kirk Douglas, Richard Dreyfuss, Kitty Dukakis, Dianne Feinstein, Tovah 
Feldshuh, Debbie Friedman, Milton Friedman, Thomas L. Friedman, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Nadine Gordimer, David Hartman, Moshe Katsav, Larry King, Francine Klagsbrun, Harold 
Kushner, Lawrence Kushner, Shia LaBeouf, Norman Lamm, Norman Lear, Julius Lester, 
Bemard-Henri Levy, Bernard Lewis, Daniel Libeskind, Joe Lieberman, Deborah E. Lipstadt, 
Joshua Malina, Michael Medved, Ruth W. Messinger , Amos Oz, Cynthia Ozick, Shimon 
Peres, Martin Peretz, Dennis Prager, Anne Roiphe, Sandy Eisenberg Sasso, Vidal Sassoon, 
Zalman M. Schachter-Shalomi, Daniel Schorr, Harold M. Schulweis, Lynn Schusterman, 
Natan Sharansky, Gary Shteyngart, Sarah Silverman, Michael H. Steinhardt, Kerri Strug, 
Lawrence H. Summers, Mike Wallace, Elie Wiesel, Leon Wieseltier, Sherwin T. Wine, Ruth 
R. Wisse, Peter Yarrow, A. B. Yehoshua and Eric H. Yoffie
514 See Judea Pearl, 'On Clash, Morality, Renaissance, and Dialogue', in After Terror: Promoting
Dialogue among Civilizations, eds. Akbar Ahmed and Brian Forst (Cambridge: Polity, 
2005), pp. 138-45
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murder he wrote an article for the Wall Street Journal ‘Daniel Pearl and the 
Normalization of Evil: When Will Our Luminaries Stop Making Excuses for 
Terror.’515
Bernard Henri Levy, a French philosopher and journalist, has published Who Killed 
Daniel Pearl?516 -  a book investigating the events surrounding the kidnap and 
murder of Pearl. HBO have also produced a documentary: The Journalist and the 
Jihad: The Murder o f Daniel Pearl about the events surrounding Pearl’s execution. 
The University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) has also founded ‘The Daniel 
Pearl Memorial Lecture’ an annual lecture to be delivered by a leading figure within 
the media. The Wall Street Journal in association with the Ecole de Joumalisme de 
Sciences Politique in Paris have also established ‘The Daniel Pearl Prize for 
Journalism’. Mariane Pearl has also written the memoir A Mighty Heart517 -  a 
personal account of the life and death of her husband.
This intimate portrait of her late husband has been a particularly potent counter­
image munition to all the negative Pearl image munitions and it has also helped to 
bring Pearl’s murder to the attention of new audiences. The Daniel Pearl incident 
has since reached an even wider audience as Michael Winterbottom, the Director of 
the docu-drama The Road to Guantanamo, has directed A Mighty Heart the feature 
film adaptation of Mariane Pearl’s memoir in which Daniel Pearl is played by Dan 
Futterman and Mariane Pearl is played by Angelina Jolie. The film begins with 
Daniel Pearl going to meet with Sheikh Mubarak Ali Gilani. It then unfolds 
following Mariane Pearl’s desperate attempts to negotiate Daniel Pearl’s release, the 
airing of his gruesome execution video on the internet, the locating of Daniel Pearl’s 
body and the hunt for his kidnappers and murderers. Towards the end of the film 
Winterbottom represents the ongoing battle between Pearl image munitions and Pearl 
counter-image munitions. He begins with a heavily pregnant Mariane Pearl (Jolie) 
lying on a bed with tears welling up in her eyes as Jolie describes the kidnapping and
5,5 Judea Pearl, 'Daniel Pearl and the Normalization of Evil: When Will Our Luminaries Stop Making 
Excuses for Terror'. The Wall Street Journal, 03 February 2009. Available at: 
http://online.wsi.com/article/SB 123362422088941893.html. Accessed on 10 February 2009, 
Unpaginated
516 Bernard Henri Levy, Who Killed Daniel Pearl? (Hoboken, NJ: Melville House Publishing, 2003)
517 Mariane Pearl, A Mighty Heart: The Brave Life and Death o f My Husband, Daniel Pearl (London:
Virago Press Ltd., 2003)
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execution of Daniel Pearl in a voiceover. Inserted into this scene are two extracts 
from the Pearl execution video as reenacted by Futterman. The first extract shows 
Pearl (Futterman) delivering his final words to the camera ‘My name is Daniel 
Pearl... and I am Jewish,’ then Jolie’s voiceover describes how Daniel Pearl 
remained undefeated and defiant as the second extract shows Pearl (Futterman) 
recalling how there is a street in Israel named after his Great Grandfather. It then 
cuts immediately to a scene of Mariane (Jolie) giving birth to Adam Pearl and the 
film ends with a shot of Mariane and Adam walking off into the distance of a French 
street.
Here Winterbottom is drawing attention to the fact that Pearl’s execution image 
munition is undermined by the fact Pearl remained proud of his Jewish heritage right 
to the end. This is emphasized by the fact that Jolie clearly states that he remained 
undefeated. The film could have ended there but instead Winterbottom offers a 
compelling counter-image munition: the birth of Adam Pearl (Daniel’s most precious 
legacy) and shows how Mariane and Adam continue to live their lives after his death. 
Footage from this film -  including clips and still images -  has since been used to 
help advertise the film at film festivals, film premiers, awards ceremonies, at cinemas 
and to mark its DVD release. All of this has resulted in the wide circulation of a 
number of powerful counter-image munitions to counter the negative jihadi image 
munitions of Pearl. These counter-image munitions, however, are distinct entities 
from those counter-image munitions produced and deployed by the Bush 
administration in response to A1 Qaeda’s image munitions.
Nick Berg -  an American telecommunications worker in Iraq -  was last heard from 
by his family on April 9, 2004. It soon emerged that he had been kidnapped. His 
kidnapping was later confirmed when he appeared in a video, released over the 
internet, on May 11, 2004. In this image munition Berg was also shown being 
beheaded, like Pearl. It was later determined though that Berg had in fact been 
executed on May 7, 2004. The Berg case has been singled out for discussion here 
because it marks another important step-change in terms of contemporary hostages. 
Berg’s hostage execution video was the first to be produced by the Iraqi insurgency 
movement and it started the trend of hostage image munitions being deployed with 
the intention of gaining a strategic advantage against technologically superior
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Coalition forces operating in the Iraqi theatre of war. His hostage-taking is also 
further evidence of hostages now being taken specifically to produce gruesome 
image munitions, rather than being taken specifically to manufacture a media 
presence. The Berg execution video is further evidence of A1 Qaeda denying a 
hostage a ‘privileged execution’ and instead turning his death into a public spectacle.
The Berg execution video is clearly modelled on the earlier Pearl execution video. In 
this video Berg is bound, sitting on the floor and looking straight into the camera. 
Again this links in with Benjamin’s idea about figures gazing out of images creating
SIRthe illusion of being able to actually see their spectators. Therefore, instead of 
audiences simply being spectators to Berg’s execution (with little or no emotional 
engagement), audiences are instead transformed into witnesses (who register 
different emotional responses from enjoyment to horror). Behind Berg, in the video, 
are stood five masked men. The masked man, in the centre, is reading a statement. 
This statement explains that Berg has been taken hostage in response to the abuse of 
Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison facility. This statement thus replaces the 
usual set of demands which hostage-takers release to authorities through their 
communications. The nature of this statement also shows that the hostage-takers 
were not looking to engage in any kind of dialogue. This is also reflected by the fact 
that only one Berg video was released (his execution video) and therefore the 
hostage-takers gave authorities no opportunity to try and open up a dialogue. The 
same man who read out the statement also hacked off Berg’s head. Berg is, 
therefore, transformed with this video into a Baudrillardian ‘counter-gift’519 -  due to 
the retrospective nature of the exchange. This video also shows Berg’s hostage- 
takers striving to frame the execution video in a global context. He is shown wearing 
an orange coloured jump-suit, an apparent allusion to the detainees at the 
Guantanamo Bay detention facility. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the ‘al-Qaida leader in 
Iraq’ until his death in June 2006, has also confirmed that he executed Berg.
Kenneth Bigley (a British civil engineer) was taken hostage, along with Eugene 
Armstrong and Jack Hensley, two American civil engineers, in Iraq, on September
518 Benjamin, One-Way Street, p. 244
519 See Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange
520 Hoskins and O'Loughlin, Television and Terror, p. 128
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16, 2004. On September 18, 2004, a video, or image munition, was released 
showing that the hostage-takers did indeed have Bigley, Armstrong and Hensley and 
that they were still alive (a mimetic of earlier hostage mug shot images). This video 
showed the three hostages blindfolded and bound, sitting on the floor, with a masked 
man standing behind them reading a statement calling for the immediate release of 
Iraqi women from US custody, a demand that the hostage-takers knew neither the 
American nor the British government would accede to. This video was already 
familiar to the media and news audiences, primarily because of its mimetic qualities 
and was able to be quickly inserted into existing news frames. This video was only 
the start of a hostage drama which would be played out through five further videos 
released to the international media.
On September 20, 2004, as America and Britain had not acceded to the hostage- 
takers earlier demand for the immediate release of female Iraqi prisoners from US 
custody, a video was released which showed the gruesome execution of Eugene 
Armstrong. This image munition was reminiscent of the earlier Berg execution 
video. Armstrong appeared bound, sitting on the floor, wearing an orange coloured 
jump-suit (a reference to Guantanamo Bay detainees), looking straight into a set 
piece camera, with five masked men holding AK-47s stood behind him and with the 
masked man in the centre reading a statement. One striking difference between this 
video and the earlier Berg video is the presence of the al-Tawhid wal-Jihad banner 
hanging on the wall. Whereas it was only confirmed afterwards that Berg had been 
executed by al-Zarqawi, the presence of the al-Tawhid wal-Jihad banner in the 
background of the Armstrong video made it immediately clear that al-Zarqawi 
(founder of al-Tawhid wal-Jihad) was involved in this execution. Armstrong’s 
execution video was quickly followed, on September 21, 2004, by the release of 
another image munition showing the beheading of Jack Hensley. The Hensley 
execution video was a direct mimetic of the Armstrong execution video.
On September 22, 2004 Kenneth Bigley appeared in his second video. This Bigley 
video was similar stylistically to the earlier Armstrong and Hensley videos (thus 
helping to manufacture a continuity of ‘place’) only he was not executed. Instead he 
was shown making a direct plea to Prime Minister Blair. This image munition marks 
another important step-change in contemporary hostage-taking as Bigley was able to
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address the British Prime Minister directly via the media. Bigley appeared in a third 
hostage video, on September 29, 2004. This image munition was a departure from 
previous hostage videos because this time Bigley appeared, as Rory McCarthy 
describes it, ‘sitting hunched on the floor in a shiny orange jumpsuit. His hands and 
feet were shackled with a metal chain that hung round his neck and he sat in a 
cramped, steel mesh cage built against a brick wall.’521 This video was a further 
allusion to the Guantanamo Bay detainees because the official Camp Delta images 
show detainees being held bound in cages in orange coloured jump-suits, so Bigley’s 
kidnappers here had reproduced the same scenario but with Bigley now assuming the 
role of an ‘unlawful combatant’. This image munition was also timed specifically to 
coincide with Prime Minister Blair’s keynote speech at the 2004 Labour Party 
Conference in Brighton. This once again shows how in a global media age terrorists 
are indeed able to keep abreast of events in the West and also that they can 
confidently produce and disseminate footage for release to coincide with Western 
events. This echoes bin Laden’s November 1, 2004 video where he timed his image 
munitions release to coincide with the US Presidential election (see Chapter Three). 
I identify these interventions into the regular affairs of politics as image munitions 
rather than as examples of propaganda because they are clearly weaponized images 
which are meant to elicit a political response rather than propaganda designed to 
elicit a purely emotional response.
On October 7, 2004 Bigley appeared in his fourth and final video. This video was a 
return to a more familiar style of hostage video, which once again reproduced a 
continuity of ‘place’ for the media and news audiences. In this image munition 
Bigley again appeared sitting bound, on the floor, in an orange coloured jump-suit, 
looking straight into the camera, with five masked men -  holding AK-47s -  stood 
behind him (with the man in the centre reading out a statement) and the familiar al- 
Tawhid wal-Jihad banner on the wall. As in previous execution videos Bigley was 
decapitated, evidence again of hostage executions being turned into media spectacles 
and nothing more than a source of powerful image munitions.
521 Rory McCarthy, Sophie Arie, and Sandra Laville, 'Caged and Chained, Bigley Makes New Plea: 
Kidnappers Should Contact Us, Says PM as Video Shows Hostage's Plight', The Guardian, 
30 September 2004. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.Uk/print/0.3 858,5028011-
I03681.00.html. Accessed on 15 March 2006, Unpaginated
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According to Heather Nunn and Anita Biressi:
Mr. Bigley’s predicament (and others like it) [were] transmitted around the 
world and claimed audience attention not only through written and spoken 
reportage, but also through the circulation of video footage and stark 
photographic stills produced by the kidnappers, which arguably took on 
iconographic status. In these images Kenneth Bigley was bound and 
surrounded by his captors, or chained and trussed in a cage (reminiscent of 
images of those held at Guantanamo Bay), forced to address the camera and 
plea for help, and finally killed on camera. The kidnapped body can be used 
for propaganda, its vulnerability and imminent death transposed into portraits 
of the victim marshalled for political rhetoric about the impossibility of 
compromised intervention.... The Bigley case was dissected in the British 
media as one that offered insights into how individual trauma can be 
deployed for propaganda purposes and also as a prompt in expanding the 
ongoing public political dialogue on the War against Terror. This footage 
(video images of the kidnapped body) was regarded variously as a vehicle of 
propaganda and evidence, defiance and msult.
Nunn and Biressi argue that Bigley’s videos (and those of other hostages) are 
important sources of propaganda for A1 Qaeda. They explore this with reference to 
the way in which Bigley’s hostage-takers carefully manufactured his videos and 
packed them with symbolic references to the wider war on terror, for example 
Guantanamo Bay, and with the specific intention of circulating them internationally 
through the media. They also argue that the kidnapped body in the war on terror has 
become an important vehicle of propaganda for A1 Qaeda. However, it is important 
to recognise that such images are not only pieces of powerful propaganda but 
weaponized images that are designed specifically to elicit responses from Western 
governments and militaries.
The apparent abandoning -  by A1 Qaeda -  of jihadi hostage execution videos is often 
explained by the release of a letter, by Ayman al-Zawahiri, A1 Qaeda’s second in 
command, in late 2005. In this letter al-Zawahiri suggests that hostage execution 
videos could actually be counterproductive. Lentini and Bakashmar have 
concluded that this letter suggests
522 Heather Nunn, and Anita Biressi, 'The Kidnapped Body and Precarious Life: Reflections on the
Kenneth Bigley Case', in The War Body on Screen, eds. Karen Randell and Sean Redmond 
(New York, NJ: Continuum, 2008), p. 227
523 Pete Lentini and Muhammad Bakashmar, ‘Jihadist Beheading: A Convergence o f Technology,
Theology, and Teleology’. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 4 (2007), p. 317
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that the jihadists do not always live by the maxim that they would prefer 
more casualties than publicity. It is doubtful that the A1 Qaeda leadership 
disagrees with the tactic in principle. Rather, the leadership views it as 
counterproductive to its overall objectives. Although there is no guarantee 
that beheadings may not resume elsewhere or in Iraq, the letter’s appearance 
and delivery appear to suggest that although it is important for jihadists to 
demonstrate commitment to potential recruits and supporters, it is in effect 
preaching to the converted. Beheadings in the context of the Iraq conflict, 
therefore, may have had limited tactical value. By 2005 they appear to have 
served their purposes, at least for A1 Qaeda.524
As sources of jihadi propaganda hostage execution videos did not get A1 Qaeda many 
new supporters. Those who agreed with their use of such gruesome tactics were 
already jihadist followers. Therefore as sources of propaganda and as recruitment 
tools the hostage videos possibly backfired because instead of recruiting more 
moderate potential jihadists the extreme tactics employed in these videos alienated 
wavering jihadists, having a potentially negative effect on A1 Qaeda’s support base. 
They are also evidence of the unpredictability of images in the information age, how 
image munitions can have a damaging ‘own goal effect’ (see Chapter Six) and they 
also point toward the success of some of the counter-image munitions. Attention 
will now turn to the kidnapping of Alan Johnston which shows how certain aspects 
of A1 Qaeda’s hostage execution video script have since been picked up and used by 
other terrorist groups.
Alan Johnston was kidnapped on March 12, 2007 -  whilst working as a BBC 
journalist in the Gaza Strip -  and later released on July 4, 2007. Johnston’s hostage- 
taking is distinct from that of Pearl, Berg and Bigley because he was kidnapped 
primarily for financial gain and Hamas actually intervened playing an instrumental 
role in his release. However, Johnston’s hostage-taking did still result in the 
production of a series of powerful image munitions and counter-image munitions 
which have since circulated widely throughout the international media. According to 
Karen Randell:
In early May a tape was released by his alleged kidnapers, a group called 
Jaish al-Islam (Army of Islam) showing not Johnston but his BBC pass,
524 Ibid, p. 319
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presumably his only ID on the day, but also a symbol of the British 
institution, a history of imperialist power.
Then, on June 1, 2007, Johnston’s kidnappers released a second video which actually 
featured Johnston himself. This image munition was a mimetic of the earlier hostage 
image munitions from Iraq. In the video Johnston appeared sitting on the floor, 
wearing an orange coloured jump-suit, delivering a statement in a set piece to camera 
in front of a generic black background. His kidnappers were clearly mindful not to 
give away any visual clues as to his location. This mimetic of the Iraq hostage 
videos was more to do with making sure that the video would fit neatly into existing 
news frames, rather than for its overt references to the Guantanamo Bay detainees. 
Following Johnston’s kidnapping colleagues at the BBC mobilized a media 
campaign (reminiscent of the earlier FOJM media campaign) which produced 
powerful counter-image munitions. Randell has recounted how:
[o]n April 12, 2007, a group of journalists gathered in Trafalgar Square, 
London, to mark the anniversary of, and to protest at, the kidnapping of the 
BBC correspondent Alan Johnston on March 12, 2007. Giant pictures of 
Johnston hung in the square as a reminder of the loss but also as a means of 
ownership of Johnston, as a means to care about one man whose life few 
knew about on March 11, 2007.... The face of Alan Johnston has now 
become the face of the hostage in Britain: symbolic of loss and symbolic of 
our powerlessness to do anything.... Johnston was literally absent. His 
AWOL status prompted marches, petitions, special BBC Radio programs -  
one in particular “From Our Own Correspondent” renamed “To Our Own 
Correspondent” aired on BBC Radio 4 and the World Service on May 17, in 
the hopes that Johnston could access it and know that he was being cared for 
in his family’s and colleagues’ thoughts. Vigils were held to commemorate 
his forty-fifth birthday on May 17, and over 100,000 people worldwide 
signed a BBC-organized petition urging that he be freed.
On June 25, 2007, another Johnston hostage video was released. He again appeared 
sitting on the floor, in an orange coloured jump-suit, in front of a generic black 
background, thus manufacturing a continuity of ‘place’ and helping to immediately 
frame this latest video with the media and news audiences. However, in this video, 
his kidnappers chose to escalate the level of symbolic violence by making Johnston 
wear a suicide bomber vest. This video was another powerful image munition for
525 Karen Randell, 'Introduction: The Body o f the Hostage', in The War Body on Screen, eds. Karen
Randell and Sean Redmond (New York, NJ: Continuum, 2008), p. 217
526 Ibid, pp. 217-218
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their cause. Following his release Johnston has also given his hostage-taking a
• • • 527strong media afterlife by recounting his hostage experiences in interviews. This is 
reminiscent of the earlier Beirut hostage crisis where former hostages went on to do 
interviews and write autobiographies.528
In Iraq, hostage execution videos may now have become counterproductive but the 
possibility that A1 Qaeda cells will make use of this same strategy in other parts of 
the world is still a very real threat. In fact, in January 2007, Parviz Khan, Basiru 
Gassama, Hamid Elasmar, Mohammed Irfan, Zahoor Iqbal and Arnjad Mahmood 
were arrested in Birmingham whilst planning to kidnap and behead -  on video -  a 
British Muslim soldier. Parviz Khan, the leader of the cell, had planned to befriend a 
British Muslim soldier and whilst on a night out on Broad Street (Birmingham’s 
entertainment district), with the help of local drug dealers, kidnap him, behead him
529Tike a pig’ and then release the gruesome video footage over the internet. Just as 
the introduction of suicide terrorism into the West, on 9/11 and 7/7, brought A1 
Qaeda’s fight to the streets of America and Britain (see Chapter Four), so a hostage 
execution video, made in Britain, would again take A1 Qaeda’s fight to the streets of 
Britain rather than to the streets of some distant conflict theatre (like Iraq).
Andrew Hill has argued that,
[because] of the relative absence of Western casualties in media coverage of 
the War on Terror, these videos offer the opportunity to see death, in a culture 
in which -  while fictive depictions of death proliferate (in cinema, 
photography, and film), pointing to the desire to witness death -  real deaths 
are rarely seen.530
The symbolic power of hostage execution videos can also be measured by the fact 
that writers and directors of fictive depictions of death are now drawing on and even 
directly copying the symbolism contained in real hostage execution videos. These 
fictional depictions from popular culture are evidence of the success of hostage
527 For example Alan Johnston appeared in conversation with Stephen Sackur in an episode of the 
BBC programme HARDtalk that was aired on December 25, 2007
528 See Brian Keenan, An Evil Cradling (London: Vintage, 1993), McCarthy and Morrell, Some Other
Rainbow and Terry Waite, Taken on Trust (London: Coronet Books, 1994)
529 David Byers, 'Gang Plotted to Behead Muslim Soldier 'Like a Pig", The Times, 29 January 2008,
Available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article3269848.ece. Accessed 
on 21 April 2008, Unpaginated
530 Hill, Re-Imagining, pp. 63-64
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image munitions. For example, Studio 60 on the Sunset Strip, a show about a 
fictional American late night sketch-comedy show, from the creators of The West 
Wing, in 2007, ran a four episode storyline about the fictional kidnapping of three US 
airmen in Afghanistan (one of whom was the younger brother of Studio 60 on the 
Sunset Strip regular cast member Tom Jeter). At the centre of this storyline was a 
fictional hostage video which contained all of the now familiar symbolic elements of 
real hostage videos: the hostages sat on the floor looking straight into the camera, 
while five masked men -  armed with AK-47s -  stand behind them and a statement is 
read out. Also, on the background wall is the terrorist group’s flag.
Contemporary hostage-taking was again fictionalised, on October 27, 2008, this time 
for the opening episode of the seventh series of the hit BBC drama Spooks. Spooks, 
since first airing back in 2002, has successfully managed to tap into the Zeitgeist of 
the war on terror. This episode was about the kidnapping of the character Private 
Andy Sullivan, a British soldier, from the streets of London. Much of this series 
seven opener was played out as a desperate race against time to find Private Sullivan 
before his mediated execution. The Private Sullivan hostage video again shares 
many of the hallmarks of real hostage videos: the hostage sitting before a set piece 
camera, the wall behind the hostage covered with the Islamic group’s flag, the 
kidnappers wearing balaclavas and holding AK-47s. These fictional hostage 
execution videos from Studio 60 on the Sunset Strip and Spooks point toward the 
circulation and remediation of hostage execution videos: something which I will now 
discuss.
Circulating Hostage Images
Hostage images have become the subject of a number of interventions as new media 
actors have reused them. This is not surprising given that hostage images are 
manufactured by terrorists with the specific intention of being circulated. Parody is 
of course the next logical remediation phase, after news networks and jihadi internet 
propaganda. What these interventions help to illustrate are the surprising and 
unpredictable number of new contexts hostage execution videos are able to appear 
across in the information age.
234
Five subversive interventions will now be explored. Pearl’s execution video has 
been remediated on YouTube in a mimetic video featuring Star Wars figures. Boba 
Fett (the bounty hunter who captured Han Solo and delivered him to Jabba the Hutt 
in Return o f the Jedi) appears playing Daniel Pearl, whilst five Sand People or 
Tusken Raiders are stood behind him (playing Pearl’s executioners). To help give 
this video a realistic edge it has been edited together with the appalling audio from 
the original Pearl video. This video parody concludes, like the real Pearl video, with 
the beheading of Fett (Pearl). The producer of this YouTube video was clearly 
making a satirical comment about Pearl’s execution but it is certainly done in bad 
taste.
Nick Berg has similarly become the subject of a remediation video. Derek Rose 
writes:
The shocking video was found... on the Web site of supporters of radical 
hook-handed London preacher Sheik Abu Hamza al-Masri.... Two hooded 
boys and a girl in what appears to be a Muslim head scarf stand behind a 
kneeling lad in a sick, twisted parody of the Kim Sun II and Nick Berg 
beheading videos. The leader of the rugrat pack wags his index finger over 
his head and shifts what looks like a large stick from hand to hand as he 
appears to deliver a speech in the silent, chilling movie. The other two 
brandish what look to be wooden play rifles. Then the ringleader removes a 
shiny object that was wrapped in his mask, quickly bends over and pretends 
to saw off the head of his little captive. The girl lends her assistance. The 
movie ends.531
The producer of this perverse video parody was making light of Berg’s execution. 
This disturbing video also shows a dangerous mimetic escalation: a group of children 
playing at being terrorists and kidnappers. This video also forces Western audiences 
to confront the fact that just as children have for generations been encouraged to 
aspire to become soldiers, some children are also encouraged to aspire to become 
terrorists and kidnappers.
531 Derek Rose, 'These Tots Are Terrors Kids Parody Grisly Real-Life Killing in Web Video', New 
York Daily News, 24 June 2004. Available at: 
http://www.nvdailynews.com/archives/news/2004/06/24/2004-Q6-
24 these tots are terrors kids .html?print=1&viewall=l. Accessed on 08 March 2009, 
Unpaginated
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Next, are two interventions about Kenneth Bigley. First, the comedian Billy 
Connolly has been criticised for making the following joke: ‘Perhaps I shouldn’t be 
saying this... aren’t you the same as me, don’t you wish they would just get on with 
it?’ Comedy gives a social commentary on events, often contemporary ones. 
Sometimes comics do misjudge the situation and this was certainly the case with 
Billy Connolly’s joke about Kenneth Bigley. Second, the blog: World o f Mr 
Agreeable features the following parody, entitled ‘Today’s Third Guest Blogger: Ken 
Bigley’ posted on October 23, 2004. It features an image of Kenneth Bigley -  taken 
before his kidnapping -  wearing a white polo shirt and a smile. This is followed by a 
fake quote from Bigley: “According to the publicity material around campus, the 
blog is mightier than the sword. Well I beg to differ, frankly!” Below this is the 
poster from the 1966 Carry On film: D on’t Lose Your Head (which is a parody of 
The Scarlet Pimpernel) it shows five Carry On stars with their heads under the blade 
of the guillotine. Underneath this the blogger has added: [Oh come on, you’re 
laughing on the inside...]. This subversive intervention again misjudges the situation 
because it makes light of Bigley’s execution -  with its reference to D on’t Lose Your 
Head -  when audiences are still reeling from the news of his gruesome mediated 
beheading.
Finally, a hostage execution video parody was also produced by American, Benjamin 
Vanderford, back in 2004. This video contains many of the hallmarks of real hostage 
execution videos: a hostage (Vanderford) appearing bound, sitting in a plastic chair, 
looking straight into a camera, while a disembodied hand -  holding a knife -  appears 
and proceeds to cut the hostages’ head off. So convincing was this video that it was 
mistaken for a real hostage execution video and actually found its way onto a number 
of jihadi internet propaganda websites, appearing alongside actual hostage execution
532videos. This video is therefore an important example which illustrates just how 
uncontrollable the spectacle of execution actually is in the war on terror, the fact that 
a new media actor -  such as Vanderford -  was able to produce his own fake hostage 
execution video and for it to be mistaken for a real one and end up where he could 
never have expected (on websites alongside real hostage execution videos).
532 Hill, Re-Imagining, p. 67
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Vanderford’s fake hostage execution video also supports my earlier claims about 
remediated images carrying strong auratic presences.
These interventions which parody contemporary hostage images -  produced by new 
media actors with distinct intentions from A1 Qaeda -  are proof of the unpredictable 
trajectories of hostage image munitions, beyond their initial deployment, in the 
image warfare theatre of war. The ability of hostage image munitions to float freely 
today means that they now appear in surprising new places and as a result reach out 
to new audiences. For example, people are confronted with remediated hostage 
footage when they go online (and receive email jokes or go on YouTube and view a 
spoof Pearl hostage execution video reinacted with Star Wars figures and view a 
video featuring children reinacting the execution of Berg or see Vanderford’s fake 
hostage execution video) and also when they watch live comedy (Billy Connolly’s 
misjudged joke about Kenneth Bigley). These remediations of contemporary hostage 
images also highlight the fact that mass media information systems (centred on 
controlling and censoring the flow of information and images and still popular with 
America and Britain) are outdated in the war on terror, following the advent of the 
rhizomatic condition. A1 Qaeda has instead embraced and adapted to the challenges 
of image warfare, focussing their attention on producing image munitions that will 
have a maximum impact when deployed rather than misdirecting their attention 
towards trying to keep control of hostage image munitions following their release. 
Attention will now turn to examine the spectacular hunt and killing of Uday and 
Qusay Hussein.
Hunting, Killing and Circulating Uday and Qusav Hussein
During the opening phase -  the military phase -  of the 2003 Iraq War the Bush 
administration once again rolled out its familiar RMA way of warfighting, still 
believing that they could control the spectacle of war. Initially this strategy proved 
successful. However, the Saving Private Lynch episode, the spectacle of Saddam’s 
falling statue and President Bush’s ‘Mission Accomplished’ speech were all quickly 
discredited. These manufactured media spectacles were soon shown to be, according 
to Mirzoeff, ‘literally re-runs: of Saving Private Ryan (1998), the revolutionary
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533destruction of statues since 1776 and the action film Top Gun (1986).’ Also, to 
help US troops identify members of Saddam’s government the Pentagon also 
produced and disseminated a set of playing cards (‘Personality Identification Playing 
Cards’) which were issued to soldiers in the Iraq theatre, who could then play with 
them during their down time and also use them to familiarise themselves with the 
fifty two most senior members of Saddam’s government. However, these playing 
cards can also be read as an unintended allusion to the uncontrollability of the 
spectacle in contemporary war and a sign of the surprising contexts that images of 
Uday, Qusay and Saddam Hussein would eventually end up in. A1 Qaeda’s 
manufactured media spectacles from Iraq, which include gruesome hostage videos, 
however, are not merely mimetics of popular culture (like the Pentagon produced 
spectacles) rather they mark a return to public execution as a spectacle. Attention 
will now turn to discuss the insurgency phase of the war in Iraq and specifically the 
misjudged transformation into a media spectacle of the hunting and killing of Uday 
and Qusay Hussein, on July 22, 2003, and the misfiring of damaging image 
munitions.
Coalition forces were aware that to capture or kill Saddam’s two sons would be a 
major blow to Saddam’s power base. This was because, after Saddam, they were the 
most potent symbols of Saddam’s reign of terror. Uday Hussein, Saddam’s oldest 
son, the Ace of Hearts in the Pentagon’s ‘Personality Identification Playing Cards’, 
used to be the heir apparent to Saddam, however, in 1988, he beat to death one of 
Saddam’s bodyguards and during the same period he also shot in the leg one of his 
uncles. Saddam was forced to briefly exile Uday to Switzerland. According to 
Suzanne Goldenberg, Uday was ‘a sadist with a taste for cruelty so extreme that even 
his father was forced to acknowledge that his first-born son would not be a worthy 
heir.’534 In 1996, Uday was also injured in an assassination attempt that left him with 
a limp and having to walk with a cane. This, in the eyes of Saddam, had a further 
detrimental effect on Uday’s public image because the cane symbolised weakness 
something which Saddam had to distance himself from. Another factor which 
contributed to his falling out of favour with his Father was his extravagant playboy
533 Mirzoeff, Watching Babylon, pp. 67-68
534 Suzanne Goldenberg, 'Uday: Career of Rape, Torture and Murder'. The Guardian, 23 July 2003.
Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/iul/23/iraq.suzannegoldenberg.
Accessed on 21 February 2010, Unpaginated
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lifestyle. While many Iraqis were surviving in poverty Uday was instead flying 
around the world on a private jet, he had a collection of expensive cars and he also 
had his own private zoo. He also had a reputation for kidnapping women off the 
streets and raping them. His extravagances and taste for cruelty caused tensions with 
Saddam and Qusay Hussein. However, Saddam did try and channel Uday’s sadistic 
tendencies by appointing him as head of the Fedayeen Saddam, who were 
responsible for the disappearance of members of the political opposition to Saddam’s 
government -  who were often interrogated, tortured and murdered. Uday was also 
made head of the National Iraqi Olympic Committee and he used this position to deal 
out sadistic punishments to Iraqi sportsmen who failed to deliver on the international 
sporting stage. For example, he routinely imprisoned athletes and when the Iraqi 
football team failed to qualify for the 1994 World Cup finals they were forced to kick 
concrete balls.
Qusay Hussein, the Ace of Clubs in the Pentagon’s ‘Personality Identification 
Playing Card’, who was the heir apparent to Saddam, was the total opposite of his 
brother Uday. He did not live an extravagant playboy lifestyle (in fact he was a 
family man) and he also did not share in his brothers’ taste for cruelty. This does not 
mean though that Qusay was afraid to order punishments, rather it meant that he was 
able to keep a cool head when under pressure and not loose control like his brother. 
For example when Uday killed one of Saddam’s bodyguards or when Uday shot one 
of his uncles in the leg. Because of this Qusay was appointed as the head of the 
Republican Guard and also head of the secret police and in both these positions he 
was responsible for the interrogation, torture and murder of many people. As heir 
apparent Qusay also took an active role in the day-to-day running of Iraq and the 
Ba’ath Party. In the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War the country was divided up into 
four military zones and Qusay was put in charge of the Baghdad-Tikrit zone. After 
Saddam, Qusay was in fact the most powerful man in Iraq.
Therefore, after the conclusion of major combat operations the capture or killing of 
Uday and Qusay Hussein was made a top priority, along with the hunt for Saddam 
Hussein (see the next section). This is evidenced by the fact that big rewards were 
put up for information leading to their capture. Coalition forces then searched Iraq 
using a combination of intelligence reports and tip-offs. This eventually resulted in
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Uday and Qusay being tracked down to Mosul, on July 22, 2003, and so ensued a 
fierce fire fight between Coalition forces and Saddam’s two sons; the result of which 
saw the killing of Uday, Qusay and also one of Qusay’s sons. The Pentagon hoped 
that the deaths of Uday and Qusay Hussein would send a strong message to the Iraqi 
people that the Saddam regime had been dealt a considerable blow and this would be 
a significant move in winning over the hearts and minds of Iraqis. However, instead 
the announcement of the deaths of Uday and Qusay Hussein was immediately met by 
scepticism from sections of the Iraqi public who thought that news of their deaths 
was the result of some sophisticated Pentagon produced hoax rather than the result of 
a real military operation.
To try and counter this scepticism, prove that Uday and Qusay Hussein were indeed 
dead, win the hearts and minds of Iraqis and regain control of the spectacle of war 
the Pentagon hastily transformed their deaths into a media spectacle (still thinking 
that they could control the circulation of information and images in the internet age) 
by releasing death images of Uday and Qusay to the media. This move was justified 
by the Bush administration as necessary in order to win over the hearts and minds of 
Iraqis. The Pentagon also stressed that they had initially announced the deaths of 
Uday and Qusay Hussein without publishing their death images but that this had 
been met by strong scepticism in Iraq and therefore it was felt that the only way to 
prove once and for all that Uday and Qusay were in fact dead was to release the 
gruesome images of them lying on autopsy slabs to the media. However, this 
episode marked a dangerous escalation by the Pentagon. It meant that the Bush 
administration no longer held the moral high ground over A1 Qaeda regarding, what
STSFoucault has termed, ‘the disappearance of punishment as a spectacle.’ Instead 
these image munitions opened up a new visual chapter in the war on terror which 
saw the Pentagon breaking its taboo of showing death images in the media.
Because the death images of Uday and Qusay were designed specifically to be 
circulated it is not surprising then that these image munitions have gone on to 
remediate uncontrollably beyond news networks and jihadi internet propaganda and 
have been deployed, by new media actors, in criticism of the Bush administration.
535 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 8
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For example, Peter Nicholson drew a cartoon to mark the release of the death images 
of Uday and Qusay Hussein. The cartoon shows President Bush and Colin Powell in 
The Oval Office with the dead bodies of Uday and Qusay Hussein propped up 
against the wall. A speech bubble from Powell reads: ‘You’re right Dubya. We 
could have them stuffed and mounted...’ The hunt for Uday and Qusay is thus 
presented here as a sport, their bodies as souvenirs of the kind taken by rich imperial 
aristocrats hunting ‘big game’ in Africa. This political cartoon is a clear criticism of 
the Bush administration and the somewhat arrogant way in which it has operated in 
Iraq and Nicholson also draws a link here between this display of arrogance and the 
arrogance displayed by imperial aristocrats who plundered Africa for game souvenirs 
without a care for the local populations.
Again, in response to the release of death images of Uday and Qusay Hussein, Jay 
Leno, host of The Tonight Show, made the following joke: ‘A number of Arabs say 
they do not believe Uday and Qusay are dead. They said they want more proof, so 
today we shot them again.’ Jay Leno is here drawing a clever cognitive link between 
the act of shooting someone with a gun and the act of shooting someone with a 
camera. Leno is also making satirical reference here to the fact that it was a mistake 
by the Bush administration to release death images of Uday and Qusay to the media 
because they were never going to satisfy every Iraqi on the street and stop conspiracy 
theories from circulating about their deaths. These Uday and Qusay remediations are 
also displayed in surprising places and so bring news of their deaths to the attention 
of new audiences: in a political cartoon and in a joke on The Tonight Show with Jay 
Leno. The problems encountered by the Bush administration in their response to the 
deaths of Uday and Qusay -  the misjudged transformation of their deaths into a 
media spectacle and the launching of self-defeating death image munitions which 
have gone on to be remediated by new media actors -  are even more pronounced in 
relation to the hunt/capture/trial/execution of Saddam Hussein, something to which I 
will now turn.
Hunt/Capture/Trial/Execution and Circulation of Saddam Hussein
After media attention about the Uday and Qusay Hussein death image controversy 
had died down, according to Nicholas Mirzoeff, ‘[t]he hunt for Saddam himself
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continued with the release of several digitally altered photographs, suggesting what 
the deposed leader might look like,’ thus reflecting elements of the earlier hunt for 
bin Laden537 (see Chapter Three). However, it was not until December 14, 2003 
when Coalition forces picked up Saddam’s scent and finally tracked him down to a 
‘spider hole’ near the town of Tikrit. Saddam -  the Ace of Spades in the Pentagon 
produced ‘Personality Identification Playing Cards’ -  was found hiding in a 
claustrophobic underground space with a large sum of money. When confronted he 
showed no resistance and was immediately placed into coalition custody. To 
document and turn his capture into a media spectacle an image munition was quickly 
released, to the media, which showed the dishevelled former Iraqi Presidents’ 
capture. This image showed Saddam with his face in the dirt and with an American 
soldier restraining him whilst also posing for the camera.
This image munition was quickly followed by the release of a further image 
munition, footage showing the former Iraqi President undergoing a somewhat 
humiliating medical examination. This medical examination video showed a weary 
and slightly stunned looking Saddam Hussein with a military physician checking his 
matted hair (both facial and head) for fleas, shining a light in Saddam’s eyes and 
inside his mouth. Finally, the military physician could be seen swabbing Saddam’s 
mouth for a DNA sample. The turning of Saddam’s capture into a media spectacle 
and a source of image munitions was again justified by the Bush administration in 
terms of winning Iraqi hearts and minds and also in terms of proving, so there could 
be no doubt, that Saddam was indeed in coalition custody.
Anthony Barnett, in an OpenDemocracy.net article, conveys what many people were 
thinking when they first witnessed Saddam’s capture. ‘I was delighted. It didn’t feel 
to me like the improper humiliation of a prisoner of war. I felt absolutely no pity. 
Saddam Hussein is quite beyond any regular calculation of innocence. I revelled in
C I Q
his reduction to ordinariness and the stripping away of illusions and myths.’
536 Mirzoeff, Watching Babylon, p. 87
537 McVeigh, The American Western, p. vii
538 The pose in this image of Saddam’s capture shares parallels with some o f the poses in the Abu
Ghraib and Camp Breadbasket prisoner abuse images (see Chapter Six).
539 Anthony Barnett, 'Inside Saddam's Mouth', OpenDemocracy, 18 December 2003. Available at: 
http://www.opendemocracv.net/democracv/article 1652.isp. Accessed on 6 April 2009, 
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However, this does not take into account the views of Saddam’s supporters. In 
releasing image munitions of Saddam’s capture the Bush administration had 
neglected to fully take into account the ripple effects of Saddam’s capture. In turning 
Saddam’s capture into a humiliating media spectacle, the coalition had unwittingly 
transformed their hunt for Saddam into a possible A1 Qaeda recruitment tool because 
it showed him being persecuted and humiliated by American military personnel. 
Saddam was indeed well on his way to becoming a martyr.
After his spectacular capture the former Iraqi President again disappeared from 
public view. On May 20, 2005, he appeared on the front page of The Sun newspaper. 
The front cover featured a new humiliating image munition of Saddam Hussein in a 
pair of white Y-front pants, folding up his trousers, and the accompanying headline 
stated: ‘THE TYRANT’S IN HIS PANTS.’ This served to reinforce the dishevelled 
and broken man image which had been constructed with his capture. It is also 
further evidence of the uncontrollability of image munitions in the information age. 
Following this, Saddam again disappeared from public view. He did not appear 
again until the start of his trial on October 19, 2005.
During his trial, Saddam seized the opportunity to try and repair some of the damage 
which had been done to his image since his capture. Throughout the trial he always 
appeared in court wearing a suit and with well kept hair, he was hoping to produce a 
powerful counter-image munition to replace the image munitions of him looking 
dishevelled. He also remained defiant throughout his trial by refusing to recognize 
its legitimacy. His trial was finally concluded on November 5, 2006 when he was 
found guilty of committing crimes against humanity: specifically for ordering the 
killing of 148 Shias in Dujail in 1982. As a result he was sentenced to be executed 
by hanging. Again he disappeared from public view.
Saddam Hussein once again, on December 30, 2006, became the subject of further 
image munitions when he was hanged at ‘Camp Justice’ in Kazimain. A1 Qaeda had 
already made execution the subject of public spectacle following their release of 
numerous hostage execution videos. However, having taken inspiration from 
hostage execution videos rather than the many recent misguided MIME-NET 
inspired media spectacles, the new Iraqi government decided to up the mimetic ante
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by recording Saddam’s execution and then screening it on the Iraqi state television 
station Al Iraqiya. From here Saddam’s execution then circulated internationally 
from one media platform to another. Vian Bakir believes that:
[g]iven the complexity of the political situation, for Saddam Hussein’s 
execution to convey the appropriate political message, maximum control over 
the imagery was needed -  including who should execute him, and where, and 
when. The execution was the result of an Iraqi-governed trial, itself a 
response to the groundswell of support for “Iraqi ownership” of the state- 
building process and a signal of Iraq’s capacity to self-govem.... When the 
execution should happen was [also] the subject of debate between Iraqi 
officials as, under Iraqi law, no execution could be carried out during 
religious holidays. The Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha began on Saturday 
for Sunnis and Sunday for the Shi’a, who now controlled Iraq’s government. 
As such, the decision to execute Saddam Hussein on the Saturday could well 
have been interpreted by Sunnis as a major sectarian slight.... Whether or not 
the timing was wise is another matter, but what is clear is that such decisions 
were carefully deliberated, with the aim of exercising political control over a 
volatile situation.540
Bakir’s points align with my own about image munitions because she describes how 
the new Iraqi government were aware throughout the planning of Saddam’s 
execution that footage of his execution had the potential to function positively or 
negatively as a weapon, depending on how it was managed. Bakir’s argument also 
clearly points out just how much the new Iraqi government misunderstood the 
uncontrollability of images in the information age by thinking that in pre-planning all 
aspects of the execution they would be able to somehow control its dissemination 
and circulation and so control its political message. In fact the new Iraqi government 
were always going to loose control of Saddam’s execution and its political message, 
beyond the initial deployment of his execution image munition.
Although Saddam’s execution was not public in the way described by Foucault541 
(no large crowds gathered) it was public in another way: transmitted to an audience 
of millions through the media. Audiences’ were given ‘ringside seats’542 in front of 
their television and computer screens to watch Saddam’s execution. The new Iraqi 
government had not accounted for the fact that this same audience would also be able
540 Vian Bakir, 'Tele-Technologies, Control, and Sousveillance: Saddam Hussein - De-Deification and
the Beast'. Popular Communication 7, no. 1 (2009), p. 10
541 See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 58
542 Carruthers, The Media at War, p. 168
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to redeploy and remediate his execution footage for their own political purposes, 
distinct from the original political message of the new Iraqi government. The Al 
Iraqiya execution image munition will now be examined more closely.
Al Iraqiya’s Saddam Hussein execution video was filmed, according to Bakir, by 
‘Ali Al Massedy normally Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki’s official videographer.’543 
It began with the former Iraqi President being led into the execution chamber, by his 
executioners, who each wore black balaclavas to help disguise their identities -  a 
modem twist on the traditional executioner’s mask. His executioners can then be 
seen leading the shackled former Iraqi President up the steps of the scaffold and out 
onto the platform, positioning him carefully over the trapdoor. Saddam can then be 
seen staring at the floor. In a final act of defiance Saddam had refused to wear the 
traditional black hood. This garment is traditionally placed over the head of the 
condemned thus shielding audiences from the actual moment of death. However, 
Saddam wanted to be transformed into a martyr and a ‘privileged execution’544 -  like 
the wearing of a black hood -  would have threatened this. Parallels can be drawn 
here with Hannah Arendt’s account of Adolf Eichmann’s execution: “I don’t need 
that’, he said when the black hood was offered him. He was in complete command 
of himself, nay, he was more: he was completely himself.’545 The noose was then 
placed around Saddam’s neck. To help spare audiences from witnessing Saddam’s 
actual moment of death, and to indirectly ensure that his execution was privileged,546 
the video then cuts to a later scene of a dead Saddam wrapped in a white death 
shroud. Despite attempts by the Iraqi government to control the spectacle of 
Saddam’s execution (by limiting video access to Ali Al Massedy) a remediation 
battle soon ensued following the release of an unofficial Saddam execution video 
over the internet.
This video was, according to Bakir, ‘an act of user-generated content, illegally and 
secretly filmed through the railings of the scaffold by a security guard at Saddam 
Hussein’s execution on a mobile phone and uploaded to the Web 12 hours later that
543 Bakir, 'Tele-Technologies’, p. 11
544 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 58
545 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality o f  Evil (New York, NJ: Penguin
Books, 1994), p. 252
546 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 58
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same day.’547 This unofficial video or image munition -  which spared audiences 
none of the gruesome details of Saddam’s final moments and also did not afford him 
a privileged execution -  then quickly circulated virally on YouTube, through emails 
and mobile phones and therefore reached a massive international audience. Bakir 
believes:
this [video] showed that rather than being “frightened and terrified” in the 
moment before his death, Saddam Hussein repeatedly denounced the 
Americans and called for all Iraqis to resist them, stating that he was unafraid 
of death and shouting “the Muslim Ummah [community] will be victorious,” 
and “Palestine is Arab.”... As Saddam Hussein stands on the gallows, one 
observer is heard to tell him to “go to hell.” Saddam replies, “The hell that is 
Iraq?” Amid such exchanges, a man appeals for propriety, pleading, “Please, 
stop. The man is facing an execution.” Saddam begins to recite the 
Shahadah, an act of faith performed by Muslims prior to death, but before he 
has completed the second recitation the trap door is opened and he falls to his 
death. Approximately 15 seconds after Saddam Hussein is seen falling 
through the trap door, the camera phone lingers on his forcedly upturned face, 
lit from above, swinging from a rope.548
What this illicit footage reveals -  like the official footage -  is that Saddam was 
defiant to the very end, but what this footage also reveals -  unlike the official footage 
-  is that Saddam also faced admonishment from some of those present in the 
execution chamber and attempts were also made to try and maintain a sense of 
decency around his execution. However, although this image munition has 
circulated widely -  for obvious reasons, the fact that it shows the gruesome scene of 
Saddam’s lifeless body swinging from a rope -  it has not received as large a 
mainstream circulation as the official Al Iraqiya execution image munition. Instead 
the footage has been widely denounced by the Iraqi government, the Bush 
administration, the Blair government and beyond. Regardless, this image munition 
has been -  and continues to be -  damaging for both the Iraqi government and 
Coalition forces. It works in Al Qaeda’s favour because it shows the new Iraqi 
government in a bad light humiliating Saddam Hussein and therefore it could bring 
wavering jihadists over to Al Qaeda’s cause. Saddam’s reputation as a martyr was 
indeed cemented with his very public execution as it was the ultimate humiliation.
547 Bakir, 'Tele-Technologies', p. 12
548 Ibid, p. 12
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Sean Redmond has remarked of the unofficial Saddam execution video that it 
enabled him to bring the war body home and engage fully with the footage:
I could rewind and fast-forward, I could re-edit the footage, and I could copy 
it and send it to others, partaking in the trade of images of the war body on 
screen. I could kill and kill again; and I could reanimate, give life to, Hussein 
the Tryant. I could give life and death to the war body on screen. I too could
i • 549be a wamor tyrant.
Redmond also argues: ‘I also knew that the war body on screen can never be
disappeared: a billion mobile phones and low-end digital cameras will see to that. 
YouTube will see to that.’550 Since Saddam’s execution, and the ensuing remediation 
battle, the Iraqi government have also realized that they cannot control the spectacle 
of execution. Members of Saddam’s former government who have since been found 
guilty of committing similar crimes against humanity have been executed without 
becoming the subjects of media spectacle: as official photographers, mobile phones 
and digital cameras have all been banned from the execution chamber.551
What the above discussion has revealed is that the insurgency phase of the war in 
Iraq has indeed been dominated by misjudged media spectacles, or misfired image 
munitions, once again proving that the Pentagon -  and more recently the new Iraqi 
government -  has failed to respond effectively to the new security challenges posed 
by the new image warfare theatre of war. Because in reality the Bush administration 
and the new Iraqi government were always going to loose control of the image 
munitions featuring the capture, trial and execution of Saddam Hussein after their 
initial deployment. I will now turn to discuss some examples which describe the 
uncontrollable remediation of Saddam image munitions beyond news networks and 
jihadi internet propaganda.
For example, a screen-grab from Saddam’s medical examination video, where an 
army physician can be seen shining a medical torch into his mouth, has been edited
549 Sean Redmond, 'Introduction: The War Body on Screen', in The War Body on Screen, eds. Karen
Randell and Sean Redmond (New York, NJ: Continuum, 2008), p. 18
550 Ibid, pp. 18-19
551 This reflects the lawful execution o f prisoners in the US and beyond. For an account o f American
lawful executions see Stephen Trombley, The Execution Protocol: A Controversial and 
Shocking Look into America's Capital Punishment Industry from the Inside (London: 
Century, 1993)
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together with the following caption: ‘The U.S. military searches Saddam for
weapons of mass destruction.’ This is a satirical attack against the Bush 
administration who built their case for going to war in Iraq and removing Saddam 
Hussein from power around the fact that Iraq had WMD that were a threat to 
Western security. At the end of what the Bush administration called major combat 
operations no WMD had been found. The producer of this image parody is making a 
comment about the absence of WMD in Iraq and how the only place left to search for 
them is seemingly on Saddam’s person, specifically in his mouth.
Four political cartoons will now be examined. Kevin Robertson has drawn a cartoon 
of Saddam’s execution which shows him, to the right, with a noose around his neck, 
asking: ‘What are you doing?’ To the left is a masked man with a camera-phone, 
answering: ‘Playing “Hangman.”’ The caption reads: ‘During the execution of 
former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, a cell phone camera was used to spread the 
“noose” around the world...’ This cartoon depicts Saddam’s execution as justice, as 
sport and as souvenir. It also, with its caption, explains how the spectacle of his 
execution quickly became news around the world.
A cartoon by Martin Rowson shows three masked men (Saddam’s executioners) 
sitting down while Saddam’s rotting legs, surrounded by flies, hangs from a rope. A 
speech bubble coming from the side of the cartoon reads: ‘Do it again! It still ain’t 
dignified enough...’. This cartoon points to the conflicting relationship the West 
currently has with representations of death. People wanted to witness the spectacle 
of his execution/death but they also wanted to make sure that his execution was 
dignified. It is almost as though in striving to make his mediated execution more 
dignified this somehow raises Saddam’s executioners morally above Al Qaeda who 
have executed hostages on video in Iraq.
In another cartoon Matt Glover has drawn the lower half of a bound Saddam Hussein 
hanging from the scaffold, while two spectators look on. One of the spectators asks 
the other. ‘Remind me how this makes us any better than him...’ This cartoon 
makes the argument that through mediating the execution of Saddam Hussein any 
moral divisions which previously separated the Iraqi, American and British 
governments from him have now been eroded.
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Harley Schwadron’s cartoon shows a school boy sat at home in front of his 
computer, while his Mum is standing in the doorway -  presumably telling her son to 
get on with his homework. The boy responds: ‘I’m not goofing off. I’m watching 
Saddam’s hanging on YouTube for my current events class.’ This cartoon shows 
how through mediating Saddam’s execution, and because unauthorized camera­
phone footage of his execution also exists, the subject of execution has now become 
normalized to the point where it could be the subject of a child’s current events class 
at school. All of these political cartoons are aimed at attacking the Bush 
administration and the new Iraqi government over their ill-thought-out attempts to 
win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people by releasing humiliating images of 
Saddam Hussein’s capture, trial and execution.
A number of subversive interventions have also been made. A selection of them will 
now be explored. Saddam Hussein has become the subject of a mock Norelco 
electric razor advert. The advert shows two images of Saddam Hussein -  one of him 
looking dishevelled just after his capture and the other shows him clean shaven with 
a moustache. The advert reads: ‘A shave fit for a dictator! Try the new Norelco 
Spectra, the razor of choice by the US Special Forces!... Ideal for even the most 
stubborn beards!’ The producer of this image parody is making reference to the fact 
that following his capture American Special Forces were able to completely control 
Saddam. The Norelco razor is employed here to show just how Saddam has been 
transformed, since his capture, from a wild and unpredictable figure (looking 
dishevelled) back into his familiar figure (clean shaven and with a moustache) the 
subject of so much international derision and hatred.
Another parody features the image of President Bush presenting the troops, in Iraq; 
with a Thanksgiving turkey (an image which has been widely criticised because of 
the fact that the turkey was manufactured as a photo-opportunity by the military) 
only the turkey has been photoshopped out and replaced instead with the dishevelled 
head of Saddam just after his capture. This image makes reference to the fact that 
the Bush administration presented Saddam to the waiting world following his capture 
but how this was, like the Thanksgiving turkey, merely a manufactured photo­
opportunity designed by the military to win over the hearts and minds of Iraqis.
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Saddam’s dishevelled head can also be seen peaking out of the first ‘o’ in the Google 
logo, whilst two US soldiers stand and look on. This image is ironic because it 
shows Saddam hiding in the first ‘o’ of the Google logo, Google being the worlds 
most popular internet search engine. The producer of this image parody was making 
a sarcastic reference to the fact that the Bush administrations hunt for Saddam was 
still ongoing.
The dishevelled head of Saddam has also been superimposed onto the body of a 
Queer Eye fo r  the Straight Guy makeover participant. Thus making it seem as 
though the ‘Fab Five’ have made over Saddam: styling his hair, trimming his beard 
and giving him a manicure and also giving him a new identity. This image parody is 
yet another sarcastic reference to the fact that Saddam has still not been caught and 
somewhat irreverently it shows Saddam on the run turning to a popular American 
television makeover show for advice on how to change his appearance and so keep 
evading capture.
Conan O’Brien, host of the NBC show Late Night with Conan O'Brien, following 
Saddam’s execution, made the following joke: ‘A cell phone video has surfaced of 
Saddam Hussein’s hanging and officials are trying to figure out who shot the video. 
People who were at the hanging say it was probably the guy who kept yelling, “Hey, 
keep it down. I’m on the phone here.’” O’Brien is making a joke here at the 
expense of the new Iraqi government over the fact that they thought that they could 
control the airing of Saddam’s execution in the age of video-phones and the internet.
Video parodies of Saddam’s execution can also be found on YouTube. One titled 
Execution o f Saddam Hussein: Official video from Iraqi Ministry o f Information 
features Saddam as a finger puppet pleading for clemency, with a Cartman-like 
voice, then the finger puppet is shown being hung with a knotted shoelace. Another 
video mimics the unofficial execution camera-phone footage, reproduced with Lego 
figures. The video features the following subtitles:
Executioner: Do you have anything to say?
Saddam: Anyone up for a game of “Hangman”?
250
Guards: [Laughter]
Executioner: Pull the Switch!
These particular YouTube videos are a satirical reference to the fact that the new Iraqi 
government mistakenly believed that it could produce, disseminate and control the 
circulation of Saddam’s execution spectacle. All of these subversive interventions 
make fun of official attempts by the Bush administration and the new Iraqi 
government to win over the hearts and minds of the Iraqi public via the production 
and dissemination of Saddam Hussein image munitions.
These interventions parody the image munitions documenting Saddam Hussein’s 
capture/trial/execution. They are produced by new media actors who operate beyond 
the control and censorship of traditional top-down information management systems, 
still popular with America and the new Iraqi government, and are further proof that 
the spectacle of execution cannot be controlled in the information age. These 
remediations also reveal that because of the free floating and unpredictable nature of 
image munitions people are increasingly able to come into contact with Saddam’s 
image in surprising new places -  beyond the range of the traditional media -  thus 
bringing Saddam to the attention of new audience demographics. For example, 
people are confronted by Saddam’s image when they go online to check their email 
and go on YouTube (and see Saddam in Lego, in the Google logo or as a contestant 
on Queer Eye fo r  the Straight Guy). Saddam is also a rich source of material for 
comedians and as such he confronts people when they watch comedy; for example, 
Conan O’Brien’s joke about Saddam’s execution on Late Night with Conan O ’Brien. 
Al Qaeda again shows here how it has leamt an important lesson in the war of 
images -  unlike America and the new Iraqi government. That it cannot hope to 
control the flow of image munitions, beyond their initial deployment, as they will get 
picked up and deployed by new media actors who have their own distinct intentions. 
Consequently, Al Qaeda instead focussed its attention on maximising the immediate 
impact for its Saddam Hussein image munitions.
Conclusion
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This chapter has examined the role of executions in the new image theatre of war. I 
began by historically situating hijackings and hostage-takings -  with reference to a 
diverse range of examples -  showing how they are examples of early image munition 
experiments, employed to gain a media presence and to promote an us versus them 
distinction. Then hostages and executions were conceptualized with specific 
reference to ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ hostages and Baudrillard’s discussion of 
hostages through the prism of ‘symbolic exchange’. Attention then shifted to 
examine the contemporary hostage-takings of Pearl, Berg, Bigley and Johnston, thus 
showing that contemporary hostages are the subjects of increasingly sophisticated 
image munitions. The Johnston hostage-taking in the Gaza Strip, the foiled 
Birmingham hostage plot and the mimetic of hostage videos within popular culture 
all prove that contemporary hostage-taking is still symbolically powerful. Beyond 
news network footage and jihadi internet propaganda hostage images continue to 
circulate and are also remediated by people with distinct intentions from those of 
governments and Al Qaeda. Indeed further evidence that the circulation of images 
cannot be controlled in the information age.
I then turned to discuss the hunt for Uday and Qusay Hussein and how the decision 
to show their death images within the media rather than winning the hearts and 
minds of Iraqis instead produced a number of damaging image munitions which have 
since been picked up and deployed by Al Qaeda against the Bush administration and 
have also been picked up and remediated by new media actors with intentions that 
are distinct from those of the Pentagon and Al Qaeda. I then discussed how these 
same mistakes were made, again with the intention of winning the hearts and minds 
of Iraqis, with the mediated capture/trial/execution of Saddam Hussein. The Bush 
administration and the new Iraqi governments decision to transform Saddam into a 
media spectacle has also resulted in the production of a series of damaging image 
munitions that Al Qaeda has since deployed against the Bush administration. People 
with divergent intentions from the Pentagon, the new Iraqi government and Al Qaeda 
have since also picked up and remediated these Saddam image munitions. The fact 
that the death images of Uday and Qusay Hussein and the images documenting the 
capture/trial/execution of Saddam Hussein now appear in a diverse range of 
surprising new image contexts is again evidence of the uncontrollability and 
unpredictability of the circulation of images in the rhizomatic condition.
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The next chapter will discuss the role of abuses in the war on terror. This case study 
is distinct from my previous thematic case studies because rather than examining 
images that were produced with the original intention of being made publicly 
available and being weaponized I will instead be exploring prisoner abuses, 
Guantanamo Bay and the Extraordinary Rendition programme. These were 
supposed to remain invisible but have instead been picked up, weaponized and 
deployed by Al Qaeda, anti-war protesters and NGO’s against America and Britain.
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Chapter Six
Abuses
Introduction
In Chapters One and Two I developed the theoretical part of this thesis. Exploring 
how society has shifted from a mass media age to a rhizomatic media age (defined by 
the uncontrollable and unpredictable circulation of information and images) and then 
examining the impact of this shift on contemporary war: a move from techno-war to 
image warfare. I then embarked on the empirical part of this thesis, a series of four 
thematic case studies examining the wider theatre of image warfare. Chapter Three 
explored the ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ political communication image munitions 
produced by President Bush, Prime Minister Blair and bin Laden and their 
circulation and remediation in the war on terror. Chapter Four examined the 
symbolic dimension of suicide terrorism, how it is an important source of powerful 
image munitions which Al Qaeda produces and deploys in the war of images and 
how new media actors have also remediated these suicide terrorism image munitions. 
Chapter Five discussed how the visualising of hijackings, hostage-takings and 
hostage executions have over time become increasingly sophisticated and how the 
hostage image munitions produced are also now subject to unpredictable 
remediation, appearing in surprising new contexts which depart from the original 
intentions of Al Qaeda. I also saw how the transformation of the hunt for Uday and 
Qusay Hussein and the capture/trial/execution of Saddam Hussein into media 
spectacles were misjudged because instead of winning the hearts and minds of Iraqis 
they resulted in a number of damaging image munitions being deployed against the 
Pentagon and the new Iraqi government by Al Qaeda. They have also been picked 
up and used by new media actors with intentions that are distinct from those of Al 
Qaeda.
In this chapter I focus on abuses in the war on terror. This case study is distinct from 
my previous case studies because it examines images which were not originally 
produced as media spectacles, or image munitions, but were instead later deployed as
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damaging image munitions against America and Britain. President George W. Bush, 
on September 20, 2001, in an address made to Congress and the American people, 
declared that the war on terror would be ‘unlike any other [war] we have ever 
seen.’552 He then proceeded to declaim that this war ‘may include dramatic strikes, 
visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success.’ Elsewhere I have 
argued that ‘[w]hat this paradox shows... is the schizophrenic nature of the Bush 
administration’s war on terror. Where, at one end, visualization is encouraged, at the 
other, invisibility is encouraged.’554 This case study examines a range of ‘covert
• tkioperations’ which have taken place since September 11 and have become 
subsequently visible, thus proving, once again, that the spectacle of war cannot be 
controlled because in the information age the spectacle of abuse will not remain out 
of sight. This uncontrollability is further emphasised by the fact that these abuses -  
perpetrated by the American and British militaries -  were able to be filmed and 
photographed by military personnel (semi-autonomous agents) and then became 
unintentionally weaponized against the Bush administration and the Blair 
government.
I will conceptualise war abuses, showing that although warfare is punctuated by 
instances of abuse, traditionally they have remained out of sight. Where they have 
become visible they have been mobilized by anti-war movements and popular 
culture. This ‘other’/invisible war on terror will then be discussed, in detail, with 
reference to Nicholas Mirzoeff s account of ‘The Empire of Camps’ and how it has 
since become visible and the focus of intense military/political/public debate and has 
resulted in the production of a number of powerful image munitions and counter­
image munitions and continues to be the subject of remediation battles. I will then 
explore the uncertainty surrounding the weaponizing of the Abu Ghraib images and 
identify when they actually underwent their transition from unauthorized trophy 
shots to weaponized images, discussing specific Abu Ghraib image munitions and 
also exploring their circulation and remediation. Two other features of the invisible 
war on terror -  Guantanamo Bay and the Extraordinary Rendition programme -  will 
then be surveyed, exploring examples of remediation. I will then explore General Sir
552 President George W. Bush, 20/09/2001, Unpaginated
553 Ibid, Unpaginated
554 Roger, 'Watching Babylon’, p. 95
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Michael Jackson’s announcement of an investigation into the abuse of Iraqi prisoners 
by some British soldiers, the publication of faked prisoner abuse images in The Daily 
Mirror (which raises important questions about the relationship between real and 
faked abuse images and also about the invisibility/visibility of abuses in the war on 
terror) and the making public of real abuse images from Camp Breadbasket in Iraq. 
Finally, the ‘own goal effect’ of abuse images will be explored and reference made to 
the early steps taken by President Barack Obama to try and exorcise Bush’s 
schizophrenic legacy of simultaneously manufacturing visibility and enforcing 
invisibility in the new image warfare theatre of war.
Conceptualizing W ar Abuses
Warfare, especially since the advent of photography, is peppered with accounts of 
abuse where the laws of war have been violated: the Crimean War;555 the American 
Civil War;556 the Boer War;557 the First World War; the Spanish Civil War;558 the 
Second World War; the Algerian War; the Vietnam War; the Cambodian Civil 
War559 and beyond. However, war abuses have largely remained hidden. This is 
because in the age of mass media communication governments and militaries were 
better placed to control what images the press reported. When war abuses are 
visualized this is evidence of governments and militaries losing control of the flow of 
information. On these occasions these images quickly become mobilized by anti-war 
movements, as was the case with the My Lai Massacre images, and also the subject 
of popular culture, like Gillo Pontecorvo’s film The Battle o f Algiers (although this 
film was made after the Algerian War). With this in mind, at the end of the First 
Gulf War the American government, the Pentagon and American news networks 
were all mindful to maintain the clinical narrative of war by self-censoring negative
555 See Ulrich Keller, The Ultimate Spectacle: A Visual History o f  the Crimean War (London:
Routledge, 2002)
556 See Anthony W. Lee, and Elizabeth Young, On Alexander Gardner's Photographic Sketch Book o f
the Civil War (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008)
557 See Nicholas Riall, ed. Boer War: The Letters, Diaries and Photographs o f Malcolm Riall from the
War in South Africa, 1899-1902 (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 1999)
558 See Robert Capa, Heart o f  Spain: Robert Capa's Photographs o f the Spanish Civil War (London:
Aperture Foundation, 1999)
559 See Craig Etcheson, After the Killing Fields: Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide (Lubbock,
TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2005)
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war abuse images, such as the infamous Turkey Shoot incident. According to 
Sontag:
American television viewers weren’t allowed to see footage acquired by NBC 
(which the network then declined to run) of what that superiority could 
wreak: the fate of thousands of Iraqi conscripts who, having fled Kuwait City 
at the end of the war, on February 27, were carpet bombed with explosives, 
napalm, radioactive DU (depleted uranium) rounds, and cluster bombs as 
they headed north, in convoys and on foot, on the road to Basra, Iraq -  a 
slaughter notoriously described by one American officer as a ‘turkey 
shoot’.560
These images were in fact not made public until just prior to the Second Gulf War 
when they featured in the February 14, 2003 edition of G2 magazine in The 
Guardian newspaper. These gruesome images were finally published, in an effort to 
mobilize opposition to the invasion of Iraq. During the 2003 Iraq War abuses were 
once again hidden, substituted by manufactured media spectacles, like Saving Private 
Lynch, the fall of Saddam’s statue and Bush’s ‘Mission Accomplished’ speech.
In 2004, war abuses finally made the headlines when images appeared showing the 
abuse of Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison facility at the hands of some 
American military personnel. These images were quickly picked up and used by the 
anti-war movement and non-government organizations (NGO’s), such as Amnesty 
International (and will be the subject of the next section). However, apart from Abu 
Ghraib, abuses were still largely hidden from view. Unlawful combatants in the 
Guantanamo Bay internment camp were still shrouded in mystery, appearing only in 
a limited number of official images. Detainees are shown in these images wearing 
orange coloured jump-suits. These official images have since been copied by 
contemporary hostage-takers, where hostages have been made to appear in videos 
wearing orange coloured jump-suits (see Chapter Five). Since then, unlawful 
combatants, Extraordinary Rendition and internment centres like Camp X-Ray (now 
Camp Delta) have also been copied in popular culture: Rendition, 24, Battlestar 
Galactica and Heroes. According to Randell: ‘In an articulating feedback loop, one 
can [also] read the entire series of Lost as a metaphoric, displaced exploration of
560 Sontag, Regarding the Pain, p. 59
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America’s rendition policy.’561 These popular culture references to abuses from the 
war on terror highlight the symbolic power of these abuses and also the fact that they 
are uncontrollable as they appear in such diverse and unpredictable new contexts.
It is important to also remember that these kinds of abuses are not limited solely to 
war. Abuses in the war on terror are indeed strikingly similar to the institutionalized 
forms of abuse found in American prisons. Christopher Reed has pointed out that:
Americans have been mistreating and torturing their fellow Americans in 
their own lock-ups for decades.... In “liberal” California, horror stories have 
appeared for years from hellholes such as Pelican Bay prison, where they 
house “the worst of the worst” — and also inflict the worst brutalities. A 
prisoner dumped in scalding water so his skin peeled off like varnish; 
prisoners left naked outside in rainy and bitter weather for days; multiple 
beatings and rapes; several unexplained deaths.
In Corcoran prison, California, guards held their own Roman gladiator games 
with prisoners pitted against each other in fights to the near death. A disliked 
and defenceless prisoner was placed in the same cell as the biggest and 
baddest sex criminal — known as the Booty Bandit -- to be duly raped to the
562amusement of the prisoner’s supposed guardians.
These kinds of abuses now also appear in the prisons and internment camps of the 
war on terror. This is perhaps unsurprising given that some of the guards, certainly 
SPC Charles Graner from the Abu Ghraib prison facility, prior to joining the US 
army had been employed in the American prison system.
‘The disappeared’ or ‘the unseen’563 indeed played a central role within the Bush 
administrations war on terror. According to Andrew Hill ‘it is possible to point to 
two broad dimensions of the [empirical] unseen that have weaved their way through 
the War on Terror.’564 He sees the first dimension as:
the case of the body of images from Abu Ghraib shown to US senators, but 
deemed too ‘disturbing’ to appear elsewhere... The Bush administration’s
561 Karen Randell, and Sean Redmond, 'Introduction: Setting the Screen', in The War Body on Screen,
eds. Karen Randell and Sean Redmond (New York, NJ: Continuum, 2008), p. 8
562 Christopher Reed, 'Torture on the Homefront: America's Long History o f Prison Abuse',
Counterpunch, 2004. Available at: http://www.counterpunch.org/reed05112004.html.
Accessed on 25 February 2009, Unpaginated
563 Hill, Re-Imagining, pp. 117-130
564 Ibid, p. 117
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argument on limiting the disclosure of these images centred on their 
dissemination damaging US interests, and -  in yet another example of the 
duplicity that has so undermined the moral claims made for the War on 
Terror -  that their disclosure would contravene the Geneva Convention 
against the humiliation of prisoners, by showing prisoners being treated in 
such a degrading fashion.565
And the second dimension:
to deliberately render aspects of the conflict unseen is evident in the 
injunction against images showing the coffins of US service personnel 
returning to the United States from Iraq and Afghanistan. Images of this 
nature have been subject to a Pentagon ruling dating from 1991 -  in the wake 
of the Gulf War -  that prohibits the depiction of... [the repatriation of dead 
US soldiers]. This ruling was however seldom applied, until its strict 
reinforcement in the wake of the Iraq War, as evinced in the action taken 
against employees of a cargo contractor in Kuwait whose images of coffins 
draped in the stars and stripes returning to Dover Air Force base appeared in 
April 2004 in the Seattle Times.566
These two dimensions of the unseen, as identified by Hill, the Bush administration’s 
censoring of some of the Abu Ghraib abuse images and its banning of images 
showing the repatriation of dead US service personnel to Dover Air Force base, are 
part of a broader landscape of invisibility in the war on terror.
Perhaps the most compelling account of the invisible war on terror has been made by 
Nicholas Mirzoeff in his discussion of ‘the empire of camps.’567 Mirzoeff has 
appropriated the term ‘empire’ from Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s book 
Empire568 which examines ‘the new geo-politics of globalization’569 and appropriated 
‘hauntology’ from Jacques Derrida’s work regarding how the spectre of Marx and 
Communism are still haunting society in the post-Cold War era. Derrida’s 
hauntology is the idea that the present is haunted by the decisions of the past.570 
According to Mirzoeff:
[t]he undead of the empire of camps remain in an unacknowledged limbo, 
forced to learn the techniques of the spectre, to replace ontology with
™ Ibid, p. 117
566 Ibid, p. 118
567 Mirzoeff, Watching Babylon, pp. 117-173
568 See Hardt and Negri, Empire
569 Mirzoeff, 'The Empire of Camps', Unpaginated
570 Jacques Derrida, Spectres o f  Marx: The State o f  the Debt, the Work o f Mourning and the New
International Translated by Peggy Kamuf (New York, NJ: Routledge, 1994)
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hauntology. Such hauntology has its own spectral history and there are 
lessons to be learnt from the ghosts that have gone before us.571
He believes therefore that the empire of camps is a contemporary example of this 
hauntology as the shadowy spectre of unlawful combatants continues to have an 
unpredictable impact on the war on terror. This idea relates to my own research 
about the uncontrollability of image munitions in the rhizomatic condition precisely 
because ‘the undead of the empire of camps’ currently haunt the war on terror via 
image munitions. In fact, Mirzoeff turns to the past where the culture of invisibility 
has a long history, which can be traced right back to Britain when Jeremy Bentham 
was proposing his vision of a panoptic prison,572 in order to learn lessons about 
invisibility in the war on terror. Bentham’s prison idea was one of two plans 
proposed at the time for dealing with Britain’s increasing prison population. 
Bentham’s prison was, according to Mirzoeff, ‘characterized... by constant 
surveillance of the inmates... It took in criminals, prostitutes and other delinquents 
and turned them into respectable citizens.’573 Although paradoxically the emphasis 
here is on scopic power, Mirzeoff s appropriation of the panoptic prison concept is to 
help him explore invisibility.
The second plan, and the one ultimately adopted, involved the deportation of 
criminals to the new penal colony which Britain had set up over in Australia. 
Deportation made these criminals instantly invisible as they had been relocated to the 
other side of the world. Along with criminals the idea of camps was also exported to 
Australia where, as Mirzoeff describes, ‘in 1860 the Board for the Protection of 
Aboriginals created internment camps for Aboriginals living in the country in order 
to separate the category of the native from that of the citizen.’574 According to 
Mirzoeff, ‘Aboriginals of different peoples and language groups were herded 
together behind cattle fences in order to quietly die out.’ The Board for the 
Protection of Aboriginals were essentially working to make Aborigines permanently
571 Mirzoeff, Watching Babylon, p. 168
572 Janet Semple, Bentham's Prison: A Study o f  the Panopticon Penitentiary (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993)
573 Mirzoeff, Watching Babylon, pp. 123-124
574 Ibid, p. 127
575 Ibid, p. 127
260
invisible. In 1868, Britain stopped sending prisoners out to Australia and instead 
built more prisons in Britain.
The next phase in the history of camps, discussed by Mirzoeff, was the development 
of the concentration camp: ‘Historians debate whether the first camps to appear were 
the campos de concentraciones created by the Spanish in Cuba in 1896 to suppress 
the popular insurrection of the colony, or the “concentration camps” into which the 
English herded the Boers towards the start of the [twentieth] century.’
Then during the Second World War concentration camps were revived by Nazi 
Germany as a way of rounding up Jews, homosexuals and disabled people and 
making them invisible. This was when concentration camps fundamentally changed 
from being places where the visible simply became the invisible, to places where 
whole populations were exterminated. A single image taken by Margaret Bourke- 
White, which was published in the May 7, 1945 issue of LIFE magazine, of prisoners 
standing at the fence of Buchenwald concentration camp in Germany has come to act 
as a metonym for the previously invisible populations of concentration camps during 
WWII.
As the Cold War ended ‘the camps’ were again revived, first in Australia, back in 
1992, where, according to Mirzoeff, ‘everyone seeking asylum or refugee status in 
Australia... [was] sent to remote refugee camps, which have been convincingly 
linked to the nineteenth-century camps for Aboriginals. The new internment camps
• S77 • •are not reforming institutions but simply serve as detention centers.’ Similar 
camps to Woomera, in Australia, also began to appear right across the globe. In 
Britain at Yarl’s Wood refugees and migrants were made invisible and at Sangatte in 
France refugees also disappeared from view. According to Daniel Joyce: ‘This shift 
has attempted to contain in ‘the camp’ migrants and refugees whilst encouraging the 
movement of goods and information.’578 These new internment camps have been the 
subject of much public debate and political controversy in the years since they were
576 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Translated by Daniel Heller-
Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 166
577 Mirzoeff, Watching Babylon, p. 143
578 Daniel Joyce, 'Book Review: Watching Babylon: The War in Iraq and Global Visual Culture by
Nicholas Mirzoeff. Global Media and Communication 1, no. 3 (2005), p. 380
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first opened. Mirzoeff has highlighted one particular incident where by way of 
protest ‘[t]he poet Abas Amini, a Kurdish refugee in Britain, sewed both his mouth
C7Q ,
and his eyes closed to protest his ordered deportation to Iran in May 2003.’ His 
protest was particularly symbolic because he denied himself his sight and his ability 
to speak in order to show how since being detained he had become invisible and 
voiceless. Reuters photographer Paul Vreeker shot an image munition of Amini’s 
protest which has since circulated internationally. This image also won second place 
in the 2004 World Press Photo Awards.580
The Howard government in Australia possibly received the greatest backlash of all 
regarding its treatment of refugees when the MV Tampa was refused emergency 
permission to land on Christmas Island in August 2001 following the rescue of 
hundreds of refugees aboard a sinking ship.581 This controversy was soon 
overshadowed, however, by the events of September 11, 2001. Mirzoeff s claim, 
though, is that, as he summarises: ‘September 11 did not create these camps but has 
engendered a legitimating context in which the empire of camps has emerged in its
582pomp, generating xenophobia and attacks on multiculturalism around the globe.’
Post-9/11, America quickly adapted its existing detention facility in Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba for housing Cuban and Haitian refugees, and set up a temporary terrorist 
detention camp, Camp X-Ray. Mirzoeff has picked up on the significance of Camp 
X-Ray through its name: ‘X-Ray, a place beyond normal vision, in which mere flesh 
cannot be seen.’583 This detention facility has since been decommissioned and 
replaced instead by a permanent facility, Camp Delta, also situated in Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba. According to Mirzoeff, ‘the camp is the panopticon for our time’ and 
its new use as a detention facility for terrorist suspects has been adopted by many 
other countries. Therefore, in the war on terror the panopticon has been reversed.
579 Mirzoeff, Watching Babylon, p. 149
580 Engin F. Isin, and Kim Rygiel, 'Abject Spaces: Frontiers, Zones, Camps', in The Logics o f
Biopower and the War on Terror: Living, Dying, Surviving, eds. Elizabeth Dauphinee and 
Christina Masters (New York, NJ: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 182. This image is 
reminiscent of a scene in Silence = Death, a film by Rosa von Praunheim, where the artist 
David Wojnarowicz is shown sewing together his closed lips.
581 Mirzoeff, Watching Babylon, pp. 143-144
582 Mirzoeff, 'The Empire of Camps', Unpaginated
583 Mirzoeff, Watching Babylon, p. 144
584 Ibid, p. 146
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Mirzoeff believes that ‘while the panopticon wanted its prisoners visible at all times, 
the camps want their inmates to be permanently invisible. The Bush administration 
has invented a new category of criminal, the “enemy combatant,” who can be
r o c
detained at will because their presumed actions render them without value.’ Judith 
Butler believes that “‘indefinite detention” does not signify an exceptional 
circumstance, but, rather, the means by which the exceptional becomes established as 
a naturalized norm.’586
Following on from this the US government also passed The Patriot Act. Both enemy 
combatants (also known as ‘unlawful combatants’) and The Patriot Act were a ‘state 
of exception’587 response to the events of 9/11 which quickly became the new 
norm.588 According to Michael J. Shapiro, this “state of exception” ‘has devolved
c o q
into an ecology of encampments’ and has
proliferated a global patchwork of gulags, zones of incarceration in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, where prisoners are held, and outsourced spaces of 
incarceration and interrogation for “detainees” worldwide, the United States 
has not simply consorted with murderers and sadists; some of its own 
personnel, who have operated with positive official sanction, fit the 
description.590
Mirzoeff believes ‘Iraq is now functioning as a camp.’591 He also recognizes that 
‘the camps are themselves the center of an expanding transnational industry...a 
market that has been cornered by the multinational Halliburton.’ It is therefore in
CQT
the interest of the hegemonic powers to maintain the empire of camps.
Mirzoeff also offers the following intriguing response to the Abu Ghraib abuses. He 
argues that after Abu Ghraib ‘it seems possible to envisage an end to the empire of 
camps.’594 Because, he believes, ‘a visual image changes the dynamics of the
585 Ibid, p. 149
586 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Power o f  Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2004), p. 67
587 Giorgio Agamben, State o f  Exception. Translated by Kevin Attell (Chicago, IL: The University of
Chicago Press, 2005)
588 Mirzoeff, Watching Babylon, p. 133
589 Shapiro, Cinematic Geopolitics, p. 46
590 Ibid, p. 50
591 Mirzoeff, Watching Babylon, p. 154
592 Ibid, p. 152
593 Roger, 'Watching Babylon’, p. 95
594 Mirzoeff, Watching Baby Ion, p. 181
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invisibility of the empire of camps.’595 More recently, in 2006, Mirzoeff has pointed 
out how:
during the subsequent U.S. presidential election campaign, Abu Ghraib never 
became an issue, so that it was not even mentioned in the debates. 
Paradoxically, these photographs seem to have remained invisible in the 
United States even as they were circulated around the world.596
With the distance of a couple of years Mirzoeff has rethought his position on the 
initial impact of the Abu Ghraib abuse images on the empire of camps, in fact he has 
gone so far as to stress that ‘alongside these changes, the empire of camps continues 
to flourish. The revived insurrection in Iraq has turned cities like Fallujah and Najaf 
into camps within the camp, reinforcing the sense of intractable moral deviance that 
motivates the system.’597
However, though a compelling account of the history of invisibility, the war in Iraq 
and the invisible war on terror Mirzoeff s book Watching Babylon (which was 
completed, bar its afterword, prior to the breaking of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse 
scandal) and his response to Abu Ghraib (published in 2006) do not recognize the 
proliferation, penetration and remediation of abuse image munitions in the new 
image warfare theatre of war. His argument does, however, show how America 
mistakenly -  and somewhat arrogantly -  believes that they can still control the 
spectacle of abuse in the war on terror, even following the revelations about abuse at 
Abu Ghraib. It is to the visual documenting of that abuse that I will now turn.
Abu Ghraib: A  New Visibility
On April 28, 2004 the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib, at the hands of
fhAmerican military personnel from the 800 Military Police Brigade became the 
focus of public attention when the controversy was aired on the CBS news show 60 
Minutes II. On April 30, 2004, Seymour M. Hersh (the journalist who first broke the 
story of the My Lai Massacre) also published an article online for The New Yorker
595 Ibid, p. 180
596 Nicholas Mirzoeff, 'Invisible Empire: Visual Culture, Embodied Spectacle, and Abu Ghraib'.
Radical History Review, no. 95 (2006), p. 21
597 Mirzoeff, Watching Babylon, p. 176
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magazine in which he discussed the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuses. Also, on April 30 
the Abu Ghraib abuse images were first aired on the Arabic news channels: Al 
Jazeera and Al-Arabiya.598
Now picture the scene. First, a bound prisoner sat in a chair, with a peg on his nose, 
whilst his open mouth is held under a running water tap -  so as to simulate drowning. 
The process is repeated again and again until the bound prisoner surrenders 
information. Second, a prisoner is shown kneeling before a large wooden barrel 
filled with water while his head is dunked under the water for varying periods of 
time, again simulating drowning. Third, a prisoner has his hands bound above his 
head, with his arms forming into a V  shape. A few military personnel can also be 
seen hanging around in the background of this scene while one soldier handles a 
blow torch and applies the naked flame to the prisoner’s naked flesh. Fourth, is a 
prisoner with his hands and feet bound together, lying on his back as he is slowly 
raised up into the air by a rope that is attached to a length of wood which passes 
between his bound arms and legs. Fifth, another prisoner, bound to a chair with 
electrodes attached to both his ear lobes, writhes with pain each time an electric 
current is passed through his body. The final scene returns to the prisoner suspended 
from the ceiling, though this time he appears unconscious.
These are not descriptions of abuse from the Abu Ghraib prison facility in Iraq. 
They are descriptions of the abuse of Algerian detainees depicted within the 1966 
film The Battle o f Algiers by Gillo Pontecorvo. Prior to the breaking of the Abu 
Ghraib abuse story, back in April 2004, these fictional scenes of abuse formed part of 
the iconography of torture and abuse along with other sources such as Christ in art. 
Pontecorvo’s film was also presented as a guide to fighting insurgency operations, by 
the Pentagon, when it was screened to US military personnel. The Abu Ghraib abuse 
scandal has successfully managed to create a new iconography of torture -  thus 
replacing these old iconographic representations. This so-called new iconography 
comprises images depicting actual abuses, rather than the abuses which Pontecorvo 
so expertly directed within his film or the abuse of Christ which artists have painted 
and sketched for centuries.
598 Lila Rajiva, The Language o f  Empire: Abu Ghraib and the American Media (New York, NJ: 
Monthly Review Press, 2005), p. 11
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Immediately audiences of the Abu Ghraib abuse images were shocked, repulsed, 
transfixed and left with a ‘void of meaning.’599 Meaning started to be assigned to 
these abuse images following the publication of Hersh’s first Abu Ghraib article for 
The New Yorker magazine. Many thousands of lines of copy had already been 
written by other journalists, following the airing of the 60 Minutes II  show. Hersh, 
however, is credited with breaking the Abu Ghraib abuse story. This is because 
where most journalists were merely reporting specifically on the issues raised by the 
60 Minutes II  investigation Hersh drew on his own investigative research, having 
received a leaked copy of the military report investigating abuse claims at the Abu 
Ghraib prison facility.
In contrast to the My Lai Massacre, and prior to the abuses at Abu Ghraib being 
made public, the American military had already begun an investigation following Sgt 
Joseph Darby anonymously making available a CD-ROM of Abu Ghraib abuse 
images. This investigation The Article 15-6 Investigation o f the 800th Military Police 
Brigade, more commonly known as The Taguba Report, was headed up by Major 
General Antonio Taguba who began his investigations in January 2004. This report 
is significant because it shows how the Pentagon underestimated the Abu Ghraib 
abuse images and the uncontrollability of images in the information age; mistakenly 
believing that it could investigate the Abu Ghraib abuses, keep the report of their 
investigations secret and also keep the Abu Ghraib images discussed in the report 
from being made public. The remit for his investigation was as follows:
that between October and December 2003, at the Abu Ghraib Confinement 
Facility (BCCF), numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal 
abuses were inflicted on several detainees. This systematic and illegal abuse 
of detainees was intentionally perpetrated by several members of the military 
police guard force (372nd Military Police Company, 320th Military Police 
Battalion, 800th MP Brigade), in Tier (section) 1-A of the Abu Ghraib Prison 
(BCCF). The allegations of abuse were substantiated by detailed witness 
statements... and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence. 
...In addition to the aforementioned crimes, there were also abuses committed
599 Jackson, Writing the War, p. 29
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by members of the 325th MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade, and Joint 
Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC).600
During his extensive investigations MG Taguba and his team of investigators 
reviewed a number of witness statements, the abuse images themselves, the policy 
systems and command structures in place during the time period and interviewed 
many of the military personnel, and some of the prisoners, who were at the Abu 
Ghraib prison facility at the time. Taguba identified major failings in the command 
chain, overseen by BG Janis L. Karpinski, and poor morale among the military 
personnel stationed at Abu Ghraib. For this he gave the following explanation:
Prior to BG Karpinski taking command, members of the 800th MP Brigade 
believed they would be allowed to go home when all the detainees were 
released from the Camp Bucca Theater Internment Facility following the 
cessation of major ground combat on 1 May 2003. At one point, 
approximately 7,000 to 8,000 detainees were held at Camp Bucca. Through 
Article-5 Tribunals and a screening process, several thousand detainees were 
released. Many in the command believed they would go home when the 
detainees were released. In late May -  early June 2003 the 800th MP Brigade 
was given a new mission to manage the Iraqi penal system and several 
detention centers. The new mission meant the Soldiers would not redeploy to 
CONUS when anticipated.601
Coinciding with this new mission was the transition of command from BG Paul Hill 
to BG Karpinski and new duties and responsibilities pertaining specifically to the 
overseeing of prisoners. Taguba found that military personnel had not been 
adequately trained for these new duties and that Karpinski and LTC Jerry L. 
Phillabaum had little contact with the individual soldiers stationed at Abu Ghraib. 
Therefore The Taguba Report laid most of the blame for this episode with the 
commanding officers and recommended that each of them be relieved of their 
command and issued with a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand.602 Taguba 
also recommended that LTC Phillabaum’s name ‘be removed from the Colonel / 0-6 
Promotion List’.603
600 Major General Antonio Taguba, 'Article 15-6 Investigation o f the 800th Military Police Brigade',
2004. Available at: http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison abuse report.pdf. Accessed on 10 
July 2008, p. 16
601 Ibid, pp. 36-37
602 Ibid, pp. 44-45
603 Ibid, p. 45
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However, following the breaking of the Abu Ghraib abuse scandal public pressure 
soon mounted against even more senior members of the Bush administration. For 
example, on May 8, 2004 The Economist ran a black front cover with the following 
headline in bold yellow letters: ‘Resign, Rumsfeld’. This headline was also 
accompanied by the powerful image munition of a man in a hood, with his arms out 
straight holding wires and fearing electrocution.604 Public pressure was also 
increasing on those military personnel, who had been directly responsible. As a 
result a number of military personnel who appeared in the abuse images or who were 
found to have shot the images were court-marshalled. Two of these, SPC Graner605 
and SPC England,606 were court-marshalled in January 2005 and found guilty of 
committing war crimes. Both were sentenced to serve time in military prisons and 
upon release be Dishonourably Discharged from the US Army. LTC Phillabaum has 
since received his General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand and he been removed 
from the Colonel / 0-6 Promotion List. In May 2005 BG Karpinski was demoted to 
Colonel. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld survived the fallout from Abu Ghraib 
but announced his resignation on November 8, 2006. He has since stated that during 
the controversial period immediately following the making public of the Abu Ghraib 
prisoner abuses he offered President Bush his resignation on two separate occasions 
but on both occasions the offer was rejected. Colonel Karpinski has since publicly 
stated that she believes she has been made the scapegoat for this highly embarrassing 
episode in America’s war on terror. The next section will identify when the Abu 
Ghraib images became weaponized and also discuss several of the Abu Ghraib image 
munitions.
Abu Ghraib: Image M unitions
604Nathan Roger, 'Abuse and Death in the Media! The Exploitation o f Prisoners o f War as a Focus Of 
"Public Curiosity'". Aberystwyth Journal o f  World. Affairs, no. 2 (2004), p. 99
605 Kate Zemike, 'U.S. Soldier Found Guilty in Iraq Prison Abuse Case', The New York Times, 15
January 2005. Available at: http://www.nvtimes.eom/2005/01/15/national/l5abuse.html. 
Accessed on 4 June 2009, Unpaginated
606 Nathan Levy, 'Private England Pleads Guilty to Abuses', The New York Times, 03 May 2005.
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/03/national/03abuse.html. Accessed on 4 
June 2009, Unpaginated. Lynndie England’s official biography has since been written. See 
Gary S. Winkler, Tortured: Lynndie England, Abu Ghraib and the Photographs That 
Shocked the World (Keyser, WV: Bad Apple Books, 2009)
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Two narratives, Mirzoeff on the empire of camps (the so-called invisible war on 
terror) and the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuses (which represent a ‘new visibility’ that 
may ‘despectralise’608 or ‘de-mystify’ war abuses in the war on terror) have already 
been discussed. These abuse images, according to Mark Danner, ‘have long since 
taken their place in the gallery of branded images, as readily recognizable in much of 
the world as Marilyn struggling with her billowing dress or Michael dunking his 
basket ball.’609 These revelations about Abu Ghraib are, therefore, proof that the 
spectacle of abuse in the war on terror cannot be controlled.
I will now turn to address the uncertainty surrounding when the Abu Ghraib images 
actually became weaponized. The abuse images were taken by military personnel on 
their digital cameras and camera-phones at the prison facility in Iraq as sadistic 
souvenirs of their tour of duty and also as tools for use in interrogations to threaten 
prisoners with the use of violence. In the process the soldiers were transformed, 
according to Sontag, into ‘photographers -  recording their war, their fun, their 
observations of what they find picturesque, their atrocities -  and swapping images 
among themselves.’610 These images were never meant to become publicly available 
in fact they were ‘private images’ and consequently this means that they were not 
taken with the intention of being weaponized, rather the only intentions behind their 
production were either to privately document the tour of duty or to scare prisoners 
into giving up information in their interrogations. When Sgt. Darby made a CD- 
ROM containing abuse images from Abu Ghraib available to the American military 
it kick started a military investigation into the abuses, however, Sgt. Darby only 
made the CD-ROM available to the American military and not the American press. 
This shows that while Sgt. Darby indeed had grave concerns about the abuse of Iraqi 
prisoners at the Abu Ghraib facility he also did not want to expose the US military to 
damaging public scrutiny, rather he wanted the matter of prisoner abuses to be dealt 
with internally. It does though show the abuse images being transformed from
607 John B. Thompson, 'The New Visibility'. Theory, Culture & Society 22, no. 6 (2005), pp. 31-51
608 Hill, Re-Imagining, p. 108
609 Mark Danner, 'Abu Ghraib: The Hidden Story', in The New York Review o f  Books, 07 October
2004. Available at: http://www.markdanner.com/articles/show/abu ghraib the hidden story. 
Accessed on 1 May 2008, Unpaginated
610 Susan Sontag, 'What Have We Done?' The Guardian, 24 May 2004. Available at:
http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/views04/0524-09.html. Accessed on 
08 September 2006, Unpaginated
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private souvenirs and interrogation tools to evidence in a military investigation but it 
was not when the Abu Ghraib images became weaponized. The leaking of abuse 
images to the 60 Minutes II news show and the Taguba report to The New Yorker 
magazine and their exposure to a public audience was not even when these abuse 
images became weaponized. Although it does mark the transformation of the abuse 
images and the Taguba report from private military evidence to evidence in the court 
of public opinion (the media) and ‘public images’. In fact it was not until anti-war 
protesters and NGO’s, such as Amnesty International, appropriated the Abu Ghraib 
abuse images and deployed them in their campaigns against the war in Iraq and the 
wider war on terror that these images became weaponized and were finally 
transformed into image munitions. This feeds into another significant difference 
between the Abu Ghraib image munitions and the other forms of image munitions 
explored in this thesis (see Chapters Three, Four and Five). It is concerned with 
temporality and the fact that the other kinds of image muntions have all been 
weaponized from the moment of their production. What makes the Abu Ghraib 
image munitions distinct though is the fact that at the moment of their production 
they were not weaponized -  instead they were either photographed as sadistic 
souvenirs or interrogation tools -  and their eventual weaponization was in fact a 
totally separate effect from their original production.
Hundreds of images featuring the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib are already 
in the public domain and many more are still waiting to be put into circulation. I will 
now turn to examine five of them. Each of these abuse images operate as image 
munitions because they have all been deployed by anti-war protest groups, Amnesty 
International and others in their campaigns against the war in Iraq and the wider war 
on terror. They are particularly powerful because they can be inserted into a news- 
cycle and immediately draw audience attention and political debate back to the issue 
of abuses at Abu Ghraib. These five image munitions also reveal a rich network of 
associations which not only helps them to connect more forcefully with as wide an 
audience as possible but also helps them to circulate in the rhizomatic mediascape as 
new media actors can exploit these diverse associations and use them to remediate 
these image munitions for their own purposes. For example, Stephen F. Eisenman, 
an art historian, has noted how when he was first confronted with these abuse images 
he was also confronted by
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a shock of recognition: even though these brutal images from a prison in 
occupied Iraq are not works of art -  indeed, were never intended to be seen 
by more than a handful of people -  they nevertheless insistently recalled to 
mind treasured sculptures and paintings from a distant past.611
These images also echo testimony which document abuses taking place in the 
American prison system.
The first image, which has since become the overriding metonym and the most 
powerful image munition for the Abu Ghraib abuses features a male prisoner 
standing on a small wooden crate (dressed in a large black smock-like outfit, with a 
black hood over his head), his arms out straight holding wires as he evidently fears 
electrocution. It is known as Accidental Electrocution and would probably at the 
time of its production have been an effective tool in interrogations. Eisenman has 
noted ‘visual similarities between...a drawing by Goya from his Inquisition Album
f\ 1 9and [this] iconic image.’ He also sees further ‘visual similarities’ between this 
iconic image and another Goya image, Third o f May 1808.eu Another image, This is 
Nazi Brutality by Ben Shahn, also shares striking ‘visual similarities’ with this iconic 
image of abuse from Abu Ghraib.614 This image also references Christ-like 
symbolism: with the figure holding his arms out straight.
Although Eisenman describes a rich and complex network of associations between 
this image and iconic images from art history, this does not automatically mean that 
others will make the same connections. Many who see this image munition will be 
unfamiliar with Goya and/or Shahn’s work. However, they may create their own 
network of associations rooted instead in popular culture. Both networks of 
associations are equally as valid and others who see this image will create their own 
distinct networks of associations. This fluidity of meaning has enabled this image 
munition to circulate and remediate widely. Because this image munition is not as 
overtly violent as some of the other Abu Ghraib image munitions it has also reached 
a wide mainstream audience.
611 Stephen F. Eisenman, The Abu Ghraib Effect (London: Reaktion Books Ltd., 2007), p. 11
6X2 Ibid, p. 12
613 Ibid, p. 19. See also Andrew Hill on Goya. Hill, Re-Imagining, pp. 71-73
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271
The second image or image munition, that has similarly circulated and remediated 
widely, shows SPC Lynndie England standing in the middle of a prison block at Abu 
Ghraib, with her left arm out, holding a dog lead. On the end of this dog lead is a 
naked and helpless male Iraqi prisoner who, like some kind of defiant pet dog, is 
being dragged along the floor. England has since become the poster girl for the 
abuses at Abu Ghraib, she has also been widely condemned by feminists who believe 
that she has set back the progress of women in the military with her actions as an 
abuser. This image has, therefore, been the subject of much intense debate regarding 
gender and the military. It has also opened up a network of associations to 
dominatrix pornography, however, the relationship between BDSM and this image of 
England is a complex one. Eisenman has attempted to explain it:
BDSM, according to its adepts, transforms the postures, actions and rhetoric 
of institutionalized violence into a ritualized, privatized and carefully 
orchestrated costume drama of intimacy, pleasure and mutuality. In actual 
torture, no safe-words can be used to stop the tormentor from pressing his 
advantage to the point of excruciating pain or even death. At Abu Ghraib, the 
chain around a Muslim inmate’s neck, attached to a leash held by Lynddie 
England, is not a BDSM collar, shared symbol of a long-term emotional and 
erotic bond between the dominant and the submissive partner; it is the 
expression of the complete emotional alienation of master and slave.615
Paul A. Taylor meanwhile has suggested that ‘the pornographic nature of the abuse 
was part of a ritual humiliation of the Iraqi prisoners’616 rather than dominatrix 
pornography per se. His observation about pornography and Abu Ghraib could 
equally be used to describe England’s relationship with pornography and her ritual 
humiliation of the prisoner in this image. However, at the moment of its production 
this image was also probably a powerful tool in interrogations. As an image 
munition it has since also circulated and remediated widely.
The third image or image munition, the front cover of Eisenman’s book The Abu 
Ghraib Effect, shows a naked male prisoner facing forward, with his arms bound to
Eisenman, The Abu Ghraib Effect, p. 34
616 Paul A. Taylor, 'The Pornographic Barbarism o f the Self-Reflecting Sign'. International Journal o f  
Baudrillard Studies 4, no. 1 (January 2007). Available at: 
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272
the top of a metal framed bunk bed. The prisoner also has a pair of white women’s 
knickers on his head. According to Eisenman:
The purpose of forcing inmates to wear women’s underwear, according to the 
report of General George P. Fay, was what Military Intelligence called ‘ego 
down’, a form of sexual humiliation -  especially aimed at Muslim men -
* f\ 17intended to help establish ‘favourable conditions’ for interrogation.
The Abu Ghraib images feature a series of similar images where inmates are shown 
being humiliated by wearing women’s underwear. This image as well as opening a 
network of associations with BDSM also opens a network of associations with racist 
imagery.618 Again at the time that this image was produced it would probably have 
been another powerful tool in interrogations at the Abu Ghraib prison facility. It has 
since also circulated and remediated widely through the new image warfare theatre 
of war.
The fourth image or image munition shows SPC England and SPC Graner in the 
middle of an Abu Ghraib prison block, standing behind a human pyramid -  
comprising of a number of naked male prisoners that are indistinguishable as 
individuals rather they appear as a collection of anonymous arms, arses, feet, hands, 
heads, legs, penises and torsos. England and Graner are stood behind the human 
pyramid with their thumbs up, smiling for the camera. This pose is confusing, given 
the context. If England and Graner were stood in front of a holiday landmark -  such 
as the Eiffel Tower, the Statue of Liberty or indeed the Taj Mahal -  then they would 
be indistinguishable from any number of other couples posing for a souvenir holiday 
photograph.619 However, in striking their thumbs up pose whilst standing behind a 
human pyramid, according to Lindsay Coleman, this image has ‘effectively 
illustrated the anti-American and the all-American in a single image.’620 At the time 
of its production this image was probably taken as a sadistic souvenir of abuse. Also, 
so striking is the discontinuity of ‘place’ and ‘pose’ in this image that it would not 
look out of place on a website dedicated to documenting Abu Ghraib image parodies.
617 Eisenman, The Abu Ghraib Effect, p. 98
6,8 Ibid, p. 97
619 Thompson, 'The New Visibility', p. 31
620 Lindsay Coleman, "'Damn You for Making Me Do This": Abu Ghraib, 24, Torture, and Television
Sadomasochism', in The War Body on Screen, eds. Karen Randell and Sean Redmond (New  
York, NJ: Continuum, 2008), p. 211
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The final image or image munition shows a naked male prisoner, with his back 
against the bars of a cell door, with his hands on the back of his head. Just in front of 
him are two menacing looking prison dogs that are being restrained by military 
guards. This image is interesting partly because it depicts Graner as a voyeur rather 
than as an active participant. It is also interesting and ultimately a damaging image 
munition because it shows a sanctioned ‘Torture Lite’ technique, the ‘Fearing Up’ of 
prisoners with dogs, being exploited for the personal gratification of the guards at 
Abu Ghraib. This image also further undermines President Bush’s ‘bad apples’ 
claim because it shows some of the same guards who -  in other Abu Ghraib images -  
have been depicted choreographing the simulated sex acts also manipulating a 
sanctioned ‘Torture Lite’ technique for their own personal gratification. At the time 
of its production this image would probably also have been used as a tool in 
interrogations. This image munition has since been circulated and remediated 
widely.
The Abu Ghraib image munitions also represent the opening up of a new front in the 
new image warfare theatre of war, where instead of fighting against A1 Qaeda 
manufactured image munitions -  America is now also engaged in battles against the 
blowback of abuse images weaponized by anti-war protest groups and NGO’s: the 
product of their invisible war on terror. According to Slavoj Zizek:
the very positions and costumes of the prisoners suggest a theatrical staging, a 
kind of tableau viviant, which brings to mind American performance art, 
“theatre of cruelty,” the photos of Mapplethorpe or the unnerving scenes in 
David Lynch’s films.621
Abu Ghraib images are also frequently categorized as ‘War Pom’ because of their 
pornographic nature. Jeff Lewis argues that ‘the wardens at Abu Ghraib were, as 
much as anything else, ensnared in the momentum of visualization, creating images
621 Slavoj Zizek, 'What Rumsfeld Doesn't Know That He Knows About About Abu Ghraib', In These
Times, 21 May 2004. Available at: http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/747/. Accessed on 30 
July 2008, Unpaginated
622 See Jean Baudrillard, 'War Pom'. Translated by Paul A. Taylor. International Journal o f
Baudrillard Studies 2, no. 1 (January 2005). Available at: 
http.7/www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol2 1/taylorpf.htm. Accessed on 08 July 2006, 
pp. 1-5
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that they may have themselves engaged with in dominatrix pornography.’623 The 
invoking of the term pornography in relation to the Abu Ghraib abuse images is more 
complex than this though. In fact Taylor has identified two distinct meanings for this 
single term:
The Abu Ghraib photographs are Pornographic because of their sexual 
content but they are also pornographic in a more attenuated and abstract 
manner. The pornographic nature of the abuse was part of a ritual 
humiliation of the Iraqi prisoners. Such ritual abuse is but an extreme 
example of a ubiquitous, voyeuristic aesthetic that now pervades wider 
Western society. It is increasingly Pornographic in the obvious literal and 
quantitative sense that Pornography is much more socially acceptable and 
widely available.624
The orgy of abuse on display in these gruesome images is indeed evidence of a wider 
policy of abusing terror suspects in the invisible war on terror. Paradoxically this 
also shows that the RMA principles of distancing military personnel from the theatre 
of war -  that are rigidly followed when operations are visible and a clear propaganda 
opportunity -  do not necessarily apply when the Pentagon thinks no one is watching. 
Instead the Pentagon orders its military personnel to ‘“take the gloves off.’” But 
the Abu Ghraib abuse images have become weaponized against America and 
currently remediate uncontrollably. It is to this unpredictable remediation that I now 
turn.
Circulating Abu Ghraib
The Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse images have continued their circulation in the new 
image warfare theatre of war. This section will explore their circulation beyond 
news networks and jihadi internet propaganda and show that the spectacle of abuse in 
the war on terror is uncontrollable. The Abu Ghraib image munitions have been 
appropriated by people who have their own reasons for copying, parodying and 
remediating them.
623 Lewis, Language Wars, p. 242
624 Taylor, 'The Pornographic Barbarism1, p. 6
625 Mark Danner, 'We Are All Torturers Now', The New York Review o f  Books, 06 January 2005.
Available at: http://www.markdanner.com/articles/show/we are all torturers now.
Accessed on 1 May 2008, Unpaginated
275
A diverse range of political interventions have been made which feature the Abu 
Ghraib image munitions. The online arts and culture magazine salon.com, as a new 
media actor, was quick to set up an archive of them. This catalogue has since 
become an important record documenting the abuses at Abu Ghraib and it has also 
been used by academics, journalists and protesters alike to source abuse images for 
circulation and remediation. Academics have deployed these abuse images in their 
discussions of the war on terror, journalists have deployed these abuse images in 
their commentaries of the war on terror and protesters have also deployed these 
abuse images in their protests (against the 2003 Iraq War, against the Bush 
administration and against the wider war on terror). I will now look more closely at 
some examples of the different ways in which protesters have weaponized and 
deployed Abu Ghraib image munitions.
Protest artists have remediated the Abu Ghraib image munitions for their own 
political purposes. Perhaps the most famous series of protest posters about the war in 
Iraq are entitled: iRaq and are a direct parody of iPod advertisements. One of these 
images depicts the hooded prisoner from the Accidental Electrocution image 
munition from Abu Ghraib in a black silhouette against a fluorescent orange 
background. The wires from the original Abu Ghraib image munition here appear 
white, mirroring original iPod adverts which all have white wires in them, and at the 
bottom of this poster is the following powerful statement: ‘10,000 Iraqis killed. 773 
US soldiers dead.’ Inserting Accidental Electrocution into the context of the 
iconic iPod advertisement is clever because it means that the iRaq posters can be 
displayed in all the same spaces and places as the iPod posters. At first glance 
people will think that they are looking at just another iPod poster but on closer 
inspection they will be shocked to discover the true message behind the poster. The 
fact that the iRaq images are also able to be downloaded off the internet for free and 
printed by anyone also meant that soon the iRaq posters were popping up on the 
walls of cities around the world. Just as the iPod adverts are successful in planting 
the iPod lifestyle in the publics’ consciousness so the iRaq posters are successful in 
planting the 2003 Iraq War firmly in the publics’ consciousness. They have a
626 Leander Kahney, The Cult o f iPOD (San Francisco, CA: No Starch Press, Inc., 2005), p. 141
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powerful force-multiplier effect as they force people to confront the real price of the 
war in Iraq: ’10,000 Iraqis killed. 773 US soldiers dead.’
Street artists have similarly remediated the Accidental Electrocution image munition. 
Iraqi artist Salah Edine Sallat painted a mural on an Iraqi wall which featured this 
Abu Ghraib image munition standing alongside the Statue of Liberty (a metaphor for 
liberty and freedom). Both figures were painted connected by wires, the Statue of 
Liberty flipping the electric generator switch. This graffiti image was also 
accompanied by the following powerful statement: ThaT FRee Dom For Bosh (That 
Freedom For Bush). Sallat with his mural was making a powerful statement against 
the Bush administration and questioning their liberation of Iraq. With this mural 
Sallat had successfully produced a powerful image munition which clearly directed 
blame for the failings of the 2003 Iraq War and the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at 
America. He had clearly intended to make an impact with his mural, given its 
controversial subject matter, and he also hoped to draw attention to his mural by 
painting it in the daytime. Without talking to Sallat it is impossible to know for 
definite whether he intentionally produced his mural with the intention of having an 
impact beyond Iraq, unlike the iRaq posters which were clearly produced with the 
intention of having a global impact. However, I have to assume that in 
manufacturing an event around his mural (painting it in the daytime) he was hoping 
that it would be photographed before being painted over and thus would potentially 
have a global impact.
Another wall in another city -  this time Sydney, Australia -  and the Accidental 
Electrocution image munition appears again in back silhouette, this time alongside 
the words FREEDOM NO LONGER FREES YOU. This graffiti image munition is 
further evidence of Abu Ghraib being remediated by anti-war protesters and 
deployed to insert Abu Gharib once again into an everyday context, a wall in 
Sydney, and to collapse the invisible division between the public and the abuse of 
Iraqi prisoners.
The Accidental Electrocution image munition has also been painted on a Seattle wall. 
This stencilled graffiti image has, on its left hand side (as you look at it), Mickey 
Mouse standing on a footstool with his left arm held out as if presenting the iconic
277
hooded figure from Abu Ghraib. The artist of this powerful image munition is 
drawing public attention to the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib, having chosen 
to display it on a public wall where anyone passing it will see it. The artist has also 
cleverly chosen to pair up the iconic hooded figure from Abu Ghraib with an icon 
from American popular culture: Mickey Mouse. In this graffiti image Mickey 
Mouse is employed as a representation of American society and he is also depicted 
proudly presenting the Abu Ghraib figure. The image poses the following question: 
what has America got to be proud of? These parodic image munitions all point to a 
democratization of the Abu Ghraib images because they have been remediated by 
ordinary people -  new media actors -  right across the world.
This idea of the democratization of the Abu Ghraib images has been extended by the 
artist Giuseppe Di Bella with his series: Abu Ghraib Stamps. A  reaction against the 
initial censoring of the Abu Ghraib abuse images by the Pentagon. Di Bella’s Abu 
Ghraib Stamps has circulated widely, rivalled only by the circulation of Abu Ghraib 
images on the internet. He selected a number of images from the Abu Ghraib 
scandal, one of which was the Accidental Electrocution image munition, printed 
them as sheets of stamps and painstakingly stuck them on individual postcards (next 
to real stamps) and then posted them off to various locations and patiently waited for 
them to be posted back. Donald Malcolm Reid has argued that ‘[a]round the world, 
stamps are a form of propaganda through which governments project selected
627images, and they are too illuminating a source to be left only to a philatelist.’ 
Stanley D. Brunn has also noted that ‘stamps are products or ‘windows’ of the state 
that illustrate how it wishes to be seen by its own citizens and those beyond its 
boundaries.’628 What Di Bella has achieved, with his Abu Ghraib Stamps, is the 
democratization of negative images which show exactly what was supposed to be 
invisible -  the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison facility. These 
stamps are, therefore, windows onto a parallel universe of abuse and torture from the 
2003 Iraq War. Di Bella has said the following about his Abu Ghraib Stamps:
627 Donald Malcolm Reid, 'The Postage Stamp: A Window On Saddam Hussein's Iraq'. The Middle
East Journal 47, no. 1 (1993), p. 77
628 Stanley D. Brunn, 'Stamps as Iconography: Celebrating the Independence o f New European and
Central Asian States'. GeoJournal 52, no. 4 (2001), p. 315
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Traditionally, the postage stamp [s] function is to pay tribute or commemorate 
the traditions and culture of a country. It is also a powerful form of 
communication as it travels around the globe advertising the proudest aspects 
of a nation, in contrast to the Abu Ghraib photographs. I was interested in 
how the mechanical act of licking and stamping a postage stamp could be 
linked to a notion of humiliation and abuse/torture as revealed in the 
photographs. I was conscious that this process could turn the viewer into an 
active consumer and make the user aware of the consumption and treatment 
of public images in circulation. This could also lead the user to become an 
active accomplice - in some sense - to the abuse and violence. The repetitions 
of images on the stamp sheets are also a reflection of the depersonalisation 
that happens to victims of such abuse. The intimate and personal details of 
each account, and the consequences for the abused/tortured is hidden and 
forgotten as the images are multiplied, repeated and ‘consumed’ by 
society.629
Di Bella’s account of designing and producing his Abu Ghraib Stamps reveals that 
the careful juxtaposing of Abu Ghraib images with postage stamps was more 
complex than just the production of negative images and shocking audiences. Di 
Bella recognizes the fact that the act of licking the stamp is a transformative act 
which forces audiences to become active consumers in the art itself. The multiple 
reproductions of Abu Ghraib images on stamp sheets are also a statement about the 
depersonalisation of the victims at Abu Ghraib and in posting his stamps to 
individuals around the world Di Bella was also attempting to re-personalize the 
victims of Abu Ghraib and force audiences to recognize their own complicity within 
the abuses at Abu Ghraib.
The cartoonist David Rees has also remediated the Abu Ghraib Accidental 
Electrocution image munition, making a political intervention, as the Bionic Abu 
Ghraib Man, inserting it into his long running cartoon series Get Your War On about 
the war on terror (that has been serialised in Rolling Stone magazine). Rees’ cartoon 
series stands as a counter-history of the war on terror. It is an attempt to subvert the 
official version of the war on terror. Also being serialised in Rolling Stone magazine 
has given it a popular cult following and this is proven by the fact that it has now 
been turned into a book.
629 Giuseppe Di Bella, 'The Democratic Image: Archive for the 'Giuseppe Di Bella' Category', in
OpenDemocracy. Available at:
http://thedemocraticimage.opendemocracv.net/categorv/giuseppe-di-bella/. Accessed on 13 
July 2008, Unpaginated
630 See David Rees, Get Your War On: The Definitive Account o f  the War on Terror, 2001-2008
(Berkeley, CA: Soft Skull Press, 2008)
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Cartoonist Dennis Draughon has similarly remediated the hooded figure in the Abu 
Ghraib image munition. According to Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites:
A particularly startling juxtaposition is achieved in [this] editorial cartoon 
that has the hooded figure from Abu Ghraib behind Kim Phuc [the accidental 
napalm girl]. At the least, the older iconic image is used to heighten the 
emotional and moral content of its successor. Her nakedness reveals the 
vulnerability of his shrouded body, her scream voices the agony within his 
hooded silence, her violated innocence represents his torture. As the tableau 
draws on virtually every element of the napalm icon’s repertoire, the moral 
message is linked to the even more troubling implications of a traumatic 
history. Once again, war crimes are occurring because of U.S. policy; once 
again, the war will not go away. This haunting, sickening, traumatic 
relationship between past and present is underscored by the parallelism 
between the girl’s arms and the arms of the hooded figure.631
A number of artistic representations of Abu Ghraib image munitions are also 
currently being exhibited in art galleries right across the world. Four specific 
interventions made by the artists: Martha Rosier, Fernando Botero, Susan Crile and 
Bill Concannon will now be explored. Martha Rosier, with her 2004 photomontage 
series: Bringing the War Home: House Beautiful, New Series, has cut and pasted 
together images of war from Iraq with images of home from Life magazine. 
Elsewhere I have written that:
The Election (Lynndie) image which I am specifically interested in comprises 
of: an image depicting the latest in high-spec kitchen design, and the image of 
Lynndie England leading an Iraqi prisoner on a dog leash (however minus the 
dog-like prisoner). Instead, seemingly England appears to be looking over 
her shoulder and admiring the luxurious island workspace of the kitchen -  
whilst in the original image, from Abu Ghraib prison, she is giving a gloating 
stare back over her shoulder towards the now absent dog-like prisoner. The 
windows of the kitchen depict the war zone outside... Interspersed 
throughout the kitchen, in places where one would ordinarily expect there to 
be cook books, magazines, newspapers and other general items that we all 
have in our own kitchens, instead these have been replaced by the Accidental
fk'K  9Electrocution image from Abu Ghraib.
631 Hariman and Lucaites, No Caption Needed, p. 202
632 Nathan Roger, 'Abu Ghraib Abuse Images: From Perverse War Trophies through Internet Based
War Pom to Artistic Representations and Beyond', in De-Naturalising Violence: Trans- 
Disciplinary Explorations, eds. Alejandro Cervantes-Carsen and Leonhard Praeg (Oxford: 
Inter-Disciplinary Press, forthcoming), Unpaginated
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This series of image munitions help to collapse the distance between war from home, 
forcing audiences of these images to confront and recognize their own complicity 
within the events of the 2003 Iraq War.633
Fernando Botero has also produced a compelling series of over eighty paintings 
entitled: Abu Ghraib. The paintings are divided up into two distinct styles: the first 
are full colour paintings; and the second are more like the preparatory sketches that 
an artist will often make before committing paint to canvas. All of the prisoners and 
guards depicted in his paintings are plump/Boteromorphic, a style which has over the 
decades become Botero’s trademark. Abu Ghraib 64 -  one of his colour paintings -  
shows a prisoner with his arms and legs bound (with rope) to a metal prisoner gate. 
The prisoner is blindfolded and also he is wearing only women’s underwear 
(matching red knickers and a bra). It soon becomes evident that the prisoner has 
been subjected to a severe beating, prior to him being forced into this highly 
degrading pose, with various bruises (some old, some new) and a number of bleeding 
wounds located at various sites on his exposed flesh.
Abu Ghraib 84 -  is one of Botero’s sketch images and it again shows a prisoner with 
his arms and legs tied with rope to a metal prison gate, while also being humiliated 
by being made to wear women’s striped knickers and a bra. This picture depicts the 
prisoner with a hood over his head, whereas in Abu Ghraib 64 the prisoner is 
blindfolded. The references to the beating of this particular prisoner are less overt, in 
this picture, compared with Abu Ghraib 64. Abu Ghraib 84, although a stand alone 
piece, could almost be described as a preparatory sketch for Abu Ghraib 64. His 
series of images is directly confrontational as it is supposed to force audiences to 
recognize their own complicity with the abuses.
Susan Crile has also produced the Abu Ghraib: Abuse o f Power Series.634 Her series 
of pastel drawings takes a selection of the most iconic Abu Ghraib image munitions 
and commits them to paper. Her drawings are made using a combination of chalk,
633 Martha Rosier produced a series of similar photomontage images in response to the Vietnam War. 
Bringing the War Home: House Beautiful (1967-1972)
634 See Abu Ghraib: Abuse of Power Series by Susan Crile. Available at: 
http://www.susancrile.com/abuse o f power.pdf. Accessed on 18 May 2009
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charcoal and pastels on dark coloured sheets of paper. Andrea K Scott, in a review 
for The New York Times, wrote: ‘large areas of the page remain blank, echoing the 
sense of exposed vulnerability and free-floating terror that the inmates must have
/TO C
experienced.’ She also wrote that:
[t]he chalk is always white when depicting the anonymous victims, who 
become spectral icons of martyrdom, an association underscored by the 
show’s largest work, “Obscene Intimacy.” A man, his head, spine and 
buttocks smeared with fecal patches of brown, stands with arms outstretched 
and legs crossed in the posture of crucifixion.
Crile also breaks her muted colour palette of black, brown, grey and white with the 
occasional introduction of a vibrant pastel colour to a drawing. She does this to help 
draw attention to a particular object within a drawing which holds a wider 
significance in the war on terror. For example, in the drawing “Hands of Power: 
Murdered Prisoner” which depicts a dead Abu Ghraib prisoner being pointed at by a 
disembodied green medical gloved hand. The colour green is used to draw attention 
to the fact that the Abu Ghraib abusers often wore medical gloves when abusing the 
prisoners. This shows how they viewed them as ‘others’ and as a result felt that they 
could abuse them guiltlessly. This guiltlessness is also a dominant discourse in the 
war on terror. In the drawing “Threatened” which depicts a bound Abu Ghraib 
prisoner, on his knees, being ‘Feared Up’ and threatened with a baying dog, the 
prisoner is wearing an orange coloured jump-suit. The colour orange is a clear 
allusion to unlawful combatants at Guantanamo Bay who are routinely made to wear 
orange coloured jump-suits. Crile is linking the abuse of Abu Ghraib prisoners with 
the abuse of unlawful combatants at Guantanamo Bay. Again, like Rosier and 
Botero, her series of paintings forces audiences to recognize their complicity with the 
abuse.
Bill Concannon has also taken the Accidental Electrocution image munition and 
turned it into a neon sign: Untitled (Abu Ghraib). This image munition strives to 
illuminate public complicity with the Abu Ghraib abuses. Concannon has picked up
635 Andrea K. Scott, 'Art in Review: Susan Crile - Abu Ghraib: Abuse o f Power'. The New York Times,
13 October 2006. Available at:
http://querv.nvtimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0DE5DDl 130F930A25753C1A9609C8B 
63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=print. Accessed on 06 February 2010, Unpaginated
636 Ibid: Unpaginated
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on the fact that the hooded figure is reminiscent of Christ on the cross and as such is 
a kind of martyr; a martyr figure for all the Iraqi prisoners abused by a few American 
military personnel at the Abu Ghraib prison facility. To make this reference explicit 
he employs the figure in black silhouette, lit from behind with a strong red neon 
light. The red neon light helps give the effect of a halo as seen throughout art history 
and depictions of Christ on the cross.
A number of different commercial interventions have also been made. For example, 
Chris Wilson the webmaster of nowthatfuckedup.com offered military personnel in 
Afghanistan and Iraq free access to the pornography on his website in exchange for 
War Porn images from the Afghanistan and Iraqi war theatres. Wilson was 
commercially exploiting War Porn images so as to bring his website to the attention 
of a wider audience and also to offer his members a new category of pornography 
and so increase his membership revenue. In April 2006 the US government 
responded by shutting down his website. Finally, photographer Steven Meisel (who 
shot the images for Madonna’s book: *Sex) has appropriated Abu Ghraib in his ‘State 
of Emergency’ shoot for the September 2006 edition of Italian Vogue. Joanna 
Bourke has summed up this shoot as follows: ‘In [Meisel’s] lavish fashion shoot, we 
are shown a world peopled by hyper-real security staff and a faux woman -  skinny, 
toned, and modelling fantasy clothes and shoes. The heavily armed security
f . ' i n
personnel exude violence; the model oozes sex.’ Meisel’s embedding of abuse 
within these scenes of high fashion is designed to shock and ultimately draw 
commercial attention to the fashion featured in his shoot.
The diversity of contexts in which the Abu Ghraib image munitions have appeared in 
is confirmation that the spectacle of abuse in the war on terror cannot be controlled. 
It also highlights the fact that the traditional top-down information system -  still 
dominant in America and Britain -  has indeed now been replaced by a rhizomatic 
system which is defined by the uncontrollable flow of information and images. The 
ability of the Abu Ghraib image munitions to float freely has resulted in them 
appearing in new image contexts and places and coming to the attention of new
637 Joanna Bourke, ‘A Taste for Torture? A Fashion Shoot in This Month’s Italian Vogue is Clearly 
Inspired by the Current Climate of Terror, Torture and Abuse’, The Guardian, 13 September 
2006. Available at: http.V/www.guardian.co.uk/stvle/story/O, J871263.00.html. Accessed on 
26 February 2007, Unpaginated
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audiences, who do not necessarily engage with the mainstream media. For example, 
people are confronted with the Abu Ghraib abuse images online (when they check 
their emails and view the image archives on salon.com or nowthatsfuckedup.com), on 
the street in graffiti images and posters {iRaq), in galleries (as photomontages, 
pastels and a neon sign), in magazines {Italian Vogue and Rolling Stone) and in their 
post {The Abu Ghraib Stamps). This all demonstrates how in the rhizomatic 
condition new media actors are able to pick up and deploy the Abu Ghraib image 
munitions with their own intentions that are totally distinct from the original 
intentions of the American soldiers, anti-war protesters, NGO’s and A1 Qaeda. 
While America has sought to regain control of the Abu Ghraib image munitions after 
their deployment, A1 Qaeda has instead realised that it cannot control them after their 
release. Instead A1 Qaeda has focussed its attention on getting a maximum initial 
impact for the Abu Ghraib image munitions. Guantanamo Bay and the Extraordinary 
Rendition programme -  two other features of the invisible war on terror -  will now 
be discussed, to improve our understanding of this new front in the new image 
warfare theatre of war.
Guantanamo Bay and Extraordinary Rendition
Since September 11, 2001, according to Elaine Scarry,
the Bush administration has dedicated itself to creating an alternative 
universe, an offshore world with no legal constraints on the American 
executive... This fabricated universe also requires fabricating rules about 
habeas corpus to ensure that this made-up universe lies beyond the reach of 
real-world courts.
This fabricated universe (or ‘neverland’639) is comprised of ‘unlawful combatants,’ 
‘Torture Lite’ techniques and the Pentagon’s reinvention of the panopticon. Central 
to it is the Guantanamo Bay detention facility (Camp X-Ray, now Camp Delta) and 
the Extraordinary Rendition programme which facilitates the movement of terror 
suspects from camp to camp in the international network of internment camps,
638 Elaine Scarry, 'Presidential Crimes: Moving on Is Not an Option', Boston Globe, 2008. Available
at: http://bostonreview.net/BR33.5/scarry,php. Accessed on 14 May 2009, p. 12
639 David Mutimer, 'Sovereign Contradictions: Maher Arar and the Indefinite Future', in The Logics o f
Biopower and the War on Terror: Living, Dying, Surviving, eds. Elizabeth Dauphinee and 
Christina Masters (New York, NJ: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 161
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created for the interrogation and detention of terror suspects. This is the invisible 
war on terror. However, unlike Abu Ghraib which is now extremely well 
documented visually, Guantanamo Bay and the Extraordinary Rendition programme 
are both still shrouded in mystery. Most of what is known about Guantanamo Bay 
and Extraordinary Rendition is known because of witness testimony, investigative 
journalism and thanks to reports published by international organizations such as 
Amnesty International and The International Committee o f the Red Cross who are 
increasingly viewed as a new kind of resource separate from the official media.
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, because of its position off mainland America, was seen by 
the Bush administration as the perfect location for detaining ‘unlawful combatants’ 
and distancing the American government from its newly sanctioned ‘Torture Lite’ 
techniques. The American military, however, drastically misjudged their 
management of the media by invoking references to earlier military campaigns, such 
as the invasion of Grenada (Operation Urgent Fury -  October 23, 1983 to December 
15, 1983). According to Robin Andersen, at the start of the invasion of Grenada:
Admiral Wesley McDonald banned reporters for “operational reasons”.... 
After three days of heated charges by media organizations of Pentagon 
censorship and pressure from some members of Congress, Joints Chiefs of 
Staff Chairman General John W. Vessey directed McDonald to allow 
reporters on the island by October 28.640
Even then journalists were prevented from properly reporting on the situation 
because, according to Andersen, ‘the press were escorted to Charleston Air Force 
Base, where returning medical students kissed the ground, exhilarated to be out of 
harm’s way.’641 Journalists had been left with no choice other than to report on 
events specifically taking place at Charleston Air Force Base rather than in the 
conflict theatre itself. This was echoed when the Pentagon allowed journalists to 
visit the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. The journalists were treated to a parade 
of some of the unlawful combatants as they arrived: all wearing orange coloured 
jump-suits and shackles, with ear guards, medical face masks, goggles and gloves on 
depriving the detainees of their senses. They also witnessed the holding pens -  
where detainees were held prior to processing, often in the baking Cuban sun -  but
640 Andersen, A Century o f  Media, p. 119
641 Ibid, p. 123
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not treated to a full tour of the facility itself They were only allowed to stand and 
look on, from the other side of the fence, taking notes and pictures.642 A few images 
have since been released that show interior scenes from the detention facility. These 
interior images were released for two specific reasons: an attempt to counter growing 
criticism that journalists had not been given a proper tour of the detention facility and 
symbolically to help manufacture transparency with the watching world. It is 
because of this limited journalistic access that images of some of the Guantanamo 
Bay detainees have emerged. In reviving media management strategies from the 
early 1980s the Bush administration have again proven though that they 
misunderstand the media changes that have taken place between the mass media age 
and the information age and consequently still believe that they can control the flow 
of images and information in the war on terror.
These images have since proven damaging for the Bush administration as they have 
been weaponized and used in protest campaigns about unlawful combatants, terrorist 
internment camps and Extraordinary Rendition. One particular Guantanamo Bay 
image munition which has been widely circulated -  and which today acts as a 
metonym for both Camp X-Ray and Camp Delta (and also unofficially the 
Extraordinary Rendition programme) -  features ten detainees on their knees in a 
holding pen, with their hands bound, wearing orange coloured jump-suits and with 
medical face masks, blacked-out goggles and ear guards on. The detainees are also 
being watched over by two patrolling military personnel. This image operates as a 
powerful image munition because it visually communicates how unlawful 
combatants at Guantanamo Bay are treated when they arrive at the facility. Also, 
whenever this image munition is redeployed it immediately helps to raise the issues 
of Guantanamo Bay and unlawful combatants (and Extraordinary Rendition) back up 
the international news agenda. Having described the Guantanamo Bay detention 
facility I will now turn to describe the Extraordinary Rendition programme, another 
important feature of the invisible war on terror.
Extraordinary Rendition is another circuit breaker, first introduced under President 
Bill Clinton and appropriated by President Bush for use in the war against terrorism,
642 Alicia Upano, 'U.S. Military in Cuba Keeps Journalists at Bay'. The News Media & The Law 26, 
no. 4 (2002): p. 43
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which operates between the White House, the Pentagon and the invisible war on 
terror. According to Hill, this programme facilitates:
the snatching of suspects from numerous countries (including Canada, 
Germany, Italy, and Sweden), and their transportation either to US-run 
facilities outside the United States (notably in Afghanistan), or their turning 
over to foreign security services for detention and interrogation, in particular 
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Uzbekistan -  and also, it is alleged, to a 
number of Eastern European countries, including Poland and Romania. 
(While there is a degree of overlap here with the transportation to and 
detention of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, both the location of the latter and 
the identity of detainees held there are in the public realm.) Even though the 
existence of the extraordinary rendition programme has been exposed, the 
programme purportedly remains ongoing. Furthermore, the aspects of the 
programme that have been uncovered raise the question of those features of 
the programme that have not come to light.643
Jane Mayer, in an article for the February 14, 2005 edition of The New Yorker 
magazine, entitled ‘Outsourcing Torture,’644 revealed the existence of the 
Extraordinary Rendition programme. In this article she discussed the case of Maher 
Arar
a thirty-four-year-old graduate of McGill University whose family emigrated 
to Canada when he was a teen-ager, [he] was arrested on September 26, 2002, 
at John F. Kennedy Airport. He was changing planes; he had been on 
vacation with his family in Tunisia, and was returning to Canada...Arar, who 
was not formally charged, was placed in handcuffs and leg irons by 
plainclothes officials and transferred to an executive jet. The plane flew to 
Washington, continued to Portland, Maine, stopped in Rome, Italy, then 
landed in Amman, Jordan. ...Ten hours after landing in Jordan, Arar said, he 
was driven to Syria, where interrogators, after a day of threats, “just began 
beating on me.” They whipped his hands repeatedly with two-inch-thick 
electrical cables, and kept him in a windowless underground cell that he 
likened to a grave. ...Although he initially tried to assert his innocence, he 
eventually confessed to anything his tormentors wanted him to say...A year 
later, in October 2003, Arar was released without charges, after the Canadian 
government took up his cause.645
Mayer, with this article and her detailed description about Arar’s experiences of 
being outsourced to Syria, has shed light on this controversial American practice.
643 Hill, Re-Imagining, p. 106
644 Jane Mayer, 'Outsourcing Torture', The New Yorker, 14 February 2005. Available at:
http://kuwaitifreedom.org/media/pdf/Qutsourciong%20Toiture.pdf. Accessed on 23 July 
2008, Unpaginated
645 Ibid, Unpaginated. See also Mutimer, 'Sovereign Contradictions', pp. 159-81
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She has also cited Egypt and Morocco646 as being two further favourite destinations 
for the unfortunate passengers of American Rendition ‘ghost flights’.
Alex Danchev has documented how Britain is also complicit within this 
Extraordinary Rendition programme because it has allowed ‘ghost flights’ to take off 
and land from numerous UK airports. He explains how:
Luton was the most popular, but the CIA and its sub-contractors also availed 
themselves of the facilities at Belfast, Biggin Hill, Birmingham, 
Bournemouth, Brize Norton, Edinburgh, Famborough, Gatwick, Glasgow, 
Heathrow, Inverness, Leuchars, Mildenhall, Northolt, Prestwick, Stansted and 
Wick.647
He has also commented on how Prime Minister Tony Blair’s complicity with these 
flights embarrassingly came to light:
As late as December 2005, asked in the House of Commons when he was 
first made aware of the rendition flights, the prime minister replied, ‘In 
respect of airports, I do not know what the Right Hon. Gentleman is referring 
to’...Hardly were the words out of his mouth than a leaked memorandum 
from the foreign secretary’s private office to the prime minister’s private 
office revealed that the government knew of CIA requests for British 
logistical support, including the use of territory and airspace, and knew also 
of the existence of ‘interrogation centres’ in third countries.648
The leaking of this memo forced the British government into an embarrassing u-tum 
over this controversial issue. A European Parliament commissioned report, 
published in February 2007, has also identified fourteen other European states that, 
like Britain, are complicit, in the Extraordinary Rendition programme.649
Mayer has further embarrassed President Bush by quoting him as having said ‘torture 
is never acceptable, nor do we hand over people to countries that do torture.’650 This 
statement coupled with evidence of prisoners having been outsourced to other 
countries and later tortured has collapsed the circuit breaker between the White 
House, the Pentagon and the invisible war on terror. Danchev has also noted how the
646 Ibid, Unpaginated
647 Alex Danchev, 'Accomplicity: Britain, Torture and Terror'. The British Journal o f  Politics and
International Relations 8, no. 4 (2006), pp. 593-594
648 Ibid, p. 594
649 Hill, Re-Imagining, pp. 110-111
650 Mayer, 'Outsourcing Torture', Unpaginated
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British Muslim Moazzam Begg came to end up at the Guantanamo Bay detention 
facility after having been the subject of Extraordinary Rendition. Begg, according to 
Danchev, was extracted from Islamabad, Pakistan, on 31 January 2002:
To the warders and whippers of the war on terror, his intentions and his 
connections were axiomatically suspect. He was taken from his home at the 
dead of night and shipped to Kandahar. Moazzam Begg became Detainee 
558. Bare life had begun. Detainee 558 was given a full tour of the American 
penal colony. After Kandahar came Bagram; after Bagram, Guantanamo. He 
was tortured and abused wherever he went. He was held, often in chains, 
sometimes in solitary confinement. He was interrogated, ineffectually, as an 
‘enemy combatant’. ...Three forlorn years later he was informed that ‘any 
charges that we had pending have been dropped’, and released without 
explanation or apology.651
Making up for his invisible time in detention Begg has since given a voice to the 
invisible war on terror, through his public lectures and press interviews. He has also 
co-authored a book, with Victoria Brittain, about his experiences Enemy Combatant:
r 652The Terrifying True Story o f a Briton in Guantanamo. Collectively, the testimony 
from victims of Extraordinary Rendition -  such as Arar and Begg -  and the various 
witnesses who have come forward with information and the leaking of memos, etc 
have all helped to maintain media and public interest in this issue. Many of these 
declassified papers are available in Administration o f Torture: A Documentary 
Record From Washington to Abu Ghraib by Jameel Jaffer and Amrit Singh.
Mark Danner has written that in response to growing public resentment over the 
invisible war on terror:
just before the fifth anniversary of the September 11 attacks, the President of 
the United States strode into the East Room of the White House and informed 
the high officials, dignitaries, and specially invited September 11 survivor 
families gathered in rows before him that the United States government had 
created a dark and secret universe to hold and interrogate captured terrorists -  
or, in the President’s words, “an environment where they can be held secretly 
[and] questioned by experts” -  he was not telling a secret but instead
651 Danchev, 'Accomplicity', p. 588
652 Moazzam Begg, and Victoria Brittain, Enemy Combatant: The Terrifying True Story o f  a Briton in
Guantanamo (London Free Press, 2007)
653 Jameel Jaffer, and Amrit Singh, Administration o f  Torture: A Documentary Record from
Washington to Abu Ghraib and Beyond (New York, NJ: Columbia University Press, 2007)
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converting a known and well-reported fact into an officially confirmed 
truth.654
President Bush then went onto announce that he was going to give the International 
Committee o f the Red Cross access to fourteen high-value unlawful combatants 
detained at Camp Delta. His intention, according to Danner, was to bring these 
“ ‘high-value detainees” out of the dark world of the disappeared and into the 
light.’655 This was clearly an attempt by the Bush administration, the Pentagon and 
the CIA to regain control of the remediation battle over the invisible war on terror. 
The International Committee o f the Red Cross was given access to the detainees on 
the proviso that their report would remain secret and confidential and for the eyes of 
high level officials only. However, a copy of the report was leaked and Mark Danner 
has discussed the reports findings -  which place ‘Torture Lite’ into a wider context 
with testimony from detainees -  in a series of articles for The New York Review o f 
Books. Attention will now shift to explore the circulation of Guantanamo Bay and 
the Extraordinary Rendition programme.
Circulating Guantanamo Bay and Extraordinary Rendition
Guantanamo Bay and the Extraordinary Rendition programme have circulated 
widely in the new image warfare theatre of war. I will now explore this remediation 
beyond news networks and jihadi internet propaganda and show how this points to 
the uncontrollability of the spectacle of abuse in the war on terror.
A number of political interventions with Guantanamo Bay as their focus have been 
produced. The image munition from Guantanamo Bay -  featuring ten detainees and 
two guards in a holding pen -  has been used as the front cover of New Terror, New 
Wars by Paul Gilbert.656 This image serves as a representation of the New Terror 
and New Wars discussed in Gilbert’s book. This same image munition has also been 
parodied. For example, in response to news of deaths of detainees at the 
Guantanamo Bay detention facility Guardian cartoonist Steve Bell produced a
654 Mark Danner, 'US Torture: Voices from the Black Sites', The New York Review o f  Books, 09 April
2009. Available at:
http://www.markdanner.com/articles/show/us torture voices from the black sites.
Accessed on 1 May 2009, Unpaginated
655 Ibid , Unpaginated
656 Paul Gilbert, New Terror, New Wars (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003)
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cartoon showing detainees in the same stress-positions as in the original image again 
being watched over by two military guards. However, in the cartoon all the 
detainees have orange Mickey Mouse-like ears and one of the guards has a speech 
bubble which says: IS THERE ANYTHING YOU PEOPLE WON’T DO FOR 
PUBLICITY?’651 His depiction of the detainees wearing Mickey Mouse-like ears is 
significant because in everyday life if someone was to put on a pair of Mickey 
Mouse ears they would be instantly drawing attention to themselves. The presence 
of Mickey Mouse-like ears in this cartoon image is a way for Bell to visually 
describe the fact that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay have succeeded in drawing 
attention to themselves with the recent deaths of detainees. This is further supported 
by the fact that Bell has also drawn one of the guards asking a question about 
whether detainees will do anything for publicity. Bell’s image munition helps to 
draw public attention back to the issue of unlawful combatants at Guantanamo Bay, 
it helps to bring the issue to the attention of new audiences and it also forces people 
to rethink the issue of Guantanamo Bay in light of the recent deaths of some of the 
detainees.
The conditions at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility have also been replicated 
by an Amnesty International campaign which built a mock Camp Delta cell and 
toured with it, hoping to publicize ‘bare life’ with the general public and therefore 
replicate some of the experiences of unlawful combatants. Bare life, according to 
Giorgio Agamben, describes: ‘[n]either prisoners nor persons accused, but simply 
“detainees,” they are the object of a pure de facto rule, of a detention that is 
indefinite not only in the temporal sense but in its very nature as well, since it is
• / : c o
entirely removed from the law and from judicial oversight.’ This campaign is 
significant because it again shows how novel ways have been found to visualise and 
draw public attention to the plight of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, thus taking 
further informational control away from the Bush administration and the Pentagon. 
It also shares similarities with the FOJM campaign, during the Beirut hostage crisis, 
in the 1980s, where a cage -  containing a dummy and sometimes a celebrity -  toured 
Britain in an attempt to publicize the plight of John McCarthy and in turn the other
657 Steve Bell, ‘The Deaths in Guantanamo Bay’. The Guardian, 24 July 2008. Available at:
http://www.guardian.co.Uk/cartoons/stevebell/Q,, 1797429.00.html. Accessed on 24 July
2008, Unpaginated
658 Agamben, Homo Sacer, pp. 3-4
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Beirut hostages (see Chapter Five). Unlawful combatants were again publicized, 
according to Randell and Redmond, when
in December 2006, Banksy, a UK-based guerrilla artist, placed a life-sized 
figure of a Guantanamo Bay detainee within the Big Thunder Mountain 
Railroad ride at the Disneyland theme park in Anaheim, California. With this 
intervention, Banksy is not only intending to draw attention to the camps in 
Cuba but also to bring the absented and dehumanized war body to the 
ultimate in simulated play environments. The Disneyland theme park 
reconstructs the world in utopian environments. The Disneyland theme park 
reconstructs the world in utopian colors and dreamscapes. Banksy sets or 
retunes the screen so that the absented war body is made present; it comes, or 
rather it plays back into troubling view.659
Guantanamo Bay has also become the subject of artistic intervention with an art 
exhibition entitled: Rattling the Cage (similar in style to Mark Wallinger’s State 
Britain). According to its curator Louise Purbrick:
Rattling the Cage is a community archive of documents, textiles, photographs 
and film used in the ‘Save Omar’ campaign. It demonstrates the power of 
improvisation. As a group of people from Brighton, Worthing and 
Eastbourne began to work together for the return of Guantanamo detainee 
Omar Deghayes to his home in Saltdean, they developed skills and materials 
that could be called an art of politics: they wrote letters and plays, performed 
on the street and for the screen. They created posters, postcards, badges and 
clothing. The exhibition of their archive is an opportunity to reflect upon 
how the creativity of local people can be used to effect political change.660
This exhibition clearly has a strong political message. It reveals the power of protest 
and emphasises that although Omar Deghayes, a Guantanamo Bay detainee, was (in 
Bartle Bogle Hegarty’s slogan from the 1980s Beirut hostage crisis) kept out of sight 
he was not out of mind.
The Extraordinary Rendition programme has similarly been the subject of political 
intervention. Cartoonist Steve Bell has produced a series of cartoons about 
Extraordinary Rendition. In an interview, with Klaus Dodds, Bell has stated that his 
motivation for producing these cartoons ‘was to both publicize and belittle this
659 Randell and Redmond, 'Introduction', p. 10
660Rattling the Cage. Available at: http://w w w . ph oen ixarts. or g/arch i ved-
exhibs/2009/exhibitions 2009.htm Accessed on 18 May 2009
292
practice of Extraordinary Rendition, which has relied on making some people 
(labelled illegal combatants) invisible and thus largely beyond the scrutiny of 
democratic governments and independent judiciaries.’661 One of his cartoons 
features Frank Sinatra singing “COME FLY WITH ME LET’S SCREECH DOWN 
TO GITMO” a parody of his ‘Come Fly With Me’ song. In the background, of this 
cartoon, a plane is taking off and another one is sitting on the tarmac. Boarding the 
flight and standing on the CIA boarding steps is the hooded figure from the 
Accidental Electrocution image munition. Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay are 
thus identified as parts of a wider dynamic of abuse characteristic of the war on 
terror.
Other political cartoonists have made similar political interventions about the 
Extraordinary Rendition programme. All these image munitions are important 
because they help to draw attention to the issue of Extraordinary Rendition, they help 
to bring Extraordinary Rendition to the attention of new audiences and they also 
encourage people to rethink their attitudes towards Extraordinary Rendition. For 
instance, a cartoon by Grizelda shows a man and a woman (presumably both no-frills 
flyers) sat beside each other having just boarded the wrong flight. The couple soon 
realize they are on the wrong flight because their chairs have restraints on them and 
because the window has bars on it. The caption reads: “Eve been wondering about
f \ fO  . * • • •these extraordinary rendition flights... ”. This image munition draws attention to 
the fact that society are interested in the phenomenon of Extraordinary Rendition but 
how this interest is largely only superficial.
A cartoon by Karsten Schley shows a bearded, bound and perspiring detainee sat at a 
table. Standing over him is a suited CIA agent with his shirt sleeves rolled up, 
smoking a cigarette, sunglasses on, and with his finger poised on a CD player. The 
caption reads: HIT ME! KICK ME! BUT PLEASE STOP TORTURING ME WITH
661 Klause Dodds, 'Steve Bell's Eye: Cartoons, Geopolitics and the Visualization o f the 'War on 
Terror". Security Dialogue 38, no. 2 (2007), p. 172
662Grizelda, ‘Extraordinary Rendition Cartoon’. Available at:
h ttp ://w w w .cartoon stock. com/news cartoon s/d i rectorv/e/extraordinary rendition. asp.
Accessed on 24 July 2008, Unpaginated
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BRITNEY-SPEARS-SONGS!!663 This image munition describes how the victims of 
Extraordinary Rendition are routinely tortured, often by being exposed to loud music 
for prolonged periods of time. Schley is also drawing public attention to the direct 
involvement of the CIA in Extraordinary Rendition.
A third cartoon, by Richard Sly, is a three part storyboard. Scene one features a 
politician and a journalist, with the journalist asking the politician: What’s the
government’s stance on the use o f torture in the war on terror? Scene two is a close- 
up on the politician responding to the question: Our stance is absolutely clear... . 
The final scene cuts again to the journalist and the politician and the rest of the 
politicians answer: we are totally against admitting that we torture suspects.664 This 
three part cartoon again draws public attention to Extraordinary Rendition because it 
refers to government complicity with the Extraordinary Rendition programme.
Extraordinary Rendition has also become the subject of artistic intervention, albeit 
with a powerful political message, having been remediated for the theatre. Rendition 
Monologues scripted by Christine Bacon, with an original score by Michael Edwards 
and performed by Ice and Fire Theatre Company, according to the Ice and Fire 
Theatre Company website, ‘was launched at the Bridewell Theatre, London, in June 
2008, it weaves together first-hand accounts of men who have been victims of 
“extraordinary rendition.’”665 Rendition Monologues offers audiences the unique 
opportunity to engage with first-hand accounts of Extraordinary Rendition, it also 
helps to bring the issue of Extraordinary Rendition to new audiences and it also 
challenges audience perceptions about Extraordinary Rendition.
The above remediations all relate to either the Guantanamo Bay detention facility or 
to the Extraordinary Rendition programme. They also further help to establish, along 
with Abu Ghraib, that the spectacle of abuse in the war on terror cannot be 
controlled. However, unlike Abu Ghraib which is extremely well documented 
visually (with hundreds of original abuse images currently in circulation) the
663Karsten Schley, ‘Extraordinary Rendition Cartoon’. Available at: 
http://www.cartoonstock.eom/newscartoons/directorv/e/extraordinary rendition.asp.
Accessed on 24 July 2008, Unpaginated
664 Ibid, Unpaginated
665 Rendition Monologues. Available at: http://iceandfire.co.uk/index.php/outreach/scripts/rendition- 
monologues/. Accessed on 18 May 2009
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Guantanamo Bay and Extraordinary Rendition programme are less well documented 
visually, rather they are well documented instead through witness testimony and 
leaked government and NGO reports. I have already discussed how the Pentagon 
mistakenly allowed limited journalistic access to Camp Delta and have also released 
official images featuring the detainees to the media, believing that they could still 
control the flow of information and images in the internet age. Thus giving A1 
Qaeda and new media actors’ further ammunition with which to produce and deploy 
their own abuse image munitions and to also appropriate to help visualize the 
Extraordinary Rendition programme. The ability of image munitions to float freely 
also means that they appear in surprising new image contexts and places and as a 
result become available to new audiences. For example, people can engage with 
Guantanamo Bay and Extraordinary Rendition in Disneyland (thanks to Banksy), on 
the street as Amnesty International toured with a mock Camp Delta cell, in gallery 
spaces (with Rattling the Cage), in the theatre (with Rendition Monologues) and 
beyond. What this again shows is that A1 Qaeda has a more sophisticated 
understanding of image munitions than America, because rather than trying to keep 
control of the abuse image munitions following their deployment A1 Qaeda has 
instead focussed attention on getting the largest initial impact for these image 
munitions. Attention will now turn to examine the faked prisoner abuse scandal 
which is further evidence of just how uncontrollable and damaging the spectacle of 
abuse in the war on terror has actually become.
The Faked Abuse Images and Camp Breadbasket Abuses
As the international community were still reeling from the news of the abuse of Iraqi 
prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison, on April 30, 2004, at a specially convened press 
conference called by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), General Sir Michael Jackson 
the Chief of the General Staff confirmed rumours that allegations of Iraqi prisoner 
abuse at the hands of some British soldiers were currently being investigated. This 
press conference also confirmed rumours that Britain was involved in an invisible 
war on terror.
The following day, on May 1, 2004, The Daily Mirror ran a full front page image 
and article supposedly documenting these abuses. These images gave news
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audiences an immediate ‘place’ of focus for the recent announcement about ongoing 
investigations into claims of abuse perpetrated by some British soldiers against Iraqi 
prisoners. This front page image shows a bound and hooded Iraqi prisoner in the 
back of a truck, trouserless, with his shirt open, with a British soldier (back to 
camera) standing over him and urinating on him. This image munition was framed 
with the headline: ‘VILE... but this time it’s a BRITISH soldier degrading an Iraqi.’ 
The Daily Mirror ran this image and this headline on its front page because it wanted 
to make an impact with its readers and also bring the allegations of British soldiers 
abusing Iraqi prisoners to the attention of as wide an audience as possible.
Four more disturbing image munitions of prisoner abuse were also printed on the 
inside pages of the newspaper. These four other abuse images show the same Iraqi 
prisoner again sitting on the floor with his hands bound behind his back. The first 
image munition shows the prisoner this time being threatened with a gun and bullets 
rather than with a penis and urine. The second image munition shows the bound 
prisoner being hit in the genitals with the butt of the soldier’s gun. In another image 
munition the prisoner is shown lying on the floor -  in a kind of foetal position while 
the soldier has his boot resting on the prisoner’s neck. The last image munition in 
the series shows the prisoner lying helplessly waiting for the soldier to kick him in 
the face. The publication of these abuse images was met by a public backlash which 
immediately transformed the MoD investigation about the alleged abuse of Iraqi 
prisoners by some British soldiers, into a media spectacle. Each of these abuse 
image munitions mimics the symbolism on display in the Abu Ghraib images: 
humiliation, pornography and violence. They were deployed by The Daily Mirror to 
show how the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by American and British military personnel is 
equally barbaric and sadistic.
Attention quickly centred on the Queen’s Lancashire Regiment (QLR) that was 
based in Cyprus. It was not long before major concerns were being raised over the 
credibility of these abuse images. The journalist Claire Cozens reported, on May 4, 
2004, how the Regimental Secretary of the QLR Lt. Col. John Downham had major
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doubts over ‘the veracity of the photographs.’666 Lt. Col. Downham specifically 
‘questioned the absence of identifying badges on the soldiers’ uniforms and non­
standard lacing of the army boots,’667 while journalists Sandra Laville, Richard 
Norton-Taylor and Helena Smith were also reporting on similar inconsistencies:
the pictures looked too pristine to have been taken by a soldier with a pocket 
camera. Other defence experts said that the rifle in the photograph was an 
SA80 Mkl which was not issued to soldiers in Iraq and British troops on 
patrol wore berets or helmets not floppy hats like the one in the picture.
The authenticity of the soldiers’ urine was even debated. Media commentators were 
speculating that it may instead of urine be water squeezed from a water bottle. The 
prisoner, according to commentators, also did not look to be distressed enough when 
viewed against the Abu Ghraib abuse images.
After further investigation the images were finally proven to be fakes. For example, 
the trucks’ interior was shown to belong to a model which had not been used in Iraq. 
On May 14, 2004 Brigadier Geoff Sheldon of the QLR ‘confirmed that the truck in 
the Mirror photos had been found at the Territorial Army’s Kimberley barracks in 
Preston.’669 Trinity Mirror were swift in their response, they immediately sacked 
editor Piers Morgan for failing in his duty as editor to confirm the validity of the 
abuse images before deciding to publish them. The next day, on May 15, 2004, The 
Daily Mirror also published a full front page apology, stating: ‘SORRY.. WE WERE 
HOAXED’. It later emerged that Private Stuart Mackenzie of the Territorial Army 
had unsuccessfully sought a payment of £5,000 from The Daily Mirror for the faked 
abuse photographs. Private Mackenzie was soon court marshalled over the hoax, but 
his court marshal collapsed in April 2005. In December 2005, the Crown
666 Claire Cozens, 'Morgan Faces Army Grilling over 'Torture' Pictures', The Guardian, 04 May 2004.
Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2004/may/04/pressandpublishing.iraq/print. 
Accessed on 21 June 2008, Unpaginated
667 Ibid, Unpaginated
668 Sandra Laville, Richard Norton-Taylor, and Helena Smith, 'Inquiry into 'Torture' Pictures: Mirror
Stands Firm as Doubts Raised over Images o f British Abuse ', The Guardian, 03 May 2004. 
Available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2004/may/03/iraqandthemedia.politicsandiraq/printAccess 
ed on 19 June 2008, Unpaginated
669 Dan Milmo, and Helen Carter, 'Mirror Editor Sacked over Hoax: Morgan Refuses to Apologise
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at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2004/mav/15/mirror.politicsandthemedia/print.
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Prosecution Service also threw out his case citing insufficient evidence. 
Unfortunately irreparable damage had already been done; the images were already in 
circulation and had already been added to the abuse image archive/arsenal. These 
faked abuse images furthermore help to illustrate the uncontrollability of the 
spectacle of abuse in the war on terror and the fact that the government and military 
are no longer able to control if, how or indeed when abuses images are made publicly
f \ lC \available (even those these images turned out to be fake). They also -  as with 
Vanderford’s fake hostage execution video (see Chapter Five) -  show that 
remediated images have strong auratic presences, can easily be mistaken for real 
image munitions and therefore be circulated through the international media before 
being identified as fakes.
Images showing the abuses that General Sir Michael Jackson had alluded to in his 
press conference, on April 30, 2004 -  the abuse of Iraqi looters by some British 
soldiers at Camp Breadbasket near Basra (during Operation Ali Baba), back in May 
2003 -  were finally made public on January 18, 2005. These image munitions had 
not been released prior to this because they were evidence in pending court marshals. 
They were released, however, in January 2005, as a part of the media’s reporting of 
these ongoing court marshals. It was also hoped that the publication of these actual 
abuse image munitions would finally replace the faked abuse image munitions and 
give the British army some control back over the remediation of the abuse of Iraqi 
looters at the hands of some British soldiers. This shows how the British army, like 
the American military, still mistakenly believes that they can control the spectacle of 
abuse and the blowback of image munitions from their invisible war on terror.
Attention will now turn to discuss seven image munitions from the Camp 
Breadbasket abuse incident. These abuse images mark a new visibility for Britain, 
like the Abu Ghraib abuse images did for America, because they have helped to 
visualize Britain’s invisible war on terror. There are striking visual similarities 
between the Camp Breadbasket abuse images and the Abu Ghraib abuse images. 
Two particular image munitions from Camp Breadbasket could easily be inserted
670 See Robin Brown, 'The Politics o f Visual Images in International Politics: The Case o f British
Prisoner Abuse in Iraq', in International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention 
(Honolulu: 2005). Available at: http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/staff/robin/Image V4-1 .doc. Accessed 
on 18 November 2007, pp. 1-10
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into the Abu Ghraib image archive/arsenal and not look out of place. The first image 
munition sees a British soldier standing in the foreground, giving a grin and thumbs 
up to the camera, while an Iraqi civilian is being forced to work in the background. 
As in the Abu Ghraib image where England and Graner appear, grinning with their 
thumbs up to the camera, standing behind a human pyramid, this image is also 
reminiscent -  paraphrasing Thompson -  of exotic holiday snapshots. This image 
munition also features the same striking visual discontinuity between ‘place’ and 
‘pose’ as in the England and Graner image. Paraphrasing Coleman: this image also 
manages to capture the anti-British and the all-British again within a single image.
The second image munition is a direct visual mimetic of certain Abu Ghraib images 
(like the simulations of anal and oral sex) although the Camp Breadbasket and Abu 
Ghraib abuses took place independently from each other. This image features two 
male Iraqi civilians being forced to simulate anal sex. Both men are shown posing 
with smiles and with their thumbs up to the camera.
The next five images, a loose series, appear to document an escalation of abuse. 
They give audiences a ‘place’ of focus -  for the Camp Breadbasket abuses -  because 
the same scene, a hanger or warehouse, appears in each of the image munitions and a 
further continuity also runs throughout this series of images because of the continued 
presence of netting. They also provide audiences with definitive proof (after the 
earlier controversy surrounding the publication of fake abuse images in The Daily 
Mirror) that some British military personnel had indeed abused Iraqi prisoners. The 
first image munition shows an Iraqi civilian lying bound on the ground and wrapped 
in netting. The next image munition sees an Iraqi civilian -  again bound and 
wrapped in netting -  being stood over by a British soldier who is ready to punch him 
in the head. Another image munition sees an Iraqi civilian, again wrapped in netting, 
again lying on the floor, waiting for a British soldier to kick him in the head. In 
another image munition, yet another Iraqi civilian is lying on the floor, wrapped in 
netting, whilst a British soldier stands on top of him. The image munition which has 
since become the metonym for the Camp Breadbasket abuses shows an Iraqi civilian 
-  bound and in netting -  hanging from the prongs of a forklift truck.
671 Thompson, 'The New Visibility', p. 31
672 Coleman, "'Damn You for Making Me Do This’” , p. 211
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These abuses came to light when Fusilier Gary Bartlam returned from Iraq and took 
a film of photos into his local Max Spielmann photography shop for developing on 
May 23, 2003. Employees at the branch saw the images in the development process 
and immediately alerted the authorities. As a result of a detailed military 
investigation, four British soldiers (Fusilier Gary Bartlam, Lt. Cpl. Mark Cooley, 
Cpl. Daniel Kenyon and Lt. Cpl. Darren Larkin) were court marshalled in Germany 
in January 2005 and in February 2005 they were all found guilty of committing these 
abuses. The images or rather image munitions which document this abuse have had 
a similar fate to earlier abuse images -  they have all circulated globally, joining the 
already circulating abuse image munitions from Abu Ghraib and those faked abuse 
image munitions which appeared in The Daily Mirror. However, Abu Ghraib still 
remains the most infamous out of the Iraq prisoner abuse incidents because it was the 
first to be made public and therefore audiences will often automatically associate 
prisoner abuses with Abu Ghraib. In terms of image warfare in the war on terror 
abuse image munitions all contribute to the same image archive/arsenal. Attention 
will now turn to examine the ‘own goal effect’ of abuse images.
Abuse Images and the ‘Own Goal Effect’
Susan Sontag has drawn attention to the fact that:
in 1924, on the tenth anniversary of the national mobilization in Germany for 
the First World War -  the conscientious objector Ernst Friedrich published 
his Krieg dem KriegeI (War Against War!). This is photography as shock 
therapy: an album of more than one hundred and eighty photographs mostly 
drawn from German military and medical archives, many of which were 
deemed unpublishable by government censors while the war was on.... 
Almost all of the sequences in War Against War! are difficult to look at, 
notably the pictures of dead soldiers belonging to the various armies 
putrefying in heaps on fields and roads and in the front-line trenches. But 
surely the most unbearable pages in this book, the whole of which was 
designed to horrify and demonize, are in the section titled ‘The Face of War’, 
twenty-four close-ups of soldiers with huge facial wounds.... By 1930, War 
Against War! had gone through ten editions in Germany and been translated
f j i ' i
into many languages.
673 Sontag, Regarding the Pain , pp. 13-14
300
Now, fast forward to the first years of the twenty-first century where, according to 
Hill, abuse images and
the use of torture can be judged self-defeating.... The matrix ‘torture -  
extraordinary rendition -  Guantanamo Bay -  [faked abuses -  Camp 
Breadbasket -] Abu Ghraib’ has served to fatally undermine the values the 
Bush administration and its allies have sought to identify as directing the War 
on Terror.674
However, this strategic matrix was always supposed to remain invisible and 
ultimately deniable. It was never meant to become public. These abuse image 
munitions have since played an important force multiplier role. Today, these abuse 
image munitions, or ‘free-floating weapons,’675 have been published instantly on the 
internet and copied by other people -  located anywhere in the world -  onto their own 
private blogs and websites, reaching a wider and wider audience and gaining a larger 
and larger circulation each time they are copied. These images have, therefore, had a 
damaging cumulative ‘own goal effect’. I deploy the term ‘own goal effect’ here to 
describe the abuse images which have been produced by America and Britain in the 
war on terror -  either by soldiers independently of the military or by military 
officials in an attempt to control the spectacle of abuse in the war on terror -  and it 
helps to describe the fact that all of these abuse images have been uncontrollable 
since their release and as such have been damaging for both America and Britain.
Phillip Carter believes that ‘if Osama bin Laden had hired a Madison Avenue public 
relations firm to rally Arabs hearts and minds to his cause, it’s hard to imagine that it 
could have devised a better propaganda campaign.’676 David Simpson also believes 
that ‘the staging of these incidents as pranks rather than as formal spectacles 
provided exactly the touch of the real that might have been absent from more
674 Hill, Re-Imagining, p. 115
675 Timothy V. Kaufman-Osbom, 'Gender Trouble at Abu Ghraib?' in Western Political Science
Association (WPSA) Annual Conference (Oakland, CA: 2005). Available at:
http://www.csus.edu/ORG/WPSA/NesvoldQ6.pdf. Accessed on 13 May 2007, p. 3
676 Phillip Carter, 'The Road to Abu Ghraib', Washington Monthly, November 2004. Available at:
http://www.washingtonmonthlv.com/features/2004/0411 .carter.html. Accessed on 19 August 
2008, Unpaginated
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carefully composed images falling into the inherited genres of wartime reportage.’677 
According to Mirzoeff:
the refined torture technique known as the “Vietnam,” in which a hooded 
prisoner standing on a box connected to wires was led to believe he would be 
electrocuted if he stepped off This mode of torture used to be preferred 
precisely because it left no visible marks but the digital cameras and 
computers that were so central to the success of the US-led invasion have
cn  o
now “blown back” the sight of Americans as torturers.
Jean Baudrillard believed that ‘these images are as murderous for America as those 
of the World Trade Center in flames’679 a point which can also be made about The 
Daily Mirror faked abuse images and those from Camp Breadbasket. But they have 
also helped the invisible war on terror to remain in the public consciousness and 
therefore high up on both the political and news agendas. However, I do not want to 
make any direct causal claim here about the release of the Abu Ghraib images and 
changes in the international political landscape.
In fact, this making visible of the invisible war on terror did not result in immediate 
political changes. The Abu Ghraib images did contribute though to the growing 
public discontent with the war in Iraq. According to Jeff Lewis:
Elections in the US and Australia in 2004 returned with increased majorities 
the incumbent conservative governments that had sponsored the invasion and 
occupation of Iraq. In the British elections in 2005 dissatisfaction with Tony 
Blair’s management of the war was not enough to remove the Labour 
government from office, even though protest votes were directed to the 
Liberal Democrats.680
Lewis concluded, back in 2005, that
the universal outrage with which the Abu Ghraib photographs were met 
seems not to have translated into a more generalized public expression within 
the institutionalized electoral system. The photographs, we might assume, 
were not sufficient in themselves to galvanize public protest against the war
Z O  I
and force the removal of ‘responsible’ governments from power.
677 David Simpson, 9/11: The Culture o f  Commemoration (Chicago, IL: The University o f Chicago
Press, 2006), p. 133
678 Mirzoeff, Watching Babylon, p. 180
679 Baudrillard, 'War Pom', p. 1
680 Lewis, Language Wars, p. 244
681 Ibid, p. 244
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However, fast forward to 2009 (with four more years of insurgency activity and 
soldier deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan) and it is immediately apparent that the 
international political landscape has changed dramatically. After a ‘long goodbye’ 
Tony Blair -  George W. Bush’s closest ally since the 9/11 terror attacks -  finally 
stepped down as Britain’s Prime Minister, on June 27, 2007, he was immediately 
succeeded by Gordon Brown (Blair’s former Chancellor of the Exchequer). In 
Australia, on December 3, 2007, Prime Minister John Howard -  another ally of the 
Bush administration -  was succeeded by Kevin Rudd. Meanwhile in America 
President Bush had come to the end of his second term in office (and was 
constitutionally bound not to run for re-election), therefore, the Republican Party 
selected a new Presidential Candidate. The Party selected Senator John McCain -  a 
Vietnam War Veteran and former Prisoner of War -  who, back in 2000, had lost out 
to Senator George W. Bush in the race to become the Republican Party’s Presidential 
Candidate. In selecting McCain the Republican Party were possibly hoping to 
maintain continuity between the Bush years of the war on terror and the post-Bush 
years.
The race to become the Democratic Party’s Presidential Candidate soon came down 
to two runners: Senator Hilary Clinton (wife of former US President Bill Clinton) 
and Senator Barack Obama (a junior United States Senator, former Editor of the 
Harvard Law Review and an African American). The Presidential race was finally 
fought between Senator John McCain and Senator Barack Obama. McCain’s 
Doctrine682 echoed Bush’s Doctrine683 (especially on the issue of Iraq) and as in 
other parts of the world America voted instead for change.
Following his inaugural address, on January 20, 2009, in which he made repeated 
rhetorical references to the start of a new chapter in American history and the war on
682 See Matt Bai, 'The McCain Doctrines', The New York Times, 18 May 2008. Available at:
http://www.nvtimes.eom/2008/05/l 8/magazine/l 8mccain-t.html? r= 1 fcpagewanted^print. 
Accessed on 13 May 2009, Unpaginated
683 See Charles R. Kesler, 'Democracy and the Bush Doctrine', Claremont Review o f  Books, 2004.
Available at: http://www.claremont.org/publications/crb/article print.asp?articleid:=1218.
Accessed on 15 May 2009, Unpaginated
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terror,684 President Obama was also quick to institute some major changes. In fact, 
on January 22, 2009, he signed his first executive orders which called upon the CIA 
to close, within a year, their international network of internment camps -  including 
the Guantanamo detention facility. However, in April 2010, Guantanamo Bay was 
still being used to detain a number of terrorist suspects. He also ordered an 
immediate review of the status of the remaining 245 detainees at Camp Delta and he 
banned the use of ‘Torture Lite’ techniques.685 President Obama has also been clear 
that the immediate suspensions of the Guantanamo military tribunals are pending a 
review. On February 26, 2009 President Obama also lifted the moratorium, passed 
in the lead up to the 1991 Gulf War by President George H. W. Bush, preventing the 
publication of images of the repatriation of dead US service personnel to Dover Air 
Force Base. Instead responsibility about whether images of the repatriated dead 
should be published or not was handed over to the families of individual victims to 
be considered on a case by case basis.686 President Obama then committed his 
administration to a withdrawal plan from Iraq, something that the Bush 
administration had never committed to. “‘Let me say this as plainly as I can: By Aug 
31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end.’”687 In a move designed to make the 
invisible war on terror even more transparent the Obama administration has also 
declassified a number of documents pertaining to both Guantanamo Bay and 
Extraordinary Rendition. He has also renamed the war on terror an ‘Overseas 
Contingency Operation.’ These executive orders and rhetorical word games all 
signal the beginning of the end for the invisible war on terror and symbolically they 
are also meant to draw a line under the Bush administrations years in office.
684 See Barack Hussein Obama, 'Inaugural Address', 20 January 2009. Available at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the press office/President Barack Obamas Inaugural Address/ 
. Accessed on 21 May 2009, pp. 1-4
685 Mark Mazzetti, and William Glaberson, 'Obama Issues Directive to Shut Down Guantanamo', The
New York Times, 22 January 2009. Available at: 
http://www.nvtimes.com/2009/01/22/us/politics/22gitmo.html? r= 1 &pagewanted=print. 
Accessed on 13 May 2009, Unpaginated
686 John Myers, 'Obama Lifts Moratorium on Coverage o f War Dead', associatedcontent.com, 2009.
Available at:
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1518852/obama lifts moratorium on coverage.ht 
ml?cat=49. Accessed on 13 May 2009, Unpaginated
687 Ben Feller, 'Obama Sets Firm Iraq Withdrawal', The Detroit News, 28 February 2009. Available at:
http://www.detnews.com/article/20090228/PQLITICS/902280332/Obama+sets+Firm+Iraq+
withdrawal. Accessed on 13 May 2009, Unpaginated
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To conclude, President Bush was right -  in his September 20, 2001 speech to 
Congress and the American people -  the war on terror has proven to be ‘unlike any 
other we have ever seen.’688 In fact, post-9/11, a new image theatre of war has 
opened up. However, it is now known -  with the benefit of hindsight -  what could 
not have been known then: that the Bush administration would misjudge the 
challenges of image warfare. Instead of working towards understanding the 
meanings of images -  like A1 Qaeda have done -  the Pentagon have remained 
trapped, convinced that the war on terror will be won through a military campaign 
which is derived from techno-war principles developed from the most recent RMA 
and adapted for image warfare.
The Pentagon’s technological superiority has proven to be no match against A1 
Qaeda’s damaging image munitions. When the Bush administration has 
manufactured media spectacles -  such as Saving Private Lynch, the falling Saddam 
statue and Bush’s ‘Mission Accomplished’ speech -  it has done so failing to 
understand the decentralized nature of the contemporary rhizomatic media system. 
Where an increasing number of new media actors are now able to take a 
manufactured media spectacle -  say Bush’s ‘Mission Accomplished’ speech -  
reinsert it into new image contexts and remediate it for political purposes that are 
entirely distinct from the original intentions of The White House. The Bush 
administration also mistakenly believes that it can still centrally control the flow of 
information and images in the war on terror. It fails to grasp the fact that today’s 
news audiences are increasingly media savvy and more able to identify a 
manufactured media spectacle from an unscripted media event than they were back 
during the 1991 Gulf War. Therefore, when these kinds of manufactured media 
spectacles are released they are quickly met with criticism from both the media and 
the audience. Finally, the Bush administration has failed to realise that its media 
spectacles are in fact image munitions and some of them even have a damaging ‘own 
goal effect’: Uday and Qusay Hussein death images, Saddam’s
capture/trial/execution and prisoner abuse images. These same mistakes have been 
repeated by the new Iraqi government when they turned Saddam’s execution into a 
media spectacle and thought that they could control its dissemination.
688 President George W. Bush, 20/09/2001, Unpaginated
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A1 Qaeda has instead realised that its media spectacles -  bin Laden tapes, suicide 
terrorism footage, suicide video wills and hostage videos -  are powerful image 
munitions and have deployed them to gain a strategic advantage in the war on terror. 
A1 Qaeda have also realised that new media technologies now allow them to 
manufacture increasingly sophisticated images and videos which can then be 
deployed with greater accuracy -  having a force multiplier effect -  as they can be 
inserted into news-cycles to coincide with specific events on the international 
political agenda. Thus enabling A1 Qaeda to hijack political events, for example: a 
bin Laden video was released to coincide with the 2004 US Presidential Election (see 
Chapter Three) and a Kenneth Bigley hostage video was released to coincide with 
Prime Minister Tony Blair’s keynote speech at the 2004 Labour Party Conference 
(see Chapter Five). A1 Qaeda is also mindful of the fact that information is 
increasingly uncontrollable and unpredictable in the rhizomatic media age. This is 
because a growing number of new media actors can now remediate image munitions 
and deploy them for political purposes which are distinct from A1 Qaeda’s original 
intentions. Therefore, A1 Qaeda realizes just how crucial the initial impact of their 
image munitions are as they have no control over their circulation and remediation. 
To help guarantee a strong initial impact they design their image munitions either to 
fit into existing news frames, borrowing from well established media messages like 
political communications with their bin Laden videos and suicide video wills. Or 
they produce their image muntions with a shocking content, suicide bombing footage 
and hostage videos, so as to make them immediately newsworthy.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored abuses and the invisible war on terror and its impact on the 
new image warfare theatre of war. It began with a conceptualization of war abuses. 
Since the advent of photography, abuses have been documented in a number of wars. 
However, war abuse images have largely remained hidden and where they have 
become visible they have been mobilized by anti-war movements and popular 
culture. A contemporary example of war abuses being hidden is the “Turkey Shoot” 
incident from the 1991 Gulf War -  these images were not published in full until just 
prior to the 2003 Iraq War. War abuses were again hidden during the conventional
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operations phase of the Second Iraq War, however, in 2004 images showing the 
abuse of Iraqi prisoners, by some American military personnel, at the Abu Ghraib 
prison facility emerged. Comparisons were then drawn between these Abu Ghraib 
abuses and prisoner abuses in the American prison system. Mirzoeffs 
conceptualisation of the invisible war on terror, ‘The Empire of Camps’ -  was then 
explored and used to launch into my own discussion of the weaponization of abuse 
image munitions in the war on terror.
The Abu Ghraib abuse images were then identified as a major turning point, marking 
a new visibility in the war on terror, and I have also explored the uncertainty 
surrounding when the Abu Ghraib images actually became weaponized: establishing 
that the Abu Ghraib images were actually transformed into image munitions not at 
their initial point of production but when they were picked up and deployed by anti­
war protesters and NGO’s. I then singled out five specific Abu Ghraib image 
munitions for discussion and also explored the circulation and remediation of Abu 
Ghraib image munitions beyond news networks and jihadi internet propaganda. 
Revealing how in the information age these abuse images have been appropriated by 
a number of new media actors and consequently appear in surprising and 
unpredictable new image contexts. Attention then turned to examine the 
Guantanamo Bay and the Extraordinary Rendition programme. The limited 
journalistic access to Guantanamo Bay and the return of ‘unlawful combatants’ from 
internment camps have failed to prevent a number of damaging image munitions and 
damaging testimony appearing in the media, these images and testimony have since 
continued to circulate and remediate.
On April 30, 2004, at a MoD press conference, General Sir Michael Jackson 
announced news of an investigation into abuses by some British soldiers in Iraq. The 
following day, on May 1, 2004, The Daily Mirror published images supposedly 
showing some British soldiers abusing Iraqis. These abuse images were later proven 
to be fakes, however, they continue to circulate and remediate and be confused with 
actual abuse image munitions. These fake abuse images point to the uncontrollable 
nature of the spectacle of abuse in the new image warfare theatre of war. This 
episode was then followed by the publication, on January 18, 2005, of real abuse 
image munitions showing the abuse of Iraqi looters at Camp Breadbasket at the
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hands of some British soldiers. These damaging image munitions are proof that the 
British army currently misunderstands (like America) the nature of image warfare in 
the war on terror. It shows the British Army continuing to believe that it can control 
the spectacle of abuse, via the release of actual abuse image munitions. I then 
examined seven of these Camp Breadbasket abuse image munitions, revealing a 
network of associations between them and the Abu Ghraib abuse images. Finally, 
the so-called ‘own goal effect’ of contemporary abuse image munitions was 
discussed with reference to the publication, in 1924, of War Against War! by Ernst 
Friedrich (highlighting the ‘own goal effect’ of these gruesome images for post-WWI 
German society) and to the changing international political landscape between 2004 
and 2009. To conclude, the election of President Barack Obama and his 
administrations early efforts to exorcise Bush’s schizophrenic legacy of visibility and 
invisibility in the war on terror were discussed.
The above case study on abuses has explored the opening up of a new front in the 
new image warfare theatre of war -  the making visible of the invisible war on terror. 
Today, instead of just having to guard against attacks from A1 Qaeda manufactured 
image munitions, America and Britain is now facing attack from abuse image 
munitions produced by their own soldiers and unintentionally weaponized as they 
have circulated and have been picked up and deployed by anti-war groups and 
NGO’s in campaigns against the war in Iraq and the wider war on terror.
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Conclusion
This thesis has explored the changing ways in which images circulate within 
contemporary society. It defined this as a shift from a mass media system (connected 
to a twentieth century notion of propaganda, characterized by control and the 
‘mobilization of images’) to a rhizomatic media system (connected to the 
deterritorialized circulation and the ‘weaponization of images’). It was also argued 
that this has resulted in a paradigm shift: from techno-war to image warfare. Failing 
to recognise this shift, the American and British governments and militaries are also 
failing to manage image warfare in the war on terror because they are still trapped in 
an outdated techno-war mindset. In contrast A1 Qaeda appears to better 
understand the new security challenges posed by the uncontrollability of images in 
image warfare.
The first part of this thesis (Chapters One and Two) was theoretical. In it I outlined 
the mass media system, what characterises the rhizomatic media system and the step- 
changes in contemporary war from the Vietnam War (the first television war), the 
First Gulf War (the first real-time war), the Kosovo Conflict (the first internet war) 
and the September 11th instituted war on terror (image warfare). I also discussed the 
work of a number of key IR theorists: F rancis Debrix, Richard Jackson, Stuart 
Croft, Milena Michalski and James Gow, Michael J. Shapiro and James Der Derian. 
Although Critical International Relations, Critical Security Studies and post­
positivist IR theorists have already made important inroads with their study of 
images and popular culture and their embracing of the aesthetic turn in International 
Relations. They do not go far enough in my opinion. In order to fill this gap and 
promote a more sophisticated understanding of the media and how images circulate 
in society I have embraced literature in cognate disciplines such as Media Studies 
and Visual Culture. Exploring how propaganda has transformed from something 
produced centrally and disseminated from the top-down, into information that flows 
unpredictably from decentralized sources. I have also discussed the work of Jean 
Baudrillard and Paul Virilio, revealing how Baudrillard was -  with the 1991 Gulf 
War -  critical of real-time communication and how he was forced to rethink this in
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response to September 11th; whereas Virilio instead immediately saw possibilities in 
real-time communication for making new forms of activity and agency possible, 
offering a prophetic glimpse of future war. I also engaged with work in Visual 
Culture about photography, image production, circulation and relocation by Susan 
Sontag, W. J. T. Mitchell, Nicholas Mirzoeff and Robert Hariman and John Louis 
Lucaites. Then, to make these diverse insights more appealing to IR theorists I 
developed three conceptual terms: ‘image munitions’, ‘counter-image munitions’ and 
‘remediation battles’ and then tested them against the iconic historic images: Flag 
Raising at Iwo Jima and The Unknown Rebel (or Tank Man) and a selection of 
contemporary appropriations. I concluded the first part of this thesis with a 
discussion of my methodology.
The second, empirically driven part of my thesis (Chapters Three to Six) employed 
my three conceptual terms in four thematic case studies (political communications, 
suicides, executions and abuses) which each explored a different part of the new 
image warfare theatre of war. My political communications case study traced out 
certain aspects of political communications in the war on terror, understood as a form 
of image munition. I discussed how ‘official’ political communications -  especially 
those by American Presidents and British Prime Ministers and specifically President 
Bush and Prime Minister Blair in the war on terror -  are important because they 
facilitate the dissemination of information to the public by leaders in times of war 
and peace. Also, how technology has been important in the development of political 
communications and how the power of political communications has been 
recognized by A1 Qaeda who now produce ‘unofficial’ political communications 
featuring Osama bin Laden. I then examined the bin Laden tapes up until 2009, 
discussed Andrew Hill’s Lacanian analysis of the bin Laden tapes and Binoy 
Kampmark’s work on the spectre of bin Laden. Finally, I explored how the 
remediation of bin Laden image munitions has resulted in them being picked up and 
deployed in surprising new image contexts by new media actors. Evidence of the 
uncontrollability of images, but also how bin Laden is indeed a savvy communicator 
and manipulator of new media technologies exploiting them to guarantee his 
continued presence in the war on terror.
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My suicides case study examined suicide terrorism, a key terrorist tactic. However, 
rather than focussing exclusively on the physical tactical value of suicide terrorism I 
also went beyond this to reveal a further symbolic dimension: used by terrorists to 
manufacture propaganda around their acts of terror. I started by looking at why A1 
Qaeda’s suicide terrorism is an effective counter to techno-war. I then examined -  
with reference to the bombing of The Canal Hotel in Iraq on August 19, 2003, the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, the triple suicide bombing of Firdos Square on October 
24, 2005, the July 7, 2005 London Bombings and the July 21, 2005 Failed London 
Bombings -  how suicide terrorism and suicide video wills are both rich sources of 
image munitions, counter-image munitions and remediation battles. To conclude, 
again reflecting the uncontrollability of image munitions, I discussed a number of 
examples which show how new media actors have picked up, adapted and deployed 
suicide terrorism image munitions for their own political purposes.
My executions case study explored another feature of the image warfare theatre of 
war, a source of further powerful image munitions. I started by discussing three 
symbolically powerful terrorist tactics: hijackings, hostage-takings and hostage 
executions. Revealing how hijackings and hostage-takings are traditionally 
conducted to manufacture a strong media presence and also maintain media interest 
in a crisis (early examples of image munitions). I also discussed how hostage 
executions are similarly conducted to produce a strong media presence, but how they 
are also designed with the intention of producing powerful image munitions. I 
explored this with reference to pre-9/11 airplane hijackings, the Achille Lauro cruise 
ship hijacking, the kidnap and murder of Aldo Moro and the 1980s Beirut hostage 
crisis. I also examined the contemporary hostage-takings of Daniel Pearl, Nick Berg, 
Kenneth Bigley and Alan Johnston. The fact that hostage executions in Iraq now 
appear to be counterproductive is significant, but what is equally important is how 
the symbolism continues to be popular. This is evidenced by the symbolism 
deployed in the Johnston image munitions, the fact that a plot to kidnap and behead a 
British Muslim soldier in Birmingham has been foiled and the appearance of this 
symbolism in popular culture: Studio 60 on the Sunset Strip and Spooks. The 
uncontrollable circulation of image munitions was again proven through a discussion 
of a number of examples showing how hostage execution image munitions have -  
since their initial release -  been picked up, remediated and deployed by new media
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actors. I then examined, with a discussion of the release of damaging image 
munitions (the death images of Uday and Qusay Hussein), how America and the new 
Iraqi government have again proven that they misunderstand image warfare and the 
contemporary circulation of images. I have also shown how these damaging Uday 
and Qusay image munitions have since been picked up and used by new media actors 
who have deployed them in surprising new image contexts. The 
capture/trial/execution of Saddam Hussein was also transformed into a series of 
media spectacles and a source of damaging image munitions which have since also 
been picked up by new media actors and deployed in surprising new image contexts, 
thus providing further compelling evidence of the uncontrollable circulation of image 
munitions in the rhizomatic condition.
My abuses case study is distinct from the previous case studies. Rather than 
examining images which were originally produced as image munitions, instead I 
focussed attention on images and testimony that documented abuses and were only 
later deployed as damaging image munitions against America and Britain. Evidence 
that the spectacle of abuse cannot be controlled in the internet age as images which 
were originally filmed and photographed by military personnel as souvenirs were 
able to be picked up, at a later date, and weaponized against the Bush administration 
and the Blair government. I also discussed how although the history of war is 
littered with abuses they have largely remained out of sight and when they have 
become visible they have quickly been mobilized by anti-war movements and 
popular culture. I explored the invisible war on terror via Nicholas Mirzoeff s 
account of ‘The Empire of Camps’, also the uncertainty over when the Abu Ghraib 
abuse images actually underwent their transition from gruesome images to image 
munitions (identifying that it was when they were picked up and deployed by anti­
war protesters and NGO’s), I then selected a number of Abu Ghraib image munitions 
for discussion and followed this with a discussion of some examples which highlight 
their uncontrollable circulation and remediation in the rhizomatic condition. My 
attention then turned to two other features of the invisible war on terror: Guantanamo 
Bay and the Extraordinary Rendition programme both of which have also been 
subject to unpredictable remediation by a number of new media actors who have 
their own distinct reasons for picking up and deploying these images. I then 
discussed General Sir Michael Jackson’s announcement that allegations of the abuse
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of Iraqi prisoners by some British soldiers were being investigated, the publication in 
The Daily Mirror of faked prisoner abuse images (that raised questions not only 
about the invisibility/visibility of abuses in the war on terror but also about the 
relationship between real and fake abuse images) and the release of real abuse 
images documenting the abuse of Iraqi’s by some British soldiers at Camp 
Breadbasket in Iraq. This decision to publish the Camp Breadbasket abuse image 
munitions shows that Britain still mistakenly believed that it could control the 
spectacle of abuse. In fact the publication of these abuse image munitions only gave 
anti-war protesters, NGO’s and A1 Qaeda further ammunition to deploy against 
Britain. I finished by exploring what I term the ‘own goal effect’ of abuse images 
and President Obama’s failed attempt to increase transparency and also draw a line 
under the Bush years of the war on terror.
Having identified that society has moved away from the age of mass media to 
rhizomatic media, fundamentally altering the ways in which images circulate and 
resulting in a paradigm shift from techno-war to image warfare, I discussed how this 
new theatre of war has largely been sidelined by mainstream IR. However, engaging 
concepts found in Media Studies and Visual Culture literature and introducing them 
to ER -  via my conceptual terms -  I have endeavoured to help bridge the gaps 
between these diverse disciplines. I hope that by reassessing the war on terror my 
work can contribute to debate within IR about image warfare and that this will 
encourage others in International Relations to embrace work from Media Studies, 
Visual Culture and beyond and to engage in further research about image warfare. 
This is important because to continue reworking techno-war for the challenges of 
image warfare is ineffective, especially when A1 Qaeda have already fully embraced 
the fact that they are engaged in a war of images against the West. What I am calling 
for, along with scholars including: Roland Bleiker, David Campbell, William E. 
Connolly, Stuart Croft, Alex Danchev, F rancis Debrix, James Der Derian, James 
Gow, Richard Jackson, Liam Kennedy, Debbie Lisle, Milena Michalski, Michael J. 
Shapiro and Cynthia Weber, is a comprehensive theoretical restructuring in 
International Relations in a way that ensures the movement of aesthetic, critical and 
post-positivist approaches from the outside to the mainstream of IR and an embrace 
of new media and visual forms.
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If any doubts should exist about the importance or likely longevity of the politico- 
aesthetic transformations which dominated the Bush years of the war on terror, then 
the election of Barack Obama should dispel them. Although there are significant 
differences between the Bush years and the new Obama era continuity remains in the 
form of image warfare and the fact that Obama mistakenly believes that he can 
control the spectacle of war and image munitions in the same manner as he 
controlled his election spectacle. Obama -  as a Senator, a Presidential Candidate, 
President Elect and now as President of the United States of America -  has at every 
stage proven himself to be a skilled communicator and manufacturer of media
/T O Q
spectacles. In fact, as Kellner puts it, Obama has become ‘a “supercelebrity.
And has ‘in the first months of his presidency, deployed his status as global 
supercelebrity and utilized media spectacle to advance his agenda.’690
Here are a few examples of Obama mobilizing media spectacle to great effect: the 
2008 Democratic Party primaries were a spectacle of ‘race’ and ‘gender’, between 
the first African American candidate and the first female candidate;691 Obama’s 
campaign speeches also became immediate internet spectacles, especially his Super 
Tuesday victory speech which was the most searched for speech on the internet at 
that time.692 Obama also became a ‘spectacle of hope’693 and this hope was soon 
circulating and remediating via street art, as graffiti, posters and stickers (on 
everything from street signs to billboards).694 Obama eventually became the 
Democratic presidential nominee and soon embarked on an international tour, 
visiting the leaders of the world. According to Kellner, Obama was acting ‘as if he 
were the presumptive president. This established him as a global celebrity.’695 
Brand Obama was bom.
On election night the spectacles of ‘victory’, ‘celebrity’ and ‘race’ converged as 
famous African American celebrities, such as Jessie Jackson, Spike Lee and Oprah
689 Douglas Kellner, 'Barack Obama and Celebrity Spectacle'. International Journal o f
Communication 3 (2009), pp. 717
690 Ibid, p. 717
691 Ibid, p. 717
692 Ibid, p. 718
693 Ibid, p. 718
694 Ibid, p. 719
695 Ibid, p. 721
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Winfrey, gathered in Chicago to hear Obama’s speech and celebrate his victory.696 
Then, as Kellner writes, ‘the pre-inaugural spectacle in January was memorable and 
perhaps unparalleled in recent U.S. history.’697 Kellner also believes that:
the Obama inaugural spectacle was as well-planned and performed as the 
primary and presidential campaigns.... Obama’s traditionally short inaugural 
speech did not have the lofty and soaring rhetoric and crowd-pleasing chants 
of his most memorable discourses, its recognition of the severity of the crisis 
confronting the country, the need for fundamental change in politics and 
values from the Bush-Cheney administration, and determination to confront 
these problems satisfied the crowds and most serious observers.698
Following his inauguration and announcement of an immediate break from the Bush 
administration’s foreign policy, on January 26, 2009, he also gave his first formal 
televised interview as President. In it he offered to open a dialogue with Iran and so 
hinted at a potentially significant shift in America’s relationship with President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his government. According to Leonard Doyle, his 
‘selection of al-Arabiya over its better-known rival al-Jazeera or the US-funded 
network al-Hurra emphasised his desire to reach out to the Muslim world without 
seeming to pander to America’s fiercest critics.’699 Obama’s appearance on al- 
Arabiya also mirrors the earlier appearances of Prime Minister Blair and President 
Bush on A1 Jazeera (see Chapter Three). Obama then went on tour again to meet 
world leaders in Europe, Latin America and the Middle East -  once more confirming 
his global celebrity status.700 Although a master manufacturer of media spectacles, 
the uncontrollable circulation and remediation -  via graffiti and stickers -  of his 
image should have served as a warning that spectacles cannot be controlled. Obama 
has not heeded this warning and has instead launched into controlling the fallout 
from the spectacle of abuse in the war on terror, a decision which is currently 
unravelling.
696 Ibid, p. 730
697 Ibid, p. 735
698 Ibid, pp. 735-736
699 Leonard Doyle, 'Obama Reaches out to Iran with Message to Muslims'. The Independent, 28
January 2009. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/obama- 
reaches-out-to-iran-with-message-to-muslims-1517853 .html. Accessed on 14 April 2010, 
Unpaginated
700 Douglas Kellner, 'Barack Obama and Celebrity Spectacle'. International Journal o f
Communication 3 (2009), pp. 736
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President Obama soon realised that exorcising Bush’s schizophrenic legacy and 
drawing a line under the damaging invisible war on terror -  via increased 
transparency -  were both going to be more challenging than he had planned. In fact,
• 701according to Jon Ward, Obama has become something of an ‘apologizer-in-chief.’
In a move designed to finally exorcise Bush’s legacy and take control of the 
remediation battle over abuses in the invisible war on terror, Obama announced plans 
to declassify 2,000 prisoner abuse image munitions as part of this new era of 
transparency.702 However, on May 13, 2009, Obama performed a u-tum on this issue 
on national security grounds.703 This decision has since been heavily criticised by 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Obama could have avoided this 
situation though because as he came to power promising a clean break with the Bush 
years of the war on terror he could have adopted a policy that the Pentagon would 
not be declassifying any further prisoner abuse images. However, instead he has 
fallen into the same trap as the Bush administration, mistakenly believing that he can 
control the spectacle of abuse. What has now happened is that these 2,000 abuse 
image munitions have started to be leaked anyway.704 Proof again that the spectacle 
of abuse cannot be controlled. It is also confirmation that image warfare still 
continues to dominate in the war on terror.
In exploring the ways in which society has shifted from a mass media system to a 
rhizomatic media system, the implications for this shift on the contemporary 
circulation of images and the significance of a paradigm shift from techno-war to 
image warfare. I hope that this has opened up for fuller consideration this new 
‘theatre’ of war and with it avenues for future research. For instance, the concepts of 
‘image munitions’, ‘counter-image munitions’ and ‘remediation battles’ could be 
deployed to help interpret and investigate other examples of contemporary conflict, 
terrorism and protest. The coordinated Mumbai terror attack, on November 26,
701 Jon Ward, 'Obama Tries out Role as Apologizer-in-Chief, The Washington Times, 09 April 2009.
Available at: http://www.washintontimes.com/news/2009/apr/Q9/obama-tries-out-role-as-
apologizer-in-chief/. Accessed on 14 May 2009, Unpaginated
702 Jonathan Beale, 'Reasons Behind Obama's U-Turn', BBC News, 13 May 2009. Available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8049178.stm. Accessed on 14 May 2009, Unpaginated
703 Ibid, Unpaginated
704 Alex Spillius, "Prisoner Abuse' Photographs Surface as Barack Obama Prepares to Block
Publication', The Telegraph, 16 May 2009. Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldwide/northamerica/usa/barackobama/5325444/Prison 
er-abu se-photo graph s-surface-as-Barack-Obama-prepares-to-bl ock-publ icati on.htm 1.
Accessed on 16/05/2009, Unpaginated
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2008, when terrorists (later identified as members of Lashkar e Toiba -  Pakistan’s 
largest militant group) launched ten coordinated attacks, including bombings, 
shootings and sieges -  reminiscent of earlier A1 Qaeda terror attacks -  against The 
Chatrapati Shivaji Terminus (a railway station), The Oberoi Trident (a complex of 
two hotels), The Taj Mahal Palace & Tower (another hotel), The Leopold Cafe, The 
Cama & Albless Hospital, Nariman House (an Orthodox Jewish Centre), The Metro 
Cinema, an ally near The Times o f India building and St. Xavier’s College, The 
Mazagaon Docks and finally a taxi in the Vile Parle suburb of Mumbai. The sieges 
at The Oberoi Trident and The Taj Mahal Palace & Tower were finally ended on 
November 29, 2008. The coordinated Mumbai terror attack shows Lashkar e Toiba 
using new media technologies (television media coverage and mobile phones) to 
their advantage. Senior operatives in Pakistan were able to keep in constant 
communication with their operatives on the ground in Mumbai and direct them and 
also use the television coverage to adapt their plans so as to manufacture a number of 
powerful image munitions and transform the terror attack into an episodic media 
event. It once again proves that terrorists, this time Lashkar e Toiba rather than A1 
Qaeda, have a more sophisticated understanding of the rhizomatic media system and 
image warfare compared with government and military authorities, this time India, 
rather than America, Britain or indeed the new Iraqi government. Applying my 
theory of image warfare to this coordinated terror attack will provide IR theorists 
with further important insights about contemporary acts of terror.
The inability of authorities to control the circulation of images -  in the information 
age -  was again demonstrated, on June 20, 2009, when Neda Salehi Agha Soltan (a 
twenty six year old Graduate of Azad University and a trainee tour guide) was shot 
dead during protests against the recent re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. A 
video quickly began to circulate and remediate uncontrollably on different media 
platforms (YouTube, Facebook, Twitter) despite moves by the Iranian government to 
stop information from leaving Iran. This disturbing video depicts the final moments 
of Neda’s life and also the actual moment of her death (something that is usually 
taboo). This video and the damaging image munitions cribbed from it have since 
become the instant metonym for the 2009 Iranian election protests and they continue 
to be picked up and deployed by new media actors, appearing in surprising new 
contexts and haunting the Ahmadinejad government. Analysis of the Neda video and
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Neda image munitions will provide further compelling evidence of the dominance of 
image warfare and also how the circulation of images is today uncontrollable.
This thesis has explored how the image as circulated within society has changed as 
society has transformed from a mass-media to a rhizomatic media system. I have 
also identified how war has shifted from techno-war to image warfare, how America 
and Britain are currently one war behind -  still all consumed by theories of techno­
war -  when in reality image warfare now dominates; whereas A1 Qaeda has 
embraced image warfare and currently holds the strategic advantage in the war on 
terror. I have also embraced cognate literatures, such as Media Studies and Visual 
Culture, and developed and introduced the conceptual terms: ‘image munitions’, 
‘counter-image munitions’ and ‘remediation battles’ to the lexicon of IR -  
representing a convergence of Media Studies/Visual Culture terminology and IR 
terminology and encouraging a dialogue about image warfare. In singling out the 
2008 Mumbai terror attacks and the 2009 Iranian election protests, as subjects for 
potential future research, I show that image warfare is not just confined to 
theorisations of the war on terror. Rather, my theory of image warfare can be 
adapted to help explain other forms of contemporary and future conflict.
318
Bibliography
Kaleem Aftab, 'First Night: Four Lions, Sundance Film Festival'. The Independent, 
25 January 2010. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-
entertainment/films/reviews/First-night-four-lions-sundance-film-festival- 
1877852.html. Accessed on 13 April 2010, Unpaginated
Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Translated by 
Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998)
Giorgio Agamben, State o f Exception. Translated by Kevin Attell (Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2005)
Anna M. Agathangelou, and L. H. M. Ling, 'Power, Borders, Security, Wealth: 
Lessons of Violence and Desire from September 11'. International Studies Quarterly 
48, no. 3 (2004), pp. 517-538
Kamal Ahmed, and Jay Rayner, 'Campbell Urges BBC to Censor Bin Laden Videos'. 
The Guardian, 14 October 2001. Available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2001/oct/14/broadcasting.afghanistan/print. 
Accessed on 25 February 2009, Unpaginated
Nasrin Alavi, We Are Iran (London: Portobello Books, 2005)
Robin Andersen, A Century o f Media, A Century o f War (New York, NJ: Peter Lang, 
2006)
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f  
Nationalism. 2nd eds. (London: Verso, 1991)
Edmund L. Andrews, and John Kifner, 'George Habash, Palestinian Terrorist 
Tactician, Dies at 82'. The New York Times, 27 January 2008. Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/world/middleeast/27habash.html? r=l&pagew 
anted=print&oref=slogin. Accessed on 15 April 2008, Unpaginated
Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions o f Globalization 
(Minnesota, MN: University of Minnesota, 1996)
Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality o f Evil (New 
York, NJ: Penguin Books, 1994)
Max Atkinson, Our Masters' Voices: The Language and Body Language o f Politics 
(London: Routledge, 1988)
Roland Atkinson, and John Flint, 'Accessing Hidden and Hard-to-Reach Populations: 
Snowball Research Strategies', in Social Research Update 2001. Available at:
319
http ://www.soc. surrey.ac.uk/sru/SRU3 3 .html. Accessed on 23 February 2010,
Unpaginated
Ben H. Bagdikian, The New Media Monopoly (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2004)
Matt Bai, The McCain Doctrines’, The New York Times, 18 May 2008. Available at:
http://www.nytimes.eom/2008/05/l 8/magazine/18mccain-
t.html? r=l&pagewanted=print. Accessed on 13 May 2009, Unpaginated
Vian Bakir, 'Tele-Technologies, Control, and Sousveillance: Saddam Hussein - De- 
Deification and the Beast'. Popular Communication 7, no. 1 (2009), pp. 7-16
Anthony Barnett, 'Inside Saddam's Mouth', OpenDemocracy, 18 December 2003. 
Available at: http://www.opendemocracv.net/democracy/article 1652.isp. Accessed 
on 6 April 2009, Unpaginated
Roland Barthes, Image Music Text. Translated by Stephen Heath (London: Fontana 
Press, 1977)
Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections o f Photography. Translated by Richard 
Howard (New York, NJ: Will and Wang, 1981)
Roland Barthes, 'The Reality Effect', in French Literary Theory Today: A Reader, ed. 
Tzvetan Todorov. Translated by R. Carter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1982), pp. 11-17
Roland Barthes, 'The Photographic Message', in Barthes: Selected Writings, ed. 
Susan Sontag. Translated by Stephen Heath (Oxford: Fontana/Collins Paperbacks,
1983), pp. 194-211
Roland Barthes, Mythologies. Translated by Annette Lavers (London: Vintage, 1993)
Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation. Translated by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann 
Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1994)
Jean Baudrillard, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place. Translated by Paul Patton 
(Sydney: Power Publications, 1995)
Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death. Translated by Iain Hamilton Grant 
(London: Sage, 1998a)
Jean Baudrillard, 'In the Shadow of the Millennium (or the Suspense of the Year 
2000)'. Translated by Francis Debrix. CTheory.net, 1998b. Available at: 
http://www.ctheory.net/printer.aspx?id=104. Accessed on 23 July 2008, pp. 1-7
Jean Baudrillard, The Vital Illusion. Translated by Julia Witwer (New York, NJ: 
Columbia University Press, 2000)
Jean Baudrillard, The Perfect Crime. Translated by Chris Turner (London Verso, 
2002)
320
Jean Baudrillard, The Spirit o f Terrorism and Other Essays. Translated by Chris 
Turner (London: Verso, 2003)
Jean Baudrillard, ’War Pom'. Translated by Paul A. Taylor. International Journal o f  
Baudrillard Studies 2, no. 1 (January 2005). Available at: 
http://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol2 1 /taylomf.htm. Accessed on 08 July 
2006, pp. 1-5
Jonathan Beale, 'Reasons Behind Obama's U-Turn', BBC News, 13 May 2009. 
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8049178.stm. Accessed on 14 May 
2009, Unpaginated
Roger Beam, 'Executed Briton's Last Terrified Words: Witness Solves 19-Year 
Mystery', The Times, 01 May 2005. Available at:
http://www.timeonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article387164.ece. Accessed on 27 
March 2009, Unpaginated
Moazzam Begg, and Victoria Brittain, Enemy Combatant: The Terrifying True Story 
o f a Briton in Guantanamo (London Free Press, 2007)
Andreas Behnke and Benjamin de Carvalho, ‘Shooting War: International Relations 
and the Cinematic Representation of Warfare’, Millennium: Journal o f International 
Studies 34, no. 3 (2006), pp. 935-937
Steve Bell, ‘The Deaths in Guantanamo Bay’. The Guardian, 24 July 2008. 
Available at: http://www.guardian.co.Uk/cartoons/stevebell/Q,, 1797429,00.html.
Accessed on 24 July 2008, Unpaginated
Alex J. Bellamy, Roland Bleiker, Sara E. Davies, and Richard Devetak, eds. Security 
and the War on Terror (London: Routledge, 2008)
Raymond Bellour, 'System of a Fragment (on the Birds)', in The Analysis o f Film, ed. 
Penley Constance (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000), pp. 28-69
Walter Benjamin, One-Way Street and Other Writings. Translated by Edmund 
Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter (London: Verso, 1985)
Walter Benjamin, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', in 
Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt. Translated by Harry Zohn (London: FontanaPress, 
1992), pp. 211-245
John Berger, Sven Blomberg, Chris Fox, Michael Dibb, and Richard Hollis, Ways o f  
Seeing (London: British Broadcasting Corporation and Penguin Books, 1975)
David M. Berry, Copy, Rip, Burn: The Politics o f Copyleft and Open Source 
(London: Pluto Press, 2008)
321
Patrick Biemacki, and Dan Waldorf, 'Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques 
of Chain Referralo Sampling'. Sociological Methods and Research 10, no. 2 (1981), 
pp. 141-63
Crispin Black, 7-7: What Went Wrong? (London: Gibson Square, 2005)
Roland Bleiker, 'The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory'. Millennium: 
Journal o f International Studies 30, no. 3 (2001), pp. 509-533
Roland Bleiker, 'Art after 9/11'. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 31 (2006), pp. 
77-99
Luc Boltanski, Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999)
Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, Remediation: Understanding New Media 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000).
Jay David Bolter, Blair MacIntyre, Maribeth Gandy, and Petra Schweitzer, 'New 
Media and the Permanent Crisis of Aura'. Convergence: The International Journal o f  
Research into New Media Technologies 12, no. 1 (2006), pp. 21-39
Daniel J. Boorstin, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America. 25th 
Anniversary ed (New York, NJ: Vintage Books, 1992)
Ken Booth, ed. Critical Security Studies and World Politics (London: Lynne 
Rienner, 2005)
Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power. Translated by Gino Raymond and 
Matthew Adamson (Cambridge: Polity, 1991)
Pierre Bourdieu, On Television and Journalism. Translated by Priscilla Parkhurst 
Ferguson (London: Pluto Press, 1998)
Joanna Bourke, ‘A Taste for Torture? A Fashion Shoot in This Month’s Italian 
Vogue is Clearly Inspired by the Current Climate of Terror, Torture and Abuse’, The 
Guardian, 13 September 2006. Available at:
http://www.guardian.co.Uk/style/storv/0,, 1871263,00.html. Accessed on 26 February 
2007, Unpaginated
Stephen Brook, 'Spoof Suicide Bomber Ad Sparks Global Row', The Guardian, 20 
January 2005. Available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2005/ian/20/media.newmedia. Accessed on 5 
February 2009, Unpaginated
Stephen Brook, 'Spoofers to Apologize for VW Suicide Bomber Ad', The Guardian, 
31 January 2005. Available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2005/ian/31/newmedia.advertising/print.
Accessed on 16 June 2009, Unpaginated
322
Richard Brooks, 'Satirist Turns Terrorists into Dad's Army', The Times, 13 January
2008. Available at:
http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts and entertainment/film/articles31776 
54.ece. Accessed on 5 February 2009, Unpaginated
Robin Brown, 'The Politics of Visual Images in International Politics: The Case of 
British Prisoner Abuse in Iraq', in International Studies Association (ISA) Annual 
Convention (Honolulu: 2005). Available at:
http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/staff/robin/Image V4-1 .doc. Accessed on 18 November 2007,
pp. 1-10
Kath Browne, 'Snowball Sampling: Using Social Networks to Research Non- 
Heterosexual Women'. International Journal o f Social Research Methodology 8, no. 
1 (2005), pp. 47-60
Stanley D. Brunn, 'Stamps as Iconography: Celebrating the Independence of New 
European and Central Asian States'. GeoJournal 52, no. 4 (2001), pp. 315-323
Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods. 2nd eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004)
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out o f Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve o f the 21st Century 
(New York, NJ: Collier, 1993)
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its 
Geostrategic Imperatives (New York, NJ: Basic Books, 1997)
President George W. Bush, 20/09/2001. Address to a Joint Session of Congress and 
the American People, 20 September 2001. Available at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/2001092Q-8.html. Accessed on 
16 November 2008
Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Power o f Mourning and Violence (London: 
Verso, 2004)
Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for
Analysis (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998)
Barry Buzan, and Lene Hansen, The Evolution o f International Security Studies 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
David Byers, 'Gang Plotted to Behead Muslim Soldier 'Like a Pig", The Times, 29 
January 2008, Available at:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article3269848.ece. Accessed on 21 
April 2008, Unpaginated
David Campbell, 'Time Is Broken: The Return of the Past in the Response to
September 11'. Theory & Event 5, no. 4 (2001), Unpaginated
323
David Campbell, 'Cultural Governance and Pictorial Resistance: Reflections on the 
Imaging of War'. Review o f International Studies 29 (2003), pp. 57-73
Robert Capa, Heart o f Spain: Robert Capa's Photographs o f the Spanish Civil War 
(London: Aperture Foundation, 1999)
Susan L. Carruthers, The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the 
Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000)
Susan L. Carruthers, "Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media- 
Entertainment Network' by James Der Derian. Westview, Oxford, Boulder, Co,
2001. 'Degrading Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis' Edited by Edward 
S. Herman. Pluto, London, 2000. 'Strategy of Deception' by Paul Virilio. Verso, 
London, 2000'. International Affairs 77, no. 3 (2001), pp. 673-681
Phillip Carter, 'The Road to Abu Ghraib', Washington Monthly, November 2004. 
Available at: http://www.washingtonmonthlv.com/features/2004/0411 .carter.html. 
Accessed on 19 August 2008, Unpaginated
Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume 2: 
The Power o f Identity (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997)
Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume 1: 
The Rise o f the Network Society. 2nd eds. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000a)
Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume 3: 
End o f Millennium. 2nd eds. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000b)
Manuel Castells, The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business and 
Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)
Manuel Castells, Mireia Fernandez-Ardevol, Jack Linchuan Qiu, and Araba Sey, 
Mobile Communication and Society: A Global Perspective (Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 2007)
Stephen Castle, 'Anti-Muslim Video Sparks New Outrage against Denmark'. The 
Independent, 10 October 2006. Available at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/antimuslim-video-sparks-new- 
outrage-against-denmark-4193 92.html. Accessed on 18 February 2010, Unpaginated
Rinella Cere, 'The Body of the Woman Hostage: Spectacular Bodies and Berlusoni's 
Media', in The War Body on Screen, eds. Karen Randell and Sean Redmond (New 
York, NJ: Continuum, 2008), pp. 239-251
Samuel A. Chambers, The Queer Politics o f Television (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009)
Lilie Chouliaraki, 'Watching 11 September: The Politics of Pity'. Discourse & 
Society 15, no. 2-3 (2004), pp. 185-199
Lilie Chouliaraki, The Spectatorship o f Suffering (London Sage Publications, 2006)
324
Michael P. Clark, The Work of War after the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', in 
The Vietnam War and Postmodernity, ed. Michael Bibby (Boston, MA: The 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), pp. 17-49
Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare (London: Routledge, 2001)
Christopher Coker, Waging War without Warriors? The Changing Culture o f 
Military Conflict (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002)
Christopher Coker, The Warrior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror 
(London: Routledge, 2007)
Lindsay Coleman, '"Damn You for Making Me Do This": Abu Ghraib, 24, Torture, 
and Television Sadomasochism', in The War Body on Screen, eds. Karen Randell and 
Sean Redmond (New York, NJ: Continuum, 2008), pp. 199-215
Mark Connelly and David Welch, eds., War and the Media: Reportage and 
Propaganda, 1900-2003 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005)
William E. Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2002)
Julian Corbett, 'Command of the Sea', in War, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 225-28
Claire Cozens, 'Morgan Faces Army Grilling over 'Torture' Pictures', The Guardian, 
04 May 2004. Available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2004/mav/04/pressandpublishing.iraq/print. 
Accessed on 21 June 2008, Unpaginated
Stuart Croft, Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006)
P. J. Crowley, 'The Battle of Narratives: The Real Central Front against A1 Qaeda', in 
The Impact o f 9/11 on the Media, Arts and Entertainment, ed. Matthew J. Morgan 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), pp. 37-50
Alex Danchev, 'Accomplicity: Britain, Torture and Terror'. The British Journal o f 
Politics and International Relations 8, no. 4 (2006a), pp. 593-594
Alex Danchev, "Like a Dog!' Humiliation and Shame in the War on Terror', 2006b. 
Available at: http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/theoryworkshops/danchevpaper.doc.
Accessed on 13 January 2007, pp. 1-32
Mark Danner, 'Abu Ghraib: The Hidden Story', in The New York Review o f Books, 07 
October 2004. Available at:
http://www.markdanner.com/articles/show/abu ghraib the hidden story. Accessed 
on 1 May 2008, Unpaginated
325
Mark Danner, 'We Are All Torturers Now', The New York Review o f Books, 06 
January 2005. Available at:
http://www.markdanner.com/articles/show/we are all torturers now. Accessed on 1 
May 2008, Unpaginated
Mark Danner, 'US Torture: Voices from the Black Sites', The New York Review o f  
Books, 09 April 2009. Available at:
http://www.markdanner.com/articles/show/us torture voices from the black sites. 
Accessed on 1 May 2009, Unpaginated
Daniel Dayan, and Elihu Katz, Media Events: The Live Broadcasting o f History 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994)
Benjamin de Carvalho, ‘War Hurts: Vietnam Movies and the Memory of a Lost 
War’, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 34, no. 3 (2006), pp. 951-963
Guy Debord, The Society o f the Spectacle. Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith 
(New York: Zone Books, 1999)
F rancis Debrix and Cynthia Weber, eds. Rituals o f Mediation: International Politics 
and Social Meaning (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003)
Francis Debrix, Tabloid Terror: War, Culture and Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 
2008)
Frangois Debrix, 'Jean Baudrillard', in Critical Theorists and International Relations, 
eds. Jenny Edkins and Nick Vaughan-Williams (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 54- 
66
Gilles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. Translated by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987)
Gilles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
Translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1992)
Don DeLillo, Falling Man (London: Picador, 2007)
James Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy o f Western Estrangement (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1987)
James Der Derian, 'The (S)Pace of International Relations: Simulations, 
Surveillance, and Speed'. International Studies Quarterly 34, no. 3 (1990), pp. 295- 
310
James Der Derian, Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1992)
326
James Der Derian, 'Cyber-Deterrence'. Wired, September 1994. Available at: 
http://www.wired.eom/wired/archive/2.09/eyber.deter pr.html. Accessed on 22 July 
2007, Unpaginated
James Der Derian, 'A Reinterpretation of Realism: Genealogy, Semiology, 
Dromology', in International Theory: Critical Investigations, ed. James Der Derian 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1995), pp. 363-397
James Der Derian, 'The Simulation Syndrome: From War Games to Game Wars', in 
Interpreting the Political: New Methodologies, eds. Terrell Carver and Matti 
Hyvarinen (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 158-65
James Der Derian, "All but War Is Simulation", in Rethinking Geopolitics, eds. 
Gearoid O' Tuathail and Simon Dalby (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 261-274
James Der Derian, 'Virtuous War / Virtual Theory'. International Affairs 76, no. 4 
(2000), pp. 771-788
James Der Derian, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media- 
Entertainment Network. 1st eds. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001a)
James Der Derian, 'Global Events, National Security, and Virtual Theory'. 
Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 30, no. 3 (2001b), pp. 669-90
James Der Derian, '9.11: The Media-Entertainment Network', INFOinterventions, 
2001c. Available at:
http://www.watsoninstitute.org/infopeace/91 l/article.cfm?id=28. Accessed on 23 
July 2007, Unpaginated
James Der Derian, 'In Terrorem: Before and after 9/11', in Worlds in Collision: 
Terror and the Future o f Global Order, eds. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 101-118
James Der Derian, 'The Question of Information Technology in International 
Relations'. Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 32, no. 3 (2003a), pp. 441- 
457
James Der Derian, 'War as Game'. The Brown Journal o f World Affairs 10, no. 1 
(2003b), pp. 37-49
James Der Derian, '9/11 and Its Consequences for the Discipline'. Zeitschrift fur  
Internationale Beziehungen (Journal o f International Relations) (2004), pp. 89-101
James Der Derian, '9/11: Before, after and in Between', in Terrorism, Media, 
Liberation, ed. J. David Slocum (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
2005a), pp. 321-37
James Der Derian, 'Imaging Terror: Logos, Pathos and Ethos'. Third World Quarterly 
26, no. 1 (2005b), pp. 23-37
327
James Der Derian, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media- 
Entertainment Network. 2nd eds. (London: Routledge, 2009a)
James Der Derian, 'Paul Virilio', in Critical Theorists and International Relations, 
eds. Jenny Edkins and Nick Vaughan-Williams (London: Rouledge, 2009b), pp. 330- 
41
James Der Derian, 'Virtuous War and Hollywood: The Pentagon Wants What 
Hollywood's Got', in Critical Practices in International Relations Theory: Selected 
Essays, ed. James Der Derian (London: Routledge, 2009c), pp. 239-243
Jacques Derrida, O f Grammatology. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1977)
Jacques Derrida, Spectres o f Marx: The State o f the Debt, the Work o f Mourning and 
the New International Translated by Peggy Kamuf (New York, NJ: Routledge, 1994)
Mark Deuze, Media Work: Digital Media and Society Series (Cambridge: Polity, 
2007)
Richard Devetak, 'The Gothic Scene of International Relations: Ghosts, Monsters, 
Terror and the Sublime after September 11'. Review o f International Studies 31, no. 4 
(2005), pp. 621-643
Faisal Devji, Landscapes o f the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity (London: C. 
Hurst & Company, 2005)
Giuseppe Di Bella, 'The Democratic Image: Archive for the 'Giuseppe Di Bella' 
Category', in OpenDemocracy. Available at:
http://thedemocraticimage.opendemocracv.net/categorv/giuseppe-di-bella/. Accessed 
on 13 July 2008, Unpaginated
Michael Dillon, 'Network Society, Network-Centric Warfare and the State of 
Emergency'. Theory, Culture & Society 19, no. 4 (2002), pp. 71-79
Klaus Dodds, 'Steve Bell's Eye: Cartoons, Geopolitics and the Visualization of the 
'War on Terror". Security Dialogue 38, no. 2 (2007), pp. 157-177
Klaus Dodds, 'Screening Terror: Hollywood, the United States and the Construction 
of Danger'. Critical Studies on Terrorism 1, no. 2 (2008), pp. 227-243
Elsa Dorfman, Book Review: Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography by 
Roland Barthes. Available at: http://elsa.photp.net/barthes.htm. Accessed on 27 
August 2009, Unpaginated
Giulio Douhet, 'Command of the Air', in War, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 228-31
John Downey, and Graham Murdock, 'The Counter-Revolution in Military Affairs:
328
The Globalization of Guerrilla Warfare', in War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 
24/7, eds. Daya Kishan Thussu and Des Freedman (London: Sage Publication, 2003), 
pp. 70-87
Leonard Doyle, 'Obama Reaches out to Iran with Message to Muslims'. The 
Independent, 28 January 2009. Available at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/obama-reaches-out-to-iran-with- 
message-to-muslims-1517853 .html. Accessed on 14 April 2010, Unpaginated
Jim Dwyer, 'A Nation at War: In the Field - V Corps Commander; a Gulf 
Commander Sees a Longer Road', The New York Times, 28 March 2003. Available 
at:
http://querv.nvtimes.com/ gst/fullpage.html?res=9C01E4D81F3 0F93 BA 15750C0 A96 
59C8B63. Accessed on 30 November 2008, Unpaginated
Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory o f Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003)
Jenny Edkins, 'Missing Persons: Manhattan, September 2001', in The Logics o f  
Biopower and the War on Terror: Living, Dying, Surviving, eds. Elizabeth 
Dauphinee and Christina Masters (New York, NJ: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 
25-43
Jenny Edkins, and Nick Vaughan-Williams, eds. Critical Theorists and International 
Relations (London: Routledge, 2009)
Stephen F. Eisenman, The Abu Ghraib Effect (London: Reaktion Books Ltd., 2007)
M. A. Eland-Goossensen, L. A. M. Van der Goor, E. C. Vollermans, V. M. 
Hendricks, and H. F. L. Garetsen, 'Snowball Sampling Applied to Opiate Addicts 
Outside the Treatment System'. Addiction Research 5 (1997), pp. 317-30
Craig Etcheson, After the Killing Fields: Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide 
(Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2005)
Stuart Ewan, PR!: A Social History o f Spin (New York, NJ: Basic Books, 1996)
J. Faugier, and M. Sargeant, 'Sampling Hard to Reach Populations'. Journal o f  
Advanced Nursing 26, no. 4 (1997), pp. 790-97
Ben Feller, 'Obama Sets Firm Iraq Withdrawal', The Detroit News, 28 February 
2009. Available at:
http://www.detnews.com/article/20090228/PQLITICS/902280332/Obama+sets+finn 
+Iraq +withdrawal. Accessed on 13 May 2009, Unpaginated
Alastair Finlan, The Gulf War 1991 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003)
Alastair Finlan, Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror: Warfare by Other 
Means (London: Routledge, 2008)
329
Alan Finlayson, Making Sense o f New Labour (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd.,
2003)
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology o f Knowledge. Translated by A. M. Sheridan 
Smith (London: Routledge, 1989)
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f the Prison. Translated by Alan 
Sheridan (London: Penguin Books, 1991)
Bridget Fowler, ’Collective Memory and Forgetting: Components for a Study of 
Obituaries'. Theory, Culture & Society 22, no. 6 (2005), pp. 53-72
Bob Franklin, Packaging Politics: Political Communications in Britain's Media 
Democracy. 2nd eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)
Marianne I. Franklin, Resounding International Relations: On Music, Culture and 
Politics (New York, NJ: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)
General Tommy R. Franks, American Soldiers (London: HarperCollins, 2004)
Lawrence Freedman, ’The Revolution in Strategic Affairs', in Adelphi Papers 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1998)
Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: The Globalized World in the Twenty-First 
Century. 2nd eds. (London: Penguin Books, 2006)
David Friend, Watching the World Change: The Stories Behind the Images o f 9/11 
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2007)
David Frum, and Richard Perle, An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror 
(New York, NJ: Ballantine Books, 2004)
Patrick Fuery, and Kelli Fuery, Visual Cultures and Critical Theory (London: 
Arnold, 2003)
John Garofano, "Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-
Entertainment Network' by James Der Derian. Boulder, Co, Westview Press, 2001. 
pp. 249'. Political Studies Quarterly 117, no. 1 (2002), pp. 138-139
Alexander L. George, and Andrew Bennett, Case Study and Theory Development in 
the Social Sciences (London: MIT Press, 2005)
George Gerbner, 'Instant Flistory, Image History: Lessons from the Persian Gulf 
War', in Images in Language, Media and Mind, ed. Roy F. Fox (Urbana, IL: National 
Council of Teachers of English, 1994), pp. 123-141
John Gerring, Case Study Research (New York, NJ: Cambridge University Press,
2005)
Paul Gilbert, New Terror, New Wars (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003)
330
Bill Gillham, Case Study Research Methods (London: Continuum, 2000)
Dan Gillmor, We the Media: Grassroots Journalism by the People, fo r  the People 
(Sebastopol, CA: O'Reilly Media, Inc., 2006)
Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred. Translated by Patrick Gregory (London: 
Continuum, 2005)
Todd Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and 
Unmaking o f the New Left (London: University of California Press, 1980)
Suzanne Goldenberg, 'Uday: Career of Rape, Torture and Murder'. The Guardian, 23 
July 2003. Available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/iul/23/iraq.suzannegoldenberg. Accessed on 
21 February 2010, Unpaginated
Roger Gomm, Martyn Hammersley, and Peter Foster, eds. Case Study Method: Key 
Issues, Key Texts (London: Sage Publications, 2000)
Chris Hables Gray, Postmodern War: The New Politics o f Conflict (London 
Routledge, 1997)
Chris Hables Gray, Cyborg Citizens: Politics in the Posthuman Age (London: 
Routledge, 2002)
Chris Hables Gray, 'Posthuman Soldiers in Postmodern War'. Body & Society 9, no. 
4(2003), pp. 215-226
Jacques Hamel, Stephane Dufour, and Dominic Fortin, Case Study Methods. 
Translated by Maureen Nicholson (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1993)
Susan C. Herring, Inna Kouper, John C. Paolillo, Lois Ann Scheidt, Michael 
Tyworth, Peter Welsch, Elijah Wright, and Ning Yu, 'Conversations in the 
Blogosphere: An Analysis "From the Bottom Up'", in 38th Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences (Hilton Waikoloa Village, Island of Hawaii (Big 
Island): 2005). Available at:
http://www.computer.org/plugins/dl/pdf/proceedings/hicss/2005/2268/04/226801Q7b 
.pdf?template= 1 &loginState= 1 &userData=anonymous- 
IP%253A%253A1.97.130.63. Accessed on 08 January 2010, pp. 1-11
Michael Howard, and Peter Paret, eds. Carl Von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1989)
Philip Goodchild, Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics o f Desire 
(London Sage Publications, 1996)
Colin S. Gray, The American Revolution in Military Affairs: An Interim Assessment 
(London: TSO for Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1997)
331
Colin S. Gray, 'The Revolution in Military Affairs', in The Nature o f Future Conflict: 
Implications for Force Development, ed. Brian Bond (London: TSO for Strategic and 
Combat Studies Institute, 1998), pp. 58-66
Robert W. Gregg, International Relations Film (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publications, Inc., 1998)
Marita Gronnvoll, 'Gender (In)Visibility at Abu Ghraib'. Rhetoric & Public Affairs 
10, no. 3 (2007), pp. 371-398
Richard Grusin, 'Premediation'. Criticism 46, no. 1 (2004), pp. 17-39
Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, and Michael Marrinan, eds. Mapping Benjamin: The Work 
o f Art in the Digital Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003)
Renuka Gusain, 'The War Body as Screen of Terror', in The War Body on Screen, 
eds. Karen Randell and Sean Redmond (New York, NJ: Continuum, 2008), pp. 36-50
Stuart Hall, 'Encoding, Decoding', in The Cultural Studies Reader, ed. Simon During 
(London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 507-18
Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere: An Inquiry 
into a Category o f Bourgeois Society. Translated by Thomas Burger (Oxford: Polity 
Press, 1992)
Philip Hammond, Media, War and Postmodernity (London: Routledge, 2007)
Philip Hammond, 'The Gulf War Revisited', in Jean Baudrillard: Fatal Theories, 
eds. David B. Clarke, Marcus A. Doel, William Merrin and Richard G. Smith 
(London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 118-136
Victor Davis Hanson, An Autumn o f War: What America Learned from September 
11th and the War on Terrorism (New York, NJ: Anchor Books, 2002)
Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2000)
Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age o f  
Empire (London Penguin Books, 2006)
Robert Hariman, and John Louis Lucaites, No Caption Needed: Iconic Photographs, 
Public Culture, and Liberal Democracy (Chicago, MI: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2007)
B.H. Liddell Hart, 'The Indirect Approach', in War, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 231-32
David R. A. Hatcher, 'Self-Sacrifice Terrorism (the Suicide Bomber): Global Threat 
or Tactical Weapon?' in Seaford House Papers, ed. Lieutenant General Sir
332
Christopher Wallace KBE (London: Royal College of Defence Studies, 2004), pp. 
74-91
Meir Hatina, Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement (Ramat 
Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv 
University, 2001)
Colin Hay, Why We Hate Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 2007)
Martin Heidegger, 'The Age of the World Picture', in The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays, ed. Martin Heidegger Translated by William Lovitt 
(New York, NJ: Harper Torchbooks, 1977), pp. 115-155
Edward S. Herman, and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political 
Economy o f the Mass Media (London: Vintage, 1994)
Irene Herrmann, and Daniel Palmieri, 'A Haunting Figure: The Hostage through the 
Ages', in International Review o f the Red Cross, 2005. Available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/review-857- 
pl35/$File/irrc 857 Palmieri.pdf. Accessed on 7 March 2006, pp. 135-146
Aaron Hess, 'In Digital Remembrance: Vernacular Memory and the Rhetorical 
Construction of Web Memorials'. Media, Culture & Society 29, no. 5 (2007), pp. 
812-31
Andrew Hill, 'The Bin Laden Tapes'. Journal for Cultural Research 10, no. 1 (2006), 
pp. 35-46
Andrew Hill, 'Hostage Videos in the War on Terror', in The War Body on Screen, 
eds. Karen Randell and Sean Redmond (New York, NJ: Continuum, 2008), pp. 251 - 
66
Andrew Hill, Re-Imagining the War on Terror: Seeing, Waiting, Travelling 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009)
Bruce Hoffman, 'The Logic of Suicide Terrorism', The Atlanic Monthly, June 2003. 
Available at: http://www.theatlanic.com/doc/200306/hoffman. Accessed on 21 June
2008, pp. 1-10
Andrew Hoskins, Televising War: From Vietnam to Iraq (London: Continuum,
2004)
Andrew Hoskins, and Ben O'Loughlin, Television and Terror: Conflicting Times and 
the Crisis o f News Discourse (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)
House of Commons, 'Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 
7th July 2005'. Available at: http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hcl0/1087/1087.pdf. Accessed on 11 May 
2006, pp. 1-41
333
Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. Carl Von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1989)
Rachel Hughes, 'Through the Looking Blast: Geopolitics and Visual Culture'. 
Geography Compass 2 (2007), pp. 976-994
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f Civilizations and the Remaking o f World Order 
(London: The Free Press, 2002)
Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity 
(New York, NJ: Simon & Schuster, 2005)
Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (London: Yale 
University Press, 2006)
Jef Huysmans, 'James Der Derian: The Unbearable Lightness of Theory', in The 
Future o f International Relations: Masters in the Making, eds. Iver B. Neumann and 
Ole Waever (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 337-359
Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (London: Vintage, 2001)
International Relations special issue on ‘Images and Imaginings of Security’ (edited 
by Stuart Croft, 20(4) (December 2006))
Engin F. Isin, and Kim Rygiel, 'Abject Spaces: Frontiers, Zones, Camps', in The 
Logics o f Biopower and the War on Terror: Living, Dying, Surviving, eds. Elizabeth 
Dauphinee and Christina Masters (New York, NJ: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 
181-205
Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter- 
Terrorism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005)
Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning, eds. Critical Terrorism 
Studies: A New Research Agenda (London: Routledge, 2009)
Jameel Jaffer, and Amrit Singh, Administration o f Torture: A Documentary Record 
from Washington to Abu Ghraib and Beyond (New York, NJ: Columbia University 
Press, 2007)
Lee Jarvis, Times o f Terror: Discourse, Temporality and the War on Terror 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009)
Lee Jarvis, 'Remember, Remember, 11 September: Memorialising 9/11 on the 
Internet'. Journal o f War and Culture Studies 3, no. 1 (2010)
Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide (New 
York, NJ: New York University Press, 2006)
Alain Joxe, Empire o f Disorder (New York, NJ: Semiotexte(e), 2002)
334
Daniel Joyce, ’Book Review: Watching Babylon: The War in Iraq and Global Visual 
Culture by Nicholas Mirzoeff. Global Media and Communication 1, no. 3 (2005), 
p p .378-380
Leander Kahney, The Cult o f iPOD (San Francisco, CA: No Starch Press, Inc., 2005)
Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. 2nd eds. 
(Cambridge Polity Press, 2006)
Binoy Kampmark, 'The Spectre of Bin Laden in the Age of Terrorism'. CTheory.net,
2002. Available at: httn://www.ctheory.net/printer.ast>x?id=355. Accessed on 20 
January 2008,p p .1-13
Lawrence F. Kaplan, and William Kristol, The War over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny 
and America's Mission (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2003)
Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams o f the Post-Cold 
War (London: Vintage, 2001)
Robert D. Kaplan, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos 
(London Vintage, 2003)
Timothy V. Kaufman-Osbom, 'Gender Trouble at Abu Ghraib?' in Western Political 
Science Association (WPSA) Annual Conference (Oakland, CA: 2005). Available at: 
http://www.csus.edu/ORG/WPSA/NesvoldQ6.pdf. Accessed on 13 May 2007
Jeremy Kay, 'Chris Morris's Four Lions: A Mixed Dish That Fails to Satisfy'. The 
Guardian, 25 Janurary 2010. Available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2010/ian/25/four-lions-chris-morris. Accessed on 13 
April 2010, Unpaginated
Brian Keenan, An Evil Cradling (London: Vintage, 1993)
Thomas Keenan, 'Looking Like Flames and Falling Like Stars: Kosovo, 'the First 
Internet War". Social Identities: Journal for the Study o f Race, Nation and Culture 7, 
no. 4 (2001), pp. 539-550
Ulrich Keller, The Ultimate Spectacle: A Visual History o f the Crimean War 
(London: Routledge, 2002)
Douglas Kellner, 'Media Culture and the Triumph of the Spectacle', 2004. Available 
at: http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/facultv/kellner/papers/medculturespectacle.html.
Accessed on 29 November 2007, pp. 1-18
Douglas Kellner, Media Spectacle and the Crisis o f Democracy (Boulder, CO: 
Paradigm Publishers, 2005)
Douglas Kellner, 'Barack Obama and Celebrity Spectacle'. International Journal o f 
Communication 3 (2009), pp. 715-41
335
Peter Kennard, Dispatches from an Unofficial War Artist -  Extract, Available at: 
http://www.peterkennard.com/main/home set.htm. Accessed on 19 January 2008
Liam Kennedy, ’Remembering September 11: Photography as Cultural Diplomacy'. 
International Affairs 79, no. 2 (2003), pp. 315-326
Charles R. Kesler, 'Democracy and the Bush Doctrine', Claremont Review o f Books,
2004. Available at:
http://www.claremont.org/publications/crb/article print.asp?articleid=l218.
Accessed on 15 May 2009, Unpaginated
Mohammad Sidique Khan, London Bomber: Text in Full, BBC News, 01 September
2005. Available at:
http://newsvote.bbc.co.Uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk/4206800.st 
m. Accessed on 30 May 2008, Unpaginated
Naomi Klein, 'The Year of the Fake', The Nation, 08 January 2004. Available at: 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040126/klein/print. Accessed on: 20 November
2008, Unpaginated
Chase Laurelle Knowles, 'Towards a New Web Genre: Islamist Neorealism'. Journal 
o f War and Culture Studies 1, no. 3 (2008), pp. 357-380
Keith Krause, and Michael C. Williams, eds. Critical Security Studies: Concepts and 
Cases (London: UCL Press, 1997)
Leon Kreitzman, The 24 Hour Society (London: Profile Books, 1999)
Julia Kristeva, Powers o f Horror: An Essay on Abjection. Translated by Leon S. 
Roudiez (New York, NJ: Columbia University Press, 1982)
Howard Kurtz, Spin Cycle: Inside the Clinton Propaganda Machine (London: Pan 
Books, 1998)
Richard Lacayo, 'Not Again a Grisly Image of a Dead Hostage Outrages the U.S.', 
Time, 14 August 1989. Available at:
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0.8816.958340.00.html. Accessed on 24 March
2009, Unpaginated
Sune Laegaard, 'The Cartoon Controvery: Offence, Identity, Oppression?' Political 
Studies 55, no. 3 (2007), pp. 481-99
Zaki Laidi, A World Without Meaning: The Crisis o f Meaning in International 
Politics. Translated by June Burnham and Jenny Coulon (London: Routledge, 1998)
Andrew Latham, 'Re-Imagining Warfare: The 'Revolution in Military Affairs", in 
Contemporary Security and Strategy, ed. Craig A. Snyder (London: Macmillan Press 
Ltd., 1999), pp. 210-237
336
Sandra Laville, Richard Norton-Taylor, and Helena Smith, 'Inquiry into 'Torture' 
Pictures: Mirror Stands Firm as Doubts Raised over Images of British Abuse ', The 
Guardian, 03 May 2004. Available at:
http://wvsrw.guardian.co.uk/media/2004/mav/03/iraqandthemedia.politicsandiraq/prin 
t. Accessed on 19 June 2008, Unpaginated
Bruce Lawrence, ed. Messages to the World: The Statements o f Osama Bin Laden. 
Translated by James Howarth (London: Verso, 2005)
Stephen Lax, Beyond the Horizon - Communications Technologies: Past, Present 
and Future (Luton: University of Luton Press, 1997)
Michael Ledeen, The War against the Terror Masters: Why It Happened, Where We 
Are Now, How We'll Win (New York NJ: St. Martin's Press, 2002)
Anthony W. Lee, and Elizabeth Young, On Alexander Gardner's Photographic 
Sketch Book o f the Civil War (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008)
Pete Lentini and Muhammad Bakashmar, ‘Jihadist Beheading: A Convergence of 
Technology, Theology, and Teleology’. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 4 
(2007), pp. 303-325
Bernard Henri Levy, Who Killed Daniel Pearl? (Hoboken, NJ: Melville House 
Publishing, 2003)
Nathan Levy, 'Private England Pleads Guilty to Abuses', The New York Times, 03 
May 2005. Available at: http://www.nvtimes.com/20Q5/05/03/national/03abuse.html. 
Accessed on 4 June 2009, Unpaginated
Jeff Lewis, Language Wars: The Role o f Media and Culture in Global Terror and 
Political Violence (London: Pluto Press, 2005)
Martin C. Libicki, 'Illuminating Tomorrow's War', in McNair Paper 61, 1999. 
Available at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/McNair/mcnair61 /mcnair61 /pdf. Accessed on 
8 December 2008, pp. 1-129
Debbie Lisle, 'Gazing at Ground Zero: Tourism, Voyeurism and Spectacle'. Journal 
o f Cultural Research 8, no. 1 (2004), pp. 3-21
Debbie Lisle, 'How Do We Find Out What's Going on in the World?' in Global 
Politics: A New Introduction, eds. Jenny Edkins and Maja Zehfuss (London: 
Routledge, 2008), pp. 147-70
Timothy W. Luke, Shows o f Force: Power, Politics and Ideology at Art Museums 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992)
Timothy W. Luke, Museum Politics: Power Plays at the Exhibition (Minnesota, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2002)
337
Edward N. Luttwak, 'Towards Post-Heroic Warfare'. Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3
(1995), pp. 109-122
Edward N. Luttwak, 'A Post-Heroic Military Policy'. Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4
(1996), pp. 33-44
Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. 
Translated by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1991)
Scot Macdonald, Propaganda and Information Warfare in the Twenty-First Century: 
Altered Images and Deception Operations (London: Routledge, 2007)
Michael Mann, States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1988)
Steve Mann, 'Secrecy, No Privacy, May Be the True Cause of Terrorism', 2002. 
Available at: http://wearcam.org/sousveillance.html. Accessed on 8 February 2009, 
Unpaginated
Steve Mann, Jason Nolan, and Barry Wellman, 'Sousveillance: Inventing and Using 
Wearable Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments'. 
Surveillance & Society 1, no. 3 (2003): pp. 331-55
Steve Mann, "'Sousveillance": Inverse Surveillance in Multimedia Imaging'. MM'04 
(New York, NJ, 10-16 October 2004), pp. 620-27
Christopher May, The Information Society: A Sceptical View (Cambridge: Polity, 
2002)
Jane Mayer, 'Outsourcing Torture', The New Yorker, 14 February 2005. Available at: 
http://kuwaitifreedom.org/media/pdf/Qutsourciong%20Torture.pdf. Accessed on 23 
July 2008, Unpaginated
Mark Mazzetti, and William Glaberson, 'Obama Issues Directive to Shut Down 
Guantanamo', The New York Times, 22 January 2009. Available at:
http://www.nvtimes.eom/2009/01 /22/us/politics/22gitmo.html? r= 1 &pagewanted=pr 
int. Accessed on 13 May 2009, Unpaginated
Achille Mbembe, 'Necropolitics' translated by Libby Meintjes. Public Culture 15, no. 
1 (2003), pp. 11-40
John McCarthy, and Jill Morrell, Some Other Rainbow (London: Corgi Books, 1994)
Rory McCarthy, Sophie Arie, and Sandra Laville, 'Caged and Chained, Bigley 
Makes New Plea: Kidnappers Should Contact Us, Says PM as Video Shows 
Hostage's Plight', The Guardian, 30 September 2004. Available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,5028011-10368L00.html. Accessed on 15 
March 2006, Unpaginated
338
Colin Mclnnes, Spectator-Sport War: The West and Contemporary Conflict 
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002)
Colin Mclnnes, 'A Different Kind of War? September 11 and the United States' 
Afghan War'. Review o f International Studies 29, no. 2 (2003), pp. 165-185
Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (London: Routledge, 2004)
Stephen McVeigh, The American Western (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2007)
Milena Michalski, and James Gow, War, Image and Legitimacy: Viewing 
Contemporary Conflict (London: Routledge, 2007)
Roger Middleton, 'Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local 
Wars', Chatham House, October 2008. Available at:
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12203 1008oiracysomalia.pdf. Accessed on 
11 April 2009, pp. 1-12
F. O. Miksche, 'Blitzkrieg', in War, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), pp. 232-35
Noureddine Miladi, 'Mapping the Al-Jazeera Phenomenon', in War and the Media: 
Reporting Conflict 24/7, eds. Daya Kishan Thussu and Des Freedman (London: Sage 
Publications, 2003), pp. 149-61.
Hugh Miles, Al Jazeera: How Arab TV News Challenged the World (London: 
Abacus, 2005)
Jennifer Milliken, 'The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of 
Research and Methods'. European Journal o f International Relations 5, no. 2 (1999), 
pp. 225-55
Cahal Milmo, 'Now Chris Morris Sees the Funny Side of Suicide Bombers', The 
Independent, 17 March 2007. Available at:
http://license.icopvright.net/user/viewFreeUse.act7fuid-MiYwOTE4QA%3D%3D. 
Accessed on 5 February 2009, Unpaginated
Dan Milmo, and Helen Carter, 'Mirror Editor Sacked over Hoax: Morgan Refuses to 
Apologise after Iraq Abuse Pictures Are Shown to Be Fakes', The Guardian, 15 May 
2004. Available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2004/mav/15/mirror.politicsandthemedia/print. 
Accessed on 19 June 2008, Unpaginated
Nicholas Mirzoeff, An Introduction to Visual Culture (London: Routledge, 1999)
Nicholas Mirzoeff, 'The Empire of Camps'. Situation Analysis 1 (2002), Unpaginated
Nicholas Mirzoeff, Watching Babylon: The War in Iraq and Global Visual Culture 
(London: Routledge, 2005)
339
Nicholas Mirzoeff, ’Invisible Empire: Visual Culture, Embodied Spectacle, and Abu 
Ghraib’. Radical History Review, no. 95 (2006), pp. 21-45
W. J. T. Mitchell, Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation 
(Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994)
W. J. T. Mitchell, '9/11: Criticism and Crisis'. Situation Analysis 1 (2002), 
Unpaginated
W. J. T. Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves o f Images 
(Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2005a)
W. J. T. Mitchell, 'The Unspeakable and the Unimaginable: Word and Image in a 
Time of Terror'. ELH12, no. 2 (2005b), pp. 291-309
W. J. T. Mitchell, 'Cloning Terror: The War of Images, 9/11 to Abu Ghraib', in 
Baker-Nord Seminar Series: "Information", Baker-Nord Center for the Humanities, 
Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH. 30 November 2006. Available 
at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yqb8eTK 1 aMs. Accessed on 13 August 2008
W. J. T. Mitchell, 'Picturing Terror: Derrida's Autoimmunity'. Critical Inquiry 33, 
no. 2 (2007), pp. 277-290
W. J. T. Mitchell, 'Cloning Terror: The War of Images, 9/11 to Abu Ghraib'. History 
& Theory (Bezalel Academy o f Art and Design: Jerusalem), no. 10 (2008. Available 
at: http://bezalel.secured.co.i1/8/mitchell.htm. Accessed on 14 May 2010,
Unpaginated
Tariq Modood, Randell Hansen, Erik Bleich, Brendan O'Leary, and Joseph H. 
Carens, 'The Danish Cartoon Affair: Free Speech, Racism, Islamism, and 
Integration'. International Migration 44, no. 5 (2006): pp. 3-62
Matthew Moore, 'Suicide Bomber Video Game Condemned by Terror Victims', The 
Telegraph, 06 November 2008. Available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/3388318/Suicide-bomber-video-game- 
condemned-bv-terror-victims.html. Accessed on 8 March 2009, Unpaginated
Rosalind C. Morris, 'Images of Untranslatability in the US War on Terror'. 
Interventions: International Journal o f Postcolonial Studies 6, no. 3 (2004), pp. 401- 
424
David Mutimer, 'Sovereign Contradictions: Maher Arar and the Indefinite Future', in 
The Logics o f Biopower and the War on Terror: Living, Dying, Surviving, eds. 
Elizabeth Dauphinee and Christina Masters (New York, NJ: Palgrave Macmillan,
2007), pp. 159-181
John Myers, 'Obama Lifts Moratorium on Coverage of War Dead', 
associatedcontent.com, 2009. Available at:
340
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1518852/obama lifts moratorium on cov
erage.html?cat=:49. Accessed on 13 May 2009, Unpaginated
Brigitte L. Nacos, Terrorism & the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the 
Oklahoma City Bombing (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994)
Brigitte L. Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role o f the Media in 
Terrorism and Communication (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
2002)
Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital (London: Coronet Books, 1996)
Iver B. Neumann, ’Book Review: Tabloid Terror'. International Studies Review 10, 
no. 2 (2008), pp. 306-308
Heather Nunn, and Anita Biressi, 'The Kidnapped Body and Precarious Life: 
Reflections on the Kenneth Bigley Case', in The War Body on Screen, eds. Karen 
Randell and Sean Redmond (New York, NJ: Continuum, 2008), pp. 222-239
Nye Jr., Joseph S., and William A. Owens, 'America's Information Edge'. Foreign 
Affairs 75, no. 2 (1996), pp. 20-37
Nye Jr., Joseph S., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Cambridge, 
MA: PublicAffairs, 2004)
Barack Hussein Obama, 'Inaugural Address', 20 January 2009. Available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the press office/President Barack Obamas Inaugural 
Address/. Accessed on 21 May 2009
Barack Hussein Obama, 'Remarks by the President on National Security', 21 May
2009. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the press office/Remarks-bv-the- 
President-On-National-Security-5-21 -09/. Accessed on 21 May 2009
Cian O'Driscoll, 'Fear and Trust: The Shooting of Jean Charles De Menezes and the 
War on Terror'. Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 36, no. 2 (2008), pp. 
149-70
Shani Orgad, 'From Online to Offine and Back: Moving from Online to Offline 
Relationships with Research Informants', in Virtual Methods: Issues in Social 
Research on the Internet, ed. Christine Hine (Oxford: Berg, 2005), pp. 51-67
Nicholas Jackson O'Shaughnessy, Politics and Propaganda: Weapons o f  Mass 
Seduction (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004)
Robert A. Pape, 'The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism'. American Political 
Science Review 97, no. 3 (2003), pp. 1-19
Katy Parry, “War, Image and Legitimacy: Viewing Contemporary Conflict’ by
Milena Michalski and James Gow. London, Routledge, 2007. pp. 134-136’. Media, 
War and Conflict Journal 1, no. 1 (2008), pp. 134-136
341
Salam Pax, The Baghdad Blog (London: Guardian Books, 2003)
Jeremy Paxman, 'Never Mind the Scandals: What's It All For?' Paper presented at the 
The James MacTaggart Memorial Lecture, Edinburgh International Television 
Festival 2007. Available
at:http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/2007/08/the iames mactaggart memorial 
lecture.html. Accessed on 10 March 2009, Unpaginated
Judea Pearl, and Ruth Pearl, eds. I  Am Jewish: Personal Reflections Inspired by the 
Last Words o f Daniel Pearl (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights Publishing, 2004)
Judea Pearl, 'On Clash, Morality, Renaissance, and Dialogue', in After Terror: 
Promoting Dialogue among Civilizations, eds. Akbar Ahmed and Brian Forst 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2005), pp. 138-45
Judea Pearl, 'Daniel Pearl and the Normalization of Evil: When Will Our Luminaries 
Stop Making Excuses for Terror'. The Wall Street Journal, 03 February 2009. 
Available at: http://online.wsi.com/article/SB 123362422088941893.html. Accessed 
on 10 February 2009, Unpaginated
Mariane Pearl, A Mighty Heart: The Brave Life and Death o f My Husband, Daniel 
Pearl (London: Virago Press Ltd., 2003)
David D. Perlmutter, Visions o f War: Picturing Warfare from the Stone Age to the 
Cyber Age (New York, NJ: St. Martin's Griffin, 2001)
Shawn Powers, 'Examining the Danish Cartoon Affair: Mediatized Cross-Cultual 
Tensions?' Media, War & Conflict 1, no. 3 (2008): pp. 339-59
Anthony R. Pratkanis, and Elliot Aronson, Age o f Propaganda: The Everyday Use 
and Abuse o f Persuasion (New York, NJ: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2001)
Amit S. Rai, 'Of Monsters: Biopower, Terrorism and Excess in Genealogies of 
Monstrosity'. Cultural Studies 18, no. 4 (2004), pp. 538-570
Lila Rajiva, The Language o f Empire: Abu Ghraib and the American Media (New 
York, NJ: Monthly Review Press, 2005)
Sheldon Rampton, and John Stauber, Weapons o f Mass Deception: The Uses o f  
Propaganda in Bush's War on Iraq (London: Robinson, 2003)
Karen Randell, and Sean Redmond, 'Introduction: Setting the Screen', in The War 
Body on Screen, eds. Karen Randell and Sean Redmond (New York, NJ: Continuum,
2008), pp. 1-15
Karen Randell, 'Introduction: The Body of the Hostage', in The War Body on Screen, 
eds. Karen Randell and Sean Redmond (New York, NJ: Continuum, 2008), pp. 215- 
222
342
Anna Reading, 'The Global and the Mobile: Camera Phone Witnessing in an Age of 
Terror', in Collective Memory and Collective Knowledge in a Global Age - An 
Interdisciplinary Workshop (London School of Economics: 2007)
Sean Redmond, 'Introduction: The War Body on Screen', in The War Body on 
Screen, eds. Karen Randell and Sean Redmond (New York, NJ: Continuum, 2008), 
p p .15-22
Christopher Reed, 'Torture on the Homeffont: America's Long History of Prison 
Abuse', Counterpunch, 2004. Available at:
http://www.counterpunch.org/reed05112004.html. Accessed on 25 February 2009, 
Unpaginated
David Rees, Get Your War On: The Definitive Account o f the War on Terror, 2001- 
2008 (Berkeley, CA: Soft Skull Press, 2008)
Nicholas Reeves, The Power o f Film Propaganda: Myth or Reality? (London: 
Cassell, 1999)
Donald Malcolm Reid, 'The Postage Stamp: A Window On Saddam Hussein's Iraq'. 
The Middle East Journal 47, no. 1 (1993), pp. 77-91
Review o f International Studies special section on ‘Culture and Politics of Global 
Communication’ (edited by Costas M. Constantinou, Oliver P. Richmond and Alison 
M. S. Watson, 34(S) (January 2008))
Review o f International Studies special section on ‘Art, Politics, Purpose’ (edited by 
Alex Danchev and Debbie Lisle, 35(4) (October 2009))
Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic 
Frontier. 2nd eds. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000)
Howard Rheingold, Smart Mobs - the Next Social Revolution: Transforming Cultures 
and Communities in the Age o f Instant Access (Cambridge, MA: Basic Books, 2002)
Nicholas Riall, ed. Boer War: The Letters, Diaries and Photographs o f Malcolm 
Riall from the War in South Africa, 1899-1902 (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 1999)
Luca Ricolfi, 'Palestinians, 1981-2003', in Making Sense o f Suicide Missions, ed. 
Diego Gambetta (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 77-131
Kevin Robins, Into the Image: Culture and Politics in the Field o f  Vision (London: 
Routledge, 1996)
Piers Robinson, The CNN Effect: The Myth o f News, Foreign Policy and Intervention 
(London: Routledge, 2002)
Mark Robson, 'The Baby Bomber'. Journal o f Visual Culture 3, no. 1 (2004), pp. 63- 
76
343
Nathan Roger, 'Abuse and Death in the Media! The Exploitation of Prisoners of War 
as a Focus Of "Public Curiosity'". Aberystwyth Journal o f World Affairs, no. 2 
(2004), pp. 95-103
Nathan Roger, 'Watching Babylon: The War in Iraq and Global Visual Culture by 
Nicholas Mirzoeff. Media, War & Conflict 2, no. 1 (2009), pp. 93-96
Nathan Roger, 'Security and the War on Terror. Edited by Alex J. Bellamy, Roland 
Bleiker, Sara E. Davies and Richard Devetak'. International Affairs 86, no. 1 (2010), 
p. 270
Nathan Roger, 'Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment 
Network. 2nd eds. James Der Derian. Media, War & Conflict (forthcoming)
Nathan Roger, 'Abu Ghraib Abuse Images: From Perverse War Trophies through 
Internet Based War Pom to Artistic Representations and Beyond', in De-Naturalising 
Violence: Trans-Disciplinary Explorations, eds. Alejandro Cervantes-Carsen and 
Leonhard Praeg (Oxford: Inter-Disciplinary Press, forthcoming), Unpaginated
Paul Rogers, Why We're Losing the War on Terror (Cambridge: Polity, 2008)
Derek Rose, 'These Tots Are Terrors Kids Parody Grisly Real-Life Killing in Web 
Video', New York Daily News, 24 June 2004. Available at: 
http://www.nvdailynews.com/archives/news/2004/06/24/2004-Q6- 
24 these tots are terrors kids .html?print=l&viewall=l. Accessed on 08 March 
2009, Unpaginated
Flemming Rose, 'Why I Published Those Cartoons', The Washington Post, 19 
February 2006. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/02/17/AR2006021702499.html. Accessed on 17 April 2009, 
Unpaginated
Gillian Rose, 'Spectacle and Spectres: London 7 July 2005'. New Formations 62 
(2007), pp. 45-59
Gillian Rose, Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to the Interpretation o f Visual 
Materials. 2nd eds. (London: Sage Publications, 2007)
Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst & 
Company, 2004)
Diane Rubenstein, 'Reality: Now and Then - Baudrillard and W-Bush's America', in 
Jean Baudrillard: Fatal Theories, eds. David B. Clarke, Marcus A. Doel, William 
Merrin and Richard G. Smith (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 147-165
Daniel Rubinstein, and Katrina Sluis, 'A Life More Photographic'. Photographies 1, 
no. 1 (2008), pp. 9-28
Salman Rushdie, The Satanic Verses (Dover, DE: The Consortium, Inc., 1992)
344
Teela Sanders, 'Researching the Online Sex Work Community', in Virtual Methods 
in Social Research on the Internet ed. Christine Hine (Oxford: Berg, 2005), pp. 67- 
81
Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin Books, 2003)
Elaine Scarry, 'Presidential Crimes: Moving on Is Not an Option', Boston Globe,
2008. Available at: http://bostonreview.net/BR33.5/scarry.php. Accessed on 14 May
2009, pp. 1-25
Steven M. Schneider, and Kirsten A. Foot, 'Web Sphere Analysis: An Approach to 
Studying Online Action', in Virtual Methods: Issues in Social Research on the 
Internet, ed. Christine Hine (Oxford: Berg, 2005), pp. 157-71
Andrea K. Scott, 'Art in Review: Susan Crile - Abu Ghraib: Abuse of Power'. The 
New York Times, 13 October 2006. Available at:
http://querv.nvtimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0DE5DDl 130F930A25753C1A9 
609C8B63&sec=:&spon=&pagewanted=print. Accessed on 06 February 2010, 
Unpaginated
Security Dialogue special issue on ‘Securitization, Militarization and Visual Culture 
in the Worlds of Post-9/11 ’ (edited by David Campbell and Michael J. Shapiro, 38(2) 
(June 2007))
Philip Seib, The Al Jazeera Effect: How the New Global Media Are Reshaping World 
Politics (Washington D. C. : Pontomac Books, Inc., 2008)
Janet Semple, Bentham's Prison: A Study o f the Panopticon Penitentiary (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993)
Kirk Semple, '3 Bombers Strike at Baghdad Hotels', The New York Times, 25 
October 2005. Available at:
http://www.nvtimes.com/2005/10/25/international/middleeast/25iraq.html? r=l&pag 
ewanted=print&oref=slogin. Accessed on: 12 May 2008, Unpaginated
Claude E. Shannon, and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory o f  
Communication (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois, 1998)
Michael J. Shapiro, Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures o f War (Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997)
Michael J. Shapiro, Cinematic Political Thought: Narrating Race, Nation and 
Gender (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999)
Michael J. Shapiro, 'The New Violent Cartography'. Security Dialogue 38, no. 3
(2007), pp. 291-313
Michael J. Shapiro, Cinematic Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 2009)
345
Martin Shaw, Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End 
o f the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991)
Martin Shaw, The New Western Way o f War: Risk-Transfer War and Its Crisis in 
Iraq (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005)
Shaul Shay, The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks. Translated by Rachel 
Lieberman (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004)
Roger Silverstone, Television and Everyday Life (London: Routledge, 1994)
David Simpson, 9/11: The Culture o f Commemoration (Chicago, IL: The University 
of Chicago Press, 2006)
Sharon Sliwinski, 'Camera War, Again'. Journal o f Visual Culture 5, no. 1 (2006), 
p p .89-93
Nancy Snow, Propaganda, Inc.: Selling America's Culture to the World. 2nd eds. 
(New York, NJ: Seven Stories Press, 2002)
Nancy Snow, Information War: American Propaganda, Free Speech and Opinion 
Control since 9-11 (New York, NJ: Seven Stories Press, 2003)
Snow White and the Madness of Truth, Available at: 
http://backspin.tvpepad.com/backspin/2004/01/text of swedish.html. Accessed on 
08 March 2009
Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1990)
Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain o f Others (London: Penguin Books, 2004a)
Susan Sontag, 'What Have We Done?' The Guardian, 24 May 2004b. Available at: 
http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/views04/0524-09.html. 
Accessed on 08 September 2006, Unpaginated
Alex Spillius, "Prisoner Abuse' Photographs Surface as Barack Obama Prepares to 
Block Publication', The Telegraph, 16 May 2009. Available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldwide/northamerica/usa/barackobama/532544 
4/Prisoner-abuse-photographs-surface-as-Barack-Obama-prepares-to-block- 
publication.html. Accessed on 16/05/2009, Unpaginated
Robert E. Stake, The Art o f Case Study Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, Inc., 1995)
Julian Stallabrass, 'Spectacle and Terror', New Left Review (2006), pp. 1-13
Gerry Stokes, Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006)
John Street, Mass Media, Politics and Democracy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001)
346
Neha Sud, 'Review: Francois Debrix Tabloid Terror: War, Culture and Geopolitics'. 
Media, War & Conflict 1, no. 2 (2008), pp. 252-254
Suicide Bomber Barbie. Available at: http://www.theculture.net/barbie/index.html. 
Accessed on 08 March 2009
Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis o f the Vietnam War (New 
York: Presidio Press, 1995)
Christine Sylvester, Art/Museums: International Relations Where We Least Expect It 
(Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2008)
Richard Szafranski, 'Neocortical Warfare? The Acme of Skill', in In Athena's Camp: 
Preparing fo r  Conflict in the Information Age, eds. John Arquilla and David 
Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), pp. 395-417
Major General Antonio Taguba, 'Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military 
Police Brigade', 2004. Available at:
http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison abuse report.pdf. Accessed on 10 July 2008, 
pp. 1-53
Shehzad Tanweer, Video of 7 July Bomber Released, BBC News, 06 July 2006. 
Available at:
http://newsvote.bbc.co.Uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk/5154714.st 
m. Accessed on 30 May 2008, Unpaginated
Steve Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds: The Coalition, Al Jazeera and 
Muslim Public Opinion (London C. Hurst & Co., 2006)
Paul A. Taylor, 'The Pornographic Barbarism of the Self-Reflecting Sign'. 
International Journal o f Baudrillard Studies 4, no. 1 (January 2007). Available at: 
http://www.ubishops.ca/BaudrillardStudies/vol4 1 /taylor.htm. Accessed on 18 
February 2007, pp. 1-21
Philip M. Taylor, Munitions o f the Mind: A History o f Propaganda from the Ancient 
World to the Present Day. 1st eds. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990)
Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992)
Philip M. Taylor, Munitions o f the Mind: A History o f Propaganda from the Ancient 
World to the Present Day. 2nd eds. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995)
Philip M. Taylor, Munitions o f the Mind: A History o f Propaganda from the Ancient 
World to the Present Day. 3rd eds. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003)
The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report o f the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (New York, NJ: W. W. Norton, 2004)
347
'Timeline: The Muhammad Cartoons'. The Times, 06 February 2006. Available at: 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article725158.ece. Accessed on 18
February 2010, Unpaginated
The Centre for Research on Globalisation. The Pulling Down of the Statue Was a 
Staged Media Event, 11 April 2003, Available at: 
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/NYI304A.html. Accessed on 22 January 2008
John B. Thompson, 'The New Visibility'. Theory, Culture & Society 22, no. 6 (2005), 
pp. 31-51
Daya Kishan Thussu, 'Mapping Global Media Flow and Contra-Flow', in Media on 
the Move .Global Flow and Contra-Flow, ed. Daya K. Thussu (London: Routledge, 
2007), pp. 11-33
Alvin Toffler, and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Making Sense o f  Today's 
Global Chaos (New York, NJ: Warner Books, Inc., 1995)
Jacob Torfing, 'Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments and Challenges', in 
Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance, eds. David 
Howarth and Jacob Torfing (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 1-33
Max Travers, Qualitative Resaearch through Case Studies (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, 2001)
Stephen Trombley, The Execution Protocol: A Controversial and Shocking Look into 
America’s Capital Punishment Industry from the Inside (London: Century, 1993)
John Tulloch, One Day in July: Experiencing 7/7 (London: Little, Brown Book 
Group, 2006)
Joseph S. Tuman, Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions o f Terrorism 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003)
Alicia Upano, 'U.S. Military in Cuba Keeps Journalists at Bay'. The News Media & 
The Law 26, no. 4 (2002), p. 43
Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. To the Present (New 
York: The Free Press, 1991)
Nick Vaughan-Williams, 'The Shooting of Jean Charles De Menezes: New Border 
Politics?' Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 32, no. 2 (2007), pp. 177-195
Paul Virilio, The Vision Machine. Translated by Julie Ross (London: British Film 
Institute and Indiana University Press, 1994)
Paul Virilio, Ground Zero. Translated by Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2002a)
Paul Virilio, Desert Screen: War at the Speed o f Light. Translated by Michael 
Degener (London: Continuum, 2002b)
348
Terry Waite, Taken on Trust (London: Coronet Books, 1994)
Jon Ward, 'Obama Tries out Role as Apologizer-in-Chief, The Washington Times, 09 
April 2009. Available at: http://www.washintontimes.com/news/2009/apr/Q9/obama- 
tries-out-role-as-apologizer-in-chief/. Accessed on 14 May 2009, Unpaginated
Cynthia Weber, 'The Media, the 'War on Terrorism', and the Circulation of Non- 
Knowledge', in War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7, eds. Daya Kishan 
Thussu and Des Freedman (London: Sage Publications, 2003), pp. 190-200
Cynthia Weber, International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction. 2nd eds. 
(London: Routledge, 2005)
Cynthia Weber, Imagining America at War: Morality, Politics and Film (London: 
Routledge, 2006)
Cynthia Weber, 'Popular Visual Language as Global Communication: The 
Remediation of United Airlines Flight 93'. Review o f International Studies 34, no. 1
(2008), pp. 137-155
Jutta Weldes, ed. To Seek out New Worlds: Exploring Links between Science Fiction 
and World Politics (New York, NJ: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003)
Raymond Williams, Towards 2000 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985)
Michael C. Williams, 'Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International 
Politics'. International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 4 (2003), pp. 511-31
Michael C. Williams, Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics o f 
International Security (London: Routledge, 2007)
Gary S. Winkler, Tortured: Lynndie England, Abu Ghraib and the Photographs That 
Shocked the World (Keyser, WV: Bad Apple Books, 2009)
Patrick Witty, 'Behind the Scenes: Tank Man of Tiananmen', The New York Times, 
03 June 2009. Available at: http://lens.blogs.nvtimes.com/2009/06/Q3/behind-the- 
scenes-tank-man-of-tiananmen/. Accessed on 08 September 2009, Unpaginated
Richard Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory (London: Lyyne Rienner 
Publishers, 1999)
Richard Wyn Jones, ed. Critical Theory and World Politics (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2001)
Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 2nd eds. (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1994)
Robert K. Yin, Applications o f Case Study Research. 2nd eds. (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, 2003)
349
Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda (New York, NJ: Oxford University Press, 1973)
Kate Zemike, 'U.S. Soldier Found Guilty in Iraq Prison Abuse Case', The New York 
Times, 15 January 2005. Available at:
http://www.nvtimes.com/2005/01/15/national/15abuse.html. Accessed on 4 June 
2009, Unpaginated
Slavoj Zizek, Welcome to the Desert o f the Real (London: Verso, 2002)
Slavoj Zizek, Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle (London: Verso, 2004a)
Slavoj Zizek, 'What Rumsfeld Doesn't Know That He Knows About About Abu 
Ghraib', In These Times, 21 May 2004b. Available at:
http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/747/. Accessed on 30 July 2008, Unpaginated
350
